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An investigation of Edward Bond’s theory and practice for drama

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In memory of my father
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I am deeply indebted to my supervisors, Professor David Davis and Professor Richard Hatcher. This study could never even have started without their continuous support.

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Above all I am particularly grateful to Aristomenis for patiently standing by me through all the time spent isolating myself in my study room, and for developing into an outstanding housekeeper and cook…

I also need to thank from my heart my mother for uncomplainingly tolerating my absence …
Abstract

This thesis presents a case study of the process involved in the staging of a Theatre in Education programme for students in secondary education, focusing on the production by Theatre in Education Company Big Brum of the play *A Window*, written by Edward Bond especially for the company. The main aim of the study is to clarify and illustrate the theory and practice of Edward Bond through the practice of Big Brum, in order to analyse how the working model might be developed in Drama in Education.

Edward Bond is a playwright deeply concerned with finding ways to engage his audiences imaginatively, so that they can seek reason, claiming drama and imagination to have the same basis: they both address questions and provoke change, and inform values and judgments. In fact the playwright argues that drama structures can accommodate the essential need of children to ask questions and challenge culture.

The theory of Edward Bond is examined and illustrated through the practice of the TIE Company Big Brum, which identifies its work in the same terms. The critical framework for examining the company’s practice is set by the theoretical arguments of the playwright as they are presented in nine basic elements of Bondian drama, defined in the process of literature review and during the field work. These elements are the Site, Story, Drama Event, Invisible Object, Cathexis, Enactment, Accident Time, Extreme and Centre.

The findings of this research suggest that all these elements could be said to constitute the heart of Bond’s approach, but only if seen in light of a paradigm of questioning and of ‘imagination seeking reason’.
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INTRODUCTION

This research is a case study analysing the production process of a Theatre in Education programme by the TIE Company Bing Brum in the critical framework of identifying basic elements of the drama theory and practice of the playwright Edward Bond. The case study attempts to illustrate, through Big Brum’s approach and practice, the possible applications of a Bondian way of working with drama to drama in education (DIE).

Edward Bond proposes new directions for modern drama, at the heart of which lies the concern for human imagination (Coult, 1997). He thus defines drama’s essence as emanating from meeting the needs of the audience as a ‘site of imagination’ (Bond, 2000a:10). Moreover, for the playwright drama structures can accommodate children’s questioning of the dominant culture, while entering its context and harnessing their capacity to be critical (Bond, 1992). He argues that in our modern world capitalism alienates people from their own imagination by diverting its focus onto consumption. Thereby, authority takes responsibility and reduces human beings to an animal-like state. However he claims that ‘we can not [sic] be free and human till imagination is autonomous’ (Bond, 1995a:xxxii); and he proposes a theatre for our modern era that enables imagination ‘to take the journeys reason will have to take’ (Bond, 1994:157), a theatre that ‘invoke[s] reason and emotion, image and philosophy’ (Bond, 1996c:15).

Bond also strongly associates himself with the drama in education movement; he is often invited by NATD (National Association for the Teaching of Drama) to participate in its conferences as a keynote speaker (NATD conferences 1989, 1999, 2004). In fact NATD based its 2004 conference entirely onto his work. Moreover a
growing number of drama practitioners and authors (see Davis 2001, 2003; Katafiasz, 2004; McEntegart 2004; Colvil, 2004) support his arguments. Davis (2001, 2003) argues for example that we should re-examine the form of DIE in our modern context with respect to imagination and reason based on Edward Bond’s work. In agreement with Davis’ view, Katafiasz (2004) also claims that Bond’s ‘new structures for drama’ should be adopted in drama practice. On the other hand, although Edward Bond’s arguments are increasingly being mentioned within the DIE movement in theoretical discussion, it doesn’t seem that they are becoming as influential in practice. Various authors argue that the dominant forms of students’ involvement in drama can still be identified within Stanislavskian realism or Brechtian distancing (Katafiasz, 2004; Davis, 2001, 2003; Lacey & Woolland, 1992:82).

Having the experience of attending the performances of various plays of Edward Bond since 1998, and having read much of his theoretical arguments and drama, I always felt attracted to his views and form of working. I was fascinated by the immediacy of his writings, and could sense that there was in them an approach to drama that was innovative and provocative. The first Bond performance I attended was Big Brum’s TIE programme based on Bond’s Eleven Vests touring in secondary schools around the Birmingham area in 1998. I can recall being deeply surprised and rather shocked by the programme, because I felt it was the first time I had experienced something so immediately relevant to education and to myself. I can still remember that when the programme came to its end for the specific day, I left the school deep in thought; I could also argue that I had a feeling of being responsible for the situation the play described for a long time after. I felt that the company and the play made use of something completely different from what I knew till then, but I could not find words to describe it. The point is that from this period onwards my aspiration as a
teacher was settled in trying to find ways of creating similar experiences for my pupils through drama; this research is one of the latest steps in developing this prospective.

Since then, although I have repeatedly attempted to apply his ideas into my drama practice, I have never managed to do that successfully and confidently. I never felt the same extraordinary but deeply felt responsibility developing in my classrooms, either when trying to experiment with the well-known material and techniques of DIE or with the drama theory of Edward Bond. This is why I have decided to go all the way through in researching further how Bond’s theory is realised in practice.

The aim of this study then is to identify and describe as adequately as possible the basic tenets behind the work of Edward Bond in practice. It is hoped that this endeavour may clarify crucial areas and provide a possible basis for further research in the field, or even offer a basis for applying more confidently and efficiently to DIE this dramatic approach.

Big Brum is a very well known TIE Company in Birmingham, UK, strongly associated with the work and the method of the playwright for the last 18 years. Edward Bond is one of the associate artists of the company and very often produces plays especially for them. Consequently the company provided fertile ground for exploring Bond’s work in practice, and was chosen as the subject for this study because of its experience and knowledge for the playwright’s theories and method. In fact the particular research develops through exploration of a production of one of Bond’s plays, A Window, written for the company for touring in secondary schools in 2009. Consequently, a case study was chosen as the most suitable research methodology for exploring and describing the process of the production of the TIE programme.
The critical framework for exploring Big Brum’s practice is based on the analysis of Bond’s theory and the selection of initially eight crucial but distinctively Bondian elements of approaching drama for investigating in the case. These eight elements are the Site, Centre, Extreme, Drama Event, Invisible Object, Cathexis, Site and Accident Time. A ninth element was added during the phase of the analysis of data, that of Enactment.

In general terms chapter 1, the literature review, deals with the theory of Edward Bond. The first part of the literature review investigates how other authors analyse and present Bond’s arguments. The second part aims at examining in more depth, and with the help of other studies that seem to be more up-to-date, Bond’s own writings. This second part of the literature review is crucial because it defines the critical framework in which the practice of Big Brum is analysed and examined later in chapter 3. In the end of chapter 1 the research presents the above nine elements of Bondian practice and offers some definitions of them.

Chapter 2 explains the research methodology and provides a detailed presentation of the techniques used for collecting data for this case study. It also provides the details of the methodological triangulation which was used for collecting data and validating their analysis.

Chapter 3 presents the findings of the research by illustrating the process of production of Big Brum in the form of a narrative. The chapter naturally does not present a full account of the process, as this would have entailed multiple volumes of reportage and commentary. Instead the research has selected parts of the process which were considered as adequately illustrative of the whole, and indicated how they could embody one or more of the elements of interest of this study. The selection of
the most illustrative parts of the process was made on the basis of detecting ‘critical events’ as presented in the research methodology chapter (see chapter 2). These ‘critical events’ were then analysed in depth with the use of the critical framework presented in chapter 1.

Chapter 4, the final one, attempts to outline the basic directions for applying Bond’s approach in drama in classrooms. The research did not enter into constructing a new model of DIE. Such an enterprise demands a different method, such as action research, to arrive at viable conclusions. The present research outlines the crucial framework and illustrates it in the practice of Big Brum; it is to be hoped it may provide a framework and platform for future research.

Overall the study attempts to offer a clarification of Bond’s theory with the help of illustrative examples from the practice of Big Brum. As such I think it could offer a good starting-point for further research and a convenient point of reference for developing or informing the practice of DIE.
CHAPTER 1: EDWARD BOND’S THEORY OF DRAMA:

CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

The aim of this literature review is to define the starting-point of the research as a whole, initially by trying to assemble and clarify the basic elements of a Bondian way of working, and subsequently outlining possible directions for classroom drama. The first step then will be to seek to identify these basic elements in the existing primary and secondary sources.

There are numerous studies and writings which deal with Edward Bond’s theory and practice which roughly suggest a common ground for approaching his work but which, when broaching the issues of his politics or theatre aesthetic, evince marked differences. The review will seek to locate and build on this common ground by clarifying important information, themes and topics; at the same time, it will seek to detect differences, gaps and debates around Bond’s work. It is expected that these areas of disagreement could indicate, to an extent, the recurring themes and motifs of Bondian drama, and thus the essentials of his perspective on the function, importance and potential of the theatre.

The review is divided into two major parts. The first part will try to clarify the main areas that other reviewers discuss in their studies of Bond’s theatre, particularly where there are conflicting analyses. The second part will attempt to extract and provide as accurately as possible definitions of the core elements of Bond’s theory and practice through the analysis of the author’s writings and with the help of the studies that are most valid and up-to-date.
The presentation of the findings of the first part will be thematic rather than based on the chronological order of Bond’s work. The major areas of exploration could be defined as follows: first, how ideology is regarded by Bond and how his theatre attempts to deal with it; second, how imagination and the self is seen by the writer; and finally, the question concerning the form of theatre form Bond is using.

1.1 Views on Edward Bond’s work

a) Bypassing ideology

From early in his career Bond’s work was considered deeply political, exploring the relationships between the individual and his or her social and cultural context (Coult, 1977; Scharine, 1976:256; Lappin, 1987:176) and telling the same story, the subject of which is how humanity could be created and preserved (Mangan, 1998:96; Castillo, 1986; Davis, 2009:xx). Bond has commonly been regarded as an ‘atheist’ and a ‘humanist’ who has persistently refused to transfer responsibility for what happens to human beings to some nonhuman agency, to gods or religious ‘fairy-tales’ (Coult, 1977:26), or as an ‘iconoclast’ whose task was to ‘destroy’ ideology misguidedly worshiped by society (Hirst, 1985:160). He has been compared, furthermore, either to a ‘teacher’, who encourages audience to reconstruct their lives through his plays by replacing ineffective ethics with a more practical and rational approach (Hirst, ibid:44), to a ‘doctor’ who can identify the causes of society’s problems and can propose remedies, or point out what must be done in order to precipitate change (Coult, 1977:47); he has even been called a ‘conscious moralist’, who seeks to provide his audience with a means for sustaining their moral freedom (Lappin, 1987:174-175). But beyond the aforementioned, often awkward, ‘tags’ most commentators are in agreement that the playwright’s work aims at exposing the
 unnoticed ideological structures and myths that shape audiences’ perceptions and conceptions (Castillo, 1986:78; Bulman, 1986:506; Hirst, 1985:160). For instance, most commentators have noted that violence in Bond’s social and cultural theory derives not from the ideologically-constructed assumption of a violent natural state of human beings, but rather that it is socially created (Coult, 1977; Free in Demastes, 1996; Patterson, 2003). Hence, aggression is rooted in the social (Lacey, 1995:148; Trussler, 1976:3), and ‘evil’ stems from ‘satanic abstractions like society, government, Christian tradition and God’ which pervert the original innocence of life (Scharine, 1976:23, 66).

Although the point of departure for most studies of Bond is the recognition of the endeavour to dismantle dominant ideology, there are striking differences in how various authors understand this process in the playwright’s work.

It has to be noted that most of the reviewers seem to think of Bond’s theatre as a kind of a rational confrontation with ideology and social reality. In some descriptions, such as in Hirst (1985), it looks like his theatre would, at its most basic, reveal onstage an ideological error and then tell the audience what to do to change their life, or presume that the ideological error would fade away by simply informing the audience of it; his theatre reflects Bond’s ‘belief in a “rational theatre” which will tell the truth clearly and thus inform the audience how to effect change’ (pp.11-12). In that sense it looks as if ideology, in this kind of description, is for Bond a matter of reason which could be fought by reason alone. Thus Bondian Rational Theatre has been described as a Marxist one committed ‘to scientific method’ (Coult, 1977:47), where an audience’s thought-patterns need to be changed (Hirst, 1985:11-12). Ultimately the basis of Bond’s theatre is considered to be the belief that ‘strong and rational’ men who are
committed to regenerating society can break the chain of destruction and violence (Jones, 1980:517, 512).

There is however a smaller group of commentators that, in absolute contrast to the above, considers the effect of Bond’s work to be grounded in something other than a rational process (Lacey, 1995:148-154). Patterson (2003:152-153) in particular sees a theatre based on faith; he claims that Bond’s politics are based on the creation of new myths and images for our modern age, and not on the exercise of reason, and that ultimately Bond bases his work on an irrational hope that:

… somehow, without the use of violence, the natural goodness of humankind will one day win through, an aspiration that has been described as ‘pessimistic optimism’. It is a political standpoint more closely associated with religion than with reason. (p.150)

The above disagreement on the foundations of Bond’s theory and practice draws the attention to an interesting contradiction in related bibliography, which has more recently provoked other authors to enter into the discussion and offer a different view of the matter. For example, Davis (2009, 2005), argues that Bond developed a far more complicated analysis of ideology than that habitually described in the literature. The author highlighted that, for Bond, ideology is closely linked to the term ‘nothingness’, the absence of a given meaning in any social or personal setting. Ideology hence derives its power over people from its imposing a meaning upon ‘nothingness’, and in this way satisfying the ‘meaning-seeking’ need of human beings (Davis, 2009:xxiii). The author additionally argued that for Bond ideology can be identified within any ‘transcending system of ideas that draws large numbers of people into its domain’ and can take the form of political doctrines such as communism, fascism, liberalism or patriotism, as well as the various religious belief systems (p.xxii). But the important point for this specific discussion is that Bond,
according to Davis, takes into account the poststructuralist explanation of language’s double-bind, or its habit of communicating but at the same time of abstracting and distorting meaning. Language, under the control of ideology, imposes meaning on ‘nothingness’ and hence shapes the self in an ideologically-inflected fashion from the time as the newborn first enters its culture. Bond’s approach acknowledges the fact of this ‘linguistic trap’, and hence seeks a form of drama which could enable audiences to escape the mind control of ideology and to ‘see’ with ‘pre-linguistic/pre-encultured eyes’, rather than with reason and language alone, which are equally colonised by ideology (pp.xxv-xxvii). As Doona (2004) correspondingly comments, Bond’s theatre aims at pushing audiences to the boundaries of lived experience to ‘cut through’ to the non-ideologised self (p.43).

If Davis is right, however, then the term ‘rational’ in Bond’s Rational Theatre acquires a rather different function than that expected. Moreover the above accounts not only point to an overlooked complexity in Bond’s view, but also designate fundamental areas for study related to how Bond is defining ideology and in what way his theatre could escape or subvert its rule over audiences. Is, for example, the dismantling of ideology for Bond a matter of reason alone? Further, does Bond’s standpoint assume that it is possible to reach a non ideological account of reality, similar perhaps to a Marxist approach, or is it post-structuralism which may provide the context for approaching his work?

Then again, Bond’s endeavour to break away from ideology’s control over audiences’ minds, and his traditionally assumed Marxist approach, fashioned what is one of the major debates about his theatre, that of how it relates Brechtian theory and practice. Almost constantly, from early in his career, critics and commentators have struggled
to locate his work in association to Brechtian tradition; but this struggle has created the most diverse and contradictory approaches, especially in the last fifteen years.

**b) Bond and Brecht**

Bond is regarded almost habitually, in related literature, as the ‘British Brecht’ (Bennet, 1997:31; Eddershaw, 1996:63) or one of the British writers who were deeply influenced by Brecht’s theatre model (Worthen, 1991:90; Bradley, 2006:129; Lamb, 2005:20; Drain, 1995:4). Bond and Brecht are customarily linked because both analyse the social truth by avoiding ideological interpretations (Román, 2006); because both stress more the social dimension of individuals rather than their psychology (Hirst, 1985:127; Patterson, 2003:144); and even because both want the audience to react in an analytical way to what is presented onstage (Hay and Roberts, 1980:280). The idea that Brecht’s influence on Bond is ‘realised from the very beginning’ since *Saved* and *Narrow Road* (Barakat, 1990:vi) is an idea still being reproduced at present (Ravenhill, 2006; Lamb, 1997:27).

However, when commentators try to illuminate in more detail Bondian practice as a Brechtian development, they frequently fall into inconsistencies. For example, although Free (in Demastes, 1996) argued that Bond is not ‘an English imitation of Brecht’, he explicitly identified many of Bond’s plays with epic theatre and claimed that the main resemblance to Brecht is ‘his choice to distance the story (…) from contemporary life’. The only difference to Brecht is located in the fact that many of Bond’s plays ‘describe contemporary life’, like *Saved*, *Summer* and many of his later plays of the 1980s and 1990s (pp.87-88). Spencer (1992), in the same fashion, identifies as the most important distinctions between Brecht and Bond the ‘specific, material reality of the plays themselves, the different rhythms and references that
Bond constructs for his audience’ (p.6). But both arguments seem rather weak, and insufficient to illuminate or justify the possible relationships between the two playwrights, since they do not engage in a discussion related to the cornerstone of Brechtian practice, which is the critical distancing of the audience from the circumstances presented onstage.

In another case, Mangan (1998) analysed *The Bundle* in such a way as to suggest that it is an argument with and about Brecht while it develops in an episodic structure and stands in disagreement with the Brechtian idea that each scene should be complete in itself (p.51). An almost identical argument is found in an earlier account, that of Hirst (1985:128), where the author claimed that Bond ‘inevitably’ shares Brecht’s argument against dramatic theatre which is concerned with the plot. For Hirst, however, the final implication of Brecht’s theory is challenged by Bond’s developing a more complex interdependence of scenes, where each scene constitutes the cause of the next one (p.128) and reveals the process by which the characters are forced to make choices. The author described further Bond’s assumed view that montage, where every scene is whole in itself, as in epic theatre, is dangerous, since this isolation of scenes does not accurately represent reality, and that instead the playwright should dramatise not the story but the analysis which should dictate the structure of the story (p.145).

Similarly Coult (1977), even though he recognised that a Brechtian acting style could not serve the needs of a Bond play, went on to identify analogous features in the methods of the two. Thus he stated that the supposed comic acting in some of Bond’s plays allows the actor to distance his practice from pure emotion, and consequently ‘the audience can assess what it is experiencing’ (p.87). Coult (p.87) identified
another major resemblance to Brecht in the characteristic juxtaposition of events on stage by way of ironic contrast (p.93), probably directly indebted to the Brechtian technique of montage. As an example he discussed the park scene in *The Fool*, where a black and an Irishman are engaged in a bloody fist-fight to entertain some members of the bourgeoisie and religious institutions, who bet on them and, rather ironically, talk about poetry (p.93). In fact the author referred to a technique which he named ‘counterpointing emotion’, where the staging of overt emotions and the emotional reactions on the part of the audience are controlled by the comedy element, as for example in Bond’s *Lear* where Warrington, Lear’s old minister, is being mutilated on stage and at the same time Lear’s daughters, who are accountable for his mutilation, behave onstage in a ‘grimly comic’ fashion (p.94).

The same example is used by Hirst (1985) in order to emphasise the Brechtian connection in the ‘savage ironic humour’ which pervades *Lear* (p.137). Hirst, however, claimed that Bond went further than Brecht in disturbing and challenging the audience. Yet again when the author analyses the Bondian device of the aggro-effect, the provocation of emotional response from the audience through the presentation of extreme – often violent – scenes onstage, he straightforwardly connects it to Brechtian theatre in a sense that it does not deny emotion to an audience except empathy which, according to Hirst, Brecht solely dismissed (p.134). Likewise Lacey (1995) plainly describes Bondian ‘aggro-effects’ as powerful and sometimes violent images, the effect of which is ‘anything but rational’; on the other hand, he claims that Bond’s work since the seventies has followed a more rational, didactic and recognisably Brechtian route (pp.148-154).
These comments undoubtedly define Bond’s theatre within the boundaries of Brechtian dramatic form. The supposed differences, which are not evidently sustained in most cases, are of minor importance compared with the similarities to the basics of Brechtian tradition, which relate mainly to alienation and which all of the above accounts identify to a greater or lesser degree.

On the other hand, another set of commentators has used the ‘aggro-effects’ in order to differentiate Bond’s theatre from epic tradition more clearly. Garner (1990, 1994) identified Bond’s aesthetic within the post-Brechthian political drama which he defined as the ‘postmodern radicalizing of Brechtian aesthetics’ through subverting its dogmatism and its concept of ‘presence’ (Garner, 1990:146). He did see a connection between Brecht and Bond located in their interest in the body as a ‘political unit’ (ibid), but he stated that Bond, along with other ‘postmodernists’, challenged and developed this aesthetic by exposing violence and pain onstage rather than controlling it and alienating it ‘by the analytic gaze’ of the actor as in Brecht (p.149). Brecht, Garner (ibid) mentions, mistrusted the ‘theatrical experience grounded in corporeality’ (p.150). He therefore suggested that this is the fundamental Bondian way to reach the audience beyond the boundary of the stage. Pain, according to Garner, provokes discomfort in spectators through a supposed ‘neuromimetic transferral’ similar to the flicking of the eyes while witnessing an onstage blinding, which in its turn does not only reveal an ‘aversion’ but a ‘deeper defence against its sympathetic arising within the field of one’s own body’ (p.161). It is assumed that such a depiction of pain on stage, as in Lear mentioned above, works as a point of departure for the audience for seeking the grounds of violence within the play. Ultimately the discomfort generated by ‘vicarious infliction’ triggers their rationality,
‘to which it is ultimately subordinated’, and this constitutes the heart of Bond’s view of Rational Theatre (p.161).

In a similar but not identical way to Garner, Hay and Roberts (1980:280), Patterson (2003:146-147), Baracat (1990:vi, 59) and Román (2006:102) have also argued that Bond felt the need to go further than Brecht’s distancing method, which avoided the emotional commitment on the part of the audience. The ‘aggro-effects’ are seen again as the device to commit the spectators on an emotional level, and to becoming involved or invested in the events rather than sitting back and enjoying them. Similarly Stuart (1996) compared ‘aggro-effects’ to a ‘frictional’ approach ‘to shock an audience into insight’ (p.131)

One serious defect in this set of observations is that they draw largely on a term, ‘aggro-effect’, which is rarely used by Bond in the last fifteen years. Instead the term has been replaced with the ‘Theatre Event’ or ‘Drama event’, which is actually an improvement of the ‘aggro-effect’ but developed in an utterly different direction. As Katafiasz (in Davis, 2005) mentions, Bond realised that there was a problem with the earlier technique in the sense that it couldn’t sustain an audience’s engagement or acceptance of the responsibility for the brutality presented onstage. For Bond this happens because we tend to follow the easiest way of distancing ourselves from what we immediately acknowledge as ‘evil’ or ‘wrong’. Thus Bond, Katafiasz argued, tried to solve this problem by inventing the ‘Theatre Event’ which, although it may still include extreme situations, claims a more personal engagement from each member of the audience by using a more complicated process. This process includes some newly-invented techniques, such as that of the ‘cathexed object’ (p.203) and will be examined in the next part.
Accordingly, beyond the assumed association between Bond and Brecht, there is a growing number of commentaries noticeably affirming that the two approaches are more distant than what was previously asserted. Among few other commentators Davis (2009) strongly argued that Bond’s theatre should be regarded as a completely new and revolutionary form of theatre, which needs to be approached in a different way from existing forms. Although both playwrights, Bond and Brecht, try to remove the influence of ideology on an audience and engage them with ‘objective reality’, their methods are almost diametrically opposed; so, the worst thing to happen in analysis of Bond’s plays is for his theatre to be treated as Brechtian. Bond, Davis continues, does not struggle against a ‘false consciousness’ by simply informing the audience of something they didn’t know or, in other words, tackling the problem by addressing audiences’ reason and their ‘critical eye’ as Brecht would have it. Instead his practice is judged as far more radical, where autonomous reason is seen as an area existing under the dominion of ideology. Thus in contrast to Brecht’s rationalism, which is seen as analogous to the Cartesian one where pure logic was considered the surest way for understanding, Bond would not address reasoning alone without imagination’s pursuit of human values. In short, Brecht would deal with the objective and the social while leaving the subjective, the personal, out of his theatre, whereas Bond tries to encompass both, the social and the individual, on his stage. The audience is hence placed in their own site within the ‘stream’, not outside it as is the case with the spectators of Brecht’s scientific, rational method. Audiences’ responses then are not manipulated in a specific direction; rather each member would have to find ‘his or her own humanness or confirm his or her own corruption’ by facing an Extreme situation such as Bond usually creates in his plays (Davis, 2009:xviii-xxxvii).
Along the same lines as Davis above, Katafiasz (2001, 2004) clearly argues that Brecht’s alienation is no longer useful in exploring Bond’s work (Katafiasz, 2004:7). The author claimed that although both approaches regard modern people as conforming to the demands of the markets rather than to the demands of humanity, there is a fundamental difference in where they position their audience in relation to this. Brecht, according to the specific articles, was influenced by the Russian Formalists who ‘developed a profound respect for the mind, the thought processes of the onlooker’ and sought to expose the Bourgeois values by disturbing the structure of the art form and distorting the representation of time and space. The Formalists, according to Katafiasz, focused solely on literary structures for their work and did not include the social structures, a fact that eventually disturbed the ‘masters’ of the soviet regime. But Brecht, according to Katafiasz (ibid), added the missing social dimension to the ‘Formalists’ drama’ and thus used techniques, like that of the gestus, which disturb the art form itself. The fault in this tradition, as Katafiasz is arguing, is that in so doing Brechtian theatre exclusively addresses the audience’s reason and not their personal values, an area related immediately to imagination, and thus places them above the stream of society, above their own individual values and conditions of living. Hence audience’s imagination cannot inform their reason: ‘We see society, but we cannot see ourselves in it…We are therefore not responsible for society’ (Katafiasz, 2004: 9). In contrast, Bond’s drama shows that the split between reason and imagination is happening in society, not in the self, and aims at making the audience see themselves in their social ‘site’. A similar conclusion can be found in the related bibliography as early as 1975, when Worthen (1975) identified in Bond’s use of extreme shock, as with the stoning of a baby in Saved (Bond, 1977), an attempt to provoke a ‘recognition of ourselves and our society’ (Worthen: op. cit.:479). But
Worthen – and maybe even Bond himself – was lacking the terminology and complex analytical tools at that time to analyse in more detail the way this ‘shock of recognition’ is produced in the audience.

The central technique for provoking this insight, which Bond developed over the years, is for Katafiasz (2004) the Drama Event which combines deconstruction and Cathexis of objects which are not used symbolically, and is intended to force the individual imagination to an assessment of values, and to take responsibility for the social world. In the earlier article Katafiasz (2001) gives a clear example of the split between reason and imagination produced by society. She mentions the function of a ‘literalised’ metaphor, like that of the Christian Eucharist, in blurring the boundary between object and subject, reason and imagination, and hence dogmatising or corrupting the stories told by people while explaining the world and their lives in it. She regards the work of Edward Bond hence as ‘terribly important’ because its aim is to ‘enable the object to serve imagination, so that imagination does not serve the object’ (pp.10-17).

As seen above, Davis and Katafiasz emphasise the role of imagination in Bond’s work, an emphasis lacking or missing in the majority of the other criticism. Yet imagination seems, in their accounts, to hold a special position in generating fundamental differences with the Brechtian approach, and needs to be further investigated in connection with Bond’s position concerning the imagination and how it is supposed to be stimulated through his plays.

c) Imagination and the self

It is striking that most of the related literature, even the most recent, does not examine the issues of imagination and the self, central as they are to Bond’s theory and
practice, something evidenced by a plethora of references to them in his work, especially later writings (see for example Bond 2003 and 2000a). Imagination, in particular, is more explicitly mentioned since the late eighties, with gradually more detailed and often extended accounts. It is therefore rather odd that many reviews, especially the more recent, disregard or loosely allude to Bond’s views on imagination and of the self. For example, the extended study of Spencer (1992), the critical texts of Allen (2007) and the post-Brechtian reading of Castillio (1986) took no notice of the terms and their role in Bond’s endeavour. Furthermore, even if some commentators talk about their unique importance in Bond’s theory, most of them expose very little of its theoretical basis and its practical application (Nicholson, 2003, 2009; Torma, 2010). Again, other reviews like Coults’s (1977, 1997) and Lappin’s (1987), although they acknowledge the fundamental role of imagination, focus mainly on Bond’s imagery without exploring more deeply its theoretical grounds or its practical applications.

The missing component is that, as the social psychologist Bill Roper (in Davis, 2005) contends, in order to successfully provoke his audience’s imagination and effect change, Bond extended his research in other disciplines and acquired an understanding of the mind, the origins and nature of the human being and its relationship to the physical and social world. Hence his speculations gradually took the form of detailed, intense reports, and took account of children’s development, the nature and history of society and theatre as well as the audience’s responses (p.125). Roper (ibid) consequently argues that Bond has sought to address his audience in new ways, beyond the theatre of Stanislavsky or Brecht, which are judged as inadequate to deal with the contemporary crisis (p.132), and that that is why he explored ‘complex psychological areas’ (p.126). Ultimately imagination, the self and a third
Bondian theme, that which he termed radical innocence, occupied the central ground in his psychological exploration of the human being (p.125).

Roper focuses on the role of imagination in the playwright’s extended theory by pointing out that it exists in a special relationship with reason. In a sense the two, reason and imagination, are reunited overcoming the aforementioned Cartesian split, since they are not:

… complementary opposites, each with their own sphere of operation: reason on one side with the material world, and imagination on the other side with society and ideology. Rather both are engaged with both contents; imagination using reason and reason directing imagination. Thus, material reality and physical objects come into relationship with both reason and imagination. (Roper, in Davis, 2005:131)

Ultimately imagination and reason are both equally needed in human understanding of the material and social world. Imagination in fact has a special relationship to value, and as such it informs and uses reason in a way reason could not use imagination. In brief Roper asserts that, for Bond, the self, the world and society are ‘oriented, through the question of meaning, around nothingness’ (Roper, ibid:129). This is actually a need of the self to impose meaning on nothingness, and understand the world and society and thus ‘be’ in the world (p.126). The vital means for doing this is imagination. According to Roper, the source of this method of understanding, the ‘initial state of value’, is the pre-linguistic Radical Innocence of the newborn and ‘it is this that Bond, the playwright, seeks to find and engage with his audience’ (p.126). For Roper, the phrase ‘radical innocence’ is a very important term in Bond’s theory. At first glance, Radical Innocence expresses the persistent need to be in the world existing in every individual, but needs to be further explored in a later part of the literature review.
In his rather complex presentation of the just as complex Bondian psychological and social theory, Roper (op.cit.) discusses a plethora of other terms used by Bond and describes some rather complex relations between the self, society, material reality and drama. Imagination and reason together construct the human self (p.126), which ultimately is not considered as intrinsic or even static but extrinsic and in a Marxian dialectic ‘with technology and the class or ownership structure of society’ (p.129).

But imagination is not determined by material reality; neither is it a kind of given or transcendental ‘essence’, but rather is solely a human characteristic that arises and exists in relation to the world.

Finally, the conflicting space between the self and society forms a ‘gap’ which the mind and imagination enter to create new meanings and values. This is the point where Bond, as Roper argues, aims at placing audiences through his plays: prompting them to enter this gap where meaning is made, and create their humanness through the exercise of their Radical Innocence in the confronting of the Tragic and the Comic:

> It is the place where, from the earliest days of the child’s life, humanness has been created in the confrontation between the emerging (conscious, [sic] choosing, innocent or corrupt) self and the extreme situations of pain and pleasure of oneself and others. (Roper, op. cit.:134)

Roper’s text is basically an effort to present a more comprehensive summary of Bondian theory. However, although he is one of the few authors who presents extensively Bond’s psychological and developmental theory, and calls for further understanding of this ‘compelling case for drama’ (p.147) which aims at ‘engaging audience in radical new ways’ (p.146), he does not continue to a further analysis. Bond’s use of some terms, like Imagination for example, seems to have a very special meaning which is not connected, in the above text, with other theories or is not justified. The problem becomes particularly apparent with the term radical innocence,
which seems to constitute the cornerstone of the Bondian rationale but is also a potential point of confusion, of dispute and possible criticism. In fact the term not only bears the whole edifice but it is supposed, furthermore, to complete a Bondian production; it is the foundation on which the self and humanness are initially created but it is also something ultimately addressed in performances.

As a matter of fact Radical Innocence is probably one of the few Bondian terms which have created a critical disagreement in related bibliography. Allen (2007) explicitly argued that there is no proof that it exists. In his critical paper the author examines the validity of Bond’s arguments in general and concludes with the statement that Radical Innocence is just a ‘speculative construction’, based on an ‘existential logic’ which in itself cannot be taken as a proof (p.118). In addition, the author claims that the supposed freedom given to the audience to make their own choices, by addressing their Radical Innocence in a Bond play, is rather absent since the playwright has already ‘the “right” answers in mind’ and that in reality all of Bond’s work has ‘a central didactic intention’ (p.121). By researching the rehearsals of Bond’s The Children with young people, Allen concluded that: ‘Bond insists that drama cannot teach; and yet, (…) , the “extreme situations” in The Children are learning situations, designed to teach young people “what it is to be human”’ (p.126).

The second challenge that Allen is posing to Bond’s theory and practice, connected to his disbelief in the existence of radical innocence, is related yet again to the use of the ‘aggro-effects’. For Allen, the technique is directly connected to the Brechtian Grundgestus and this is actually the source from which Bond’s didacticism stems. In the beginning of the play there is a stoning of a puppet by a child, Joe, who later tries to feed it, in vain, with some sweets. These two contradictory actions of destruction
and caring are given, for Allen, a gestic form, a *Grundgestus*, which encapsulates the central problem of the play – or the ‘Centre’ in Bondian terminology – whereby the young character has to choose between ‘corruption and innocence, humanness and inhumaness’ (p.126), but must do so by following a very rational process, and not by involving his supposed radical innocence. In conclusion Allen believes that Bond has created in *The Children a*:

…new form of *Lehrstück*, which is designed to help prepare young people to take “responsibility for the world”. The play’s “extreme situations” do not function to “enact” or uncover some quasi-innate sense of our “shared humanness”. Rather, the play tries to *create* a sense of “shared humanness” - to teach young people about the need “to replace revenge with justice, anger with care” (Allen, ibid:133).

In her response to the above article Katafiasz (2008) claims that in general Allen, together with other authors, might misread Bond’s work and mistakenly connect his theatre with Brecht. According to her argument, Allen misinterprets Bond’s terms such as the ‘Centre’ and ‘radical innocence’ ‘in terms of a Brechtian antithesis, or polemic’ which in fact ignores the ‘far more complex interpretation of opposites which takes place in Bond’s work’ (p.239). The analysis of binary opposites in Bond’s theatre does not consider any antithetical poles as separated but ambivalently overlapping. Thus the supposedly obvious antithesis ‘which Allen is so keen to demonstrate is not there at all in Bond’s version’; rather the actions should be performed in such a way so the audience ‘cannot separate the corruption from innocence by using contrasting or gestic actions’ (p.241).

Katafiasz (ibid) then defends the idea of Radical Innocence by detecting its possible similarities mainly with the Lacanian theory of the ‘spectral residue’ (p.244) and of the ‘real’ (p.245). According to the author the ‘spectral’ phenomena are based on bodily experiences which cannot be ‘structured by symbolic mechanisms or
rationalised’ and do not fit with ‘social understanding’ (p.244). In brief if this ‘residue’ is explained in semiotic terms, it is constituted by signifieds which have not been attached to any governing signifiers; thus the ‘spectral phenomena’ exist, in fact, in a ‘sort of “gap” between bodily experience and symbolic mechanisms’ (p.245). Hence they are uncontrollable by social reality and, subsequently, by ideology:

So these ‘spectres’ operate below the radar of ideology, which gives them the potential to be politically subversive. Indeed we can conceive of ideology as an attempt to master these shadowy spectres, to suture the gap between symbolically constructed social understanding and the Lacanian ‘Real’, in which a primary-felt lack can be neither represented nor eliminated. (p.245)

In order to incorporate the lack of signifiers of these ‘spectral phenomena’, Katafiasz believes that Bond is using indexes and the metonymic axis in his plays which ‘foregrounds the signified’ and ‘delivers materiality’ in a less ideologically distorted way (p.246). The author immediately connects this with the use of the ‘Theatre Event’ and other Bondian techniques, and with terms like the ‘Invisible Object, ‘Cathexed Object’, ‘Accident Time’ and ‘Centre of the play’.

It is interesting to note at this point that Allen (2007) pays no attention to most of these terms, and most importantly the ‘Theatre Event’, in his account. But undoubtedly, his critique and Katafiasz’s analysis provide an appealing, and crucial, area to explore, especially with reference to the existence of the Radical Innocence and in what way Bond’s theatre attempts to address it. All the above new terms are immediately connected to Bond’s theory and practice and hence they are going to be explored in the second part of the literature review. Similarly, Katafiasz’s claims may offer a different perspective in viewing Bond’s work and will also be further examined in the next part of the literature review, partly in comparison with Bond’s own writings.
d) Bond’s theatre form and DIE

Unfortunately the abiding unawareness of the necessity of differentiating aggro-effects and drama events continues to reproduce the view of Bond’s work as a Brechtian development even in more recent research studies (see Richards, 2009, MA thesis; Jose, 2010, PhD Thesis; Torma, 2010, PhD Thesis). In Torma (ibid), for instance, imagination in Bond’s work is still supposed to be provoked through the use of the aggro-effects, while the term ‘Theatre Event’ is consciously omitted by the author. Thus, by referring to Bond’s own writings in *The Hidden Plot* (Bond, 2000a) Torma claims that ‘Bond’s essay winds down to its conclusion by discussing how imagination is confronted by drama – by the use of aggro-effects’ (p.176). An extract from Bond’s essay is then quoted to support his opinion: ‘The dramatist’s skill is not imitating dramatic forms but enacting situations which are critical to “being”. These situations are secured by violence . . . an aggro-effect’ (ibid). The original text though mentions that: ‘These situations are secured by violence: *the TE is* [my emphasis] an aggro-effect’ (Bond, 2000a:186). It is quite odd that the author not only consciously omitted the TE (Theatre Event) in the particular account, but avoided in the whole of his study to offer an adequate explanation of the term and connect it with the other Bondian terms. In the conclusion of another research (Jose, 2010, PhD Thesis) the assumed Brechtian epic style of Bond’s theatre ‘provides him a means to convey a message to the rationalized audience’ (p.200) although the researcher repeatedly argued previously that there are significant changes in Bond work from the Brechtian practice. Other researchers have, however, challenged the established consideration of Bond’s drama as a Brechtian development (for instance see Dilworth, 2009:57, MA Thesis) but the main analysis of Bond as Brecht rather sustains.
Likewise the vast majority of the researchers neglect to mention or examine terms like ‘Drama Event’, ‘Invisible Object’, ‘Cathexed Object’, ‘Centre of the play’, ‘Accident Time’, ‘Enactment’, ‘the Site’ and ‘Story’, which seem to be at the heart of Bondian theory in practice (see glossary of these terms in Davis, 2005:201-220). Even where they do enter into discussion, it is only partial (see Allen in Davis, 2005; Nicholson, 2003).

Additionally some critics, like Nicholson (2009) and Lamb (2005), still maintain the view, even in an oblique way, of the supposed didacticism in Bond’s intention. Lamb (ibid) claims for example that in comparison to Howard Barker’s theatre, which aims at keeping the meaning of a play open to further consideration, Bond’s theatre aims at a ‘closure’, to a ‘pre-determined set of fixed ideas’ (p.37). Lamb (2005) and Nicholson (2009) in fact apply the same criticism for the work of Edward Bond. The later author compares Bond again to Howard Barker and concludes that they stand in opposition in some sense. She mentions that Barker rejects ‘theatre as education’ as ‘predictable and didactic’, while Bond works on the opposite site of the argument, believing that educational theatre ‘offers a dynamic place to pose essential questions about the human condition’ (p.8) and can ‘educate imagination’ through a ‘theatrical pedagogy’ that is ‘especially oriented towards young people’ (p.10). In another article Nicholson (2003) is clearer in hinting at Bond’s didacticism. She mentions that theatre in education for the playwright is a matter of ‘how to encourage young people to participate in a moral education which will engage their imaginations and lead them on a journey of self-creativity’ but she sees this process as something ‘to be learnt’ (p.13). Nicholson (2009), concludes by arguing that Bond’s theatre, like Barker’s, is based on the common capacity of theatre to create a gap between what is presented on stage and the audience’s everyday life (p.51), which needs to be filled by
the artists’ and audience’s imagination. Nicholson (2009) in that sense describes the gap as the distance between two separated places, external to the self, the auditorium and the stage, and not as a condition existing in both of them at the same time. In the earlier article the same author (Nicholson, 2003) describes the term as a gap created ‘between the story and the character’ which is rather different approach but still not sufficiently explained (p.14). But, as with Allen above, Nicholson or Lamb do not enter Bond’s analysis of social and psychological phenomena and present only partially the complex relationship between drama and audience in Bond’s theory. Thus the supposed ‘gap’ in Bond’s theatre is reduced to a generalised property of theatre and it is not examined as a potentially special way or method of working.

Some of the few in-depth examinations of Bondian practice and theatre form can be found in Davis (ed. 2005), where there is an extended collection of chapters not only on Bondian theory but on its parallel reflections on the theatre form. In the specific book there is even a glossary of Bondian terms in order to clarify the subject matter and help the reader to understand in greater depth the particularities in Bond’s proposal for theatre and drama. The central interest in ‘entering the gap’ and addressing the Radical Innocence of the onlookers develops into the use of the ‘drama event’ in order to provoke audience’s engagement with the situation presented on stage. This engagement does not refer to reason alone, and it is a ‘first rather than second-hand’ experience by virtue of which ‘responsibility’ for the situation presented on stage becomes ‘unavoidable’ for the audience (Glossary in Davis, 2005:216). Thus the gap, which seems to be a very important concept in Bond’s practice, is defined as a metaphorical space where things, negative or positive, happen, a ‘space between the material world and the self’ which exists everywhere there is a need for producing
values, including human beings themselves (p.207). This is a very different definition from that of Nicholson, discussed above, and demands further exploration.

The development of the ‘drama event’ is presented then in a more integrated way as a complex process which involves all of the aforementioned Bondian terms. To sum up, Bond keeps the story of a drama intact so reason and imagination can function together, in contrast to Brecht who interrupted the story and produced a damaging split between the two faculties in audiences (Katafiasz in Davis, 2005:36). Instead of interrupting the story for exposure of the ideological, Bond’s analysis focuses on the use of objects; he places the ‘argument into an object’. This is made through the cathecting of the object in use in a Theatre Event, which later the playwright named drama event. Cathecting is the charging of an object with human values as opposed to fiscal ones (ibid:204). In contrast to Brecht, then, the alienation in Bond’s plays is generated from within the act (Katafiasz op. cit.:37-38), and is not projected onto the audience (Cooper in Davis, 2005:55). A plain outline of Bond’s purpose is given by Davis (in Davis, 2005):

What Bond wants in his own theatre is a relationship between actors and audience where the audience is engaged with the action of the play, with the possibility of empathy and emotion, but where the imagination is stimulated which then has to seek reason. Imagination and reason predominate. With this approach, he seeks to alienate from within the act, that is without breaking the empathetic relationship forged between the actors and audience. (p.166)

Davis (ibid) then continues by comparing very briefly Bond’s practice with major DIE exponents, Gavin Bolton, Dorothy Heathcote, Jonothan Neelands and Cecily O’Neil, and proposes a way that Bond’s argument could enrich the practice of drama teachers in the present. The author believes that the earliest period of Heathcote’s man-in-a-mess drama and ‘living through’ could constitute a starting point for
exploration where major areas of Bondian practice already exist, such as ‘Site’, ‘Theatre Event’, ‘Centre’ and ‘Accident Time’ (p.176).

The above are some of the areas that need to be explored further. Certainly the relation of Bond’s work to that of other DIE practitioners would demand a different kind of study than this one. The specific research is trying to take the first step towards outlining the foundations of Bond’s theory and practice, in order later on to think the possible directions for drama in classrooms, and not tracing Bond’s view in comparison to other practitioners in the field of DIE.

1.2 Identifying the basic direction of Edward Bond’s theory and drama practice

Introduction

The aim of this second part of the literature review will be to draw together and clarify the basic elements of Bondian theory; it will be based mainly on Bond’s own writings, as well as on those studies identified in the first part of the literature review as more up-to-date or of abiding relevance. The studies which we argue offer a more comprehensive interpretation of Bond’s theory and practice come mainly from David Davis (2005, 2009), Kate Katafiasz (2001, 2004, 2005, 2008) and Bill Roper (2005).

Edward Bond’s theoretical writings are published in books and journals intending to clarify and support the set of ideas which inform his dramatic practice. The majority of these writings can be found in the two volumes of Bond’s own notebooks edited by Ian Stuart, the five volumes of the writer’s Letters (Bond, 1994, 1995b, 1996b, 1998b, 2001) and in The Hidden Plot (Bond, 2000a) which, as its subtitle indicates, is a selection of notes on theatre and the state. In addition Bond provides extended commentary and statements in the form of introduction or comments in some of his
published plays. Bond’s writings are, in a number of cases, particularly dense, and they require some interpretation if a reader wishes to fully understand his set of arguments regarding the development of the self, society, culture and drama, and the relationship between each. Such an interpretation will be attempted here.

As Bond’s theory often covers philosophical and psychological material, in order to elaborate this interpretation the study will also, wherever possible, draw from or make comparison with other authors from these fields, in order to find viable connections or differences which may further clarify the author’s view and practice. As McEntegart (2004) argued, if Bond’s theory and practice is not referred to the work of others then it is rather doubtful that a ‘usable holistic plan of campaign (…) based on what needs to be done and how to do it’ would be adopted by many (p.14).

So along with the examination of Bond’s theory, this study will present comparisons with other theories. These include Lacanian theory, and that of the psychoanalyst and philosopher Castoriadis. As noted in the first part of the literature review, Katafiasz (2008) suggested that Lacanian theory should constitute a major point of reference for understanding Bond’s arguments. Katafiasz explicitly argued that the Lacanian idea of the ‘spectral residue’ may correspond to one of the basic Bondian theoretical terms, radical innocence, a term which Allen (2007) heavily criticised and which will be examined below. So, Lacanian theory is one of the areas to refer to for examining Bond’s arguments. At the same time, preliminary research suggested that Castoriadis’ ideas seem very close to those of Bond, especially in regard to the Bondian theory of the development of the self and of imagination, despite some basic differences concerning how the playwright conceives of the essence of radical innocence.
Another area that needs to be further explored alongside Bond’s theory is the work of Bertolt Brecht; as was elaborated in the first part of the literature review, these two theatre practitioners are often compared or contrasted.

As mentioned above, Bond’s theory is quite dense and difficult to follow in many cases. Thus, I have chosen to divide his theory into manageable segments in order to make its development easier to follow, while conscious that this runs the risk of fragmenting the theory and thus distorting it. I have tried though to keep its essence characteristics as coherently articulated as possible.

The basic sections to follow relate first of all the philosophical stance Bond takes towards ideology, imagination, reason and other associated terminology. In the first part of this literature review it was shown that these terms constitute the heart of Bond’s philosophical theory; thus we cannot understand his drama practice if this issue is not grasped. The presentation will continue to an examination of Bond’s views on the development of the self, which seems to be fundamental for understanding its parallel development into drama practice. The review will then conclude in outlining the form of drama that Bond is using, and extracting the basic elements which will comprise the list of units of analysis for the case research in the next chapters.

In order to offer a broader or deeper perspective on Bond’s work, I have included in some cases information which does not refer immediately to his theory or practice but explains the critical context of their development, or which offers further reflection on a special area of interest that may help one better understand Bond’s arguments. This kind of information is placed into boxes which are titled ‘inputs’.
1.2.1 Laying the foundations: Bond’s philosophical ground

a) On reason

The attempt to analyse and present the core of Bond’s theory may begin with one of the author’s critical statements: ‘It is an imperative of imagination to seek reason through experience’ (Bond, 2000a:142). This statement captures the essence of Bond’s argument and therefore allows us also to identify a number of key initial questions. What exactly does Bond mean by the terms ‘imagination’, ‘reason’ and ‘experience’? Why and how is imagination charged with the task of seeking reason? Why is it an imperative and not, for instance, an option or a possibility? What is the relationship between the two? And how drama may relate to or articulate that?

As mentioned earlier, Bond’s frequent references to reason led some authors to consider his practice a ‘rational’ process. Therefore I think it would be useful here to offer a brief outline of the basic tenets of the philosophical movement of rationalism, in order then to compare it with Bond’s own theory and practice and weigh up whether Bond’s theatre can be seen in terms of rationalism.

An input from the philosophical movement of rationalism

The particular movement was predominately formulated by Rene Descartes in the seventeenth century and further developed or altered by Spinoza and Leibniz (Huenemann, 2008:1-16) and still wields an influence over contemporary thinking and practice, even in everyday life. Some of the basic axioms of Descartes’ vision of rationalism that are of interest in this study are, firstly, the conviction that pure logic is the safest way for understanding; and secondly, its explicit dualism, or the clear
distinction drawn between intellect and imagination which included mind and body respectively. In its assumed dualism, Descartes’ rationalism held that intellect is not only logical but that its conclusions are universally valid and unmistakable, whereas imagination has principally a psychological base: it is subjective, and therefore it cannot be trusted for producing sound conclusions (ibid:4-7).

In his *Sixth Meditation*, where Descartes speculated on the issue of the absolute distinction between body and mind, he argued that imagination is nothing more than a ‘certain application of the cognitive faculty to a body which is immediately present to it’ (Descartes in Beardsley, 2002:66). For example, by arguing for the impossibility of imagining – creating a mental image of – a chiliagon, Descartes proposed that imagination proves inadequate to such a task, whereas intellect may very well describe the exact properties of the particular shape (Huenemann, 2008:67). In other words, the chiliagon can be described in detail intellectually by, for example, identifying that it is a shape which has a thousand angles and a thousand sides, etc., but if we try to imagine a complete image of this shape we would inevitably fail. Imagination is thus portrayed as a kind of projection channel, an imitation of intellect’s ideas, onto an object, and in that sense it exists under the total control of intellect whereas the latter is the definitive source of all knowledge.

By the same token, imagination for Descartes is straightforwardly related to the body which, because of its materiality, produces certain barriers to reason. For instance, what we may find pleasurable or painful through our bodies may hinder our objective consideration of a phenomenon, of an event or of an object. By promoting dualism Descartes thought that he could find a solution to obstacles related to embodiment, and assumed that ‘pure’ mind can be free from these corporeal limitations and ‘can
reach its conclusions without worrying about being compromised by the body’s infirmities’ (Huenemann, 2008:7). In fact imagination – and the body (Descartes, 2008:36) – in Descartes’ method is considered as a definite burden for reason, and more or less insignificant not only to mind but to existence as well: ‘For even if I did not have it, I should undoubtedly none the less remain the same as I now am;’ (Descartes in Beardsley, 2002:67). Kearney (1988) commented that Descartes’ cogito theory focused on human subjectivity as a source of meaning, turning away from the ‘objective world of reality’ or ‘transcendent being’ and for this reason his theory was modern in relation to the positive appraisal of the cogito, but pre-modern in its ‘negative assessment of imagination’ (pp.161-162).

Accordingly, for Descartes reason, together with the capacity for language, is what distinguishes human beings from other animals and other hypothetical zombie-like machines, which could perform the same actions as humans but which lack the ability to respond appropriately in every new situation (Descartes, 2008:59; Velmans, 2009:12-13). Therefore the very first principle of Descartes’ method is that the ability to think is the elementary core of human beings (Descartes, 2008:35-36). Thus, simplified mathematical rules were to become the source of methodological tools for any area of human knowledge (Wilkinson, 2000:13) independent of sense experience (Tlumak, 2007:66). To put it briefly: reason in its crudest form, devoid of feelings and imagination, was valued as the truest and safest way to understand reality.

In attempting a preliminary interpretation of Bond’s claim cited above: ‘It is an imperative of imagination to seek reason through experience’ (Bond, 2000a:142), we could easily conclude that for Bond reason is to be found and thus it does not comprise a pre-existing, exclusive and sovereign element of human beings. On the
contrary what distinguishes humans from other animals, what lies at the heart of their existence, is imagination (Bond, ibid:113).

In The Reason for Theatre (Bond, 2000a), Notes on Imagination (Bond, 2003) and Freedom and Drama (Bond, 2006), imagination is seen as the driving force of a complex arrangement primarily seeking values. Reason is understood as the possible outcome of this pursuit, but it has a rather different meaning from the one traditionally defined by rationalist philosophy. In fact in Bond’s theory these two terms, reason and imagination, are so closely interrelated that we cannot consider the nature and the role of imagination without concurrently considering those of reason. Indeed the author remarks in another central sentence that at some stage in the development of the self, ‘Imagination is born with its twin, the reasoning mind’ (Bond, 2000a:115).

For Bond animals, apart from human beings, do think and solve problems in relation to facts, and undeniably their relationship to the world is more rational than ours. For example, when an animal is endangered by a predator it may rationally ‘think’ to ‘not leave cover’ because ‘predators are near’ (Bond, 2000a:113). The problem though is that this kind of animal reasoning cannot suit the human need for reasoning. Human beings do not fully conform to a natural order, as animals instinctively do. Rather humans also behave and live in accordance with their culture; and this being doubly bound to nature and culture already indicates a divide between their ideas and their natural instincts which animals would never suffer. Human beings are formed by the everlasting contradictions and conflicts between the pressures produced by these rather opposed ‘realities’. In other words we live within a space marked by constant conflict between two poles: how we understand and describe reality, and how we experience the demands made by this reality on ourselves. According to Bond this gap
relates to the divorce of free will from the determinism of nature in human beings, declared initially by Kant, which ultimately created the philosophical crisis in modern thought (Bond, 2006:205), and which still produces unanswered ontological questions for us to confront: what a human being is, what its needs are, and how it should live.

Ultimately a society and its culture may offer some answers to these questions; but by doing so it imposes a setting different from the natural one. The laws of a society are, in that sense, sets of ideas and values which prescribe how this society responds to needs, and which define how its members should live. In fact these sets of ideas structure a material as well as an ethical environment which exists beyond nature and makes special demands on its citizens. For Bond, even technology is a cultural product that alters the way we experience reality or makes new demands on the way we live or understand the world and ours place in it. As the playwright argues:

The difference between a natural object used as a tool and a man-made tool or machine, is that the latter make greater demands on us. They are manufactured to be of intense, ingenious use and so they use the users – change them and their society – more than natural tools do. (Bond, 1998a:270)

The point to be made here is that the Kantian crisis deeply traverses Bond’s thinking and theatre practice. The author overtly argues that if we don’t resolve this crisis, if we don’t find an adequate and just way to explain and deal with our needs or instincts, we are going to annihilate ourselves (Bond, 2006:205). Bond hence attempts to answer the ‘Kantian’ questions by designating a central role in human affairs for the relationship between imagination and reason. In fact his discussion of this particular crisis forms the foundation on which he builds the major part of his philosophy.

In sharp contrast to the above basic axioms of rationalism, Bond provocatively stated that ‘The ability to reason does not make us rational’ (Bond, 2000a:113); and, in another even more challenging formulation, that ‘Madness is an excess of rationality.
The mad are reduced to relying entirely on their reason’ (Bond, 2003:98). One justification for this argument is that the author believes that Descartes’ ‘pure’ form of reason and language could be by far the most ideologically contaminated faculties of the human mind, and as such they are locked into ideological formations (Bond, 2000a:182-185) which do not permit our minds to ‘see’ beyond ideology. Such an endeavour would be an impossible task because it is like turning ideology’s apparatuses against itself (ibid:179). Bond’s particular argument is of fundamental importance and so it will be further explored to the end of this section by referring to the functions of imagination and another related term in Bond’s theory, Nothingness. The explanation of the latter term may help us understand further how and why for Bond reason might be deeply infused by ideology.

**b) On imagination**

For Bond (1990), every child asks very basic but profound questions, similar to those of the great philosophers, which ‘adults really can’t answer’ (p.8): ‘Unlike the lion, the child, if its food doesn’t come, will ask why? Is it because it is bad (as mummy might say) or because mummy is bad? Who decides what is ‘bad’?’ (Bond, 2000a:64). The specific dilemma may seem at first glance not to be straightforwardly philosophical; but it hinges on the question: on the basis of which value we can decide who and what is ‘bad’ in the above situation? This question may open up a relevant area of Bond’s theory which is defined by the term Nothingness.

Roper (in Davis, 2005) effectively described Nothingness as the ‘absence of meaning, value and justice in a particular place or time, which provokes humans to ask questions’ (p.129). These questions are ontological (Bond, 2000a:114) and certainly they are not restricted to children only. An interesting example of these kinds of why-
questions is one often articulated by toddlers when they hear a story with a death of a hero: ‘why did he die?’ This question of course does not ask for the immediate causes, since in most cases the story offers an explanation such as sickness, old age, etc.; it rather means something like ‘why do people die?’ or ‘what death is?’ or ‘did she do something bad and so was punished?’.

The trouble with such questions, though, is that the potential answers could be innumerable and often, or rather always, contested and contradictory. An adult could answer for example only by making use of her own beliefs and values: ‘death is a door to an afterlife’, ‘God created us like this’, ‘she was punished by God or God loved her and wanted to take her with Him’, etc. These value-activating and meaning-seeking questions and the conflict between the possible answers designate the area of Nothingness for Bond, which provokes questions impossible to answer in an irrefutable and objective way. The child may address essential philosophical questions for which there are no given answers, rather ‘only the ramblings of sages’ (Bond, 2003:95).

Nevertheless human beings constantly invent questions and answers addressing Nothingness, and these answers are shaped into stories which are created and told in order to explain to people what the world is like and how we should live in it (Bond, 1990:9). Values and their development into stories are evident in every society. In fact, for Bond, their sum total constitutes the wider, all-encompassing story which we call culture and, consequently, they permeate all levels of personal, social and cultural life. These stories however developed progressively into the ‘reality they described’, they became what Bond calls our ‘second skin’, our ideology:
(The story) … appeared in language: coloured words, drove idioms, prescribed rational language and evoked poetry. The story was served on plates and eaten. It was worn. It was beaten into weapons. People lived and died for it. (Bond, 2000a:3)

As mentioned above, animals for Bond may come to a causal explanation of their surroundings by reason. They reach conclusions based perhaps on immediate facts. Human beings though, because they are meaning-seeking creatures, would fill in the ‘Nothingness’ provoked by the experience of a practical crisis, for example the presence of a predator, with a value concept like ‘the enemy’ (Bond, 2003:xi) or the ‘evil’; and undoubtedly such a value, as explained before, cannot be objectively justified. If an early-years child is accidently hit by a chair she may address it as a ‘bad chair’. Mummy may be taken to be ‘bad’ because food is late, or the child may take itself to be ‘bad’ and that is why it is not receiving it. In fact Nothingness and the values created in response designate an act of imagination which attempts to offer much-needed explanations for the world and our experience. These explanations are exclusively related to human beings since they are always related to value judgements that only humans are driven to make. A lion would not wonder if it is a ‘bad’ one if its food never comes, and it would never despise a tree for its injury. ‘Bad’ contains a value judgement that animals, since they live exclusively according to their instincts and niche, do not make; they do not feel the need to answer or even address the question of value.

Nothingness hence does not exist in nature, except insofar as it exists in the minds of human beings. As Bond mentions, people pose questions which are in some ways ‘superfluous’, questions not directly related to their immediate needs (Bond, 1990:8). This is because ‘The human mind is total and holistic’ (Bond, 2003:xi), and humans therefore ‘need to have some explanation of the total world’ (Bond, 1990:8). The
human need for totality that Bond refers to is a need for a holistic explanation of human experience involving the connection of facts and experiences with emotions, values and meanings. As he mentions, the answers to these questions must unite ‘the lowest human functions and behaviour with the highest culture’ (Bond, 1996a:2).

The holistic explanation, which includes practical experience and value, is actually taking place in the context and because of the impact of the Kantian crisis; and it is a matter for imagination to balance the inconsistencies and the conflicts between material reality and culture, the gap between experience and its potential meaning and value. Descartes’ approach to the human mind would likely never consider these values important, rather in fact as a useless burden to be discarded.

Still, according to Bond, the lack of meaning has two connected implications. On the one hand it gives to humans the possibility of creativity, freedom and choice, since in ideal conditions they are free to choose how to respond to it. At the same time however it invites exploitation by ideology (Bond, 2003:xix). Social authority, as it holds the most powerful position in social organisation, declares that it can speak for people and respond to the lack of meaning. And, although its stories are as made-up as any other, authority’s power over society is capable of transmuting them into an ideology and so it has almost supreme power over the meaning and values by which people live (Bond, 1990:8). This is why Nothingness is for Bond ‘a site of everything, and so whoever owns Nothingness owns everything’ (Bond, 2003:xii), an ‘everything’ which includes our selves.

At the same time, one must note Bond’s claim that the act of speaking on behalf of the gap of meaning is also a civilising process, and forms the basis of humanity by binding people together and crediting them with dignity (Bond, 1990:9). The reason is
that culture offers the crucial social organisation required to collectively meet the needs of a society’s members and provides people with the means to interpret the world. Stories, for Bond, let us ‘live and create civilizations’ and without them a child ‘would be a human shell’ (Bond, 2000a:3).

In preliminary research within the related literature, Bond’s views may seem to share common ground with the views of the psychoanalyst Castoriadis (1987) who also argued that history would be impossible without imagination. In the same way as Bond’s stories, society for Castoriadis (ibid:147) must supply answers in the form of ‘imaginary significations’; without these ‘definitions’ there can be ‘no human world, no society, no culture – for everything would be an undifferentiated chaos’. Similar to Bond, Castoriadis regards ‘imaginary significations’ as the answers of a society to fundamental questions, answers which neither ‘reality’ nor ‘rationality’ could provide (ibid). Correspondingly, another psychoanalyst, Althusser (in Counsel and Wolf, 2001), used the term ‘interpellation’, or hailing of an individual – similar to ‘Hey, you there!’ – to describe a comparable condition where ideology ‘recruits’ or even ‘transforms’ beings into subjects by the very act of addressing them. As Althusser claimed, ‘The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing’ (pp.41-42).

The trouble with ideology and its ‘imaginary significations’ is however even more important for individuals than simply facing up to an intellectual dilemma about meaning. Human beings are deeply fashioned by the possible answers to Nothingness; they not only obtain values and meanings regarding what the world is, which prescribe in essence how they should live, but moreover the meanings and values imposed by culture and its dominant ideology on material reality are not detached
from private meanings which in effect form how they understand their selves. As Bond clearly states, ‘The gap, its factors and vicissitudes are our consciousness and self-consciousness… The gap is also the site of our individual story, which is partly our specific biography and partly the events in ideology’ (Bond, 2000a:176). Ideology hence constitutes an elementary ingredient of our thinking to the point that it becomes, to a large extent, inseparable from our conscious ideas of who we think we are and how we perceive images of ourselves (ibid:136). Hence such recognition weakens any attainable capacity of reason to perceive the real, and ourselves, in ways other than an ideologically prescribed narrative.

But more importantly at a personal level, ideology for Bond annuls imagination as well. By imposing its meanings on the self ‘The mind loses its own imaginative logic and is possessed by ideology’ and subsequently imagination ‘collapses into reason in the form of common sense and doctrine’ (ibid:139). Imagination’s power to balance inconsistencies and the conflicts between culture and material reality, or else its aptitude to invent answers and questions to Nothingness, is displaced. In that way human beings may become socially mad and may reason irrationally (ibid:137):

Our social and private behaviour is confused and paradoxical. Love becomes hate, anger reconciliation, sacred demonic, tyrants act for people’s good, the murderer obeys his heavenly voices, armies massacre for freedom, we are cruel to be kind … (Bond, 2000a:136)

Hence when we use the meanings produced by ideology to understand reality we become intellectually and emotionally trapped in its ideological frames and, since these frames inexorably fashion the self, we may even wilfully defend them for the sake of preserving what we imagine to be our consciousness, our subjectivity. Assaults on such individualised ideological meanings may be perceived as assaults on the coherence of the self while the social dominates the personal, and thereafter social
tensions become personal tensions (ibid:176, 137-139). For example patriotism, racism and communities of believers are some of the conditions that represent what Bond calls ‘ideological madness’, which actually does not displace reason but happens in or to it (ibid:139), and becomes for the corrupted mind as reasonable as common sense (ibid:137). It has to be noted here that madness in Bond’s view is not used in an immediately psychopathological frame. It refers to the corruption of mind, of reason and of imagination, by ideology and ranges from an extreme form of fanaticism to an apparent invisible corruption resulting in an inability to see reality with your own eyes.

It seems that for Bond this corruption of the mind is made possible on the basis of the Kantian crisis. Our dual bondage to nature and culture forms the early foundations of the possible social madness because human beings have the capacity to substitute for either side of the gap its antagonist. They could regard, for example, meanings created by culture and ideology as naturally given and hence confuse a cultural contrivance as a necessity imposed by nature and practicality. Bond claims for example that human beings ‘live metaphorically, even when the immediate cause is practical’ (Bond, 2000a:158).

The confusion of the practical with the metaphorical, related to material reality and culture respectively, may very well blend value, the practical use of something, with its metaphorical one, its meaning or else its Value – with capital ‘V’ according to Bond (ibid:159). Thus, as Katafiasz (2001:10-17) argued eloquently with the example of the blood of Christ in the Christian Eucharist ceremony in the first part of the literature review, ideological metaphors can be taken to be factual and, in effect, the mad acquire and display the symptoms and behaviour of the clinically mad:
It is normal – common sense – to talk of the blood of the fatherland: the mad see the earth bleed. It is normal to pray to God: God speaks to the mad. It is normal to say I am a sinner: the mad suffer the pangs of death … soldiers spill blood on the earth, the leader is the voice of destiny, bishops tell us what God is thinking. (Bond, 2000a:137)

Harman (1999) offers an interesting example from history of how practical values have been exploited and finally used by authority in an irrational way. The Maura empire in ancient India, around the fourth century BC, was a time of agricultural growth which was required to satisfy the increased demand for food and which brought enormous changes in people’s lives, including in their attitudes to the world around them, to each other as well as towards their central resource for survival, the cattle. Until that time cattle were valued as a source of meat; but under the altered material conditions, cattle were seen as a valuable means for agricultural development. Harman argues that the ‘seemingly irrational veneration of the cow and the ban on the cattle slaughter which characterises modern Hinduism’ emerged out of the agricultural need to preserve it as the only motor power for ploughing heavy land (pp.49-50). Thus, in a Bondian reading, the practical value of the cattle obtained a metaphorical value through a religious appropriation, and in fact displaced its initial meaning. I would think that history and culture are filled with similar examples.

The idea that our attempt to intellectually describe reality and our experience is condemned to failure because reason and language are saturated by ideology is not new; indeed it can be detected in various disciplines especially after the advent of structuralism and post-structuralism. In semiotics and linguistics it is frequently mentioned, for example, that there is no neutral language to describe experience. Therefore I think that once more it would be useful here to offer a new input on the treatment of this subject in the disciplines of semiotics and linguistics.
A brief input from semiotics and linguistics

Saussure (in Cahoone, 1996:180) at the beginning of 20th century declared and instituted as orthodoxy the arbitrary nature of the sign, arguing for the absence of any ‘natural connection’ between signifier and signified. This statement established in essence ‘the autonomy of language in relation to reality’ (Chandler, 2002:25). Hence one of structuralism’s basic principles is that human beings are constructed by ‘pre-given texts’ (ibid:188) and it assumes that ‘any perceiver’s method of perceiving can be shown to contain an inherent bias which affects what is perceived to a significant degree.’ (Hawkes, T., 2003:6).

Indeed there is hardly any human activity which could be considered to lie outside the invented network of imaginary significations. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) proposed that even experience ‘takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions’ and that:

Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our “world” in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself. (p.57)

In a more detailed paradigm from cognitive linguistics, Kövecses (2006) clarified that whenever we try to conceptualise experience, we do so by using idealised frames which we get from our particular culture. An example of an idealised frame is the word ‘education’; in order for it to be understood, the subject must know a set of other, prior, culturally specific definitions, like children, teachers, learning, transition of knowledge, institutions, etc. These frames are ‘anything but neutral’ (p.69, 91), since the socially accepted configuration of any of the above definitions is culturally
constructed and not naturally given. In fact frames and their definitions represent reality in idealised or schematised versions which do not objectively exist; or, as Davis (2009:xxv) argued, they represent reality in generalised or abstract ways which in fact cannot represent the particular in life. Such generalisations distort the real because not all schools, or apples, are the same; and so our language cannot capture reality in its entirety.

Kövecses (2006) also analyses another, more crucial aspect of language, this time in relation to the function of metaphors, which may be carriers of meanings produced by a dominant discourse and form of thinking (Freeden, 2003:41; Knowles and Moon, 2006:5, 30; Hawkes, D., 2003:7). This analysis may explain, to an extent, how the land in Bond’s case above can be seen to ‘bleed’. The cognitive function of metaphor for Kövecses (op.cit.:127-129) is to ‘provide understanding for a more abstract concept (the target domain) through a more concrete one (the source domain)’ by an invented correlation or resemblance between the two. The word ‘fatherland’ is actually based on the metaphor COUNTRY IS A FATHER which describes a target domain, the abstract concept of the country, in terms of a concrete person, the ‘father’, which is the source domain. The source domain though in every case structures ‘the target domain and provides a particular perspective on it’. So a country may be consciously imagined as a place or an ensemble of places, traditions, values and people to honour, love, obey and respect, like the ‘father’, or indeed, depending on context, of which to be afraid.

Metaphors however are capable of becoming real in social and cultural reality, or ‘realized’ in Kövecses’ (ibid) word, in other ways than the linguistic. The most extreme of these ways, which is rather relevant to Bond’s illustration, is when the
Extremism, patriotism and fanaticism in Bond’s example above may base their acute form on Kövecses’ extreme category. In such a case a ‘fatherland’ may even be experienced by people as a real person who bleeds when, for example, it is invaded by an enemy or when it is believed that its traditions are threatened. Such a metaphor may be used as a summons to defend it by any and all means, depending on the cultural and historical context in which the metaphor is been used. Killing or sacrificing oneself or murdering others in the name of a ‘fatherland’ in that case may seem as ‘rational’ as ‘common sense’. ‘Fatherland’ in that sense may be valued more than democracy, human rights, or even human life. In Kövecses’ (op.cit) words again, ‘Metaphors often define what’s real for us’ (p.330); and in Bond’s: ‘In society’s structured processes metaphors are real’ (Bond, 2000a:126-127).

We could argue that culture for Bond (2003) offers the ‘structure of meanings’ which a society has created for explaining, and surviving in the world, and at the same time it controls our understanding of the past, the present and the future (p.xi). But how is it possible then to understand reality or even instigate change if we are using ideological structures, like language and culture, to understand ourselves and the world? Are human beings permanently trapped within these frames?

**c) Provoking change**

Bond argues that culture needs to be able to understand itself as implicated in this procedure of creating meaning and values; it has to leave space for interrogation of itself, and for potential change, or else it would become ‘sterile’ and rigid, incapable
of adapting to the ever-changing material conditions (Bond, 2003:ix-x). It should be self-reflexive in the same way the mind is, in ‘order to relate to the “infinite” vicissitudes and changes of existence’ (ibid:xi)—something which, for example, modern Hinduism is not in its conception of the cattle’s value. If a culture imposes through its ideology a supposedly ‘absolute truth’ as an answer to Nothingness, then our capacity to sustain our existence comes to an end. It is because of the imaginative existence of Nothingness that there is history, culture and change; and according to Bond, we could not be human if values remain intact (Bond, 2006:206).

Bond calls, then, for a recreation of human beings by the provoking of change in cultural meanings, and struggles to revive creativity and humanness disengaged from ideology and its social madness (Bond, 2000a:161) in order to perform the crucial task of updating culture. In that sense Bond does not consider human beings as irreversibly locked into cultural and linguistic structures, as the majority of structuralist and post-structuralist narratives would suggest. When Bond seeks out reason, however, he does not aim at activating a rationalist method in order to reach a supposedly objective truth, but rather seeks out meaning, values, change and ultimately the recreation of our humanness on a different cultural basis. In an earlier attempt to illustrate this aspiration, which is more or less still relevant, he stated that:

> We live and relate to ourselves, others, technology and our environment by organizing our behaviour and consciousness, with its attitudes and concepts, into a society. These things interconnect and mutually form one another. By ‘rational’ I mean the condition that exists when this is done in such a way that we’re as sane and behave as morally and humanely as historically possible at that time. (Bond, 2002:87)

Such a definition of reason and the rational could not be found mechanically by some kind of generalised mathematical laws as in Descartes, by thinking or by a rational social structure (Bond, 2006:205 and 2001:13, 10). For Bond living within our
Kantian crisis is more complex than this. Scientific reductionism, as he calls it, would ‘replace humanness with political hygiene and rational barbarism’ (Bond, 2006:205). Humanness is instead created, for Bond, by judgement, which includes thought but is more complicated (ibid) and which can be found in the logic of imagination (Bond, 2000a:161) – where, according to Bond, values and stories originally come to being:

> It isn't the reason that makes us human, it's imagination. Einstein's reason is a more complicated form of the reasoning of a rat. But no rat - no animal - imagines. Animals have no stories. (ibid:3).

It is crucial to note, however, that Bond’s idea – that meaning and value are imposed upon Nothingness by humans, not out there to be discovered (Bond, 1996a:1) – may appear similar to Descartes’ picture of the intellect’s projections onto the world, but this is not so. Bond’s meaning and value is not to be discovered ‘out there’, but neither is it simply inside one’s mind. It is an invention and constant adjustment of meaning, rather than a discovery of an objective undeniable truth. It is not a projection of ideas of the intellect but a relational, or better historical and material, creation of meaning, in the course of which humans come constantly and universally in contact with Nothingness through the ever-changing material conditions of living. Nothingness in that sense is never to be eliminated or filled up. Indeed it could not be. It has to remain wide open and available for us to respond to. Ultimately I would think that the aim of Bond’s philosophy and theatre practice is exactly this, to reveal Nothingness, the gap of meaning, to the audience and force them to enter it and respond to it without the control of ideology. The audience are asked to recreate themselves within the gap by simultaneously changing both their own and society’s values.
More importantly, it has also to be noted that Bond does not search for an answer in cognitive linguistics and semiotics. Semiotics mainly examines and explores signs, how meaning is produced and how reality is represented (Chandler, 2002:2), and cognitive linguistics how language organises or configures our conceptual structures, or, in other words, how the mind is patterned and structured by language (Evans and Green, 2006:16). But neither addresses certain crucial ontological questions which Bond is very much engaged with, especially regarding the essential role of imagination. One of his main interests, for example, is in understanding how the personal reflects the social by exploring how ideologically-inaugurated irrational acts are made possible on the personal, psychological level, and moreover how language’s and culture’s petrified structures could be revealed, bypassed and renewed. These are areas which cognitive linguistics or semiotics do not or cannot answer, or even better, do not deal with at all. That is why Bond enquires into the grounds of the development of the self, constructing a theory that delves deeper into the nature and implication of the Kantian crisis and which, as Roper (in Davis:2005) argued, seems unique.

The provoking of an uncorrupted imagination to seek reason lies at the heart of Bond’s enquiry. Roper (ibid) claims that the author ‘consistently sought to engage imaginatively, and often provoke the person, as audience of his work as a playwright’, and adds that one of the objects of this endeavour is to change the audience, a project political in nature (p.125). Roper moreover argues that, in order to be able to provoke an audience’s imagination and thereby provoke change, Bond needed to understand the mind, the origins and nature of the human being, and its relationship to the physical and social world. His speculations gradually took the form of detailed,
intense accounts, and his provinces of enquiry included children’s development, as well as the nature and history of society and theatre, and audience’s responses (ibid).

In the course of his speculations Bond came to construct a theory where the psychological conditions that permit the confusion of a metaphor with reality, which may lead to ‘blindness’ and ‘madness’, occurs when imagination and reason are sundered in the self. In fact when this split occurs it is not only reason that it may become corrupted but imagination as well. Seeing in ‘fatherland’ your bleeding father, to defend with your life or by murdering others, is in fact an act of a corrupted imagination and not merely of corrupted reason. The converse assumption would eradicate Bond’s argument for the importance of the logic of imagination so far, which considers reason and imagination as unified, and would once more restrict the conversation or analysis to reason alone.

Castoriadis (1987) offers an interesting definition of ideology, based on Marx’s writings, which may support further such a view:

… (ideology is) a set of ideas that relate to a reality not in order to shed light on it and to change it, but in order to veil it and to justify it in the imaginary [my emphasis], which permits people to say one thing and do another, to appear as other than they are. (p.11)

Bond’s provocative, and admittedly shocking, suggestion is however that the above condition is a universal stage of the development of the self, and that it is not happening merely under some unusual circumstances. We are all prospectively ‘mad’ for as long as our selves may be deeply split by any culture and any ideology.

This particular area will be further developed in the next section, and relates to how the social comes to dominate the personal and how psychological structures are built upon the deep-seated split between reason and imagination within the self. The next
section will also deal with the immediately related key areas of Bond’s developmental theory, which include how judgement is facilitated or blocked and how and why imagination seeks values and hence reason within the process of the development of the self.

1.2.2 Bond’s theory of the development of the self

Imagination for Bond is closely related to the development of the self, to the point where it is unfeasible to separate them even for the sake of a theoretical investigation. There are, according to Bond, three distinct stages in the development of the child’s self: the stage of the monad, the pre-real and finally the last stage where the child enters the world by entering culture (Bond, 2000a:113-136). None of these three stages is presented as a chronologically clear-cut developmental level; in each of them, however, imagination occupies a central position. Bond regards the self as a constant reconfiguration of a set of imagined values and stories which, in an identical way to culture described above, is considered decisive in structuring experience and the mind in every developmental stage.

A prominent feature of Bond’s theory is that there is no naturally given self to be discovered: ‘There is no homunculus in the brain, no “ghost in the machine”, no soul in the imagination, no centre in the psyche.’ (Bond, 2003:97). Instead the nature of a human being is constructed through culture: ‘Human nature is not fixed at birth, it is created through our relation to the culture of our society’ (Bond, 1977:12); as mentioned above, cultural stories play a fundamental role in every aspect of human living, including family and motherhood.

Hence, in order to understand more fully the role and the function of imagination in structuring these stories, and hence the self, we first need to understand what these
stories are for Bond. We have already examined how stories function within the cultural and social context, but we only provisionally began a consideration of how the personal may become subjected to the social. It is now time to examine how these stories may be produced, and thereafter structure the mind and psychology of the self, as well as how they may be controlled directly by ideology on the psychological level.

**a) Stories told by imagination**

For Bond the neonate structures its experience as a map (Bond, 2000a:115) which contains values and stories, formed initially by the child; but later overlaid by the values of society, which through its culture acquires greater power over them. The map illustrates the values and meanings that prescribe how the child should live and judge, and it is for this reason the map also defines what humanness is (Bond, 2003:98).

In every developmental stage, a different map is structured through the child’s imagination and reason while directly or indirectly experiencing its surroundings. They may contain all knowledge, values and meanings created by the child about the external world and the self. In a sense the map is a story which bridges the gap between the child and the world, and so it relates the child to the world. Bruner (2002) maintains, in a way similar to Bond, that:

> A self-making narrative is something of a balancing act. It must, on the one hand, create a conviction of autonomy, that one has a will of one’s own, a certain freedom of choice, a degree of possibility. But it must also relate the self to a world of others – to friends and family, to institutions, to the past, to reference groups. (p.78)

Everything should be included in these maps, even things that require knowledge or concepts which children are not able to grasp in their earliest years. Possible unknown areas may for example be mapped in a similar way to early geographical maps of the
world, where monsters, dragons or mythical places are used to designate the unknown parts (Bond, 2000a:96). Hence an incomprehensible illness may be mapped as an evil beast and an inexplicable CD-player as homunculi dwelling in a box.

The reason for mapping its experience imaginatively, even in an apparently false way, is that the child needs a ‘rational, practical, utilitarian’ map, which includes everything, in order to be in the world; and such a comprehensive map can only be imaginary (ibid), even if much of it is mistaken or a lie. As Bond eloquently comments: ‘lies are our first humanity … we have values because once we were children’ (Bond, 2003:99). Later some of the lies are abandoned after they are compared to reality, but the working of evaluation endures (Bond, 2003:98).

In Notes on Imagination (Bond, 2003) it is argued that the process of mapping the world is very important for the child’s existence because this is the way to enter the world and live in it, it is ‘its means of being’ (p.95). The map puts order onto a seemingly chaotic experience by connecting causes with effects, even if their connections are totally wrong in objective terms. A mystifying illness can be imaginatively comprehended when its cause is perceived as an evil little beast and henceforth mapped, even though its invented cause is entirely unscientific.

Imagination, values and the stories built by them are in fact our means of greater rational understanding, because even the evaluation of practical utilities, which apparently lie exclusively in the realm of reason, is still the work of imagination (Bond, ibid:101). A closet, for instance, is such a practicality; it keeps the clothes in some order away from dust. Closets are some of the basic utilities of a household, at least in the western world. Although a closet seems apparently to be a neutral object devoid of values, it wouldn’t be considered as such by Bond. It rather hides values
related to why we keep our clothes clean and tidy, in a society that may value tidiness and cleanliness or the ‘appropriate’ appearance of people publicly in those terms. In fact it may relate to the imaginary of that society in Castoriadis’s (1987) terms. Thus it is crucial to be able to perceive the closet in terms of imagination or of its values, although the apparent practicality of it seems to dominate its meaning by making its imaginary values invisible.

On the whole for Bond, imagination together with its twin, reason, continues to develop alongside the creation of new maps in all stages of the child’s growth. Something, an action, a place, an attitude or an event, is incorporated within the story/map only if it has a value and meaning, and thus a creative function (Bond, 2004:99) for helping the child explain and live in the world, and adapt to its constantly shifting circumstances. In the same vein Bruner (2002) argues that:

(…) there is no such thing as an intuitively obvious and essential self to know, one that just sits there ready to be portrayed in words. Rather we constantly construct and reconstruct ourselves to meet the needs of the situations we encounter, (…) is like making up a story about who and what we are, what’s happened, and why we’re doing what we’re doing (…) Our self-making stories accumulate over time, (…) They get out-of-date, and not just because we grow older or wiser but because our self-making stories need to fit new circumstances, new friends, new enterprises. (p.64)

Ultimately imagination, consciousness, self, stories and map are so closely related for Bond that they appear to overlap, or, in some cases, to be inseparable or even synonymous. Bruner (2002) is rather in agreement again that the process of self-making is a narrative act (p.65) and that ‘if we lacked the capacity to make stories about ourselves, there would be no such thing as selfhood.’ (p.86). It is therefore obvious why, for Bond, the map has, in its turn, consequences for the child. The self is structuring the map and, in its turn, the map is starting gradually to structure the
psychological self (Bond, 2003:96), in an identical way to how, as was examined above, the cultural stories structure society.

One of the most stimulating dimensions of Bond’s approach is the idea that, while the child gradually develops through different stages, it never loses or breaks with past selves. All stages acquire appropriate new selves based on new experiences and knowledge, but none of them disappears. The self is made by these coexisting selves, resembling a collective ‘chorus’ (Bond, 2003:97), ‘a palimpsest of maps’ (Bond, 2000a:117). This is a very important element in Bond’s theory because, as is going to be examined later, the conviction in the coexistence of selves constitutes the foundation of Bond’s theatre practice, which in central moments it is trying to evoke and address the audience’s pre-linguistic self, assumed to still lie within every individual. Castoriadis (1987) offers a similar viewpoint while he refers to the ‘successive formations’ of the subject which appear as a result of ‘separation and diversity imposed on the psyche’ and for Castoriadis these successive formations ‘exist only as attempts to hold this diversity together’ (p.302).

If at this point of the discussion we bring in the context of Nothingness that was explored in the previous section, we may realise that personal values and personal stories are created as a response to it, but may become at the same time subject to ideology as well. This is basically the central area of Bond’s interest, and connects immediately with the corruption of reason and imagination that was discussed above. If these personal stories structure our mind and the self, then it is crucial to understand how ideology may come to corrupt and control us through the marshalling or domination of these stories. For Bond, it is through these corrupted stories that we become mad, and potentially slaughterers in the name of some hidden or disguised
ideal which dominated our personal stories. So now we will turn to the immediate developmental theory of the self as it is described by Bond, in order to understand how these stories structure the self and how they may be corrupted by ideology within their development.

b) The monad self

For Bond the need for a total explanation of the world is felt even in a newborn’s early life (Bond, 2003:95). The very first attempt at creating meaning and proto-values begins at the stage called ‘monad’, where the newborn is initially aware of itself but not of the external world (Bond, 2000a:113). In fact it feels that it ‘is on both sides of its skin’. Inside and outside worlds are experienced as a unified whole so whatever the child feels it ascribes to its surroundings as well: ‘If the child quarrels with the world it quarrels with itself’. This is an imaginary condition because in reality the child only imagines that ‘it is the universe’ and obviously such is not the case. Consequently, reality and imagination in this stage are experienced as one (ibid:113-114).

Castoriadis (1987), who has almost identical views to Bond in relation to the monad stage, uses the terms ‘proto-subject’ and ‘proto-world’ – which fully and mutually overlap in the monad – in order to describe the same imaginary condition (p.294). We could compare the monad stage to a state where Nothingness and the gap between the two poles of the Kantian crisis are not yet experienced in the mind; thus mediating representations, like the ones we adults are accustomed to, do not exist yet either. In fact it would be more accurate to argue that a need for a language could not even be felt yet; it would be redundant at this stage. As Castoriadis (1987) claims, in the monad stage there is no way ‘of separating representation and “perception” or
“sensation” (p.294). This state may be partially compared with, but not identified with, the condition of autism, where the monad is unable to communicate or socially interact with the environment, not because of pathology but because it cannot yet feel the need to do so, since it does not yet realise that there is an external world at all. Of course, in absolute contrast to autism, the monad gradually and rather universally enters the social world.

Hence the apparent communication of an adult with a neonate in the monad stage is not accurate in the sense of our commonly held idea of a contact between two distinct subjects. The neonate is not yet recognising that an adult, or even an object, is something distinct, since the idea of otherness in any concrete sense is lacking. The neonate rather imagines that it ‘sees’ itself, which is imagined as the whole universe. Consequently the monad feels it is the cause and effect of everything happening in this imaginary totality, of ‘comfort, discomfort, peace, dread’. In an ‘impossible’ example: ‘If (...) it took up a cup to drink it would be mover and moved, cup, drinker and water. The cup would be the water and the water the cup. The water would drink the drinker.’ (Bond, 2000a:114).

The neonate gradually experiences Nothingness although not in terms of the Kantian crisis; since representational structures and their cultural values are not present hitherto in the brain, the pole of any culture and of any value is completely absent. Theoretically the monad lies in an imaginary condition where it can interpret Nothingness ‘freely’, before language and ideology could possibly manipulate reason and imagination. Hypothetically, as well, it may occupy the site of culture in the split which gives birth to the gap of meaning, while the other pole remains its experience of reality. This is not wholly accurate, however, because if the monad lacks culture, it
lacks simultaneously any psychology, means, language, reason or values, by which to occupy the site of culture. And indeed there is no mind yet in the monad stage. But how is that possible then? How is it possible to experience and at the same time interpret its experience when it lacks any means to do so? In other words how could the monad be on both sides of the gap, experiencing and evaluating its experience without yet possessing any evaluating structure to do so?

At this point there are some rather crucial matters to consider. It is impossible to feel the need to create values and meaning if the gap of meaning is not felt yet. The motivation to explain the world holistically presumes that the world is felt as something different from the self or, in other words, that there is an ‘otherness’; and this is not applicable at the monad stage. Otherness is the only way to draw the neonate out of his monadic manner, approximate to ‘autism’, to start creating values and explanations. In the opposite case it would remain in an autistic state permanently. A cognised ‘other’ is thus crucial in order to create a gap and compel the neonate to exit the monad stage and feel the need to evaluate. Additionally Bond mentions that the monad seeks a relationship not only to the world which it cannot yet distinguish but also a ‘relationship to itself’; ‘it is its own riddle’ (Bond, 2000a:115). But even establishing a relationship with itself presupposes that the self should have been felt as different again, as a ‘riddle’, as an ‘other’. So how and when does the ‘other’ appear in the monad world?

For Bond, Nothingness at this stage is formed gradually on the basis of an immediate but initially meaningless bodily experience of reality. In brief, as Bond argues, reality may force imagination to reflect on itself through the Tragic (ibid:114). Any real event taking place in the monad’s universe may, in certain circumstances, demand a
response and hence generate a cognised experience. In Bond’s terms this event corresponds to the Tragic, the implacable (ibid). The Tragic hence induces ‘responses and behaviour and so create[s] elemental ideas in the imagination’ (ibid:115). These ideas in their turn structure later experience and progressively generate in the monad’s mind a consciousness of itself ‘as if it were its own other’. In other words the structured experience of the monad forms an ‘idea’ of itself as an ‘other’ in the monad’s brain. So we now have an experiencing monad and an imaginary ‘other’ monad. The two sides of the gap are both in place at this instant, since ‘in this way, in the gap between itself and its other, create the vertigo of nothingness’ (ibid).

The above brief explanation still looks quite complex and unclear, especially in relation to how ideas are created in the imagination, and requires further illustration. So, as mentioned above the contact with reality, although not yet distinguished, is the fundamental inaugural event that produces primary experiences in the monad world. These primary experiences generate primary emotional responses, which are identified by Bond in terms of pleasure and pain. By pleasure is meant the emotion produced, for instance, from the experience of warmth or satisfaction of hunger, and by pain that produced from the experience of hunger or cold or discomfort. These two emotions constitute the origins and the basis of what Bond calls the Tragic, from pain, and the Comic, from pleasure (Bond, 2004:25). The author argues that they are in essence ‘sensations’ which occur in the body randomly and in patterns (Bond, 2006:208). The crucial key idea though is that these elemental experiences are seen as two of the three central causa causans events of a threefold self, which Bond argues is created in this stage.
Obviously pain and pleasure occur in the body and provoke emotional responses to experiences from practicalities related immediately to the child's needs and conditions. The third event which completes the fabrication of the threefold self is their patterned occurrence. Hunger for example is something that cannot be ignored in any sense, given that it creates physically powerful sensations of pain or discomfort. Moreover if it were to be ignored the child would die. Hunger corresponds in this sense to the Tragic or the implacable. It is felt regularly in the neonate, which is comforted by being fed in a regular way. The periodic bodily experience of hunger and feeding, pain and pleasure respectively, generates for Bond a progressively recognisable pattern. However for Bond the recognition of a pattern is an intellectual occurrence. It constitutes in fact the first mind-event in the brain which is capable of registering patterns because 'neurologically is evolved to be able to do so' (Bond, 2006:208), and seems to be related to an 'innateness of being human' (App. B, p.7).

In short pleasure and pain are 'cognised' (Bond, 2006:209). Thus hunger and feeding become present for the monad but with their presence demand a response. Before they were cognised they were merely unrecognisable parts of the monad's universe and occurred unnoticed. Or rather, their causes and effects were not yet realised and connected. But now by their presence they structure all the later experiences of hunger and feeding which henceforth can be recognised and classified as such. Cause and effect now surface, are connected and become established in consciousness. In fact they create a kind of proto-consciousness. Primary experience of pain and pleasure creates in this sense a kind of imagined proto-value structure in the monad's world, for recognising, by evaluation, its later similar experience; by the same process this experience gradually produces consciousness.
What is actually taking place at this point, though, is that the experience produced through its evaluation creates a kind of ‘mirror’ in the monad’s mind. The monad’s experience is segregated by its imaginary evaluation of it. These two form the poles of the gap between experience and value, between the experiencing monad and its own ‘other’, the evaluating monad. Consequently the gap of meaning is already wide open in this sense. In fact what is happening in the threefold self at this stage is that experience, which corresponds to the Tragic and the Comic, is ‘reflected’ into the intellect, which corresponds to the cognised, patterned experience as correlated causes and effects. In this way imagination and reality gradually become differentiated or, even better, cognised. The primary pattern creates, in summary, a thought or proto-judgement which turns the brain into a mind while the mind, in its turn, creates the self (Bond, 2006:208).

For Bond, in this process of cognising a patterned experience what is thought is not important at all; it is the very act of evaluating that ‘establishes a relationship to the world’ (Bond, 2000a:180) and brings the self into being: ‘thinker and thought\(^1\) are one’ (Bond, 2006:211). Hence self and thought are created simultaneously. Ultimately imagination is for Bond ‘the self carried into self-consciousness’ (Bond, 2000a:117).

In *The Hidden Plot* (Bond, 2000) the author describes the same procedure in another formulation. When the monad is experiencing the Tragic in situations created by material reality, it forms a cognitive ‘module’, a ‘habitualness’, which is in fact ‘the way it receives the world’. The psychological in that case comes as ‘a reaction to cognised reality’ (p.180).

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\(^1\) Bond’s use of the term ‘thought’ here might confuse the reader. What is meant actually is not a thought of reason as in Descartes, but judgement, as explained in previous sections.
So originally, for Bond, from the very first stages of the development of the self experience takes place at once in ‘two forms – in the body and in the mind’ (Bond, 2006:208). Thoughts and mind are created by imagination as an effect of the impact of material reality on the body. In Bond’s view of the subject’s very early years, these two faculties are never considered as separated at all: body and intellect, imagination and reason as well as the self and the world, direct the wholeness of the mind and of its experience. This is why reason and imagination are considered to be for Bond not ‘complementary opposites, each with their own sphere of operation’ (Roper in Davis, 2005:131) but as ‘twins’ which come into being concurrently (Bond, 2000a:115). Hence from the above statements we may ascertain that for Bond imagination and reason do not pre-exist in the human brain, but rather come into being through the co-presence and co-operation of experience in the body and of a neurologically evolved brain; they are both produced.

Yet I need to note at this point that the above examples used for illustrating the monad stage are entirely invented, and obviously it is impossible to accurately assign them to the reality of the monad. Being aware of likely distortions, I need to state that they are used only for the sake of the present theoretical clarification and not for giving a precise example of the monad’s thinking. In fact we cannot even use the word ‘thinking’ in the way we ordinarily conceive of the word, in relation to the monad stage, because there is no way we can grasp the form of its proto-values – again the word ‘value’ is as conventional in this context. If we bear in mind that the monad actually exists in a pre-linguistic state where language, as well as any other representational or evaluative structure, is yet missing, then any attempt to capture some proto-value created in the monad would be not only unsuccessful but as absurd as the above example, owing to the fact that we do not have a suitable ‘language’ to
describe it. Our perceptions are mediated by socially predetermined language and other symbolic systems, while the monad’s experience escapes any kind of a comparable mediation or representation. It existed before the symbolic could represent reality. Thus it is beyond our rational grasp, and we cannot do other than imagine it.

On the other hand the imaginary evaluating ‘other’ in the later monad stage is a product of the monad’s unmediated contact with the world and itself as a whole. In this way the ‘monadic’ experience of an immediate association between reason and imagination, between self and the world, between experience and intellect, forms a kind of a felt full selfhood that, as Bond argues, would never be greater in future as in this stage (Bond, 2000a:115). This selfhood is his idea of the core-self. As mentioned above the monad self consists only of the three elements, the Tragic, the Comic and the intellect (Bond, 2006:209). This is what Bond calls, only conventionally, the ‘core-self’ (ibid:211).

The core-self is fundamental in Bond’s theory since it is not only seen as ‘the first act of creation’ but at the same time its three constitutive elements form and make available thereafter the foundational structure, the ‘module’, for every future judgment and creation. This kind of a proto-self will be modified by future experiences but its ‘module’ will remain consistent, constituting the fundamental core of every later creativeness, while ‘Any situation which has in it elements of the first situation, which made the first act of creation necessary, will re-enact the core self, bringing it into creativity.’ (ibid:209). This is a fundamental idea; later, we will see that the remembrance of this original causal relationship in fact induces a kind of implied ‘nostalgia’ for an imaginary wholeness, which arises as soon as the assumed
immediacy between cause and effect are in later stages removed. Indeed Bond indirectly likens the monad to an imaginary condition where God creates itself. The nostalgia in fact activates the need for re-connecting cause and effect in an imaginary totality, where the hope is cherished that the gap between the self and the social ‘other’, which will be soon utterly felt, could be sealed up by a future ‘perfect’ story. As Bond, only implicitly, states: ‘We cannot return to the monad. Story begins in the realization of loss’ (Bond, 2000a:129).

Another appealing comment on this core self is that it is fundamentally a ‘dramatic and dramatising structure’ (Bond, 2006:209) because its three constitutive elements, Tragic, Comic and judgement, are in fact dramatic in their essence according to Bond. The particular comment is again crucial to keep in mind when in subsequent sections we come to examine the role and nature of Bond’s view of drama as capable of placing an audience in a similar dramatic context, where they are compelled to recreate Values and change culture. Although we cannot re-enter or remember the monad stage ever again, the state of the monad ‘may enter our later state’ by another route (ibid:207) and this is, for Bond, the route of drama.

Borrowed from Leibniz’s philosophy (Bond, 2000a:114), the term monad is used by the playwright to describe the experience of unity of the self and the external world by the newborn. In Leibniz (in Beardsley, 2002) the monad is an autonomous entity which is created by God and which nothing can enter from outside; nothing can influence it, as the monad reflects the self-sufficiency of God (p.288). Any possible changes to the monad stem from an internal principle ‘since an external cause could not influence their inner being’ (p.289). In that sense it gains a kind of transcendental reference; thus such an approach rules out any ontological questioning (Shand,
1993:105). Like Descartes, Leibniz distrusted embodied sense-experience and instead claimed that there is a rational soul or spirit that distinguishes human beings from other animals, and which can guide them towards ‘necessary and eternal truths’ (Leibniz in Beardsley, 2002:292). The term monad means for Leibniz ‘substance’ or ‘real thing’ and is used in order to describe the ‘nature and essence of what is and what constitutes reality’ (Merz, 2001:96). Elsewhere it is identified as a ‘simple substance’ (Lodge, 2004:5) or ‘true substance’ (Shand, 1993:105).

For Leibniz though the monad is created by God, and is a reflection of the whole world, also created by God. In fact the monad is part of the whole, it reflects the whole and is governed by the same laws as the whole, but it is isolated and self-sufficient:

(...) its inner state at any given moment is in reality only determined by it-self, by its own former states. The ultimate ground of its existence, and of the whole course of its development, lies in Him who created it, in God. But as God has created the whole world, and has created it according to the perfect and transparent idea which lives in His mind, so He has created each monad to represent a certain phase or appearance of the whole. (Merz, 2001:101)

The reflection of the whole world in the ‘monad’ renders it not only a part of the whole but a typical sample of the laws of the universe; so it could ‘reveal to us the unalterable connection of cause and effect, the mechanism of nature’ (ibid:103). Monad is thus seen as a stable totality which encapsulates the truth; if we address it we can understand reality. So I think that it would be helpful at this point to offer a new input tracking the term ‘monad’ in relevant bibliography, in order to compare it with Bond’s consideration of it.

Obviously there are essential differences in Bond’s view as we have seen above. Principally Bond does not make any references to a transcendental stability or creation of the monad. The self for Bond is created in a dynamic process and is not
pre-given as in Leibniz. For the playwright the monad doesn’t naturally perceive the association between causes and effects, but only it thinks it does; so there is no inner inherited truth about nature to be discovered in the monad. The term monad instead is used in order to describe a neonate’s experience of the world, an act of imagination, and not to imply a kind of all-encompassing core of the being. For Bond there is a false impression of wholeness which forms, not inherits, the core-self which in its turn is kept unchanged and henceforth offers a structure to make judgements. In this sense the function of the core-self looks similar to that of Leibniz’s monad only in the sense that they both provide a kind of a point of reference for all later experience and creativity.

The term monad is also found in Castoriadis (1987) with a similar meaning to how it is used by Bond. Castoriadis also argued that there are successive formations of the subject which co-exist in an increasingly diverse form, and the monad functions as a link for holding these selves together throughout life; they develop as an increasing separation and diversity imposed on the monadic pole (p.302). Castoriadis though made Freud’s influence explicit, which Bond doesn’t do, in his similar account of the monad where he identified this stage with the creation of the unconscious. He clearly described the above condition in terms of a desire to return to a kind of a state of wholeness where ‘object’ and ‘subject’ exist in a similar relation as in the monad. On the other hand by following Freud’s theory he claimed that ‘desire is indestructible’ (p.296) and defined its purpose as finding something missing:

What is missing and will always be missing is the unrepresentable [sic]element of an initial ‘state’ that which is before separation and differentiation, a proto-representation which the psyche is no longer capable of producing, which has always served as a magnet for the physical field as the presentification [sic]of an indissociable [sic] unity of figure, meaning and pleasure. This initial desire is radically irreducible not because what it aims at does not find in reality an
object that embodies it, or in language words that state it, but because it cannot find in the psyche itself and image in which to depict itself (pp.296)

We need to keep this imaginary totality in mind when, in the next section, we come to look at how the monad’s ‘other’ is replaced by the ‘other’ of social teaching, splitting irrevocably in this way the imaginary wholeness of the monad. Desire is another area that needs to be further investigated, in order to clarify if Bond is actually referring to the same process as Castoriadis. This area will be examined later, in comparison again to Bond’s Radical Innocence which seems to be related.

There are some other interesting references to other disciplines which may support Bond’s views on the process instigated by pain and pleasure. Psychoanalyst Modell (2003), who is trying to explore a common ground between neurosciences and psychoanalysis, argued similarly that the world is an ‘unlabelled place’ that humans sort out by selecting ‘what is of value and interest to us’ (p.152); but we do that not by using a kind of predetermined set of values and ideas, but through evaluating our conditions through our feelings: ‘There is an evident intimate connection between feelings, values, and the experience of self. Feelings assign value to what is meaningful.’ (p.151).

On the other hand the process of gradually forming ideas and imposing patterns on the world can be related partially with Freudian theory, with which Bond seems to have an ambiguous affiliation. Freud (in Gay, 1995) made a distinction between inner and outer stimuli that are experienced by ‘an entirely helpless organism’ (p.565). These stimuli correspond respectively to instincts and other physiological stimuli that ‘operate in the mind’ (p.564). In relation to the second group of stimuli, while this organism is receiving stimuli in its ‘nervous substance’ it will be soon be in a position to make its ‘first distinction and first orientation’. Stimuli are seen as sources of
pressure that demand a response from our nervous system, whose task is to master them. This ‘postulate is of a biological nature, and makes use of the concept of “purpose” (or perhaps of expediency)’. Instincts on the other hand operate in a more demanding way than the external stimuli. They do not simply vanish when, for example, the eye closes when a light irritates the retina; rather their pressure persists because there is nothing provided by the organism to tackle, for example, hunger. This is why for Freud an instinctual stimulus can be described in a better way as a ‘need’ (pp.563-568).

c) The pre-real self …

Gradually, towards the end of the monad stage\(^2\), consciousness is beginning to emerge through the recognition that the outer world is not a continuum of the monad, and the neonate learns that its skin is a ‘barrier and beyond it are places and people’ (Bond, 2000a:116). So the child gradually ‘opens a window on the world’ (ibid), the world of the others, where different values exist and operate, but there is still not yet a psychological self (ibid:115), nor is there yet any culture and ideology in the child’s mind. This is the pre-real stage where the child is not yet fully introduced into culture, but starts realising that there is something foreign to itself.

The conscious appearance of the ‘other’ may embody again the Tragic. In a sense a break is taking place between the two, the monad and the world, previouslyimagined as one, which Bond calls a gap but which is never meant to be eliminated again in real life. That gap is becoming an element of the self and of the outer world, and from that

\(^2\) There is no information in Bond’s writings relating to the exact ages for these stages of development. I would think though that if the monad stage may be compared to the egocentric stage of an infant then its full power is felt mostly during the first year of development (Butterworth in Bruner and Haste, 1987:64). But on the other hand, for Bond, the monad should not be seen as a stage that is eradicated at any certain age.
stage onwards it constitutes the metaphorical Site or place where the relationship between the gradual formation of self and the world is presented, performed and questioned.

Nevertheless in the new stage newly created meanings, values and stories by the child are articulating the already existing monad structures, resembling the learning of a ‘new grammar’. For Bond, though, the ‘new grammar’ does not erase previous grammatical forms (Bond, 2000a:117); previous selves are not deleted: ‘Just as language cannot leave its grammar, mind cannot leave its origins, which are like a grammar’ (ibid:116). According to Bond ‘if the child entered the real world by a total break the self would lose consciousness. There would be coma and chaos’ (ibid:117).

In this stage the monad relates to the external world, but behaves like a creative and demanding ‘god’. In the monad stage, while the child confronted the Tragic, there was no guilt or blame involved. There was a need for the Tragic as an ontological question through which the self and morality are defined. But in the pre-real stage the child’s morality becomes ‘atrocious’. The Tragic is still present and essential but it is not only coercing the child to create values, it is also provoking the child’s judgemental attitude. Hence the seeking of justice is becoming pivotal. That is why a child may ‘accuse’ the supposed ‘perpetrators’ for their wrongs, ‘it rages, punishes, destroys (…) the burden of justice shakes the child’s imagination. And so it is tangled, turmoiled [sic], in tragedy, in the search of justice. In this state it enters society.’ (Bond, 2000a:121)

So the neonate enters the second stage of its self-development, which is the pre-real, where it is not sealed anymore in the monad and a new self is developing, but on the foundations of the previous monad stage. The child now needs new values and stories
which could provide the means for explaining its experience of reality and the practicalities to live in the world newly manifest to it. However it does not yet possess a straightforward explanation of causes and effects, since it lacks a full psychology and an adequate culture in order to help it do so. How could it know the reason that objects fall and don’t fly? Why the light in its bedroom can be switched on or off? Why the closet door creaks when it opens? Why the food stings its tongue?

The stories of the pre-real child are created, but they are inadequate to correct interpretation of the precise causes of the effects it is experiencing. It would be impossible to be accurate because, as mentioned before, it would be unfeasible to comprehend the necessary information yet. But nevertheless, as Bond argues, the human mind needs a total explanation of the world even if correct information is lacking. Hence these new pre-real stories should respond adequately to the need for a total description; otherwise the mind would lose its coherence and retreat back to the monad or into pathology. If the monad stage is compared to egocentrism then, as Bruner (in Bruner and Haste, 1987) argues, ‘It is when the child fails to grasp the structure of events that he adopts an egocentric framework’ (p.94).

For Bond the external world, the new form of the Tragic, exists, and it demands a response, a rational explanation, one which the pre-real child has already its own means to offer; the new gap of meaning is again filled up by imagination, but this time through the association between external real objects and the child’s own values and ideas created in the monad stage.

In the pre-real stage, reality and imagination do not overlap as in the monad, and the pre-real child has one foot in reality and the other still in imagination. Objects are recognised in this stage as real objects, since they are found in the external world and
they are not imaginary configurations. But they are often anthropomorphised, having applied to them traces of human subjectivity, as being images of itself (Bond, 2000a:119-120). Indeed imagination is activated again in order to fill up gaps of meaning and of Value with imaginary effects and causes; the provided, imaginary connections between them are vital (ibid:120), even if they are completely absurd in reality. So objects fall because they may want to rest; the lamp in the bedroom contains a homunculus imprisoned in the globe, and the closet door creaks because it is hungry.

Again, this is an act of imagination because the child uses objects as something different from what their actual properties designate. It seems that this stage is close to symbolic playing, where a ‘block of wood may ‘be’ a car or dog’ (ibid); it could be compared, only to a degree, to psychosis, because the child does not yet fully identify the culturally structured values imposed on these objects. It is imposing its own on them, but obviously language or imagery from the outside world is already becoming present in the pre-real stage; otherwise it would be impossible for the ‘block of wood’ to become a ‘car or a dog’. But the main point is that the pre-real child exists in between the monad and the social.

In an impossible hypothesis, such a quasi-psychotic imaginary, as it offers complete explanations of the world, would be sufficient to preserve children in this stage and prevent them from ever entering their social world; the hypothesis cannot be valid since the vast majority of children generally do enter our world. But still, if these objects remain in the realm of imagination, then how is it possible to take the next step? Again ‘otherness’ and its consequent Nothingness are needed to shake the pre-
real self into social reality, but these are created in a considerably different fashion than in the monad stage.

d) ... and the entrance way to culture and ideology

By seeing ‘the creaking closet door as hungry’ the child is imaginatively charging the object (the door) with personal value; hence the object obtains some superfluous meaning which relates to the child, the door becomes an image of the child’s self. The only acknowledged causes and effects to the child at this moment can be drawn from its own assemblages of understandings created about itself in the monad stage, and so they are the only available material for it to use in explaining the new world around. The creaking door of the closet may be thought of as hungry because in accordance with the child’s cognised experience of the monad, this is what the child did when it was hungry: it cried out or opened its mouth to eat. In this sense metaphor, metonymy and imagination are in full operation, but still, they are based on lies and faults. In fact our ability to understand these two tropes in all later life and consequently share culture is formed in this stage according to Bond.

Lakoff and Johnson (2003) examine how understanding is deeply dependent on the use of tropes like metaphors and metonymies, which could not exist if imagination was not present. For example we could not understand, or even structure, a sentence like ‘give me a hand’ if we didn’t have imagination. In such a case we would never be able to imagine and hence understand that the ‘hand’ stands metonymically for something other than what it literally describes in this instance. In such a case the mind is considered disordered, devoid of a basic tool for understanding. Jakobson (in Dirven and Pörings, 2003) for instance argued that all varieties of aphasia lie between
two polar types of disorder, of similarity and contiguity, which correspond to the linguistic tropes of metaphor and metonymy respectively (pp.41-42).

In Bond’s case the child is cathexing the object with personal Value (Bond, 2000a:120). In this way, when the child sees the creaking door as hungry it ‘re-creates’ it in its own terms or, even better, in terms of its own monad values, causes and effects. In one sense this is again, according to Bond, a fundamental act of creation. If God could be compared to the monad creating itself, the pre-real could be compared to God creating its own world (ibid) as its image. In a similar way to the monad the pre-real child creates values through its imaginative contact with its own experience, and gains mind coherence by connecting causes with effects; but now it is projecting its values onto an external object, and in effect onto the external world. This is happening because the gap of meaning is extended and includes some parts of the external world which are acknowledged already. ‘Otherness’ nearly comes to being through external reality and consequently Nothingness again emerges as well. I am using the word ‘nearly’, however, because both are still under the total control of child’s imagination; they are both explained and filled up by projecting images of the self, and in this lies the resemblance to psychosis.

Though being on the border between reality and imaginary, the cathected object provides coherence to the mind by providing imaginary causes; complementarily, it takes the child into the world as well. So the closet door is cathected with some personal value from the child’s experience but, as mentioned above, the door exists in the real and therefore the child and its values are ‘exposed’ in the framework of the real as well. Henceforth the child’s values become available for consolidation or alteration; the object and the personal value projected onto it are ‘susceptible’ to any
reconfiguration produced by reality and later experience. Gradually another cause of the creaking would be substituted for the imaginary one; at some point, adults or experience will suggest a different but perhaps more ‘accurate’ explanation.

For Bond, causes and effects are not connected determinately in the pre-real stage (Bond, 2000a:124), and so the cathected object is open to any reconfiguration by the external world and experience. This is the new form of conflict and crisis created; but this time the battleground of Nothingness seems to be set up outside the self, while still indirectly occupying the self by default. The mirroring, evaluating ‘other’ in this stage is the cathected object, but it is becoming more ‘vulnerable’ to the ‘other’ of culture. It is this point where culture comes into being for children and provides them with the tools and knowledge to understand and live in their world; they become fully formed subjects with a psychology and set of values to help them adapt to the real world. These are what Castoriadis (1987) called ‘social definitions’, without which there can be ‘no human world, no society, no culture – for everything would be an undifferentiated chaos’ (p.341).

But as we explained earlier, these stories have the double impact of constructing the self and at the same time ‘ideologising’ it. The crucial moment is when this reconfiguration is taking place in such a way that it is virtually cancelling or forbidding the child’s own ability to imagine practical reality by itself (Bond, 2000a:122). When the monad opens the door to the world and is gradually becoming a subject, in Althusser’s terms of ‘interpellation’ (in Counsel and Wolf, 2001:41-42), by adopting the cultural stories told by its society, at the same time it is unlocking the door to ideologically-imposed readings of the real as well.
The creaking door may not seem accurately to reflect the impact of an obvious definition of ideology, because for our materialist culture its effect is produced by an objective cause from the area of physics, friction, and the true cause would seem easily proved. But what about where a culture believes that non-human entities either are or contain spirits, as for example in some animistic religions? As mentioned above, human beings live metaphorically even if their reason is practical. In this sense the altered but still value-bearing object gradually constitutes the new ‘other’ in the child’s mind, which is to be used while reflecting on and evaluating its own experience. But this time it is the ‘other’ of authority and ideology which is in control; the immediate association to the evaluating monad is crushed, not because the experience of the real necessitates changes, but because ideology occupies by power this side of the gap. Maybe this is the reason that for Bond the pre-real stage is seen as a conflict where the child ‘rages, punishes, destroys … the burden of justice shakes the child’s imagination.’ (Bond, 2000a:121). But as the playwright commented it ‘is not facile and not that it must always rage – it is sometimes uncanny in its purposefulness’ (App. B, p.9).

For Bond, in the last developmental stage where children enter their culture they first learn the ‘use and value of instrumental systems’ (Bond, 2000a:126). It is the mechanical use of objects in daily life and may relate to buying, selling, owning which in practice transform their human Value to instrumental value. So a ‘knife’s value is that it cuts bread or kills. Its Value is that it is used to commit rights and wrongs.’ (ibid). The problem at this point though is that our society according to Bond is unjust and thus mad, and the stories told by modern capitalism de-cathect objects of their humanly-created Values in order to externally re-cathect them into objects for consumption. A piece of wood block may hold for a pre-real child the Value of home,
whereas for our capitalist society is an object to own, to buy and sell, in order to make money or build a house. In other words a ‘house’ is built by the instrumental value of the wood block, whereas a ‘home’ is an imagined or cognised Value of any house or wood block prerequisite for evaluating our experience and needs. Thus the stories told by a corrupted society are not used in order to create our humanness but to guide imagination towards the fiscal value of things.

In that sense the cathected object is made unavailable for the child, so child and object have been separated. But the impact of this separation is deeper than this, because it is reflected in the child’s psyche. The cathected wood block, which holds something of the child’s self, relates now only to its immediate fiscal value and henceforth the self is as well valued as a thing to buy and sell (Bond, 2000a:126). Moreover, since the cathected object holds the child’s values, the child’s previously direct relation of imagination to reason is severed. Our reason is not in contact with our imagination anymore since values do not stem from our immediate critical experience of the Tragic but are rather imposed by ideology, and hence our creative apparatus for creating values is negated. Imagination ‘surrenders’ to fiscal values, falls into inertia, and in essence abandons the responsibility of creating values to authority.

Capitalism for Bond ‘forces the imagination to consent to a world run for the sake of the market’ and makes ‘false the story we need to create ourselves’:

The story no longer relates us to the real world but turns in on itself and shuts out reality. (…) the real world breaks down and we invent a world of fantasy and violence. (…) It [the new story imposed] seeks victims, it does not define justice. (Bond, 2000a:5)

In another way, society extends and uses imagination’s ability to anthropomorphise objects in the second stage of children’s development by imposing socially-constructed metaphors, as mentioned in the earlier section on reason. A land becomes
now not only earth to use and live by, but a motherland or fatherland: ‘we must love it, its people and their ways’ (Bond, 2000a:126). Any object may be infused with values through stories in a similar way to cathexing, except that now these values do not originate in people; they are simply imposed on them by something outside their own needs, external to their experience of reality, and they are meant to persuade them to accept authority and its ideology.

Bond argues that authority mainly or habitually addresses the pre-real self of anthropomorphism and Cathexis in order to preserve or arrest children and later adults in a permanent, infantile condition. Castoriadis (1987) points out in a similar way that the present society constantly infantilises its members by the imaginary fusion of the individual with some unreal entities (p.94). Hence, one of the most crucial aspects of this stage is that, according to Bond, the pre-real, seemingly animistic and anthropomorphic state institutes a falsehood, but this falsehood constitutes in fact the foundation on which all later value and metaphors are made possible. It is because of this original, pre-real falsehood that we may believe later as adults in other animistic or anthropomorphic metaphors like that of the ‘fatherland’ examined above.

On the other hand the institution of family, which is the first world that the monad comes to confront in essence, combines the above de-cathexing and anthropomorphism. Although family is also formed by society, it is not seen completely as an instrumental system because it has values like love (Bond, 2000a:127). Though, for Bond, love in family cannot be substituted for justice as the basis for humanness.

It should be mentioned at this point that the term Cathexis is ascribed to Freud, for whom it meant a presumed psychic energy that could be attached to ‘a thought, a part
of the body, or an object in the world”; it was likened to ‘an electrical charge’ (Modell, 2003:155-156). The most interesting argument though is that when an object is cathected ‘there is no distinction between mind and body’ (ibid:155). So imagination and reason are both exposed to the social and ideological context, and when the cathected object is corrupted they may both get corrupted as well.

However the above account of Bond’s theory of development, whereby imagination and reason start off as one coherent piece and then are sundered, is not yet complete. There are still some important questions to answer. The account didn’t answer, for example, the crucial question of why a neonate responds to experience and the Tragic in this way in the first place. In other words, why choose to face the Tragic and Nothingness instead? There is also the question of why other mammals would not ultimately respond in the same way to pain and pleasure, despite the fact that there are signs that they also feel primary emotions, or ‘sensations’, as Bond would call them. Is it because our evolution followed a different track from theirs? Or is it because God or psychology endowed us with a hidden aptitude?

Bond’s answer to the above would rather be given by his quite distinctive term, radical innocence. In the first part of the literature review, it was mentioned that this term is heavily criticised by Allen (2007) as impossible to prove. In the next section the term ‘radical innocence’ will be explored further by presenting how Bond sees it, and by comparing it to other theories.

e) Radical Innocence

For Bond, the development of the cognitive structure that brings coherence to experience and the mind has another, concomitant and just as significant aspect (Bond, 2000a:116). He takes for granted that the activation of the whole process is
based on an existential imperative of the neonate to assume the right to be ‘at home in the world’ (Bond, 2006:210). This ‘existential imperative’ (Bond, 2000a:115) is what the author calls radical innocence, which describes ‘the psyche’s conviction of its right to live’ and lies behind the need for any judgement and interpretation (Bond, 1998a:251) or, as Bond mentions, behind the need for any ‘moral discrimination’ that exists before any ‘particular moral code’ (ibid:254). Hence it is prior to imagination but is also its drive (ibid:257). Although imagination could be corrupted in practice, as mentioned earlier with the examples of metaphors, Radical Innocence is incorruptible because it is the very ‘source’ of Value (Bond, 2000a:181). In short, if imagination embodies our ability to produce Values, Radical Innocence puts forward our existential need to do so. So when the neonate identifies a pattern between hunger and feeding and thereafter creates its very first proto-Value, it is only doing so because of its need for evaluating, and by evaluating being in the world. Perhaps one could reformulate this need more precisely as the need ‘to make the world its home where it can have a good place to live’.

This conviction of the right to be is the cornerstone of Bond’s theory, supporting the whole theoretical edifice. In importance it amounts to a centre of the psyche, as thinking was the centre of Descartes’ theory, although the term ‘centre’ is not the proper one for Bond’s theory as seen above. For the sake of making clearer the prominence of Radical Innocence in Bond’s view, I will beg the reader’s forbearance in constructing a rather bold generalisation, although I understand the danger of distorting to a greater or lesser extent the idea behind his arguments. In this context, in order to clarify by comparing with Descartes’ definition of cogito, ‘I think therefore I

\[3\] I believe that the term ‘source’ is rather unsuccessful in this formulation. A ‘source’ could be confused easily with a kind of a Cartesian, pre-existing essence which projects its ideas onto an external world. What is meant here is probably the ‘need for value’ or ‘the source of the need to value’ and not the ‘source of value’ in itself.
am’, Bond’s formula could in contrast be something like: ‘there is an ontological and existential need to evaluate, therefore I become’. Although the provisional definition of the assumed Bondian ‘cogito’ above may indicate that Radical Innocence generates consciousness, it is not assuming a unilateral foundation in reason at all. Judgement is based on the logic of imagination, which concerns equally sensations and intellect, body and mind, experience and its evaluation, when human beings come into contact with the Tragic and the Comic. It seems that Radical Innocence is largely an overlooked aspect, although always in operation, an existential need which is fashioned when the neonate comes into cognitive contact with external material reality. For Bond though, it is fully revealed when Radical Innocence is facing an inconsistency or a gap in values, or, in other words, the Tragic. An example of this Tragic will be discussed later with reference to the Palermo improvisation.

Radical Innocence may give the impression sometimes in Bond’s writings of an instinctual imperative (Bond, 1998a:251) but this is not really correct. As already mentioned animals live according to their instincts. So when faced with another animal running towards them, an alleged predator, they may, let’s say, run to escape it or physiologically prepare to fight it. Their actions are predominantly based on instincts. Human beings, however, although they might eventually decide to do the same thing, will predominantly invest another person which threatens them with a value, for example the ‘enemy’ because, as explained earlier, human beings need a total explanation of the world which includes values. Human beings feel the urge to evaluate the conditions they are born or thrown into, and I would think not only for escaping danger. They would try to answer the question, let’s suppose again, of why the predator is after them. But then again, if they appraise the supposed predator as a person in need, they may even turn to help instead of fighting or running away even if
the person is still defined or evaluated as an enemy. As mentioned above, they do not react according to their instincts only, but predominantly according to their special values. The Kantian conflict between nature and free will is apparent here.

Bond regards Radical Innocence as ultimately provoking the instinct for justice (Bond, 2000a:181); this sense of justice does not address the self only but the world as well. It is provoked during the monad stage where the monad imagines the world and itself as one. When the experience of pain and pleasure is cognised, consciousness arises and hence the monad accepts the responsibility of overcoming the pain it is feeling; Radical Innocence is in this sense a product of consciousness which could be described, theoretically, as the felt responsibility for doing something to tackle the existence of pain, or to act on the instinctive sense that the pain ‘should not be’ (Bond, 2011:xiv) and therefore make the world its home. This may seem to cast Radical Innocence in a rather egotistical light, in terms of its origin, but since in the monad the world and the self are perceived as one, the same responsibility is applied to the world and not only to the self (ibid:xv). In an impossible example again, a crime against the world is perceived by the monad as a crime against itself. This is why Bond believes that the same existential imperative of Radical Innocence is not only an expression of the neonate’s desire for justice (Bond, 2000a:65) but is also the subsequent origins of our humanness (ibid:181), which does not end with the end of the monad stage or childhood. It permeates all development including adulthood, and thus it must be part of the ‘module’ that remains unaltered throughout life. Adults do not lose their Radical Innocence but it may be ‘merely socially misappropriated and misused’ (Bond, 1998a:257).
In my initial account of Radical Innocence I considered that ‘the child is radically innocent because it rejects accountability for the pain it is facing from the very beginning of its life’; but that was proved wrong based on Bond’s commentary and it was finally eliminated from the text. As Bond commented:

The neonate doesn’t reject accountability for pain. That is the whole point of humanness. The situation is more complicated. The neonate is the totality of everything and so it is the presence – and in totality that is: the cause – of pain. (Otherwise we simply apply post-monad logic to it – and the ultimate consequence of that is that fascism would be right because effective – its [sic] what I mean when I say that, if this were so, the trouble with Auschwitz would be not that it was wrong but that it was not effective, so make it effective – and structuralism and post-modernism have nothing to say against this.) So: the neonate cannot reject accountability but later must accommodate the Tragic and the Comic. (App. B, p.10)

The mistake here had to do with fully understanding the monad stage where there is no felt separation of the outer world and the self. If this is so the monad could not recognise that the pain is coming from any separated source. This is why it takes responsibility for the pain and hence later for accommodating the Tragic.

*The Palermo improvisation*

Bond (Bond, 1998a:248 – 251) mentions an example in order to clarify what Radical Innocence is and how it is expressed and thus identified. In a scheme of improvisation devised by him for students of Palermo University the participants, in the role of soldiers, faced an imaginary situation with a crucial inbuilt dilemma. They had orders to choose a baby from their street and kill it. The dramatic situation, though, was that there were only two babies in the street; one was the soldier’s brother and the other a neighbour’s. The dilemma that the students/soldiers faced was which one they would choose to kill after they had met both. Bond reveals that none of the students chose the baby which commonsense would lead one to expect, and moreover that all of
them were surprised by their final choice. Why had they chosen to kill their own
brother? Why didn’t they act in accordance with commonsense?

Their decision, according to Bond, is a fundamental paradox which is never absent
from our mind or from much or even all of what we do and it was rooted in their
radical innocence. The paradox that Bond refers to is:

… the sudden, dramatic assertion of radical innocence when it is confronted by
a conflict between itself and social teaching, which social teaching cannot
reconcile or conjure away (Bond, 1998a:258)

So, according to Bond’s explanation, the students felt or came face to face with the
conflict between their existential imperative to be at home in the world and the social
teaching which imposes values other than the ones they would have imagined by
themselves.

In order to explore in more depth what Bond intended with this improvisation, it
would be best to examine the dramatic dilemma of the Palermo improvisation from
both sides of its possible alternative resolutions, i.e. killing one’s own baby brother or
the neighbour’s. Of course there could be other alternatives as well, for example
disobeying completely the orders; but I would think that this was not permitted as a
possible alternative by the constraints of the dramatic condition of the improvisation.
As the playwright commented:

If the soldier does not kill one child then the army will kill both children as a
punishment for his or her insubordination. What the improvisation did was to
push the situation in its dramatic extreme where the self (actor) had to confront
himself/herself. (App. B, p.10)

Hence on the one hand killing the neighbour’s baby because you imagine you care for
your baby brother is actually comparable to what Nazis did in concentration camps
before they returned home and took care of their children. Although the Nazi example
may seem an extreme and distant case, it rather represents for Bond an ideologically defined ‘commonsensical’ action that is not inappropriate while describing our daily modern life. Indeed how many times have we habitually subjected ourselves to a similar social teaching, albeit with less visibly extreme consequences? In modern Greece, where financial crisis dominates cultural and psychological fields, the rise of the extreme far right party in recent elections, for the first time ever, who see the financial crisis as the effect of the presence of illegal immigrants, is in fact seeing our children as the ones which deserve to be saved at the expense of the ‘neighbour’s’; in this case the ‘fatherland’ metaphor may complete the picture. In fact their response to the current crisis is defined by an imaginary antagonism between ‘my children or theirs’, similar to the Palermo improvisation. They may even employ natural laws to justify the truthfulness of the dilemma. Adolf Hitler for example included the natural law of supremacy of species and antagonism in his propaganda in order to justify his plan to dominate and make extinct an ‘other’, something that the Greek extreme far right party may not deny either. The ideological ‘commonsensical’ actions are not restricted to some evidently severe situations, but rather pervade our daily life and condition what we accept as true, as was explained earlier, for example, with regard to the functions of metaphors.

Likewise in terms of the Palermo improvisation, in a hypothetical ideologised association of cause and effect the soldiers/students would have thought that because of their love and concern for their brothers they should kill an ‘other’. In that case a student’s imagination and reason, which are in charge of making the connections between causes and effects, are basically corrupted by conforming to authority and its dominant ideology. The connection of a cause, I need to save my brother, to a

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4 For further details on the Greek extreme far right ideas and tactics see YouTube, Parapolitiki (2011) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxUBr5_tczU,
particular ideologically fixed effect, so I kill the other, is not something that came out of their needs, by the correspondence of imagination and reason as in the monad stage above; it is rather prompted by the dominant ideology. Saving your loved sibling by killing another person is as ideologised a decision as killing for a ‘fatherland’. What is in fact happening in this case is that the student/soldier is accepting the dilemma as true, or that the dilemma exists as, more or less, naturally or otherwise prearranged. Cynically put, then, the validation of the particular action could have followed a ‘reasonable’ argument like ‘this is reality’ or ‘isn’t the same thing happening in nature already?’; ‘isn’t this already the way nature has evolved through the prevalence of the strongest?’; ‘isn’t it our instincts that anyway direct our actions?’; and finally ‘isn’t it what the competitive markets necessitate in order to manage to sustain our living?’ Pragmatic reasoning without Values would define it as ‘either you or me’. In fact such an ideological talk is plainly the consequence of substituting Values with the values of the markets and of ideology. This is what Bond would consider as the abandonment of imagination to authority. Hence, the first choice would have simply confirmed the corruption since, in ideological terms, you should have killed the other; this is its core axiom.

I understand that I am simplifying the case because killing another baby and not their brother doesn’t mean that the students would not have felt regrets; but this is not the point, because ideology and reason may support their psychology by justifying their choice anyway. On the other hand the above analysis might be charged with advocating psychological reductionism; but I don’t think that Bond is arguing for this. He is just focusing on how it is made possible for people to see reality through the social/ideological, or how the social may be reflected onto the personal.
At the same time, I don’t think that the Palermo improvisation aimed at activating students’ Radical Innocence in the sense of guiding them to make a supposedly ‘right’ choice. The objective of the improvisation was not to find a reasonable way to solve the constructed dilemma. This is not the intention of Bond’s theory and work in general. Even if we were trying to solve reasonably this ideologically-informed antagonism, we would actually be accepting its ideological dilemma and its impact as unavoidable as explained above. Moreover, the students’ actual choice is not considered by Bond as the ‘right’ or ‘good’ or the ‘preferable’ one, which was moreover based on reason alone. Such an interpretation would be as unsophisticated as ideological. Instead the aim of the improvisation was to reveal a paradox with which the specific ideology invests everyday lived experience, and which takes place largely unnoticed.

If viewed in light of a crude, ‘pure’ form of reason, whether students had chosen to kill any of these two babies it would have amounted to the same thing: a baby has been murdered and the mission is accomplished. But for Bond, as mentioned repeatedly above, this is not how human beings think. They would need an evaluation of the action, a complete, total explanation of the world and their experience in it, because their Radical Innocence would have demanded it. In these terms by killing their baby brother the soldiers/students are committing an incomprehensible act in terms of ideology; if we try to explain it by using the same ideology of competitiveness and antagonism, it obviously doesn’t make sense. Hence ideology and its ‘colonised’ reason appear rather inadequate to offer an effective explanation, since the action seems to resist any possible ideological justification.
The point I want to make is that it is only the second action that may offer a heightened awareness of the impact of ideology; only the second could have forced the students to reflect on why they were doing what they were, and subsequently to reflect on ideology as well. This is because it is an extremely Tragic choice, which involved them personally, and would have demanded more acutely a total explanation. But since there is no adequate ideologically-formed explanation the gap of meaning becomes more noticeable, or rather the vertigo of nothingness is deeply and existentially felt. Maybe this is what their feeling surprise, in Bond’s description, indicated.

Since the ideologically-formed reason is in essence bypassed by the dramatic condition, students are placed to a position comparable to the monad stage where ideology, culture and psychology are not apparent yet to inform evaluation, and the monad has an unmediated access to reality and the Tragic. Consequently they would have to evaluate it themselves or, in other words, they would have to employ their monadic ‘module’ formed by the cooperation of imagination and reason to assess why and how this action is taking place, to find its meaning and value. Radical Innocence and the improvisation in that sense did not or would not provide them with some given values, but rather coerced them to face the paradox and evaluate it anew by themselves. As Bond claims, human justice needs to be created and it is not innate (2001:25).

Hence if students would have chosen to kill the neighbour’s baby and then returned home and taken care of their baby brother, this would not imply that they made the ‘wrong’ choice but merely that the dramatic condition failed to reveal the paradox of living between ideology and our desire for justice and values. It would have failed to
reveal an ideology and a corrupted imagination which values homicide as caring and considers the specific choice as ‘rational’ and ‘commonsensical’. But with their actual choice, although not ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ yet again, the students have been obliged to ‘see’ the paradox of ideology and the Tragic situation which they and we are all put into, a choice which for Bond came from their radical innocence. In other words the paradox exposed Nothingness: it is made available, cognised, for the students to reflect on their present social condition.

In attempting a Bondian reading, their Radical Innocence denied that the ‘other’ is someone we are not responsible for. In a sense the student’s monad self, where the world and the self were seen as one, has entered their present condition and so they have felt responsible for the world as well, which is experienced as the ‘other’. Any crime against the world was felt as crime against the self. Any of the two babies would have been sensed metonymically as the other, and probably as all babies in the world including their own self. The students/soldiers have experienced the paradox of a situation where they are being forced to be murderers and carers at the same time, a paradox which is a ‘crux on which humanness is poised, an expression of the Radical Innocence which makes us human’ (Bond, 1998a:251). It is similar to a condition where a ‘madness self-shock can lead to knowledge’ (Bond, 1994:58). In that sense Radical Innocence becomes a force of reason (Bond, 1998a:255):

Radical innocence is radical because only philosophical answers can satisfy the questions of what, why, how (…). We are morally sane when our radical innocence is not turned into a mirror image of the distorted relations of unjust society. (ibid:264-265)

I think that Katafiasz (2008) was right when she argued that Bond is very much interested in such paradoxical acts, because these acts are seen as exposures of the ideological paradox we are living in, that by which the society which ‘creates us’
simultaneously ‘deforms us’ (Bond, 1998a:253-254), and these acts disclose Nothingness. Hence the Palermo students’ final choice was not in any sense the ‘right’ one because, for instance, students have demonstrated an almost ‘divine’ altruism for saving the other instead of their brother, as some Christian dogmas would have taught with the fable of offering the ‘other cheek’. It was the ‘right’ one only in the sense that the dramatic situation managed to address students’ Radical Innocence and forced the exposure of the madness behind ideology itself.

**Tracing radical innocence: beyond the instinctual and the cultural**

It needs to be noted, again, that Radical Innocence is not considered by the playwright as a kind of an instinctual response (App. B, p.9). If our values derived straightforwardly from our instincts, corruption, according to Bond, would have never existed (Bond, 1998b:83). Our instincts would have prevented us from committing crimes onto the world; our lives would approximate to the rest of the animals where change and history would never be possible or only environmentally initiated. Radical Innocence thus may be said to be the sort of agency, i.e., human, which, although it may originate with a ‘biological imperative’ (Bond, 1994:58), is not defined by or restricted to naturally-defined instinctual responses; it is not a natural state which exists outside history and society (Bond, 1998a:254). Given this, in what terms can we define it more fully?

Humanness for Bond is created by society (Bond, 1998a:249) through the attachment of ‘higher, learnt cortical synapses’, which may relate to values, to ‘lower brain’s functioning’, which may relate to instincts: ‘Our instincts become active only by being connected with analytical, interpretative feelings and images, and later concepts of the world’ (p.250). In fact our humanness is created by interpreting our instincts
and developing them into values: ‘whenever we act we must do so for human reasons and from human motives’ (ibid:249-250).

Instincts according to Bond do not threaten us but oblige us to be either ‘creative or destructive’ (Bond, 2001:136); in a sense we are compelled by them to find meaning about them, and this means that they do not have meaning or value in themselves. So how they are going to be expressed and what form they are going to take, creative or destructive, depends largely on our culture and the values we imagine.

In an older account (Bond, 1994) these two poles, instincts and values, are interpreted in terms of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ needs. ‘Primary’ needs are related to straightforward needs, as with those to ‘eat, copulate and shit’ (p.7), while ‘secondary’ needs relate to understanding and evaluation which correspond to the need for coherence through a total explanation of the world. The secondary needs perform the action of attaching values to primary needs; they interpret them, and so ‘they [our primary needs] become the meaning we give them’ (Bond, 1998a:264).

But there is a further complexity in the above version of needs because, as Bond mentions, any interpretation exceeds the scope of initial instinctual needs, like the predator and enemy example above, and very often, or even always, dominates them (Bond, 1994:7-8). Hence there is a surplus of meaning that does not fully overlap with the instincts. Actually these two, explanation and instincts, cannot completely fit or coincide. Such a coincidence could only occur in the imaginary wholeness of the monad stage, where representation and sensation were not differentiated yet. In that sense, instincts and how we interpret them are, as mentioned before, instrumental in creating the gap of meaning between nature and culture respectively, whereas Radical
Innocence is provoked at the point where Nothingness and the gap of meaning are straightforwardly felt and not made invisible by any ideology.

It may seem that this ‘surplus’ and the gap of meaning define how Radical Innocence is provoked but not how it exists. It could be explained as the need to match entirely the explanation of instincts to the experience of instincts, a need which in reality will never be fulfilled. Radical Innocence hence may be seen as the sense of incompleteness, the understanding of the inconsistency in any offered ideological explanation which distorts living and produces violence and ‘madness’. If something wasn’t felt as lacking or missing, then history would have stood still. Furthermore it is Bond who claimed that ‘Story begins in the realization of loss’ (Bond, 2000a:129), or when the monad is irrevocably split. Hence Radical Innocence may perhaps be understood as a desire to make the description feel complete once more. As Bond mentions:

The need for justice, for coherence, is consequent on the child’s situation: it is a reaction that becomes, through experience, inevitable [sic] a desire. Ultimately it is the desire to be human, which we are not. (Bond, 2001:50).

But could this desire be defined in Lacanian terms of desire, as Katafiasz (2008) argues, and be located in the unconscious? As mentioned in the first part of the literature review, for Katafiasz the ‘spectral’ phenomena are based on bodily experiences which cannot be ‘structured by symbolic mechanisms or rationalised’ and do not fit with ‘social understanding’ (p.244). They are ‘residues’ which may correspond to Bond’s excesses of meaning; they do not coincide with experience and exist in a ‘sort of “gap” between bodily experience and symbolic mechanisms’ (ibid:245). Hence they are uncontrollable by social reality and, subsequently, by ideology (ibid), and they take the form of an unsatisfied desire. Bond for his part
never explicitly located Radical Innocence within the unconscious; but in another text
he described the unconscious in a rather comparable way:

Our unconscious is not more animal than our conscious, it is often even more
human. The unconscious sees through us and our social corruption and sends us
messages of our humanity, ingeniously and persistently trying to reconcile the
divisive tensions in our lives. Our unconscious makes us sane; it is only in an
insane society that our unconscious colludes in insanity. (Bond, 1998a:250)

In addition, in another of his letters Bond argues that, ‘What Freud calls our atavistic
unconscious is really the home of our humanity – the early archaeology is a “demand”
built into us (the child must function, must know)’ (Bond, 2001:49). This ‘demand’
corresponds obviously to the conviction of Radical Innocence to be in the world by
evaluating it which is built in early childhood. The later statements are rather the
clearest correlations between Radical Innocence and the unconscious offered in
Bond’s writings, but again we cannot conclude from this that Radical Innocence is
identical to the Lacanian definition of desire. The trouble becomes even more
complicated if we read another fairly mystifying extract by Bond:

The imagination always needs freedom to build its prisons (...) and a residual
freedom to maintain them. (...) I’ve related this existential freedom to
something I called “radical innocence” (...) we must always make an
imaginative apprehension of the world and this leaves a gap which cannot be
included in the incarceration by authority. Ideology builds prisons but it always

Hence any imaginative apprehension of reality is compared to a ‘prison’ that
corresponds to culture, which controls the way we think and understand the world.
But concurrently, no imaginative apprehension coincides with experience as
explained above. This disparity escapes the control of ideology and hence generates
‘holes’ on the ‘representational wall’ of the cultural and ideological ‘prison’. In the
above extract these ‘holes’ constitute the ‘residual freedom’ which may relate to
radical innocence. But in this sense if Radical Innocence is understood as a desire
formed by the disparity between experience and the excesses of meaning, then Katafiasz (2008) perhaps makes a good point in defining it in terms of Lacanian residues (p.244), despite Bond’s never explicitly making this connection himself. Perhaps a comparison, at this point, with the Lacanian theory of the ‘real’ and of ‘residue’ which form the unconscious desire may offer a different perspective on Bond’s work as a whole, or help further to clarify his theory through discovering differences between them.

**A short input from Lacanian theory**

In Lacanian theory the ‘real’ is defined as one of the three orders or modes of experience of human beings, which bears some partial resemblance to the monad stage in Bond. The ‘real’ is defined as an ‘ontological absolute, a true being-in-itself’ (Meyerson quoted in Evans, 1996:159) which is unrepresentable in language or any other signifying system (Fink, 1995:25). It is the experience of reality that the neonate has before language is acquired, therefore before representation could be possible, where the distinction between internal and external world makes no sense. To put it more clearly, in Lacanian theory the ‘real’ is the ‘infant’s body “before” it comes under the sway of the symbolic order, before it is (…) instructed in the ways of the world’ (Fink, 1995:24). Interestingly the possible encounter with the ‘real’ is not confined to the first years of the neonate but extends to adulthood. Every bodily experience may be located within the ‘real’ before it is expressed in words and symbols. The last comment could be applied just as well to the monad’s continuous existence in Bond’s theory; but for Lacanian theory, there is no reference to a module or proto-meaning, as there is in Bond. The ‘real’ exists in or as a total absence of
meaning.

Bond’s pre-real stage, meanwhile, may be compared to the second order of Lacanian theory, the ‘imaginary’, which is identified with the mirror stage. The mirror stage defines the process whereby the infant encounters its image in a mirror and through a ‘dialectic of identification with its mirror image’ it begins to construct its ego or ‘Ideal-I through the projection of ideas upon the object in the mirror’ (Baily, 2009:91-92). At the stage of six months the child, although it doesn’t have mastery over its body, has a more advanced vision and can identify itself in visible ‘mirrors’. These mirrors are constituted by any person that can be perceived, most commonly by the gaze of the mother, and present an image of a supposed wholeness which the child is missing in reality. Hence the child imagines these ‘mirroring’ objects as reflecting a wholeness of itself, and this identification produces a ‘triumphant jubilation and playful discovery’ (Lacan, 1989:31):

What I have called the mirror stage is interesting in that it manifests the effective dynamism by which the subject originally identifies himself with the visual Gestalt of his own body: in relation to the still very profound lack of co-ordination of his own motility, it represents an ideal unity, a salutary imago’ (ibid)

The ‘imaginary’ order is constituted basically by ‘ideas’ or better images of itself as signifieds, which are still not completely captured by language; they do not have corresponding signifiers, and are yet to be expressed in words. But the crucial point is that at this stage the split of the subject is taking place. The child identifies with something that it is outside of itself, an ‘other’ from which it is obviously separated. The neonate no longer experiences the wholeness of the ‘real’, the absolute being-in-itself, since it starts identifying itself with an external ‘other’, which is identified in Lacanian theory with the ‘little other’ (Bailly, 2009:128). The adoption of its
objectified image is the beginning of a life-long reflection upon itself which founds the subject in an ‘intellectual, schismatic act’ (ibid:31). Although this is a profoundly alienating experience, and ‘the beginnings of a series of untruths’, it equips the child, as in Bond’s pre-real stage, for entry to the last order which is the ‘symbolic’, the cultural and social realms (ibid:30). In short the ego is founded on some imaginary identifications with external images, which do not correspond to the child’s own reality, and they become a form of the object of desire, the ‘petit a’. But this alienated identity according to Lacan (1989) eventually becomes a rigid structure that masks ‘the subject’s entire mental development’ (p.18).

The third Lacanian order is the ‘symbolic’ which relates to culture, or the ‘big other’, as it interprets and symbolises the ‘real’. But in this process where the ‘real’ is interpreted in terms of social signifiers, the ‘symbolic’ ‘never drains all of the real into the symbolic order; a residuum is always left.’ (Fink, 1995:26). According to Fink (ibid) the original ‘real’ or real₁ is transformed into real₂ (p.27) which never coincides with the original one:

We can think of the real as being progressively symbolized in the course of a child’s life, (…) though it can never all be drained away, neutralized, or killed. There is thus always a remainder which persists alongside the symbolic. (ibid).

The whole process approximates the feeling of something missing when we are trying to put into words any of our experiences, for example an accident. We always feel that we haven’t captured our bodily experience entirely in words; words seem not enough. This example though refers immediately to a consciously-felt missing part, whereas in Lacanian theory the vast majority of the remainders go mostly unnoticed. Ultimately Lacan explains that these missing parts of experience in representation shape the desire in the unconscious, and it is based on the relationship between need,
which is understood as a purely biological instinct (Evans, 1996:37), and its articulation in demand which in fact is removed from the original appetite: ‘Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need’ (Lacan, 2006:689). Fink (1995) offers a readily understandable example to illustrate the point. In sum, when a baby is born, it does not have ownership of the world it comes into. Since it doesn’t yet have a language and a capable body with which to express and satisfy its own needs, it relies entirely on others. Furthermore it is entering into a linguistic universe and therefore into a series expectations that belongs to its parents, not to itself. In order to manage to express their wishes, children are obliged to ‘go beyond the crying stage’ so they can be understood by their primary caretakers. They need in other words to learn and adapt to the linguistic universe that belongs to others. But:

Their wants are, however, molded [sic] in that very process, for the words they are obliged to use are not their own and do not necessarily correspond to their own particular demands: the very desires are cast in the mold [sic] of the language or languages they learn. (ibid:6)

Thus when a baby cries its caretakers can only guess why it is doing so. They may think for example that it is hungry and so they may feed it. But nothing can ensure anyone that this was the real reason and thus the initial need; where it may express a demand, the demand is interpreted according to what the cry is supposed to mean. Hence they project their own interpretation and desires onto the baby’s needs. So gradually if any cry is interpreted as a cry for food, then the original need, which originally we could never know, is moulded into hunger: ‘meaning in this situation is thus determined not by the baby but by other people, and on the basis of the language they speak.’ (Fink, 1995:6). In fact Lacan’s view, as Fink mentions, is even more radical in the sense that no one, even the child itself, can discern what was the initial
need before language is learned (ibid), which means in fact that there is no way we can ever grasp the original need. This process describes indeed a process of alienation ‘in and by language’ (ibid:49), a commonplace occurrence where the child on the one hand gains subjectivity but at the same time loses its initial absolute state of the ‘real’. The whole process illustrates in effect a traumatic experience of alienation and separation from the ‘real’, while the child is being subordinated to the ‘symbolic’ order, or in other words to the social ‘big other’ or ‘Other’. The child always loses in the struggle with the Other; psychosis would prevail if the Other was to be defeated (ibid). Desire and the formation of the subject come as a consequence of this course of subordination: ‘Without language there would be no desire as we know it (…) nor there would be any subject as such’ (ibid). Ultimately the ‘symbolic’ is identified with the social world, the ‘big other’, as it interprets and symbolises the ‘real’ in signifiers which do not belong to the child but are imposed by culture. The Lacanian ‘symbolic’ is rather similar to Bond’s stage where the child enters fully into the world of culture and adapts to its values and ways of ‘seeing’. But as mentioned above when the ‘real’ is transformed into social signifiers, the ‘symbolic’ ‘never drains all of the real into the symbolic order; a residuum is always left.’ (Fink, 1995:26). We have seen above that the same is true for Bond’s theory with its notions of the surplus of meaning.

Furthermore Stavrakakis (2007) argues that Lacan ‘stresses the theme of lack’. The subject ‘is lacking exactly because it is unable to recapture her lost/impossible real fullness through symbolic creation or imaginary representation’. For Stavrakakis the suspension of recapturing the ‘impossible real’ is what ‘keeps desire alive and socio-political creation open’ (pp.48-49):

The price for gaining access to reality (predominantly symbolic reality, socially constructed reality) is the sacrifice of the real of need. We are forced to look for
it within the symbolic, soon to realise that no identification, no social construction or relation, no Other, can fully restore or recapture it for us. But it is exactly this impossibility, this lack in the Other, which keeps desire – and history – alive. We never get what we have been promised, what we were expecting from the Other, but that’s exactly why we keep longing for it. Alienation is thus revealed as the other side – but also, and more crucially, the condition of possibility – of desire, of human creation and historical action. (ibid:47)

There are however some serious problems with identifying Bond’s Radical Innocence with Lacanian desire. The most serious is that Radical Innocence for Bond is not described as a product of alienation when the neonate submits to the social; rather it exists before the dominion of the ‘symbolic’ or of the imaginary identifications in the mirror stage. It seems that Radical Innocence could be linked to the primary drive which attempts to establish communication with caretakers in order to satisfy needs, or even to the primary need to identify with an imaginary totality in the mirror stage in order to imaginarily attain a supposed coherence, both processes or stages taken for granted by Lacanian theory. I believe that this is in the end the area of radical innocence, in Bond’s claim, and not the residues of experience.

In Lacanian theory, the demand is not identical with our needs, and forms desire soon after, but the initial needs are never to be captured. In Bond there is a ‘built demand’ even in the very first stages of a newborn and this is clearly defined as a need to be in the world, a need which attends the very fact of consciousness. This ‘built demand’ may however create more questions than answers. In a later commentary on Radical Innocence and the present text Bond claims that:

It’s a scientific cliché that the infant has the mind of a wild animal and it must be socialised. But if you took an animal you might tame and train it but you could never turn its mind into a human mind. The human mind is different. It can be taught a culture but what is it in the mind that makes this possible? The mind has to be pre-cultural but have the ability to receive a culture. It is not like a piece of wood which could be carved into a figure. There must be an appetence for culture. There are mental events but also other mental events that
are conscious of the first events – and further, consciousness can then think about itself. This ability for this second and third order cant [sic] be taught and this in itself opens a gap. The mind is conscious of a body pp (pleasure and pain) but also of itself. This capacity must be innate in the mind because it is of a different order to “what,” to the materiality of the world. A pain may be seen to have a cause (that stone) but the innate capacity has no cause. This is the innateness of being human. It accompanies (and directs) all experience. (App. B, p.7)

But as we are going to see in the next section, the above formulation of ‘an appetite for culture’ may provoke viable criticism.

Radical Innocence is the struggle for coherence, for a total explanation of the world and itself. So for Bond Radical Innocence is defined clearly as the ‘demand’ to be in the world which exists before alienation takes place, and which continues to endure after the split of imagination and reason by the imposition of ideology; but it takes different forms in each stage, from the right to live to the need for justice. Hence Radical Innocence pre-exists: it is not certain that it is located in the unconscious, as seen previously. It may be connected with a desire to be human and with a desire for justice; I doubt, however, that, at least in the way Bond describes it, it is formed in such a way as to be equated or conflated with Lacanian desire.

Neither theory considers desire or Radical Innocence respectively as sources of value, but as the driving forces for creativity that are always in a constant endeavour: to capture the impossible ‘real’, for Lacanians, or reality for Bond. But for Lacanian theory this impossibility is based on the idea that any creation cannot be understood outside alienation, and thus it should not be ‘glorified’; alienation and creation are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Stavrakakis, 2007:48-49). For Bond, on the other hand, although there is a similar condition where there is a continuous surplus of meaning that never corresponds precisely to our needs, alienation is created by ideology and authority, and creativity is regarded as a fundamental possibility of the human being.
So for Bond our society changes rapidly and substantially and ‘People need to be responsible for change, to understand and evaluate it and when possible to initiate it by anticipating necessity’ (Bond, 1992:40). In this process children should be helped to ‘make change more human’ and become ‘members of a critical culture’ (p.40), which is defined as capable of maintaining stability and accommodating and legitimising change. In a sense this society could accommodate conflict over values and recreate meanings according to the ever-changing material conditions that are generated by new technology. Children according to Bond bring to society the much needed change-precipitating conflict by asking fundamental but philosophical questions; these questions place them in a constant conflict with authority and ideology. For Bond two problems face us:

How to protect the world from the market’s ravages – and how to protect the change of cultural renewal and creation that children give us. Their conflictual need creates knowledge and human-value out of our material necessity. Children bear witness to our humanity. We must help them to do this in ways that test and legitimize their conflict or we dehumanize the future. Crises would no longer provoke our strengths but find out our weaknesses and destroy us. (ibid:46)

It thus seems that for Bond, if a society is open to changes and to conflict over meaning and values, then the split between imagination and reason doesn’t have to be an endless state but rather a temporary possibility. This society is not seen in terms of utopian ‘perfectness’ but as a society and a culture capable of facilitating change and new challenges, where the Tragic is always present and Nothingness always on display. Bond looks for a society where we can be as human as possible in the face of the ever-changing material conditions; such a society could be instituted and maintained only where people can be open to radical innocence: ‘The problem is how we can relate innocently to our society? – only when we can do that will society be radical and released from corruption.’ (Bond, 1998b:83).
**Criticism on radical innocence**

On the other hand if Radical Innocence is defined as something pre-existing the ‘symbolic’, an ‘appetence for culture’, which means pre-existing any contact with culture, then it is not without possible criticism and problems. The most important of them is that the theory may be in danger of losing its materialist foundation if there are immediate references to a putative appetence for culture which predates the constitution of the subject or its initiation into the cultural network. I believe it would be very useful at this point to try to clarify the difficulties and complexities of Bond’s idea of Radical Innocence by bringing into the discussion – since they seem to relate to both theories, Lacanian and Bondian – the arguments of Castoriadis.

**A brief input from Castoriadis’ theory**

In general Castoriadis (1987), like Bond and Lacan, accepts the idea that human beings are created by culture. For Castoriadis however the ‘core’ of the subject is occupied by the monadic pole and radical imagination, rather than desire in Lacan or Radical Innocence and the monadic module in Bond. The monadic pole is also rendered impossible to recapture after alienation takes place:

This being of the psyche is governed at one of its poles by the primal unconscious, which is the monadic core of the psyche and which has never been repressed but instead rendered impossible – unpresentable – from the moment a world of diversity and of displeasure has been set up (ibid:298).

For Castoriadis the monadic core of the subject constitutes a desire which is ‘master of all desires, of total unification’ (ibid) and it is indestructible (ibid:296). The first monadic mode of ‘originary [sic] being of the psyche’ contains the first ‘matrix of meaning’ (ibid:299), a kind of a proto meaning, similar to Bond’s module, which is
created by a ‘radical imagination’ that ‘pre-exists and presides over every organization of drives, even the most primitive ones’ (ibid:287) and which additionally pre-exists socialisation. Moreover for Castoriadis (1997a) ‘the psyche is in meaning’ (377). But the original monadic meaning is negated by socialisation, during which society imposes its own meaning on it; still, it is never fully abandoned, similar once more to Bond’s module and radical innocence: ‘Socialisation is the process whereby the psyche is forced to abandon (never fully) its pristine solipsistic meaning for the shared meanings provided by society’ (Castoriadis, 1997b:331). After the monadic core of the psyche is broken up by the imposition of the other ‘it is forever thrown off-centre in relation to itself, oriented in terms of that which it is no longer, which is no longer and can no longer be. The psyche is its own lost object.’ (Castoriadis, 1987:296-297). Castoriadis (1987) however argues for an ‘Ego of autonomy’, a human agency which is based on the monadic pole that establishes a different relation to the Other than either trying to eliminate it or conforming to it (ibid:104), not as an ‘absolute Self’ but as an ‘active and lucid agency that constantly reorganises its contents’ (ibid:106).

Obviously Castoriadis’s theory overlaps largely with Bond’s; but in Bond the role of radical imagination is performed by radical innocence. The difference between these two terms hinges on the idea that Radical Innocence expresses a need that drives imagination, whereas radical imagination rather seems autonomous and self-initiating. Castoriadis is however heavily criticised by one of the Lacanian exponents, Stavrakakis (2007), and I believe that the same criticism could be applied, to some extent, to Bond’s theory as well. Stavrakakis rejects Castoriadis’ autonomy of the Ego based on radical imagination and the monadic core, arguing that these two describe a
‘psyche totally enclosed on itself’ (Leledakis quoted in Stavrakakis, 2007:47-49) which in fact would contradict Castoriadis’ argument for the importance of culture in structuring subjects, and is certainly in opposition to Lacanian scepticism about autonomy. Moreover the proto-meaning doesn’t make sense in the context of the monad where, according to Castoriadis, meaning ‘cannot yet exist’ (quoted in Stavrakakis, 2007:52).

It seems that the human agency is also obvious to Bond but, I would assume, with a slightly different basis than for Castoriadis, whom the playwright argues ‘is in error when he talks of the prior solipsistic state of the psyche’ (App. B, p.10). Consciousness and its concomitant Radical Innocence constitute rather the foundation of this agency which is created through the experience of pain and pleasure. It is true that this creation does not come from a primary contact with culture but from a state wherein the monad is imagining itself as a ‘whole with the world’. But on the other hand from the beginning the monad is not wholly ‘self-sufficient’ but is caught up in an ongoing dialectic with the world. As mentioned above, what is thought is not important at all; it is the mode of thinking that establishes the everlasting module of thought as an active agency which the right to be in the world entails.

Bond argues for an acceptance of responsibility for change and judgement in a way that follows, though at this point only, the Kantian tradition of the need for maturity. ‘Good’ behaviour is not evidence of innocence for Bond; even if we disagree with cruelty this doesn’t make us ‘good’: we need to understand the motive behind this behaviour (Bond, 1998b:82), and Bond argued that ‘we must accept the heaviness of history and the burden of our own innocence’ (Bond, 2001:54). As Immanuel Kant (in Cahoone, 1996) has argued in An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?
maturity is not a matter of dogmas and formulas that are blindly followed by human beings but the ability ‘to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another.’ (p.51). A revolution, for Kant, ‘may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking.’ (ibid:51-53). Similarly Bond insists on human beings using their own imagination and reason to create values, rather than relying merely on dogmas created by others, most especially by ideology; the motive for so doing lies in radical innocence. Corruption of imagination is considered to be the ‘desire to escape from the self and abandon autonomy to authority’ (Bond, 2003:105).

It may seem at this point that Bond’s theory is close to the Romantic Movement; but the playwright denies such a connection:

I don’t imagine that children are innocent in the romantic sense: if they are angels then they are fiery angels. Innocence is the child’s knowledge – its ontological knowledge – not its practice. (Bond, 1998b:83)

On the other hand the subject in Bond’s theory cannot be taken as independent of culture. As seen earlier, for example, instincts do not have meaning by themselves; they acquire meaning through culture. Radical Innocence is the motivation to be in the world by judging, something which is formed in living and not pre-existing it. How it is going to be expressed though is dependent, as seen above, on a rather complex relationship and conflict between culture, material reality and radical innocence.

Radical Innocence differs from the Lacanian desire since it is present and active before the cultural contact takes place, though it also gets involved with the ‘holes on the walls’ of meaning. Castoriadis’ idea of radical imagination more closely approximates Bond’s radical innocence, but again there are some vital differences in
relation to their ontology and how they relate to the autonomy of the subject. Ultimately Radical Innocence seems to be a very distinctive term.

Bond commented that he wants to make clear that ‘RI [Radical Innocence] is not an instinct but is created by the neonate’s reality – so that its [sic] more like a habit of living’ (App. B, p.11). It cannot however be proved that it exists at any given moment, in the same way that the unconscious or desire cannot be proved. Unfortunately Bond’s description of an ‘appetence for culture’ and an ‘innateness of being human’ (App. B, p.7) still create serious problems in identifying or agreeing with it. Doubtless the present study has not managed to coherently identify Radical Innocence with any known term in the work of other authors, and this lack of acceptably synonymous terms in wider literature is why it needs further research.

1.2.3 The role of drama

Reason for Bond is emphatically the seeking of justice, an operation that is immediately connected with the logic of imagination as a manifestation of our need to be in the world, our radical innocence. But, as the playwright argues, in our modern world capitalism alienates people from their own imagination by diverting it into consumption. Thereby, authority takes responsibility and reduces human beings to an animal-like state. However he claims that ‘we cannot be free and human till imagination is autonomous’ (Bond, 1995a:xxxii); this is why he regards it as the task of imagination to seek reason as an imperative. Such a mission is closely related to whether we accept the responsibility of interpreting reality and our experience of it, or if we accept the ‘burden’ of history and of our radical innocence.

As mentioned earlier, terms like the Tragic and Comic, stories, anthropomorphism and Cathexis indicate a dramatic centre in the child. Indeed from the domain of
psychology Bruner (2002) offers interesting testimony as to the centrality of dramatic structures from early childhood, arguing that they suggest a kind of ‘theatrical precocity’ from the start of children’s’ lives (p.32). Earlier Bruner (in Bruner and Haste, 1987) drew an even clearer analogy between drama and the development of the self:

Insofar as we account for our own actions and for the human events that occur around us principally in terms of narrative, story, drama, it is conceivable that our sensitivity to narrative provides the major link between our own sense of self and our sense of others in the social world around us. (p.94)

Ultimately drama for Bond originates in the child (Bond, 2000a:14), and it combines imagination and reason in a relationship where each complements and informs the other. Hence it is not an added luxury but a manifestation of our need to be in the world, of our radical innocence. For Bond we need to dramatise ourselves and our situations (ibid:1) because in this way we can understand ourselves and what we do. This is why drama can deal with the problems of being human (ibid). Consequently he regards drama and children’s struggle to make sense of the world and ‘bear witness to life’ almost as synonyms. According to his writings, dramatic structures can accommodate children’s questioning of the dominant culture while they are entering it, and harness their capacity to be critical. Ultimately the playwright reserves for drama a special function in relation to culture and the audience. He defines its role as emanating from meeting the needs of the audience as a ‘site of imagination’ (Bond, 2000a:10) where, together with reason, they can approach reality anew, and ‘reconnect the mind with reality’ (Katafiasz in Davis, 2005:44). In fact Bond aims at creating dramatic conditions in his theatre which approximate our immediate contact with reality, with the Tragic and with Nothingness, without ideology getting involved in the way or approximating the monad stage. He then requires a theatre for our
modern era that enables imagination ‘to take the journeys reason will have to take’ (Bond, 1994:157), a theatre that ‘invoke[s] reason and emotion, image and philosophy’ (Bond, 1996c:15). As Katafiasz has argued:

As soon as we combine the rational with the imaginative we are in the realm of the ‘dramatic’. It is how we connect our minds with the world around us. It is like revisiting, in a mature way, the state of Leibnitz’s ‘Monad’ or neonate, who cannot distinguish between the self and the world (Katafiasz in Davis, 2005:206)

Bond believes that people should retain and maintain the ability to invent new stories for our era, since the current ones are not only obsolete but owned mostly by authority, and so generate madness and violence instead of reason. Obviously this is a political aspiration, but the author does not aim at teaching or showing to audience how to change by replacing the ‘mad’ stories with some ‘reasonable’ ones in his plays. Bond developed a rather distinct method for the treatment of the ideological stories and the values communicated in them which as mentioned above are attached to the self as its ‘second skin’. He certainly chooses not simply to condemn or criticise these stories by addressing the audience’s reason on the grounds that, to a great extent, such an open attack could be perceived as an attack on the self of the viewers and could have forced them to defend the stories in order to sustain their self-image, relying therefore on an already corrupted reason. As Bond argues: ‘Reflection and argument may change the appearance of what happens but they cannot undo corruption and are corruptible themselves.’ (Bond, 2011:xxii). It is like asking of a blind person that he ‘see’. Bond’s theatre would rather build gradually for his audience what the playwright thinks is the ideological madness present in their lives, asking them to judge and create new values by themselves. The Palermo improvisation is an adequate opening example where there was a dilemma which did not teach or indicate what the students should do, but addressed their Radical
Innocence and exposed the ideological madness of a social condition. As mentioned above the gap of meaning ought always to be open in Bond’s practice, for the audience to fill in.

Obviously the possibility of human agency is noticeable in Bond’s theory and practice; there is however an important matter to consider at this point. His choice brings him into conflict with modern trends in theatre which developed in response to post-structuralism and post-modernism. As seen in the first part of the literature review, there is common disagreement in relation to how Bond’s practice relates to post-structuralism. For this reason I am going to offer another input in order first to present these trends, and afterward compare them with Bond’s practice.

A brief input from critical theory and modern theatre

One of the most typical exponents of post-structuralism in the context of theatre, Auslander (1997), claimed that traditional theatre is founded primarily on ‘logocentrism’ and as such it is ‘theological’ (pp.28-30) in its essence. The basic premise of logocentrism is the postulation that meaning is produced by the immediate correlation between signifiers to some stable signifieds. However this premise was deeply challenged by post-structuralism for which the relation between a signifier and a signified is regarded as arbitrary (Sarup, 1993:32-34).

Still, as Auslander (ibid) argues, this logocentric ‘theological’ practice, which fashioned major acting styles like the one in the theatre of Stanislavsky as well as of Brecht, has an ‘authoritative presence’ given that it regards the responsibility of actors, directors and playwrights as therapeutic for the audience (pp.27-28). Hence Bourdieu (quoted in Hornbrook, 1998) claims that this form of art becomes a
Some relevant examples of applying the paradigm of post-structuralism in the context of theatre include practitioners, like Gerald Rabkin, who used post-structuralism to ‘deconstruct the authorial control and the stability of the written text in theatre which gives way to the dispersion, discontinuity and dissemination of open interpretation’, or, like Elinor Fuchs, who in the place of speech and presence posits a ‘theatre of Absence’ (Fortier, 1997:40). Hence post-structuralism gave rise to a new paradigm for theatre which is described by some authors as ‘postdramatic’. Lehmann (2006) proposes that with the advent of new technologies ‘the written text and the book are being called into question’ and in addition the mode of perception shifts from the linear-successive to ‘a simultaneous and multi-perspectival form of perceiving’ (p.16). Consequently theatre abandons some of the traditional elements of the dramatic form like the narrative, the objectives and their conflict, mimesis, dramatic action as ‘the image of the dialectics of human experience, suspense (p.69) as well as the imperativeness of the tragic (p.42) which is, as we saw above, still crucial in Bond’s theory and practice. In fact the new paradigm differentiates theatre from drama and thus attempts to ‘operate beyond drama’ (p.27), and develops mainly via Schechner’s performative dimension of the game instead of the story (p.26). The postdramatic theatre ‘no longer serves the purpose of theoretical concepts to sharpen perception but instead obstructs the cognition of theatre, as well as the theatre text’ (p.34). Within the above described context of current condition, perception has shifted so much that:

… while the drama of modern times was based on a human being that constituted itself through interpersonal rapport, the postdramatic theatre
Lehmann (ibid) argued that the new theatre is in fact a post-Brechtian development in the sense that it generates a kind of epicization of its form by keeping the strategy of interrupting the story but, on the other hand, puts away ‘the political style, the tendency towards dogmatisation, and the emphasis on the rational’ connected to Brechtian theatre (p.33). But ultimately the political, it is argued, is not absent from the postdramatic paradigm. The departure from the traditional dramatic forms is that it is provoked not by a direct political thematic or by producing political meaning, but through the implicit content of its representation which shows, destabilises and interrupts, for example, the performativity of ideologies like ‘nationalism, racism, sexism or ageism’ and is located in perception itself, ‘as a poetic interruption [sic] of the law and therefore of politics’ (Jurs-Munby cited in Lehmann, 2006:6).

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<td>Lehmann, ibid: 182</td>
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Considered in the light of the above account, it seems that for postdramatic theatre the foundation of Bond’s theory of drama as a basis of human and social thinking, perception and change is out of date. Moreover it could be considered at first sight, from the same postdramatic perspective, as a reactionary approach. Furthermore for the post-structuralist standpoint ‘reason’ in Bond’s statement would stand for authority, repression, law, established order, power and so on, while the possibility of reason is commonly refuted. In some critiques in this tradition, the fragmented subject would be celebrated instead for offering a chance of coherence. Thus any option of forming stories and values is treated with suspicion and incredulity, and any promising story is instead used in an attempt to expose the ideological formations behind it and the exercise of power over individuals. In a corresponding approach, even though not coming from the same trend, Allen (2007), for example, considered
Bond’s *The Children* as a new of form of a traditional Brechtian style intended for teaching young people (p.133).

It is true that Bond’s theory and practice could hardly be characterised as being part of the post-structuralist movement or postdramatic theatre. There are some important similarities, for example the acceptance of the fluidity of the sign or of the ‘palimpsest self’, where the subject is seen as multilayered; but radical innocence, as it is explained above, does not in any sense fit into the general post-structuralist picture.

Indeed the crucial feature which locates Bond outside post-structuralism is that the author insists on the possibility of a human agency which is not based on reason alone. On the other hand, Radical Innocence is not a source of value but of the need to value, and nevertheless there is no transcendental truth to refer to, no centre in the psyche which demonstrates how we should behave: the subject, culture and values are in a constant state of change and renewal. This is indeed a balancing act by Bond; but the way he describes Radical Innocence does not fit with either post-structuralism or any assumed ‘theological’ tendency. I would think therefore that Katafiasz rather misinterprets the nature of Radical Innocence when she locates Bond in the post-structuralist terrain. The playwright himself clearly refuses the label ‘post-structuralist’ (Davis, 2009:lili in footnotes)

Furthermore, in relation to the tragic that in Lehman’s account is abandoned by postdramatic theatre, we have already seen how it is still important for Bond. The Tragic is fundamental in his theory since this is the way human beings manage to invent stories and values and moreover provoke change.

Likewise in relation to the possible theological charges, Bond’s plays do not offer an alternative story, a teaching or a doctrinal point to be assimilated by audiences.
Stories, although clearly present, are there not in order to stand as didactic or ‘health giving’, but are used in order to leave a gap for audience’s need and ability to modify them. This is the equivalent to opening up a gap in the story in order to sustain our aptitude for change and for cultural renewal. Reason and its exhibition in stories for Bond, as mentioned above, is not a matter of the rational contemplation of reality, but instead a process that involves imagination, emotions and values. Bond does not dismiss the imperativeness of a story in offering a possible coherence and an explanation of the world we live in, but neither is he accepting it as given or as unalterable; stories are always under reconsideration. The playwright describes a continuous process, rather than a closure as Lamb (2005:37) claimed, which is based on contemporary experience, culture and reality where audiences are taking an active role in the construction of the drama.

Furthermore Bond’s practice does not interrupt the story as postdramatic theatre would do. I would think that Bond’s theatre is closer to what Counsel (1996) called the radical stance, where the artists struggle to reveal the ideology behind the constructed meaning (p.205); but again, his plays would try to go further than this and provoke an audience not only to see the ideology but to feel the gap of meaning and recreate values. Ultimately the audience members have a decisive part in Bond’s plays, and hence the most important question we need to answer for understanding how Bond’s theory informs or relates to his practice is how his plays engage the audience with the story told in a drama. The playwright has developed his own distinct strategy, with its core principles and dramatic techniques, in order to create a dramatic context where access to the monad stage earlier described is made possible.
From the preliminary research the main elements to be examined here are: the Story, Centre, Drama Event, Extreme, Accident Time, Cathexis, Invisible Object, Enactment and the Site. Enactment was not included initially in the list, but in the process of analysing the data in the case study later it was revealed that it is actually one of the fundamental elements for Bondian practice. So its definition was later added to the list which follows in the next sub-chapter.

1.2.4 Drama principles and devices

a) Story

The usage of apparently recognisable stories as a starting-point is probably one of the stepping-stones in Bond’s attempt to bypass ideology; it might also be held one of the elements that distinguish his work from postdramatic theatre. Most of his plays are based on a strong and comprehensible story line (Davis, 2009:xliv), where the plot is apparently linear and straightforward. Furthermore the plays seem to address the audience’s personal life and knowledge of a situation. In *The Children* (Bond, 2000b), Joe is a young person who in the first scene violates his puppet, and struggles with himself to get rid of it under the pressures of his mother’s will and his own growing up. In the first scene of *Eleven Vests* (Bond, 1997a), a head teacher is striving to make a student apologise for a destroyed book. In the very beginning of *The Under Room* (Bond, 2006) a woman enters a cellar holding a supposed young robber caught by her in her house. All of the above plays were written initially for young audiences or performers, and obviously bear some immediate resemblance to their lives and experience.

At the same time, the Story does not exhaust the description of the whole practice in itself. The intention is not accomplished simply by the creation of an apparently well-
made plot. As the author explicitly states, modern drama should not be created by the Story (Bond, 2000a:47).

Initially using a noticeably realistic Story line is one of the bedrocks in Bondian practice; but it works more as a starting-point for the audience rather than the ultimate aim of a drama. Furthermore, Bond may include in his plays unexpected elements which could not be comprehended rationally, such as ghosts in *The Children* (op.cit.) and in *The Fool* (Bond, 1987) or time and space overlapping in *At The Inland Sea* (Bond, 1997b), where a gas chamber from WWII coexists in the room of a teenager who prepares to take a history test in school in the present; or even a lifeless object, as in *The Under Room* (op.cit.), where a young immigrant is ‘performed’ by a dummy and a dummy-actor. The Bondian play usually is built around and develops as a comprehensible Story, but with the intention of creating a moment or moments where it would be possible to open up a gap of meaning through which the audience could ‘see’ and judge for themselves and not accept the stories as ‘natural’ occurrences. These gaps are likened to a ‘crucible’ where the crucial moments, the events, are examined by breaking them into component parts and using them for interpretation in relation to their causes or to other events (Bond, 2000a:45); these will be examined further below under the heading of the ‘drama event’.

**b) The Centre of a play**

All of Bond’s plays bring on stage the ideology behind a Story, such that it is going to be directly felt sooner or later. This relates to the Centre of a play, a concept that Bond explicitly argues should be present in all plays (Bond, 2011:xix), at least where the play is not trivial (Bond, 2000a:16). The Centre is defined as the Site of a situation (ibid:14) which contains a conflict between Radical Innocence and
corruption (Bond, 2011:xix), and not simply as a description of what ideology says about something: ‘Every drama has a centre in which justice and radical innocence confront corruption and revenge’ (ibid).

The Palermo improvisation also had a Centre which could be described in terms of the above analysis; that Centre could be felt at the point when students chose to kill their own brother, surprising themselves with the choice. Again, the Centre is not instruction or propaganda (Bond, 2000a:47), but presentation of the paradox that the conflict between ideology and Radical Innocence produces in people’s lives.

For Bond, the Centre should dictate everything in a performance, and be revealed in every simple selection made in production by actors, designers or directors. Hence every choice needs to go through the Centre of the play (Bond, 1996b:167):

> The interpretation of every line, event and even gesture and expression must pass through the play’s centre. The centre itself makes this possible but the production must know the centre’s seriousness, its meaning – not hide it in abstract effects which however powerful they may be are only theatre. (Bond, 2011:xix)

Thus the Centre should be located and described in detail by the production team in rehearsals and made available to audience, not of course as a lecture or as playbill pamphlet; it should rather be contained in every detail of the performance, in movements, actions, gestures, words. In fact going to the theatre is equated by Bond with ‘Going to the centre’ (Bond, 1996b:167) but it has to be noted that the Centre is not given by the playwright in any of his plays.

There are, however, no genuine, concise instances of a definition of the Centre. Though it ought to be expressible in a few phrases, a fact that makes its articulation quite difficult in practice. Hence in the Palermo improvisation the Centre could be described as: Dominant ideology promotes individualism, competitiveness and
aggression. It demands of people that they live in conflict with others and with
themselves. How is that made possible? And how relevant is that to the real needs of
human beings?

But how does the play ‘finally arrive at its centre?’ (Bond, 2011:xix). In order to
provoke audiences’ Radical Innocence Bond has invented a new term and dramatic
strategy which, according to him, manages to deal with the above process. He named
it the Drama Event and it can be regarded as the fundamental device of his theory and
practice. In fact the Drama Event encapsulates the whole of his theory into practice
and will be presented later below.

c) The Extreme

At certain points, all of Bond’s plays enter into Extreme events which repeat ‘the
extreme experience of the neonate’ (Bond, 2011:xix). Imagination for Bond seeks the
Extreme situations in which the self loses every illusion about itself but can still ‘hold
on’ to humanness (Bond, 2000a:190). Drama needs these Extremes because ‘their
complexity and implacability are the source of humanness’ (ibid:12); Brechtian
alienation banishes these Extremes from stage because it avoids emotions.

An actor in Bond’s plays needs to enter the Extreme event (Bond, 2011:xx) and be
ture to his/her character, ‘as the Palermo students were’ (Bond, 2006:305) to their
own. The extremity of the event is not defined merely in terms of violence or severe
arguments and so on, although it may contain these. The extremity of a situation is
produced by the conflict between social teaching and human Values. So it could be
created by anything that could encapsulate this conflict. This could be a dilemma like
the one in the Palermo improvisation, or an apparently inexplicable act like the
cleaning of a soldier’s gun by its dying victim in Eleven Vests (Bond, 1997a), or even
some chips which are thrown on the floor like the dead bodies of human beings, as happens in *Balancing Act* (Bond, 2011).

**d) Accident Time**

The Extreme for Bond is the Site of Accident Time (Bond, 2011:xix). Accident Time is an effect of experiencing an Extreme situation, and its cause is a biological effect that 'occurs in accidents in everyday life' (ibid) where the participants experience the passage of time as slower than their ordinary experience of it, or where reality appears slowed-down. It is the feeling we get when we are in a sudden crisis, as in a street accident, where it feels events are taking longer than our ordinary experience seems to dictate they should. The Extreme, it should be noted however, doesn’t have to have physical form. The Extreme provokes the experience of intense feelings, motivated for example by danger, which in their turn prompt extraordinary activity in the brain that becomes aware of more external details than it normally does. The subject is as tense as if in a life-or-death situation, but heightened awareness allows the mind to see ‘how it might escape from the accident and survive’ (Bond, 2011:xix-xx). In such a scenario, the details of the situation perceived, because they appear more substantial or prominent than ordinary perception would register, produce a feeling of slowness; this is because the more details and memories we retain, the longer the incidents are felt to be. As the neuroscientist Eagleman (2009) argued:

In a critical situation, a walnut-size area of the brain called the amygdala kicks into high gear, commandeering the resources of the rest of the brain and forcing everything to attend to the situation at hand. When the amygdala gets involved, memories are laid down by a secondary memory system, providing the later flashbulb memories of post-traumatic stress disorder. So in a dire situation, your brain may lay down memories in a way that makes them "stick" better. Upon replay, the higher density of data would make the event appear to last longer. (n. p.)
The heightened awareness of details of which the mind would not ordinarily take conscious cognition induces a kind of special understanding of the situation that the self is experiencing; thus, according to Bond:

It sees beyond the ideological screen. And as in the neonate, it is without the dualities of egoism and altruism, of moral—is and moral-ought they are the same, as in perfect justice. It sees with the logic of imagination, which is radical innocence’s way of seeing – it sees the invisible object. (Bond, 2011:xx).

It seems that the Extreme, precisely by suspending the everyday, reveals the ideology operative in everyday experience (App. B, p.12); this is not like asking ‘Have you ever looked carefully at your watch?’ as Brecht would have had it before offering an intellectual observation on the watch; rather whatever question was formulated would have to come from the audience. The question, once more, is existentially felt, similarly to the monad’s primary stage. Accident Time for Bond replaces the alienation effect of Brecht (Bond, 2000a:48), and reveals the social contradictions ‘we accept in daily life in order to survive’ in the ‘form of paradoxes’ (Bond in Davis, 2005:90).

e) Site

In Hidden Plot, Bond (2000a) claims that drama has many sites which are: ‘the stage, the capital or provincial city where the theatre is, the era, language and culture’ (p.10). He then clarifies the way that drama may occupy these sites:

A. It confronts the social sites (city, era, culture, etc), which are familiar to and taken for granted by the audience.
B. It conveys to the audience the play’s specific sites. These fall under the same headings as A, but of course may be different in the particulars of era, setting, etc.
C. It conveys the play to the audience – the audience as site. The audience is social, able to receive only in certain (if sometimes innovative) ways. C must convey A and B to the audience.
D. The audience is a site of imagination. A, B, and C must be conveyed to this site. D is drama’s specific site because – through the play – it contains all the
other sites and their interrelations. What is D? What is the need for drama? Drama’s identity comes from meeting the needs of D. (ibid)

The Site of the audience as drama’s specific Site of drama, Site D, is the Site of the logic of imagination, as was explained in the literature review. It is actually the Site of ‘the contradictions and conflicts’ (Bond, 2011:xx) that take place in society and are reflected in every individual. It is the imaginary space where the social and the personal create a gap in meaning, where they clash but make the change of values possible. For Bond, the stage of a drama consists of this Site as the Site of the ‘self-and-society’ (ibid:xxi), and the Drama Event exposes the Site so it is seen in ‘accident time’ (Bond, 2000a:48). The audience on the other hand is shown its site, which is ordinarily hidden by ideology, by being placed in it (ibid:48).

f) Cathexis

For Bond, everyday simple objects, like a cup or a coat, ‘may be used to show the total human meaning’ (Bond, 2000a:186). These objects are not symbols, but seem to be ordinary and mundane. The point is to use these objects apparently devoid of ideological baggage as an opportunity to engage the audience in a personal way, by cathecting the objects with meaning.

In a sense Bond aims at this point at placing the audience in a position analogous to that of the pre-real neonate, which projects images of itself onto objects and uses them as its own ‘other’ in order to reflect on itself and produce meaning. As Bond argued, the Drama Event ‘reuses the cathexis to create meaning’ (ibid:41). This process addresses imagination rather than discursive thinking, so the audience is called upon to be creators (ibid:186) and not simply observers. For Bond actors and audiences must both be creative for a drama to take place (ibid:11).
But as mentioned above, the cathected object is a projection of parts of the self and as such the self is exposed to the social. The same thing may happen in a Bondian play; the cathected object would be used then as part of the self of the character and the audience both. In that sense, what happens with the cathected objects in the play happens also to the self. This is one of the ways to involve the audience personally in what happens onto the stage. As Davis (2009) mentions:

Bond cathexes and decathexes objects to deprive them of their usual emotional hold over us and confront possible new meanings. It is like switching round texts under illustrations in a book. Or like turning a knife into a fork: it changes the action by changing its meaning…It’s a matter not of imagery but of use, so that the audiences are prompted into creativity. (pp.128-129)

\[g) \textit{Drama Event}\]

There is no one, all-encompassing definition of the term Drama Event. However there are a host of fragments and extended examples in related bibliography which may help us clarify it. It has to be noted here that, where Bond had previously used the term Theatre Event, this has more recently been replaced by Drama Event. Whenever the former is used in the present interpretation, it refers to the same technique. One of the clearest related fragments is given in the first volume of Bond’s letters (1994) which I am using as a starting point:

So the strategy of TEs [Theatre Events] is: we select incidents in the story and open these incidents out in such a way that they can’t be captured by the story but must be examined for themselves in relation to the story: then “reality” may impose its interpretation on the story.’ (Bond, 1994:43)

We can already detect in the above description that the relationship between the Story and Drama Event appears twofold. On the one hand the Drama Event cannot be captured by the Story; in fact it is rather more accurate to argue that the ideology behind the Story cannot explain the causes of an incident transformed to a Drama Event, as was evidenced in the Palermo improvisation. But on the other hand these
incidents should be examined in relation to the Story in order to understand their causes.

Bond is obviously arguing that stories are fundamentally deficient and the specific incompleteness needs to be exposed. The Story is suspect, in rather a comparable way to how it was considered so in postdramatic theatre and post-structuralism, and needs to be deconstructed. Similarly Davis (2009) puts the argument that Drama Event is basically offering the opportunity to ‘deconstruct the story’ (p.xliv), an argument that Bond would agree with (Bond, 2000a:47). This possible similarity to post-structuralism is probably one of the grounds that led Katafiasz (2008) to claim that post-structuralism is the right way to interpret Bond’s work; I would think however that the exposure of an ideology behind a Story is not enough to consider the work as a post-structuralist one. It should be noted again that the specific strategy is seen ‘in relation’ to Story and not as an interruption or a dismissal of it. Post-structuralism’s aim is completed when the story of an ideology is interrupted and thus exposed. But in Bond’s work the aim is to reconstruct and change the meaning of the Story: ‘The TE takes an action which the audience thinks it understands and then stages it in such a way that its meaning is changed’ (Bond in Davis, 2005:xliv). The purpose hence is not achieved by simply deconstructing the Story, and it has to be noted again that Bond’s deconstructive process would not be a rational approach.

Already the developing framework encourages an unavoidable comparison with another theatre style which is often related to or contrasted with Bond, primarily because it is thought that both styles handle story in a similar way. This is the epic theatre of Brecht which, as mentioned above, influenced postdramatic theatre, though the latter was evacuated of the Marxist politics of Brecht, and especially of the
techniques of Gestus. I have already mentioned attempts by various authors to connect Bond to Brecht, including Allen in relation to an assumed Lehrstück in *The Children*. This tendency in related bibliography is not unusual, as detailed in the first part of the literature review. It is true, too, that Bond’s political stance is identified explicitly with socialist ideas, especially during the period when *The Woman* (Bond, 1987) was written, but I don’t think that this is enough evidence to align his work with Brecht’s. For Bond, theatre should expose the ‘mythology’ on which capitalist culture is founded and replace it with a historical approach. This theatre, named ‘history theatre’, functions in opposition to Chekhovian characters’ emotionalism, seeking to analyse the events of history and not merely to reproduce them on stage or present the characters caught up within them (Bond, 1987:286-287). In Bond’s words ‘An epic play tells a story and tells why it happened’ (Bond quoted in Bulman, 1986:506).

Bond has distanced himself from Brecht, and even came to the almost surprising conclusion that Brechtian theatre is the ‘theatre of Auschwitz’ (Bond, 2000a:187). The inspiration to expose the ideology inherent in a story is a common starting-point of both Brechtian and postdramatic theatre in addition to post-structuralism. Bond also builds from the same foundation. But although all three may share some elements as a starting-point, they don’t develop in a similar way. In order to examine further the differences between Bond and Brecht I am going to present as briefly as possible the development of the epic theatre and some of its aspects important to our study, and shall do so in a new input.

*An input from the theatre of Brecht*
Nevertheless the idea of exposing ideology in stories is not recent. Avant-garde theatre from the beginning of the 20th century was grounded on ‘principles of breaking illusions’ and hence on novel devices for making strange what was thought to be known and familiar by the audience (Furness, 1973:2). The decades between the late 19th and early 20th century were characterised by a plethora of artistic forms often confusing and overlapping: ‘the various “isms” follow each other, or exist side by side, or overlap: naturalism, impressionism, symbolism, neo-romanticism, art-nouveau, then futurism and expressionism…’ (ibid). This plethora of forms probably reveals the uncertainty and experimentation of the art of that time, and the widespread attempts to develop a modern artistic form capable of capturing or reflecting their social changes which were taking place. For example, according to Brecht (in Willet, 1964), expressionist theatre was the theatre’s ‘answer to the great crisis of society’ (p.132). The then-new techniques ‘became the tools for altering the perception process’ and thus ‘The stage was no longer a place of mimetic illusions divided from reality by the proscenium arch, but rather a space where reality was made strange in order to be seen better’ (Jestrovic, 2006:7-8). The unwanted ‘illusion’ was created on stage by Naturalism, but it was heavily criticised by the new tendencies like expressionism and epic theatre.

In brief, one could say the critical context of the 19th century which propelled or fostered Naturalism was distinguished by industrialisation and a scientific revolution, and dominated mainly by several theoretical developments. Among others Darwin’s biological theory of natural selection popularised the idea of the strong influence of heredity and environment on human actions. August Comte’s scientific method of positivism emphasised logical deduction through painstaking observation of natural
and social phenomena (Furst and Skrine, 1971:10-23). Styan (1981) also mentions Karl Marx’s idea of economic man which argued for the influence and importance of class and economic organisation on human actions (p.2). Consequently the naturalists employed the scientific methods to observe reality, record it and accurately imitate it on stage ‘dispassionately and impersonally as the scientist’ (Furst and Skrine, op.cit.:21), and ‘tried to show that powerful forces governed human lives, forces we might not be fully aware and over which we might have little control’ (Styan, op. cit.:6). But the ‘natural’ dramatic context and thus the real social context seemed inescapable and unchangeable within this form of theatrical representation. By attempting to imitate life as objectively as possible on stage, Naturalism had created a naturalised ‘cage’ of oppression. Mitter (1992) while criticising Stanislavsky from a Brechtian point of view, argued that his system is a form of enforced submission. The Stanislavskian system merely seeks to depict the social conditions and thus it naturalises them and hereafter it ‘compels assent’ to actors and audiences. Mitter refers also to a Stanislavskian exercise as an example, the ‘given circumstances’. He argues that this exercise’s ‘tyranny’ lies not only in its power to convince about the objectiveness and truthfulness of representation, but also in producing tolerance towards the constraining social conditions since ‘it contrives to make those conditions far too inconspicuous to be politically subject to question’ (p.43). In agreement with the above, Williams (1960) characteristically mentions that ‘the tragedy of naturalism is the tragedy of passive suffering, and the suffering is passive because man can only endure and can never change his world.’ (p.69). Stories, for naturalism, in that sense, are not exposed on stage to be questioned or changed. They describe a social condition distant from an audience’s possible actions or critique, and
so exist beyond the audience’s reach.

On the other hand epic theatre, influenced by Marxist thinking and aesthetics, sought to criticise and change the ‘given’ social circumstances rather than maintaining them. It sought to instruct the audience that ‘in any given situation, a larger number of options is available than people normally assume’. Thus where Stanislavsky’s practice elicited submission, Brecht would seek to ‘inculcate dissent’ (Mitter, 1992:43). The main idea was to shift the position of the audience from passive submission to naturalist representation of the world to a more active involvement with criticising and questioning.

Of all the devices alienation is probably the most distinctive feature of Epic Theatre, at least in the Brechtian approach, because it seems to sum up a large part of its theory and intention. According to Brecht (in Willet, 1964) the aim of this device was ‘to make the spectator adopt an attitude of inquiry and criticism in his approach to the incident’ (p.102). The A-effect aims actually to make the characters as well as their actions, and even the use of objects, strange in the eyes of the audience. These elements are ‘normally’ unquestionable under the influence of predominant ideological formulations in daily life. Thus it aims to make the ordinary unfamiliar or peculiar and provoke questions in audience’s mind in the hope of revealing the scope of concealed ideological habits of thought (Brooker in Tompson and Sacks, 1994:191), thus prompting them to change their own lives and their context.

Gestus is an analogous device used in acting and encapsulating the A-effect. In brief, actors were called to perform a character in a way which demonstrate the ‘social gest implicit in an action or event’ in which its ‘contradictory emotions and motives were
situated or ‘historicized’’. They would act them out as observers or reporters ‘rather than surrendering to the role or inviting empathy’ (Brooker in Thomson and Sacks, 1994:197). In fact the actor is being called upon to criticise the action of the character at a certain distance from it. For example, revealing ‘the social gest of Fascism …means that the artist has to adopt a definite attitude towards the fact of pomp’ (Brecht quoted in Brooker, ibid:198). In another devised example, in an imaginary scene, a priest is lecturing a young person on the benefits or merits of religion. In fact he is telling a story about the love offered by Christianity and during this lecture he holds a Crucifix. This example is of course very obvious and unsophisticated but it is constructed in order to clarify the point.

There are various ways to use the gestus, but I will focus here on the object of the Crucifix. So if an actor holds the object like a pistol, he is in fact revealing religion’s assumed authority, its social power and violence it has exercised over people, subverting the explicit assertion of its benefits or the love it promotes. The ‘strange’ act of holding the cross as a gun could make the action unfamiliar and provoke audience’s astonished eye. It is a critique of the action of religious preaching which, in Brechtian theatre, could be accompanied by other corresponding and similarly meaningful gestures, images, words, noises etc. What is happening here is the interruption of the story told by the priest by the criticising gestus of the actor. Thus what religions, and probably some parts of the audience, could identify as their story, the ‘natural’ action of preaching about religious love, is heavily disturbed by the gestic acting and consequently it would draw audience’s attention and prompt their intellectual recognition of the ideology behind the action and the story. The same example could be used in order to reveal the ideological formations in relation for
instance to feminism, gay rights, colonialism and so on, if the young person in the scene was member of one of these oppressed groups.

Katafiasz (2001, 2004) has adequately criticised Brecht’s view in accordance with Bond’s stance. As mentioned in the first part of the literature review, for Katafiasz gestus disturbs the art form itself; by so doing, however, it addresses exclusively the audience’s reason and not their personal values, and in fact divides their reason from imagination. They cannot see their own personal values and responsibility on stage because they are left untouched. But as mentioned above, in Bond’s theory the split between reason and imagination has its roots in society, and the period when the self develops into the pre-real stage. The playwright aims at reconnecting these two and not reinforcing the split. It is a given for Bond that: ‘Reason alone cannot help us to understand our situation humanly, or even use ideology against ideology’ (Bond, 2000a:179). Brecht would seem to prefer that one ‘not feel when you think’ (ibid:184); he uses reason ‘instrumentally’, partly influenced by Piscator, a progenitor of epic theatre whom Bond considers a ‘theatrical idiot’ (ibid:185). Bond believes that where Brechtism appears to oppose the ideology of reason, in fact ‘its method derives from it’; ‘Like the Inquisition it sees “being” as lost without the saving power of reason’ (ibid:184). Discursive reason cannot ‘disturb faith or even opinion’ (ibid:183). Moreover the theatre of Brecht does not address private experience, or in Bond’s words ‘the right not just to the political’ but also to ‘sensitivity of self in society’ (ibid:11). Instead for Bond:

Drama must be particular and general. TB [the Theatre of Brecht] seeks the general but postpones (to other processes) the problem of how to make the general particular within the incompatibilities of existence. But the general can only be perceived through particulars. D [audience’s imagination] is rooted in the self, and is removed from it only in coma (not in madness or psychopathy).
But the self faces outwards. We become self-aware by relating to others. If there were no others we could not have a self. We cannot imagine ourselves. It is the only thing we cannot imagine. It would mean imagination imagining itself. If we try to imagine ourselves we imagine an ‘other’ self. (Bond, 2000a:12)

Hence for Bond ‘Drama should not seek reason – it should seek imagination knowing that imagination seeks reason and is the only possible subversion of ideology’; he contends that because ideology owns imagery, and gives to it ideological meaning ‘through its relation to reason’, then ‘discursive reason cannot displace this meaning’ (ibid:185) by itself.

It could be argued that with the use of Drama Events in Bond’s work the impasse of ideology is existentially felt rather than simply seen or intellectually perceived. It addresses the subjective experience of every individual in the audience and hence attempts to make them see their own values on stage: they could project their particular experience onto the general, or extract from the general something of their unique situation. The crucial endeavour for Bond is not to render the situation unfamiliar in the sight of the observer, but to ‘alienate the self’s presuppositions and prejudices’ (Bond, 2000a:40). Hence for Bond alienation is performed from within the situation of the Drama Event, and not from outside it as in Brecht (ibid:173, 40).

How this is done in practice though? The Drama Event is an assembly of various techniques which involve all terms listed above: Extreme, Accident Time, Cathexis, Invisible Object, Site and Enactment.

Ultimately the Drama Event’s purpose is to expose the gap of meaning that ideology seeks to hide (Bond, 1998a:304), and provoke actors and audience to struggle to fill it. It is related to the analysis of a situation that should be done only through philosophy (ibid:304, 307). A last comment to be made is that Drama Event is not an interpretation of an event, because this is not provoking philosophy; interpretation
‘fills the gap with empty theatricalization [sic], effects, aesthetics and style’ (ibid:305).

**h) Invisible object**

‘The IO [Invisible Object] is the “face” of the monad, is the appearance of RI [Radical Innocence] which the audience recognises as themselves. It’s a sort of confirming epiphany …’ (App. B, p.12).

The Invisible Object seems to be fundamental for a Drama Event which is revealed through the Extreme and the felt in Accident Time (see App. B, p.12); but it is very much connected with actors’ Enactment of the situation and with the Centre of the play. Although it does not refer to a real object, it can be revealed by anything like ‘the face or the back of the head or an object that is pointed to’ (Bond, 2011:xx), or a word, an action etc. In fact the Invisible Object is ‘called an Object because it objectifies the situation on the site: it is its meaning’ (Bond in Davis, 2005:90).

The point is that the actor by entering the Extreme event makes the Invisible Object visible to the audience as well as to him/herself. As Davis (2009) comments, the Invisible Object ‘does not show the character’s motive but the human motive – so it is our common humanness made visible in human communication.’ (p.130); it contains or represents in fact our own ‘other’ for Bond (Bond, 2011:xx), which is occupied by society as early as in the pre-real stage and needs to be seen over again.

In an interview Bond (see App. C.2, par. 104-116, pp.52-53) has offered an example taken from visual arts of what could constitute an Invisible Object and how it could be made visible for the audience. The piece of art was a sculpture by Donatello, the *Martyrdom of St. Lawrence* (Picture 1).
The sculpture refers to the martyrdom of St. Lawrence, who promoted the Christian faith in 258 C.E. and was condemned by the Roman emperor Valerian. According to tradition St. Lawrence was burnt to death on a grid.

There are various objects in this sculpture, including the grid where St. Laurence is placed to be burned, the bellows that is used to keep the fire going, and the wooden stick that holds the victim in the right place. Of these objects, Bond thinks that the wooden stick is used as the carrier of ideology, that is made invisible in our daily life.

In my initial account of the image above I thought that it was the grid that was of greatest importance, but in Edward Bond’s feedback it was clarified that it was the stick:

Donatello/St Lawrence. What you say is accurate but my main point concerned the stick. The disturbing effect of the picture is not just from the domesticated bellows, the fuel, the fire or the executioners. It is the stick. We cook food and use knives and forks to eat it. Here a utensil-stick is used to cook a person (it excretes death). (Suppose someone standing behind Lawrence had held his head with a shorter stick or a strap? -- it wouldn’t have been so strong a dramatic device.) There are four other hands on the stick, three holding it in place and one (Lawrence’s) trying to push it away. The stick dominates the picture. It is an object that is a drama device – it conveys the horror of the execution in a way
that conventional effects wouldn’t. A drama device surprises the audience – you thought you knew this but now Im [sic] showing you what it really is – the stick doesn’t alienate you but hurts you. You can also see that the ceiling is made up of classical calm lozenges that form grids and so is the back wall and the sides. Their formal restraint but ubiquity are, you could say, as seen by the monad world and create the ultimate seriousness of the Tragic. It’s the kitchen table and the edge of the universe (the saint goes to heaven) but the panel says earth-earth-earth. The panel illustrates the way I write plays. (App. B, p.12)

Obviously the event depicted in Donatello’s sculpture is an extreme event, but the general demeanour of the participants or spectators other than St Lawrence seems cool. It could be compared to a kitchen daily event, where concentrated in the stick is the cruelty and violence of the ideology, and could depict an almost bureaucratic attitude of the particular society (App. C.2, par.105-114, pp.53-54). Making the Invisible Object visible constitutes most likely the last step of the whole dramatic process of the Drama Event.

i) Enactment

All the above elements are made possible by enacting the situation of the play. Bond often asks his actors to stop acting (Davis, 2009:132) and instead enact the situation in which their character exists. The ‘actor-and-character’ enacts the meaning of the situation and makes the Invisible Object which was hidden by ‘ideology and convention’ (Bond in Davis, 2005:90) visible for the audience and for him/herself. Finding the Invisible Object is the main purpose of Enactment, but it can be done only by the actors, the playwright being unable to create it in the text.

In a sense Enactment is the lived experience of the situation, which is created through the felt understanding of the situation captured in the play and the story which is finally revealing ‘the social forces feeding that situation’ (Davis, 2009:132). This felt experience is applied to the actors and through them to audience as well. As we will
see in the next chapters, Enactment has to do with the authentic experience created on stage by the actors, generated by the impact of the Site of the play.

1.3 Some preliminary considerations

The above nine elements of Bondian practice, Story, Centre, Drama Event, Extreme, Accident Time, Invisible Object, Enactment, Cathexis and the Site, will constitute the list of units of analysis for case study of Big Brum TIE Company which will be set forth in the next chapters; they will be set in capital letters for the purpose of allowing the reader more take especial note of where they appear in the analysis of data.

The list of these elements was sent to Edward Bond and the director of Big Brum, Chris Cooper, in order to check with both of them whether there was not any other basic area missing. Their responses were rather encouraging (see App. G, p.231 and App. H, p.232). Some alterations in the present text were made after the comments of Edward Bond, and refer especially to the definition of the Invisible Object. The element that was missing initially from the above nine elements was the Enactment because, as mentioned above, it was wrongly considered as an area that may relate only to potential actors and not to participants in a classroom drama. It surfaced as a very relevant element during the analysis of data, however, and that is why it was finally added in this chapter. Chris Cooper approved the above addition (App. H, p.232).

An important point to be made here is that all the above elements, though each can be argued as crucial as any other, should not be regarded as individual components of a Bondian practice and treated independently. They should rather constitute a whole if they are to be used in any drama work. The Invisible Object in particular, as the final
step of the process, seems to be entirely dependent on all the other elements and comes as a consequence of their presence and interplay. As Bond mentions:

The various devices all relate to each other and reflect each other and combine different combinations. I think none can exist without the others so together they are an analysis of my dramatic method. I don’t think that in production you can seek one without seeking the others. The IO [Invisible Object] is different in that you cant [sic] work directly for it -- its [sic] a consequence of the others. (App. G, p. 231)

On the other hand the Centre is the element that may guide the choices made in drama work because it encapsulates the essence of the human condition, the contradictions and paradoxes in the social that impact on the personal. The Centre is in fact a question of philosophy animating a drama, and it is crucial for making the whole approach function because it contains the salient ontological questions to be felt and addressed in a drama. As Bond mentioned in his commentary on the specific analysis: ‘In drama the “centre” is a situation – in the neonate a confrontation’ (App. B, p.11).

The overall point is that for a Bondian perspective an artist would have to decide where he/she stands in relation to basic directions such as imagination and reason. An artist has also to decide the mode of engagement for the audience or the participants and what their responsibility for the situation they are facing would be. And above all artists have to decide what the role of drama is for them and for the audiences. Bond has chosen a drama that he claims ‘cannot instruct, it confronts, perplexes and intrigues imagination into creating reality’ (Bond, 2003:xxxiv). How this may be put into practice will be examined next through an analysis of the practice of Big Brum.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The primary aim of this research is to investigate and ultimately describe Edward Bond’s approach to drama through the practice of the Theatre in Education Company, Big Brum, examining the possibility of applying it to the current theory and ways of working in Drama in Education. I first came into contact with the company and the work of the playwright back in 1998, when the company was touring a TIE programme in Birmingham’s secondary schools based on Bond’s play *Eleven Vests* (Bond, 1997a), directed by Geoff Gillham. During this programme I was permitted to attend one, and then quite a few, of the performances in schools.

When I first thought of investigating Bond’s theory and practice to test its applicability to classroom drama practice, my idea was to carry out an action research. Action research may facilitate such investigation since it is defined as a study ‘with a view to improving the quality of action within it’ (Elliot, 1991:69), a ‘small-scale intervention in the functioning of the real world’ (Halsey quoted in Cohen and Manion, 1994:186) and a ‘powerful tool for change and improvement’ (Cohen et al., 2011:344). Furthermore, in the context of the ‘teacher as researcher’, Altrichter et al. (1993) maintain that action research is used by teachers in order to experiment and develop new theories relevant to their practice ‘rather than letting their practice petrify’ (p.5); for Kemmis (1993) meanwhile it is a ‘form of research carried out by practitioners into their own practice’ (p.177). Action research would thus have required a teacher as a researcher and a setting to test propositions, to explore and assess their possible practical applications. In such a case these propositions would have been constructed in accordance with Bond’s approach of drama.
Unfortunately by definition action research could not have been applied for the specific study because, as a researcher, I could not have been the teacher too, given that for the period during which the research was conducted I was on sabbatical leave and thus didn’t have my own class to teach. There was an option to develop an action research as a visiting teacher in the Greek School of London, which is the only full time working Greek school in England, but unfortunately some other practical obstacles made it more difficult to proceed. One of them is that the Pedagogical Institute of Greece, which is in charge of licensing any research in Greek schools at home and abroad, did not grant permission for any kind of video recordings in classrooms. This means that any attempt to apply an action research was immediately deprived of a basic tool of monitoring, of reflection and of triangulation.

Ultimately an application for an action research in an English school was rejected because, since English is my second language, I would have been less competent in understanding and in using the often complex or metaphorical elements of dramatic language, as well as students’ spoken language, in an English classroom. Thus it would have been more difficult, sometimes maybe impossible, to respond to students’ discourse in action.

I need to note here as well that I have conducted informal action researches in my drama groups and classrooms in the past but, as I mentioned earlier, they were not successful at all. I thus felt that I was lacking some crucial understanding of Bond’s theory and practice, and so wasn’t confident enough to conduct an action research. Eventually I concluded that I needed first to understand Bond’s theory through the practice of another practitioner. So it was the method of the case study that seemed more appropriate for my needs, because for this method the researcher is an observer
– or participant observer – of a carefully selected case of another teacher or practitioner who applies the Bondian model in his/her work.

It was felt that a case study might also help to formulate an answer to a particular ‘how’ question (Yin, 1994:6-7), in this case the question of ‘how Edward Bond’s arguments can inform Drama in Education’. As Yin (2009) argues, a case study is an empirical inquiry ‘that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context’ (p.18). Cohen et al. (2011) add that a ‘case study provides a unique example of real people in real situations, enabling readers to understand ideas more clearly than simply by presenting them with abstract theories or principles’ (p.289). Yin (1994) also claims that although case studies were considered in the past as ‘exploratory tool[s]’ they could just as well be descriptive and explanatory, and they can be used in order to ‘describe and test propositions’ (p.3).

Correspondingly, case studies can only work provided there are some cases which could be described, explored and explained within the context of the specific theoretical and practical background. Hence for the specific study a drama practitioner who employs Bond’s theory in his/her drama practice was needed, who would constitute the ‘instance’ of the research. Unfortunately, although Edward Bond’s arguments are increasingly being discussed within the DIE movement (see Davis, 2001, 2003; Katafiasz, 2004; McEntegart, 2004; Colvil, 2004; and NATD conferences 1989, 1999, 2004) it doesn’t seem that they are becoming as influential in practice. As mentioned in the introduction, various authors argue that dominant forms of students’ involvement in drama can still be identified within Stanislavskian realism or Brechtian distancing (Katafiasz, 2004; Davis, 2001; Lacey & Woolland, 1992:82).
However, the Theatre in Education Company Big Brum is a company widely celebrated for employing Bond’s mode of working in their practice. Ever since 1995, Big Brum and Edward Bond have collaborated frequently, their work sharing a common focus on imagination (Coult, 1997:37-38), and the playwright often produces plays especially for the company. The collaborations included the plays *At the Inland Sea*, 1995, *Eleven Vests*, 1997, *Have I None*, 2000, *Balancing Act*, 2003, *The Under Room*, 2005, (Big Brum, 2007a), *A Window*, 2009, *The Edge*, 2012 and *The Broken Bowl*, 2012. Moreover the writer often works with the company in order to try out his ideas for theatre and to develop ideas of a suitable style of acting for the performances of his plays for young people (Davis, 2005: xvii). The collaboration based on a mutual interest in imagination has shaped a specific form of work in drama which is reflected in the work of Big Brum as a whole, and not only for the Bondian plays. Chris Cooper, the artistic director of Big Brum, claims, for example, that the company incorporates Edward Bond’s theory into their practice for every programme they develop, and not only for the plays that the writer has written for them (Cooper, 2008). Consequently, it could be strongly argued, the company is not only in the favourable position of working directly with the author on his plays, but has developed a general model based on Bond’s method of working, honed through experience.

Big Brum could constitute an adequate case for researching Edward Bond’s approach in relation to Drama in Education for another reason. Theatre in Education is a drama practice which is considered to be a close relative of DIE, especially in relation to audience participation. Various authors identify some elements that these two practices have in common. O’Toole (1976), for example, regards TIE and DIE as the opposite ends of a continuum, and as practices which, although distinctive, share the
active involvement of the students. The ‘happenings’ in TIE and DIE are real for the participants, although the situation is ‘make-believe’ (pp.17-19). Bolton (in Jackson, 1993) argues that DIE and TIE are ‘concerned with dramatic art and pedagogy’ (p.39) and identifies a further common element for both practices, that of Teacher in Role, which he considers as having much in common with the ‘input of a TIE team’ (p.40).

Big Brum (2007b) makes even more apparent these common elements in stating that:

The most distinctive feature of TIE however is participation. In all of our work the theatre or performance element is a part of a whole programme. There is often work before a performance, in between scenes and episodes and, or, after. The participatory element is sometimes integrated even further into the structure with a much more fluid boundary between the two different modes of audience and active participant. Participation will often relate to the use of a role and there is always a task, a purpose to it for the class. (Big Brum, 2007b)

A case study may be characterised as a ‘specific instance’ used ‘to illustrate a more general principle’ (Niset and Watt quoted in Cohen et al., 2011:289); in this case, Big Brum’s practice is taken as illustrating Bond’s arguments, in order later to apply them to DIE practice. This case study, then, focuses mainly on those elements of Big Brum’s practice which are comparable to DIE and not on distinctive TIE elements which a drama teacher does not have in his/her armoury, such as elaborated acting and settings, predetermined text, outcome and plot etc.

Overall the company was observed in action while its members prepared a TIE programme based on the play *A Window* written by Edward Bond. Initially, the research intended to follow the application of the programme in various secondary schools in the Birmingham area between October and November of 2009, and then to evaluate the effects of the programme for the students; eventually however the amount of data grew to such proportions that it was judged impracticable to pursue such an enquiry in this case. The monitoring of the process did follow the application
of the programme in schools, but the finished thesis did not finally make use of these data for evaluating the programme. Instead its focus was on the production process and, predominately, on the approach that the company exemplified for making Bond’s theory work in practice.

Big Brum describes the above programme as:

> The programme accompanying the play will be designed to have cross-curricular appeal and will be invaluable for cultivating creative approaches to teaching and learning. An experience for classes of up to 30 young people, the programme will develop pupils’ personal learning and thinking skills, engaging them imaginatively in the creation of the ‘self’ in order to make meaning and create human values. (Big Brum, 2009)

Already, the statement ‘engaging them imaginatively in the creation of the “self” in order to make meaning and create human values’ raises expectations and evidently gestures toward Edward Bond’s theory and intention.

It is to be hoped this research may supply relevant information through the case study and, in locating some basic directions in relation to Edward Bond’s approach to drama as it is described in the previous chapter, Chapter 1 of the literature review, both encourage innovative thinking regarding classroom drama and provide an impetus for future research which may include action research as well.

### 2.1 Case Study: the research method

So the basic aim of this case study is to work out Edward Bond’s methodology for drama through the in-depth examination of the particular TIE Company in action. With this in-depth examination there will be an attempt to explain and describe a possible direction for Drama in Education work for teachers within the framework of Edward Bond’s arguments.
The study is interpretative in essence; it takes place within the ‘natural’ environment of Big Brum and thus segues into the broader sphere of qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) compare the qualitative researcher and the qualitative research to a ‘bricoleur’ and a ‘bricolage’ respectively. Bricolage is seen as a ‘pieced-together, close-knit set of practices that provide solutions to a problem in a concrete situation’ (p.2). The authors use this simile to stress the fact that qualitative research does not have a particular method to follow. It is a set ‘of interpretative practices, [which] privileges no single methodology over any other’ (ibid:3). According to them any choices related to research practices and tools to be used ‘are not set in advance’ but they are rather dependent on the research’s questions and its context, ‘what is available in the context, and what the researcher can do in that setting’ (ibid:2).

In contrast to quantitative research, which is grounded on the ‘collection and analysis of data in numeric form’ (Blaxter et al., 1996:60), qualitative research tends to collect and analyse data in the widest possible variety of ways since it tends:

... to focus on exploring, in as much detail as possible, smaller (than quantitative research) numbers of instances or examples which are seen as interesting or illuminating, and aims to achieve ‘depth’ rather than ‘breadth’. (Blaxter et al., ibid)

But as Blaxter et al. (2010) additionally comment, qualitative research ‘can be used for testing hypotheses and theories, even though it is used mostly for theory generation’ (p.66). Cohen et al. (2011) also claim that case studies ‘can penetrate situations in ways that are not always susceptible to numerical analysis’ (p.289).

Our particular case study shares the same framework. In agreement with the above, Stake (1994) mentions that a qualitative case study is not a ‘methodological choice, but a choice of object’ which considered object could be examined in many ways. As a form of research, case study is defined by the chosen case and not ‘by the methods
of inquiry used’ (p.236). Rose (1991) claims that ‘by virtue of its flexibility, [it] may be adaptable to your needs’ (p.190).

Generally, in the related literature, the definitions offered for case study research seem to share the idea that it is an examination of a singular contemporary instance or a phenomenon in action, within its natural environment (Denscombe, 2007:35; Blaxter et al., 1996:66; Sturman, 1999:103; Robson, 1993:40,146; Cohen et al., 2000: 181; Yin, 1994:13; Bassey, 1999:47; Hammersley, 1992:184). Likewise, Big Brum, a single case, is observed in its natural context during the preparation of the TIE programme.

There is a variety of types of case studies which are essentially defined by their purposes and their research questions. Different authors use different terms to describe this variety (Stenhouse quoted in Bassey, 1999:28; Bassey, 1999:40-41; Yin, 2003: 5; Stake, 1994: 237-238; Sturman, 1999:107). Although authors use different terms, definitions in some cases overlap with. In Stenhouse’s (in Bassey, 1999:28) terms, the specific case study could be educational because it seeks understanding of an educational action, which accords with the approach of Big Brum to Bond’s theory. The problem is that the author defines educational case study as a research project undertaken by many researchers, an element which does not apply to the present case.

According to Yin’s (2003) definition, it could constitute a descriptive case study since it aims to present a ‘complete description of a phenomenon within its context’ (p.5). Correspondingly, this study attempts to offer as complete as possible a description of Big Brum’s practice.
In relation to Bassey’s (1999) categories, it approximates a piece of theoretical research which is ‘carried out in order to understand’ (p.40) the practice of Big Brum. Bassey offers the term theory-seeking and theory-testing case study, which again is related to understanding, formulating or testing a theory stemming from the case (p.62). The author identifies the particular category with Yin’s exploratory case study (ibid), which in its turn is ‘aimed at defining the questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study’ (Yin, 2003:5).

Yet, a definition rather closer to the needs and the questions of the specific enquiry stems from Stake (1994), who uses the term ‘instrumental case study’. According to the author, an instrumental case study deals with a particular case because it seeks an understanding of something else, an issue or the refinement of a theory. The case itself is of secondary importance but it is researched and scrutinised in depth because it is expected to help in pursuing an ‘external interest’. The instance is purposefully and carefully chosen exactly for the reason that it is ‘expected to advance our understanding of that other interest’. Stake also notes that there is no definite line distinguishing the particular type from what he calls intrinsic case study, which is research undertaken in order to enhance understanding of a particular case (p.237). In fact, this enquiry is interested in understanding and outlining a model of drama work based on Edward Bond’s theory and practice for Drama in Education through the examination of Big Brum’s work.

The instrumental case study is rather similar to Bassey’s ‘theoretical research’ and ‘theory-seeking’ and ‘theory-testing’ case study mentioned before. Ultimately, the partial overlap between different definitions emphasises the idea that the defined
categories are not closed, and that there could be a kind of exchange between them (Bassey, 1999: 41).

Clearly, various authors make various claims in relation to weaknesses and strengths of case studies. Some authors consider them as the ‘weakest method of knowing’ (Smith in Cohen et al., 2000:183). This view is based on what is perceived as the close relation of the specific method with the qualitative and interpretative paradigm in methodology. Additionally, other authors criticise the possible lack of generalisability and validity. Nisbet and Watt (in Cohen et al., 2011) consider the weaknesses of case studies as:

The results may not be generilizable [sic] except where other readers/researchers see their application. They are not open to cross-checking, hence they may be selective, biased, personal and subjective. They are prone to problems of observer bias, despite attempts made to address reflexivity. (p.293)

Cohen et al. (2011) characteristically mention that there is a problem of ‘respectability and legitimacy’ within the academic context, which is led by prejudice and ideology, and claims that case studies have to ‘demonstrate reliability and validity’ like all other research methods (p.293). Similarly, other authors argue that, as a mainly qualitative strategy of inquiry, the researcher needs to collect adequate and sufficient amounts of data in order to be ‘able to explore significant features of the case and to put forward interpretations for what is observed’ (Bassey, 1999:47). Yin (1994) mentions that the data collection can be hard and difficult but, if not done adequately, may jeopardise the whole work (p.54). Blaxter et al. (1996) emphasise the variety of forms for collecting and analysing information in case studies (p.60), and Opie (2004) stresses that the ‘collection of evidence [should be] systematically undertaken’ (p.74).

On the other hand, as Denscombe (2007) argues, the use of multiple methods fosters ‘the use of multiple sources of data’ which in its turn facilitates the ‘validation of data
through *triangulation*. Denscombe considers this method one of the fundamental features of case studies, and one which in fact constitutes one of their fundamental advantages (p.45). In a similar way Denzin and Lincoln (1994) state that the qualitative ‘multimethod’ approach, or, as the authors term it, triangulation, is used as a way of securing ‘an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question’ which, in its turn, functions as an alternative to validation rather than validation *per se* (p.2).

Triangulation is, thus, one of the methods that can enhance the validity of data analysis of the specific study and will be used widely. The following sections of this chapter will examine the particular steps for data collection, interpretation and triangulation.

2.2 Developing the research methodology and data collection

2.2.1 Some preliminary remarks: developing the research methodology

It has to be noted that this was not the first time I have observed Big Brum in their ‘natural environment’. Immediately before the observation which is the object of the study, I had conducted one on the TIE programme *The Boy Who Cried Wolf*, devised by the company. From this preliminary observation it was made clear to me that in order successfully to define a way of designing the data collection I had to be very precise about what I was looking for. I had also to account for the possibility of this study’s having overlooked elements within the list of units of analysis, and to be open to the possibility that the process would reveal other components essential to Bond’s approach. Additionally the preliminary observation revealed to me that I had to be very precise about the development of the research methodology and the ways I was going to collect and finally analyse the data, because it was apparent to me that this is a dynamic process which produces a vast amount of information and data through its
development. I have tried to minimise the possibility of distracting the focus of the research and making serious mistakes by following the strategies below.

First of all this research presupposes that there is already a critical theoretical framework within which the practice of TIE Company Big Brum will be examined. The critical theoretical framework is based on the literature review of Bond’s work as well as of relevant bibliography, which is presented in Chapter 1. The purpose was to construct and define the list of constitutive elements of Bond’s theory which were then used as the critical context within which Big Brum’s practice was examined. These elements comprised in fact the units of analysis for the research and they are defined in the previous chapter as the Story, Site, Extreme, Accident Time, Drama Event, Cathexis, Invisible Object and Centre. A ninth element, that of Enactment, was added during the process of analysis because it proved to be fundamental for Bond’s approach. Ultimately the list with the units of analysis:

- offered a context for systematising observations
- indicated the methods that will be used for collecting information
- and constituted a base for analysing data.

An initial issue in relation to the above list of units of analysis was whether it could be shared with the TIE Company. This question is very much related to the role of the researcher within the observation period, as participant-observer or non-participant observer, which was crucial to decide since, as Cohen and Manion (1994) claim, the heart of each case study relates to the ‘method of observation’ (p.125). In a case where the list was shared with the company, there could already be an input by the researcher into the process. Additionally, such a condition could have created a kind
of tension or self-awareness in the members of the company. More importantly in this way the observer seems to get closer to the subject, in becoming involved with the process and the programme and thus researcher’s subjectivity and bias could as well have been provoked (Cohen et al., 2000:129). For this reason it was decided the researcher would observe the process via non-participant observation, and the list of units of analysis was not shared with the company before the end of the application of the programme.

Another point of concern was the validity of the list of units of analysis itself. There was a need for a kind of a preliminary triangulation in order to maximise the soundness of the selection of the units and their definitions, to ensure they would constitute a valid criterion for analysing the data later. Such a preliminary triangulation was achieved by sharing the list with Edward Bond and the director of the programme, Chris Cooper, after the end of the programme and asking them to comment. Both artists seemed to agree on the basic elements of the list of units of analysis and the definitions offered for them (see App. B, pp.7-12; App. G, p.231 and App. H, p.232). Bond’s clarifications, such as the function and nature of the Invisible Object, were finally included in the initial text.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the preliminary observation demonstrated that there would be a vast amount of gathered data which might become an obstacle in keeping the focus of the research and locating the areas of interest. Thus in order to be able to sustain the focus of the research during the observation and within the vast amount of data produced for the analysis, I had to find a way of selecting specific moments in the process which seemed to make sufficiently available the areas under consideration. Wragg (1994) offered the fitting notion of ‘critical events’ for this
purpose. He mentions that with critical events, an observer searches for ‘specific instances’ in classroom behaviour ‘which are judged to be illustrative of some aspect of the teacher’s styles and strategies’ (p.62). Vassilopoulou (2007) used a similar method for observing a teacher in the context of identifying ways of opening up the Zone of Proximal Development for students in drama (pp.74-75). Of course Wragg (ibid) and Vassilopoulou (ibid) discussed the above notion of critical events by placing it in the context of a classroom, which the present study does not follow, but I think that the specific idea proved to be very useful for this research too. The company’s practice was examined in terms of planning and approaching the material and not applying it in classrooms. The whole process then was treated as a context where ‘critical events’ related to Bond’s theory were located and then examined further. These critical events were chosen on the basis of the units of analysis and helped a lot not only during the period of observation but also, most importantly, when the research continued in the analysis of data. Recording the whole process then seemed to be the right way to proceed, since it offered the opportunity to revisit the specific critical events.

The recordings and the possibility to revisit the whole process also presented the opportunity to keep the analysis of the data open to further elements that were not included initially. Of course the specific aspect was also based on the methodological triangulation which is going to be presented below.

A final point should be made regarding the relationship between the researcher and the company. This relationship was first established in 1998 when I observed the production of Eleven Vests in various schools around Birmingham. Since then, our relationship has developed in the context of DIE and TIE and I frequently meet and
work with members of the company in conferences, workshops and seminars. I have often participated in seminars organised by Big Brum and, until 2002, I was a member of SCYPT-ICTIE for which the company was one of the pivotal members. I had often observed programmes by Big Brum, as well as having recorded some of their work.

Consequently, from one point, I was quite familiar with their work and already had experience of observing the company and recording them in similar conditions. I have observed, as well, other TIE companies in the past, such as Language Alive!, and recorded some of their work. But on the other hand, I acknowledge that this familiarity with the company could have influenced my ability to be critical and objective during my observation and during the interpretation of data. This was another factor which influenced the decision to apply the technique of the non-participant observation in every phase of the research, and to withhold the content of the list of units of analysis from the company. In order to further minimise the possibility of compromising my objectivity, I followed the methodological triangulation presented in next sections.

2.2.2 Collection of data: triangulation

As mentioned already above, one method of minimising possible biases in case studies is triangulation. Robson (1993) asserts that the employment of multiple methods permits triangulation to take place. He continues by defining the term as ‘a method of finding out where something is by getting a “fix” on it from two or more places’ (p.290) and argues that it should be an ‘indispensable tool of real world enquiry’ since ‘It is particularly valuable in the analysis of qualitative data where the trustworthiness of the data is always a worry’ (p.383). For Robson, triangulation provides ways to test different sources of information against each other and enhance
credibility (ibid: 404). Altrichter et al. (1993) identify considerable advantages in triangulation, such as the possibility of acquiring a detailed and balanced image of a situation, of revealing hidden contradictions and of breaking the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ by giving ‘equal status to people from different ranks’ (p.117). Moreover Yin (1994) considers triangulation as one of the three principles of collecting data and stresses the need of case studies ‘to use multiple sources of evidence [which] far exceeds that in other research strategies’ (p.91). Methodological triangulation thus was used in this study for gathering data from three different sources: The researcher, the company and the playwright, Edward Bond.

**a) The researcher**

*Non-participant observation*

Non-participant observation is defined as a condition where the researchers do not interact with the subjects under observation, meaning that they can eliminate the ‘reactivity’ of the presence of the observer’ (Opie, 2004:128). Observation, generally, is regarded as a direct method (Robson, 1993:191), since it can help to gather ‘live’ data in ‘live’ situations (Cohen et al., 2000:305).

The observation followed the company in rehearsals for 24 days, and then the application of the programme in 7 schools. Robson (1993) mentions that there might be some questions in relation to how people would have acted if an observer wasn’t present (pp.191-192). For this reason there was an initial discussion with the group which clarified that the main aim and focus of the study was more the method than the behaviour. Simultaneously, the non-participant observation was stressed in this discussion, as well as during observations with clear signing by the observer. In
addition, the relatively long period of observation gradually reduced ‘reactivity effects’ (Cohen et al., 2000:311).

Additionally, the non-participant observation for this study used a schedule in order to focus on elements of interest (Cohen et al., 2000: 302; Opie, 2004: 128), but its structure was not defined in numerical form since the approach is strictly qualitative. In accord Denscombe’s approach (2007), the features which were observed were identified ‘on the basis of a literature review’ (p.210). Hence, the base of this schedule for observing was the list of units of analysis as they are formed from the undertaken literature review, in combination with the notion of ‘critical events’ which helped in identifying, during the process of observation as well as during the revisit of the material, the moments where the areas of interest came to the fore.

*Video recordings*

The technique of video recording was chosen because it helps in gathering data and assists analysis and interpretation by constant reviewing of the critical events in the process. Denscombe (2007) claims that visual data ‘can be valuable as a source of factual information’ (p.305), and Foster (1996) that they can provide an accurate record of the process (p.36).

The recordings in total exceeded 140 hours gathered in 40 DVDs which constitute the labelled archived of the whole process. The recordings offered an accurate point of reference for revisiting the process and for transcribing parts of the critical events. They also afforded the opportunity to extract images of the process for use in the presentation of the analysis.
The members of the company proved to be well trained in observation, and that included the camera too, because of their experience as actors as well as the frequent presence of other visitors, international or not, attending Big Brum’s work.

Fieldnotes

The purpose of fieldnotes was to preserve the details in the best possible written form so they could help in analysing data in later stage. Moreover they helped ‘identify and follow the processes in witnessed events’ (Silverman, 2005: 174).

For this study expanded fieldnotes were kept. This means that the notes taken during the observation were developed with more details immediately after each session was ended. In this way the reliability of data stemming from fieldnotes was improved (Silverman, ibid: 175-176). Approximately 110 typed pages of fieldnotes were produced in total.

Research diary

A research diary was introduced from the beginning of the process in order to accompany the whole procedure. The diary contains ideas, plans, my written reflections, preliminary analyses and information (Cohen et al, 2000:10-12), informal discussions and observations with the members of the group (Altrichter et al., 1993: 10), and finally my personal feelings, reactions, interpretations and explanations, as Kemmis and McTaggart (1982: 40) also added for the process. The diary complemented the data collected by the research methodology and helped me in reflecting on the whole process.

b) The company
Semi-structured interviews

Powney and Watts (1987) mention that it is important to remember that any talk is dynamic and ‘some methods of interviewing are better at encapsulating this dynamic quality’ (p.16). This type of interview was chosen because the research was interested in recording the company’s view of Edward Bond’s theory and practice, and, as May (1997) claims, this is a type of interview that allows ‘people to answer more on their own terms’ (p.111). Equally this type of interview allowed the researcher to define a specific focus for the interview while the questions were ‘normally specified’, and the interviewer was able to seek both ‘clarification and elaboration’ on the answers of the interviewees and ender to a dialogue with them (May: ibid). This type of interview gives a greater degree of ‘latitude’ to the interviewees (May, ibid: 112) and seemed especially liable to generate dynamic talk.

Fielding (in May: ibid) proposes a guide for semi-structured interviews based on themes ‘with probes and invitations to expand on issues raised’. The thematic guide for the interviews was structured again on the basis of the list of units of analysis formed in the literature review alongside other more factual information coming from the process of observation.

Whitehurst (in Powney and Watts, 1987) argues that the dynamism of a talk is lost as soon as it is collected ‘like catching rain in a bucket for later display. What you end up with is water, which is only a little like rain.’ (p.16). In order to minimise the loss of the ‘rain’, the interviews were video recorded as well. Attention was given, though, to preserving the ‘dynamic talk’ with the interviewees.

The main focus of the interviews was on the director of the programme, Chris Cooper, because as director he had the primary responsibility for developing the process and
the programme. He was interviewed three times during the process of production and once after it. The rest of the teachers/actors were interviewed after the end of the production process. All the interviews were transcribed and are included in the Appendix C.

Informal discussions

Informal discussions, which took place with the members of the company during breaks or during unrecorded informal meetings, and which relate to the production of the programme, were kept in the fieldnotes or the research diary in order to supplement the data collected by the research methodology.

c) The playwright: Edward Bond

Semi-structured interview

Generally the interview with Edward Bond followed the same guidelines as in the interviews with Big Brum members. The writer was interviewed after the production process had concluded; his interview was recorded and its full transcription can be found in Appendix C.2. The specific interview was central to the process since it extended not only to evaluating the programme but to informing and updating the literature review and the definitions of the units of analysis.

Written commentary on the list of units of analysis and of literature review

This proved crucial for the development of the research and the analysis of data. Edward Bond provided a more valid critique of the list and of the literature review. Hence, there was some kind of revision of both texts according to the commentary. The commentary can be found in Appendix B.
Bond’s involvement in the rehearsal process

This aspect of the observation was not planned initially, since it wasn’t known that the playwright would get involved in the process. The research naturally took advantage of the particular opportunity it afforded, which proved to be extremely useful in validating the findings from the analysis of data. Hence Bond’s intervention was fully recorded, transcribed and constituted a major point of reference for concluding the research.

2.3 The analysis of data

The data collection generated a large amount of material (see App. A.2, p.5), which was kept well organised and labelled. But as mentioned above its magnitude created some difficulty in finding a way to choose the most important parts of it in order to analyse it and arrive at viable conclusions. The aim of the research was predominately to identify the basic elements of a Bondian theory and illustrate them through observing the practice of the TIE Company Big Brum, and conclude with formulating possible directions for drama in classrooms.

The research used Wragg’s (1994) notion of ‘critical events’ in order to select central moments in the process which were considered to be illustrative of the Bondian way of working according to the nine elements above. These events were then analysed and the findings were triangulated in relation to the analysis of other collected data.

Beyond my immediate recognition of these critical events during the observation period, which I have noted in the fieldnotes, I watched the video recordings twice after the completion of the research and identified even more suitable paradigms for this study. It has to be noted that Big Brum evinced an acute awareness of Bondian
theory and practice, something which contributed to gathering a large amount of suitable material which of course was part of the reason for the difficulties in choosing the most illustrative of these. So I had to proceed with an even more selective approach which, it may be admitted, might not in some respects do full justice to the company. Generally the analysis of data followed the process described below:

1. With the help of the list of the units of analysis, I located possible critical events within the process of exploration and rehearsals in the practice of Big Brum. Each of these critical events was identified in relation to one or more of the elements of interest. Locating these critical events was further assisted and validated by analysing the interviews of the director during the process as well as by going back to the literature review.

2. In the second step, as mentioned above, I twice reviewed the recordings, revisiting the chosen critical events in the process. This external observation generated more material. I have chosen to leave the biggest part of this material out because it would be impossible to analyse it sufficiently within the limited scope of a thesis. I would also think that Bond’s work in particular requires in-depth research in order to be understood, rather than the piling up of poorly analysed events.

3. I have thus chosen to focus mainly onto the first two parts of the play, especially on the scenes which, according to the analysis, could best illustrate the research areas. The remaining critical events were validated by closely examining them in relation to the analysis of the director’s as well as the playwright’s interviews and commentary. Additionally I have used my fieldnotes and the research diary. The most useful tool for analysing and validating the finding proved to be Bond’s own intervention in the
process of rehearsing. So I have analysed his practice and crosschecked the findings with the ones I have noted in the work of Big Brum.

It has to be noted here that the material that was left out of this presentation is as rich in some cases as what was included, and it could be used in support of or as a supplement to the analysis in a later research.

2.4 Validity-Reliability

As mentioned above, various authors cite various claims in relation to the validity and reliability of case studies and qualitative research (Smith in Cohen et al., 2000: 183; Cohen et al., 2000:183-184; Yin, 1994:54). It is true that fully validating the choice of a case seemed to be difficult to sustain during the process of observation and analysis.

The present study used the methodological triangulation in order to overcome this problem, gathering data from various sources in order to secure an in-depth examination (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 2) of Bond’s theory through Big Brum’s practice and at the same time to validate the offered analysis. In line with the remarks of Denscombe (2007) above, the use of multiple methods fostered ‘the use of multiple sources of data’ which in their turn assisted the ‘validation of data through triangulation’ (p.45).

Since reliability relates closely to the possibility of replicating a study (Cohen, L & Manion, L., 1994:117), I can’t claim that another researcher would have come to the same results in a different setting. Big Brum is a unique instance, since it has had a stable professional relationship with Edward Bond and has developed his method over the past 18 years. Similarly, I can’t claim that another researcher would have come to the same results even in the same setting. But ultimately I have tried to triangulate the
findings using multiple sources, the crucial one being the analysis of Bond’s own intervention in the process.

2.5 Generalisability – Relatability

In relation to the weakness of non-generalizability and relatability of the case studies it has to be stated that this study attempts to propose some ‘fuzzy generalisations’ in relation to a model of drama work, based on Edward Bond’s theory through Big Brum’s practice, which will not make an ‘absolute claim on knowledge’ (Bassey, 1999:12). As Bassey defines the term, fuzzy generalisation is not a generalisation based on statistics but a proposition which may claim that something ‘is possible, or likely, or unlikely’; it is in fact a qualitative measure (ibid).

Thus the proposed model of thinking about drama work based on Edward Bond’s theory as illustrated through Big Brum’s practice is only a proposition attempting to contribute to current relevant discussion, and it is hoped it will constitute a point of reference for further research, evaluation and testing.

2.6 Ethical considerations

Sturman (1999) argues that problems of ethics are not unique to case studies but ‘where [a] case study involves the portrayal of persons or institutions in forms that may enable recognition, the ethical issues are paramount’ (p.110). Blaxter et al. (2001) argue that ‘Research ethics is about being clear about the nature of the agreement you have entered into with your research subjects or contacts’ (p.158) and Fontana and Frey (1994) identify three main topics around which ‘traditional ethical concerns have revolved’: a) informed consent, where the consent of the subject is given after a truthful and careful briefing on the research is provided; b) right to
privacy, protecting the identity of the subject, and c) protection from harm, ‘physical, emotional or any other kind’ (p.372).

Sturman (1999) continues by proposing a general framework for resolving these problems through negotiation ‘between researchers and those researched’, and argues that researchers who use case studies have the responsibility to address in a ‘responsible way ethical issues that emerge in their work’ (pp.110-111). It is certainly the case in this enquiry that Big Brum is covered by this description. The company kindly accepted to offer this opportunity to develop the study, which was a brave decision since a potential critique may arise from different points of view. Sturman’s proposition above, to negotiate but also to inform the company about the study’s intentions and aims, was followed in every step of this research, including the permission to attend and record the programme from beginning to its end. Full and informed consent, among other concerns, was of primary importance.

The negotiation and the briefing for the study took place long before the research began and continued throughout the process whenever it was needed for either the researcher or the group under observation.

Another crucial ethical issue which needed to be addressed in the negotiation with the company was the proprietorship of the visual data produced, and the use of these data in feature presentations. It was made clear that the decision belongs to Big Brum and the researcher would happily transfer copyrights if asked to.

Confidentiality, consent, protection from possible harm, and above all respect, was kept in mind towards all participants in the research: a) the TIE Company, Big Brum; b) the director, Chris Cooper; c) The theatre writer, Edward Bond; d) The actors/teachers who participated in the programme, and e) All external visitors.
I kept the last note for the company as a whole. I need to say that all the members were extremely supportive, but I feel I am particularly indebted to the director, Chris Cooper, who made himself available at all times, even when the company was rather pressed for time. Both he and Edward Bond continued to offer me feedback even during the last stages of the writing up of the thesis.
CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFYING THE BASIC DIRECTIONS OF EDWARD BOND’S APPROACH THROUGH BIG BRUM’S PRACTICE

Introduction

Until now I have presented what I consider the basic elements of the theory of Edward Bond. In Chapter 1 of the literature review, I concluded with those elements which I regard as most important for detecting and researching in practice. In Chapter 2 I presented the research methodology of the study. In this Chapter 3, I am going to analyse the practice of the TIE Company Big Brum, in order to clarify how it incorporates Bondian theory into its practice and to identify, by way of conclusion, in the following and final chapter, possible perspectives in classroom drama.

The following presentation and analysis of data refers to the Theatre in Education programme devised by Big Brum Theatre in Education Company and based on Edward Bond’s play A Window (Bond, 2011), specially commissioned by Big Brum. This was the seventh play written by Bond for the Company.

The collected data covers the whole period of production and rehearsals, extended over 24 days. Additionally, the data contain recordings of two public ‘Q and A’ sessions with Edward Bond which followed two performances of the play in theatres; my diary and fieldnotes on the process; the notes of Edward Bond on the play; and finally interviews with the members of Big Brum and the playwright. In total the recorded data extend to around 140 hours.

The presentation of data analysis is organised, on the basis of the progression of the production process, into two rather loosely-defined but distinctive stages of the exploring and rehearsing of the play. The presentation will follow the chronological
development of the programme through these two phases, while taking account of the areas of primary interest regarding practice which were identified and defined in the literature review: Story, Centre, Accident Time, Invisible Object, Cathexis, Extreme, Site, and Drama Event. As already mentioned in the literature review, there is a ninth element which surfaced during the analysis of data, that of Enactment.

The purpose is to detect the central, driving element of the production and in this way to illustrate the process in the form of a narrative. This narrative will be interrupted by commentary boxes whenever it is believed that there is a critical event in the process, for example moments where one or more of the above main areas of interest might be identified; these areas will be analysed critically in light of the constructed theory as well as relevant aspects or clues from the rest of the collected data like interviews and field notes.

During the rehearsals there was an additional aspect added, not initially planned, and related to Bond’s own active involvement in the rehearsal process. This involvement will be used toward the end of the presentation as an extra but valuable opportunity for triangulating the findings of the process straightforwardly with the playwright’s own practice.

It has to be noted that the members of the company who took part in the process rarely mention directly the terms of Edward Bond’s theory, though they seem in most cases to share a common understanding of the playwright’s terminology at least among themselves. As shall be seen later, the same can be applied to Bond himself. So the present analysis will try to interpret the data and detect a possible connection to the theory presented above, an endeavour which, we are conscious, runs the risk of misreading the initial intentions of the company. Nevertheless, the interviews with the
members of Big Brum, especially those conducted with the director, Chris Cooper, and with the playwright, as well as Bond’s involvement in the rehearsal, contributed to reducing this risk and clarified further the possible connections, either by confirming the initial assumptions or by conversely rendering them untenable.

It must be noted at the outset, too, that the discussions of the company at some points seemed very incoherent. The process was frequently interrupted by conversation that seemed either irrelevant or highly personal, owing to the fact that members may at times have found that aspects of the drama connected with their personal life or experiences. These parts of the process, although some may appear significant, could not be included in the references and the transcriptions due to ethical considerations.

It has to be further noted that when there are transcriptions of the monitored discussions in the text, I am not using the real names of the group, in order to protect the identity of the speaker. False names are employed except in the case of the director, Chris Cooper and the playwright, Edward bond. Wherever other names are mentioned these refer exclusively to the characters in the play.

Most of the references can be found in the Appendices. When an extract is not included there, it will be referenced in my archive only. The relevant reference then will have the form of combination of Latin and Arabic numbers, for example (VII.1.15:45-17:08); the first number refers to the day of the recording, the second to the specific part of the recording, and the last set of numbers to the specific timing in the DVD.

_The play: A Window_
The play *A Window* is a triptych in three panels, and shares with all other plays of Bond a strong and clear Story; in this case one which, as the playwright comments in his notes on the play, the apparent context, particularly of the first panel, approximates a ‘TV soap opera’ (App. F, p.224).

Before going into deeper analysis of the process of the rehearsals and applications of the programme, I present a synopsis of the plot of the play in order to help the reader to follow the process more closely. Another summary of the play is offered by the director, Chris Cooper, in Appendix E (p.221).

**Synopsis of the plot of A Window**

As mentioned above, the play bears the subheading *A Triptych*, and develops into three panels which span fifteen years and take place in a room of a flat in a city, probably a living room or a spare room that is not used much. The room contains a chaise-longue, a table, a chair, a door and a window. There are three characters: Liz and Richard, who are partners, and Dan, their son.

In the first panel the play begins with Liz alone in the room, carrying sheets and making up a single bed on the chaise-longue. After a while Richard comes into the flat, and an argument develops between the two. Liz asks for some quiet (Bond, 2011:181). Richard seems disturbed by Liz’s decision to sleep alone in the room. He has had a long day out trying to find a job, as he is currently unemployed, and he claims that she needs to go to the doctor, giving the impression that this is not unusual for her. Liz refuses because, as she claims, she understands that the doctors will put her on pills. The reason that Liz needs quiet is revealed after Richard’s insistence; it relates to an article she read in a newspaper earlier the same morning. A woman has blinded her child using scissors, because she wanted to keep it with her forever. The
incident seems persistently to disturb Liz’s imagination since, as she mentions again, she kept reading the newspaper all morning, and she eventually tore it apart. She endlessly wonders how this could happen, how a loving mother might blind her child to maintain its dependence on her. Richard for his part insists that it is just an ordinary incident, one to which they should not pay too much attention, and he takes Liz’s bedding to their adjoining room. Things, as he states, just happen; they should sit and eat instead of wondering about the incident. Liz however reveals that she is pregnant, a condition that brings the couple into more trouble. Richard claims that she should get rid of the baby because they cannot afford it, and demands: ‘What use is a kid?’ (Bond, 2011:187). If she doesn’t he claims he will abandon her (Bond, 2011:ibid). Liz, however, doesn’t yet appear decided as to what she should do. Richard finally gets some money from Liz’s handbag; he throws the handbag on the floor towards her, says ‘Left enough in t’ shop for one’ (Bond, 2011:ibid) and leaves the flat.

The second panel takes place roughly fifteen years later. Richard has abandoned Liz probably because she kept the baby, Dan, who is now around fifteen years old. The room remains the same. The panel starts with Dan coming into the room, fatigued and with his face blank. He puts a small packet on the table and sits on the chaise-longue. Liz comes in the room afterward; she is older, untidy and unkempt (Bond, 2011:183). There is a common domestic dialogue developing between the mother and the son in the beginning, where Liz seems to be concerned in an ordinary maternal way for Dan. But the dialogue quickly reveals that the packet contains drugs, which Dan regularly brings for his mother. It seems that it is a common practice for Liz to ask her son to provide her with drugs. In this case, however, Dan has been injured. When he takes off his jacket, it is revealed that his right sleeve is soaked in blood. There is no information provided as to what happened, other than that there was a fight between
Dan and his best mate, Arnie, who tried to take the drugs for his own use. Liz’s attitude then becomes even more conventionally maternal; there is a jarring note to her concern, however, as she seems on the one hand worried for Dan, while on the other concerned about traces of blood being left on the carpet or on doorsteps that the neighbours would have seen. She then brings a sheet to tear for bandages, since there are none in the house. She starts treating and dressing the wound but she awkwardly spills the water and leaves the room in a fury. After some time she returns, bringing with her some nail scissors and continues tearing up the sheet. It seems that she has taken her dose of drugs while she was off. Dan states that he will stop going out in the streets to provide her with drugs and then closes his eyes while lying on the chaise-longue. Liz continues with a seemingly perplexing monologue where she flits between her maternal concern for Dan, the incident of the blinding of the child reported in the first panel, and reflections on her own life, all the while continuing to tear up the sheet into pieces, and gradually in an almost frenzied fashion. She even talks about blinding her own child, but does not carry out the act. Eventually she proposes to Dan that he take drugs too. Her speech is again controversial and reveals an ongoing conflict within her. She admits that she has blinded her child hundreds of times before now, but that she can’t bring herself to blind him again (A Window:14). Later she attempts to hang herself by standing on the chair in the middle of the room and using the strips of the sheet she had earlier cut, but then changes her mind. In the end, she hangs herself out of the room, after putting music on in Dan’s room. Dan wakes up, arguably but not certainly unaware of what has occurred, and slowly starts collecting the remaining strips while dancing and weeping at the same time.

The third panel takes place a short time after Liz’s suicide, maybe few days or weeks later. Richard visits the flat but Dan, since he has never met him before, mistakes him
in the beginning for social services. Richard tries to steal the remaining clothes of Liz’s in order to sell them, and after he is stopped by Dan he eventually reveals to him that he is his father. Richard claims that Liz was on drugs and engaged in prostitution, but Dan refuses to believe this and reacts violently. The dialogue escalates into a fight where Dan finally binds Richard on the chaise-longue. He holds the bundle of Liz’s clothes which Richard had tried to steal, and talks to them as if talking to Liz. He even demands that Richard address them the same way and ask for forgiveness. He insists on Richard admitting that he was lying previously. Richard seems at some points to accede to the demands. Dan attempts blinding Richard, but ultimately doesn’t perform this action. Finally Richard unties himself and escapes after managing to grab some of Liz’s clothes, as Dan has stopped paying attention to him and gazes out of the window of the room. The play ends with Dan looking out onto the streets uttering the words ‘For the kid. For the kid.’ (Bond, 2011:208).

3.1 Analysis and presentation of data

3.1.1 Exploration phase

*Exploration phase: Day 1 (01-09-2009), first session, DVD 1*

The very first task for the company members in the exploration phase was to create the room of the flat where the Story is taking place. All the members of the company together marked the walls of the room with masking tape on the floor, and placed in there the objects that the play describes (see Picture 1). *The director, Chris Cooper, asked the group of participants to imagine a very particular detail in the room, even if it appears to contradict the written text* (Fieldnotes, 01-09-2009, first session). *The next step was for the actors to read the text by moving into the made-up room, but*

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5 Italics denote that the specific text comes from my Fieldnotes.
only following the logic of the situation and not enacting it. The purpose of the exercise was to help actors to see where the Story takes them into the created space (Field notes, 01-09-2009, first session).

After the reading/running-through of the text there was a discussion about whether something new occurred in the consciousness of the actors or the viewers, or whether there was something that they felt they already knew before which had been confirmed. The main remarks referred to the feeling and the function of the space throughout the play and the actions of the characters (Fieldnotes, 01-09-2009, first session).

In relation to the feeling and function of the space, the group noted that the room seemed to decay significantly from the first panel to the second; it seemed gradually to fall apart, even though on the surface it remained the same after fifteen years. Moreover, the space for the team felt temporary, unsettled and unstable (App. D.1, par.4, p.63). The director added that he felt the room was especially intimate, and that the play appeared quite voyeuristic: the longer he spent looking at the action, the more he felt that he was interfering with the life of others. In relation to the actions of the characters, some of the general remarks noted that Richard is changed into a rather
pathetic person in the third panel, quite in contrast to how he is presented in the first. Some members of the group thought that Richard ends up in a tragic condition, which comes as a result of his obsession with possession and ownership; he thinks that he is in control of the situation, or that he has the last word on it, but finally the situation evades his control and explodes. The discussion continued to the realisation that the home changes from the first panel to the third; it became something else, but what else was not yet fully defined for the team; they finally agreed that the home is gradually falling apart (App. D.1, par. 1-32, pp.63-65).

Finally the group posed some questions that arose or were confronted during the running of the play. One of them was related to whether Dan in the second panel really sleeps when Liz commits suicide; this was considered a very significant question in terms of defining the Story, because it creates a specific difficulty in relation to Dan’s attitude. If he wasn’t sleeping, then not trying to stop his mother from committing suicide poses some important questions about what this decision, and the attitude it reflects, may mean for the whole of the play. There was also a question concerning the truthfulness of what the characters in the play were saying. The discussion focused mainly on the story from the newspaper about the blinding of the child, and questioned whether it was a true story that Liz really read or whether it was simply invention. The group were undecided, however, as to whether the possibility of Liz’s having invented the story matters for the play as a whole (App. D.1, par. 33-40, pp.65-66).

**Commentary**

The initial task of defining the space of the room put the actors in the position of
experiencing rather than simply thinking about the Story. My original reaction to the exercise was that it may have helped a lot in approaching the Story in a less conversational way that is probably predominantly based on commonsensical presuppositions which may present the danger of simply locking the actors to an already existing knowledge for the Story and the family matters presented in it (Fieldnotes, 01-09-2009, first session). As the director commented, the aim of the task was to create a context in which actors could see the text in a new light and with an open mind, and not in terms of preconceptions they may have brought to the project (Discussion with the director, Diary entrance 1-9-2009).

In relation to the space, the group felt an intimacy and also, collectively, an uncertainty that may indicate a kind of a conflict and pressure not yet fully defined, but helpful in approaching difficulties that may affect the Site of the room and the characters in it. In that sense there might from the first be a tension between the senses of intimacy and uncertainty in the group’s experience of the room. From one perspective, the intimacy of the space may provoke personal engagement on the part of the audience, and the uncertainty invoke to the social pressures that impinge on the personal. Hence the strange scenario of the space’s being at the same time intimate and uncertain may indicate a gap between the personal and the social that is very much of interest in Bondian theory and practice. Consequently this possible but still underdeveloped complexity affords one an insight into the term ‘Site’ in the exploration of the play. As mentioned earlier, the Site of drama in Bond’s approach is defined as the imaginary location of ‘the contradictions and conflicts’ (Bond, 2011:xx) where the clash between the social and the personal create a gap in meaning.

In the same way the preliminary examination of the actions of the characters is related
to the same areas of conflict and paradox. Richard seems to be deluded in his understanding of the condition he is in; he has created a false image of himself and of the situation, which finally contributes to his undoing. Dan, for his part, is regarded as dispossessed but simultaneously enigmatic. In that sense Dan is seen again in paradoxical terms, since being enigmatic is a condition that places him in a more powerful position in relation to the others. His possibly conscious refraining from intervening in his mother’s attempted suicide already places him at the centre of attention. Why he doesn’t interfere? Is he taking revenge for his mother’s misuse of him? Does he seek revenge? (Fieldnotes, 01-09-2009, first session).

Finally, I think that the most significant remark made above was in relation to the importance of the story of the blinding for the whole play. I believe that the group has rightly challenged the relevance of the possibility of the story not being factual. Even where story was fictional, it would have the same import for the play and Liz’s actions. Either factual or not, the event of the blinding creates a concern impossible to be circumvented by Liz or the audience. In a sense it describes an Extreme situation that again offers some essential seeds for a Bondian approach, if seen in the context of developing Accident Time. Though at this point of the process there wasn’t any kind of a clear description of the extremity of the situation and its possible consequences for the play, I think the group followed their intuition as actors, and promptly appreciated that there might not be any noteworthy difference, in terms of the themes of the play or its essence, between reality and imagination.

On the other hand the kind of pressure that the group detected in the Story is very close to what all of Bond’s stories share. The playwright claimed for example that, although the space may be thought of as recognisably ordinary in the beginning of the
first panel of *A Window*, it rather indicates an unusual room somewhat differentiated from a conventional flat: ‘The room is slightly “apart,” not the conventional kitchen or living room. Its furnishing is slightly askew -- a chaise-longue and a table.’ (App. F, p.224). That is because the few furnishings are used in a rather different way than the expected: ‘But the chaise-longue is treated as any other bed and Richard sits at the table as if it were a kitchen table. The room and furniture suggest a sort of pressure -- as if say the room were on a mountain side and over time the mountain’s weight had distorted the walls’ (ibid).

Liz’s making up a bed on the chaise-longue is an action somewhat out of the ordinary or of the expected, and indicates problems in regard to the domestic ‘normality’ of the house. In that sense it could provoke questions in the audience from the beginning, such as: what kind of a situation compelled her to make a bed up on this piece of furniture not designed for the purpose? This unconventionality of the room suggests, for Bond, a ‘sort of pressure – as if say the room were on a mountain side and over time the mountain’s weight has distorted the walls’, but a pressure which stems from the ‘city outside’ (ibid). An important question, though, is how this ‘pressure’ is connected to the ‘city outside’.

Already the analysis indicates possible but underdeveloped appearances of some of the basic concerns of this study, including the Site, with the pressure felt from outside; the Extreme, with the different use of furniture and the story of the blinding; and Story, which still seems very ordinary and recognisable. These areas are not of course developed fully as yet, but indicate some rather interesting opening themes for the exploration which need to be further studied in the next sessions.
The last area which may be detected is the Centre. Even when the group were exploring the Story in general terms, as documented above, they were already detecting some important preliminary aspects, as yet raw, that might relate to the Centre. Their contradictory feelings regarding the room, for example, or the seemingly enigmatic but dispossessed status of Dan, are some relevant suggestions because they may reveal or at least point toward paradoxes and conflicts that may help define a possible Centre for the whole play. As Bond has indicated, the Centre defines a Site of a situation which contains a conflict between Radical Innocence and corruption (Bond, 2011:xix), and produces or dramatises a paradox in people’s living under the impact of ideology.

*Exploration phase: Day 1 (01-09-2009), second session, DVD 1*

Immediately after the preliminary remarks the director, Chris Cooper, gave a new task for the participants which related directly to finding a Centre for the production. *He divided them into two subgroups and asked them to find what is for each group the central image together with the central line for each of the three panels, as well as which speech from the text they could regard as the overall central speech of the play* (Fieldnotes, 01-09-2009, second session).

For the first panel the groups used the following images and lines:

1. *Liz is sitting on the chaise-longue looking slightly downward, holding her head with her two hands. Richard is standing right behind her while holding a pillow with his two hands which he seems to be pressing* (see Picture 1).
The particular image is taking place immediately after Liz has informed Richard that she is pregnant, a pregnancy which in the play he demands she terminate. The central line for this image was ‘What use is a kid?’ (Bond, 2011:187), which is said by Richard when he is arguing against the option of keeping the baby.

2. The second image was a moving image rather than a still one, because the subgroup misunderstood the task. Liz is making a bed when the entrance door is heard outside the room. Liz then goes and shuts the door of the room she is in. It is a few seconds before Richard comes into the room in the beginning of the first panel (see Picture 2). The moving image takes place between the two closings of the doors.
The central line for this image was ‘Not another a’ yer things?’ (Bond, 2011:181) again spoken by Richard, this time when he first sees Liz making up the bed and claiming that she is going to sleep there.

For the second panel the groups offered accordingly:

1. The first image is taken from the moment when Dan is lying, maybe sleeping, on the chaise-longue, while Liz is cutting more strips from the sheet and has just said ‘The woman ’ad a kid. She took out its eyes.’ (Bond, 2011:194) (see Picture 3).

![Picture 3](image1.png)

Picture 3
The central line offered for this image was ‘Cant take ’is eyes out. Done that already. ’Undreds a’ times.’ which is spoken by Liz in her speech (Bond, 2011:195).

2. The second subgroup’s image was taken from the same scene, where Dan is probably asleep and Liz speaks to herself. It is few lines after she started speaking by herself, before starting tearing up the sheet again. She goes to Dan to shake him awake, but instead she ‘wrings her hands over his head’ (Bond, 2011:194) (see Picture 4).
The particular group has offered as a central line for the image a short speech that Liz is addressing to Dan following his asking her to give up drugs, a page before the above event takes place in the text:

Liz I cant. I know meself. Yer got t’ let me understand meself. At least allow me that. Some people start on it easy, They’re the ones ‘oo give it up easy. I didn’t want t’ start – it was ‘ard. Thass why I cant give it up. Wish I was different. This ‘ow I’ll always be. Too late t’change. (Bond, 2011:192-193)

For the third panel the images and the central lines were:

1. The first group’s image was the chair with the bundle of Liz’s clothes on it, with other items of clothes scattered around the floor of the room, with no person taking part in the image (no picture available). It is the moment when Dan throws Liz’s clothes to the chair and ‘some of them drape over it, some fall to the ground’ (Bond, 2011:203). This action takes place while the dialogue between Dan and Richard is beginning to escalate toward violence. Richard has just placed the clothes that he tried to steal on the table and left the room to collect some jewellery, which Dan has purposely misinformed him is in the wardrobe. Dan plans to attack Richard and to bind him on the chaise-longue after he returns from the next room.

6 There were some technical problems with the cam recorder at the specific moment. On the other hand the group described their image rather than showing it, because they didn’t at the time have clothes to use as Liz’s clothes.
The central line for this image was ‘As t’ be justice somewhere’ (Bond, 2011:198).

The line is spoken by Dan in his dialogue with Richard before it is revealed that he is his father. Dan explains to Richard his experience of his father:

Dan Never met ‘im – done better: I dreamt ‘im. Thass all I remember when I was a kid: ‘im in me ‘ead at night. Since she’s gone ‘e’s come back. ‘E’s the sort a man ‘oo ‘as worms crawlin on ‘is face while ‘e’s still alive. If ‘e come through that door I’d know ‘im straight away. I’d kill ‘im. Take ‘im t’ where she ‘anged ‘erself – kill ‘im that spot. ‘As t’ be justice somewhere. (ibid)

2. The second group presented a moment towards the end of panel three where Richard tries to reach for some of the Liz’s clothes after he has managed to escape the bind and is preparing to leave the place (see Picture 5). Richard is on his knees extending his arm to reach for another piece of clothing (Bond, 2011:208) while Dan is already looking the window of the flat, down at the street, with his hands in his pockets.

The central line for the image is ‘Yer dad’ (Bond, 2011:200) which is part of the dialogue between Dan and Richard at the point where the latter reveals to Dan that he is his father.
In the ensuing discussion on the first image and central line (Picture 1 above), the group noted that it looks as if there is already a struggle between the father (Richard) and the son (Dan) even before the boy is been born. The father’s situation is made analogous to the ancient Greek myth of the god Saturn, father of Zeus, who ate his children in order to protect his power (App. D.1.a, par. 13, p. 70). Richard seems very angry, ready to suffocate the coming baby, an interpretation based on the way the actor holds the cushion in the image; on the other hand, he behaves like an infantilised adult who can only see his own universe. The same is thought of Liz, but her infantilisation is taking place due to the corruption of the city, something concluded in the second panel (App. D.1.a, par. 8-12, p.70) while in the first she still retains something of her humanity.

For the second image on the first panel (Picture 2 above), one member of the group posed a question for the first time related to the significance of the story about the blinding of a child by his mother in the first panel, but the group did not yet have a full answer to this question (App. D.1.a, par. 16-23, p.71).

For the other members Liz is making a ‘life bed’ for her coming child on the chaise-longue, in contrast to the ‘death bed’ to which Richard forces her to return (App. D.1.a, par. 28, p.71). The newspaper story has turned Liz’s life upside-down, and this is an indication of how the outside world has entered the room. Additionally, Richard has brought the difficulties and tensions of society into the flat when in the text he describes the experience of being out there struggling to find a job and consorting with strangers:

**Director:** (...) It is interesting what he [Richard] is bringing in the room as well. And what she [Liz] is been through. She has incorporated something from the outside which we don’t yet know the veracity of it but it is a horrific story [of the
blinding] which literally turned her life upside down. But he is being out, trenching this bloody city trying to find a work. He talks about still choking on the stink and all of this and this and that … nothing works… ‘And you are telling me?’ Anyway, when he shouts at her face ‘we can’t afford it’ that is real desperation. (App. D.1.a, par. 35, p.72)

For the second panel the argument focused mainly on the tearing of the sheet by Liz in order to dress Dan’s wound (see Picture 3 above). The group noticed that the tearing of the strips is something done while Liz begins speaking of the incident reported in the newspaper once more, a fact that led the group to draw a parallel between these two actions. The blinding of the child by his mother is put together with the tearing of the strips:

**Director:** Why did you go for those tearing strips particularly?

**Ca:** When we went through it, it really struck me because she talks about the woman who takes the kid’s eyes out and then she tears the strips. It was like she was tearing the eyes out. (…)

**CR:** Directly after that she stood over him [Dan] and says don’t go, don’t go.

**Director:** And before that she is doing the wriggling. It is almost like it is a developing image [inaudible but talking about how an eye may be taken out]

**Ca:** … and the tearing is to make bandages to heal him [Dan].

**Director:** And so is the blinding. The blinding is done in order to protect him (…). Keeping him innocent, keeping him safe, pure. So perverted! (App. D.1.a, par. 40-45, p.72)

The group had noted that in fact Liz recognises that she has ‘blinded’ Dan already with her past actions, for example in asking him to bring drugs for her (App. D.1.a, par. 50, p.73). In focusing on this they have noticed that her monologue might contain a reach for real self-knowledge, (App. D.1.a, par.52-53, p.73) since earlier in the text she appears to want to understand herself:

**Liz** I cant. I know meself. Yer got t’ let me understand meself. At least allow me that. (Bond, 2011:192)
As mentioned in the discussion, though, from the point at which Liz utters this speech in an attempt for self-knowledge, she is not far away from her suicide:

**Director:** But what there is here is an attempt at self-knowledge in relation to her own child that she recognised she blinded by her actions. She is feeling that connection between her and, I suspect, understanding of the blinding of the child. I don’t think that those kinds of stories [of the blinding] can affect you in such a way if you can easily just go ‘Well that’s a monster, monster [for the mother who blinded her kid]’. But it is almost like the story begins to penetrate her. There is a residue of it in her. Maybe there is a residue of it in him [Richard] and him [Dan]. We might be looking at that. (…). It is almost like the story begins to penetrate you. But it is also because you interpenetrate it.

**R:** So why she moved to a room with a window? (…) I don’t know how much she is reflecting on her own blinding.

**Director:** (Inaudible) What I am saying is self-knowledge. She is almost like she can’t turn at the window but she is almost like she is feeling blindly for it. It is interesting because even Richard has moments of self-knowledge too. That is the tragedy, isn’t it? (App. D.1.a, par. 53-55, p.73)

The assumption is therefore that the tragedy lies in the supposition that both Richard and Liz, although they seem corrupted by society, eventually achieve moments of self-knowledge (App. D.1.a, par. 55, p.73). In relation to Richard, the group explained later that in the text, when he is tied up by Dan on the chaise-longue, he seems to acknowledge the corrupted Site of his living.

For the last panel it is noticed that for both subgroups the centre of attention is Liz’s clothes, and through them the absent mother herself (App. D.1.a. par. 58, p.74). These clothes have, however, very different values for each of the two characters in the third panel, Richard and Dan. For Richard they are worth only the money to be earned from selling them, while for Dan they still amount to a residue of Liz which he is trying to retain, seeking through them to ‘hold on to something of his mother’. As it is concluded, it is almost like ‘she’s being kicked up. But that’s not enough (…) she has to be dragged over and killed again …’ (App. D.1.a, par. 58, p.74). Richard has
returned in the third panel in order to get Liz’s clothes and sell them, and this is done in order to survive, since this is the only thing he is capable of doing; in contrast, Liz wanted to live but realised that she couldn’t and thus chose to kill herself (App. D.1.a, par. 76, p.75).

Another difference between the two characters of the third panel, Richard and Dan, similar to their variant relation to the clothing, was located in the nature of the questions that these two pose in relation to what a ‘dad’ means. Richard’s questions are of existential interest, while Dan’s are ontological. In the text, Dan calls Richard a ‘dad’ but the latter rejects the whole idea of fatherhood:

**Dan** Dad.

**Richard** Yer can sort it out for yerself. Teach yer not t’ be so cocksure. -- Don’t call me dad. Too late for any a’ that. We’ll keep out a’each other’s way after this. *(Picks up the clothes)* I ‘ave t’ -- no work nowadays -- get ’ard up. ‘Ave t’ screw what yer can if yer wan’ t’ live. *(Bond, 2011:202)*

One member of the group suggested that in this panel there is a ‘collision of the two worlds’, the existential and the ontological, which is at the centre ‘of the whole thing Edward [Bond] is getting up here’ (App. D.1.a, par, 80-81, pp. 80-81).

Ultimately the whole group was agreed that the central speech of the whole play should be a part of the dialogue between Liz and Richard in the first panel, where she describes the reported blinding of the child to Richard:

**Liz** She blinded ‘er kid.

**Richard** O?

**Liz** So it’d ‘ave t’ stay with her. Always be with ‘er. When it grew up. Never ‘ave t’ go out -- mix with -- never ‘ave t’ fight its way in the - - grovel t’ survive -- tear itself t’ bits. She did it ‘cause she loved it. She ‘d always care for it -- look after it -- it’d grow up as if ‘er ‘ouse was its playpen. Be buried in it! *(Bond, 2011:184)*
The director, together with the rest of the team, rather eagerly agreed that this extract should definitely work as the central speech of the play for their work:

**Director:** I think that it is! I think … for us anyway! I think it is! It is the story of the blinding. It is like (…) haunted for the rest of the bloody play! You see everything else in relation to it. And it’s truly a centre because everything else flows out of it and the whole discussion we just had about corruption, justice, revenge, survival, freedom, it all comes out of that woman’s distorted act of … I think that’s her radical innocence actually. It is completely perverted in the woman (…). That feels really rich for me. (…). (I.7.02:00- 03:10)

**Commentary**

As Bond argues, the Centre is defined ‘as the site of a situation which contains a conflict between Radical Innocence and corruption’ (Bond, 2011:xix) and every choice involved in staging a drama production needs to go through the Centre of the play. Hence this is the most important area initially to explore or define, in order to maintain the coherence of the whole work. Indeed from the second half of the first day of the exploration, Big Brum members focused their attention on an endeavour to find a possible Centre for the whole TIE programme; and it seems that the above session was mainly focused on this task.

Some parts of the above discussion could be regarded as a potentially fruitful foundation on which to develop a Centre for the production, but it is not clearly defined yet. For example the deep shock Liz felt over the reported incident of blinding, an act perpetrated by a loving mother on her child, indicates that there is still something in her that sustains her awareness of the human paradox, along with her ability to ask why-questions about an event that seems impossible to ignore or disregard, in total contrast to Richard who prefers to eat. Identifying the remains of her humanity in the first panel already reveals a possible association with the Site of
her radical innocence; but placed under pressure since, as the group mentioned, she is harassed by Richard and progressively infantilised by the city. The city is in conflict with the Radical Innocence in her. The pressure of the conflict ultimately causes her death; the city has created a paradox that led her to death.

This side of Liz might constitute one dimension of the conflict between Radical Innocence and corruption that could be contained in a possible Centre. Later, the director of the play declared that images 1, 4 and 5 (see Pictures 1, 4 and 5 above), as well as the lines that accompanied them, were closer to a Centre because ‘they had grasped the whole contradiction between birth and death in the play’, but that he hadn’t yet ‘put words on it’ (App. C.1.a, par. 2, p.13). In fact it seems that the company is consciously looking for fundamental contradictions like that dramatised in Liz, where human beings find themselves caught between their Radical Innocence and corruption, to place at the Centre of their work.

Another strong contradiction identified by the members of the company that may offer a point of reference concerns the conflicting assumptions about or definitions of the concept of ‘dad’ by Dan and Richard. Hence a ‘dad’ is not defined by identity cards in Dan’s mind, which to Dan holds not just for himself but for every child. It has to do with profound ontological questions which relate to the question: ‘who am I?’

Moreover the company thinks that the particular matter relates immediately to the area of justice, something again stated by Dan, the child. In a sense the particular comments may connect with the concept of Radical Innocence and the child’s search for meaning in relation to the ontology of things, including the concept of the father.
In other words, Dan in the third panel may be seen as a newborn child, which the company realised later with the help of Edward Bond’s notes on the play; he is like a newborn who tries to create his world in the same way as the pre-real child Cathects objects with personal meanings. As mentioned in the above discussion Richard exists in an absolute existential fashion, just being and living, which is not adequate in terms of Dan’s need for a dad. The lack of correspondence is similar to trying to match the question of ‘what is a home’ to an answer that describes a ‘house’. What Richard is offering to Dan, according to the company, is the ‘city’s’ definition of ‘dad’.

Ultimately the proposed central speech is probably working again within the context of a contradiction between Radical Innocence and corruption. As the director mentioned, the incident involving the blinding is the source of or the spur to the fundamental questions which arise in Liz’s mind, which will eventually bring her to an impasse and hence closer to her death. The impasse that Liz is coming to may be compared in that sense with the impasse students in the Palermo (see p.79 above) improvisation found themselves in and which concluded with their killing their own sibling. Whether the company is taking account of this probable similarity or not will be examined in later sessions.

The company though is already exhibiting their own central method of finding a Centre, and that is by detecting contradictions. The contradictions between the ‘city’s’ demands, which should be compared to ideology’s demands, on every single human being, like Liz in the particular play, and the real needs of every individual is a good starting-point for defining a Centre for them. The definition of the Centre for the present production is not fully formed yet, but the process till now offers an interesting direction which needs to be further explored in later sessions, but which
already poses some important questions: How should the Centre be defined in details? Does it have to have a detailed account of the situation it refers to? In other words, how specific should it be? Or how general? Is it a topic or a much more focused exploration of a particular aspect of human living?

Exploration phase: Day 1 (01-09-2009), third session, DVD 1

The last part of the first day’s session relates to a re-reading of the text by the whole group except the actors. The actors should just listen and take notes (Fieldnotes, 01-09-2009, third part). The director of the company commented later:

**Director:** I was talking to Edward [Bond] about the play very early on. He said to me (…) the thing about kids is, and he was talking about the whole universe being in the tea cup or in a grain of sand, he [Bond was] talking about how the kids see and how we need to unlock that in order to get behind ideology. If you like to un-blind people from the kind of false consciousness we live in. And what was really interesting, he said, they think metaphysically not existentially. I said what do you mean? He said, well the child would think more first about who I am before they think about mortgage. But then as we grow up we tend to fit in to society. That’s how he starts to think about the mortgage not about who am I. [It] Becomes completely transferred. Understandably part of it because I have to live, but also he [Bond] is saying if you extend that to society as a whole the action becomes a block on the thinking and connecting to yourself. I thought that was interesting, and that’s come up a lot for me in reading this [A Window] (…) But I think this whole question of being blinded and seeing is … What I am trying to get out of it in terms of her [Liz], in terms of the mother … I think what Liz experiences [is] that shift. [She] shifts constantly between the existential and the metaphysical. But concerning the story it has to do with the metaphysical. It has to do with what is it about this world that makes it what it is and she loses sight of that. I think you [Richard] almost experience it from the opposite, Richard experiences it from the opposite, he is very existential and occasionally he gets glimpses of a vision (…). The thing about the blind and someone who can see is very useful talk for us to think about the text (…). So what I was going to ask you [actors] to do as you are just listening and making notes is twofold. The first one is a mechanical one. Just note anything that you hear that you just don’t understand or something that makes you want to ask a question and discuss it (…). Very practical questions. But the one I am as well interested is to note at any point where you see blindness or vision. There may be a very particular moment where you think so and so is blinded but the boy can see. So it might be paradoxical or contradictory but that is all right. It is just for us to look at the blinding and the visions. And of course the metaphorical as well as the literal [blindness and vision]. (I.7.03:28-09:15)
The day’s session finished after the end of the re-reading, and the findings of the actors were discussed in the next day.

_Commentary_

The director’s statement made a clear link with the way of thinking that Bond bases his theory on, and relates immediately to Radical Innocence in the monad and in the pre-real child before it comes under the full control of ideology. Blindness has thus been related to being cut off from our radical innocence, to the corruption of a child’s imagination by ideology; that childlike imagination is concerned with ontological questions, but the child becomes corrupted by seeing the existential aspect of living only.

The concluding task of detecting the conflicts between the existential and the metaphysical is the end product of the whole long process that sought conflicts and contradictions within the characters. This process appears to constitute one of the building blocks of the company in defining a Centre for their drama work: to detect conflicts and contradictions within the characters that may suggest an immediate relation to the conflict between the existential and the metaphysical, corruption and Radical Innocence respectively, within every human being. It is the situation of the confrontation with ideology which, according to Bond, is experienced by every one of us, but which affects us in different ways depending on how our Radical Innocence responds to that confrontation. Hence for the director Liz exists in a space between the existential and the ‘metaphysical’ which brings her closer to an impasse, whereas Richard is more obviously corrupted and located on the side of the existential. Blindness and vision, seeing and not seeing, has become from this point onwards the
central interest of the group, and obviously it indicates a possible direction for finding a Centre for the whole play.

_Exploration phase: Day 2 (02-09-2009), first session, DVD 2_

The second day continued with discussing actors’ findings in relation to the prescribed task of finding points of seeing and not seeing in the text of _A Window the previous day_ (Fieldnotes, 02-09-2009, first session).

The discussion once more located Liz between corruption and innocence; while she can retain a vision of the story of the blinding from the newspaper, she has cut herself off from the world and she cannot see herself or her situation clearly: ‘She is trying but she got it in the wrong way’ (App.D.1.b, par. 6-8, p.77). Liz can see the drugs that Dan has left on the table; she worries about bloodstains on the carpet while he is injured; she can envision the involvement of police, etc.; but she cannot see Dan. But, according to the company her inner conflict still stems from a ‘residue of that maternal instinct or that former role she used to have as a carer’ (App.D.1.b, par. 15, p.78).

The group noticed during their discussion on blindness and vision another action that involves both Liz and Dan. It is the reaction of Dan when Liz is ripping the sheet in order to make bandages out of it and then dress his wound. Dan responds by saying that she is ruining their life (Bond, 2011:191). The group noticed the possible identification of the particular sheet with the one in the first panel with which Liz was preparing a nest as a future mother, or in which she had probably wrapped Dan as a sleeping child. In that sense she is ‘literally pulling everything apart’, or even herself, with the ripping of the sheet (App.D.1.b, par. 50-61, pp.80-81). The argument tended
once more to the interpretation that Liz sees the wound of Dan ‘so she has to put bandage on it’, but she cannot see the ‘larger wound’ that her son is able to recognise (App.D.1.b, par. 63, p.81).

Commentary

Together with the story of the blinding in the newspaper which turned Liz’s world upside down, the group detected a ‘maternal residue’ in her which causes the profound conflict that pushes her to death. On the one hand Liz is trapped in her conventional, or we could even say ideological, but corrupted role of a mother who worries for the implications of Dan’s actions in the ‘city’; on the other hand, she still retains a residue of genuine motherhood. She is haunted by the event from the newspaper, and seems to discern some similarity between it and her actions toward Dan; but her imagination is corrupted to the point where she is incapable of breaking out of the vicious circle in which she has been trapped by her drug addiction. She can recognise the impasse, but she cannot escape it. This seems a profound conflict and crisis that in one sense makes her later suicide more comprehensible, but it may generate some interesting implications for how we think about the play.

To start with, a mother that sees her son’s physical wound but worries for the bloodstains on the carpet, or about a possible scandal with an involvement of the police, or about what the neighbours would think, is a reasonably familiar attitude in the experiences of a family infused by ideological values. Liz’s actions could in that sense be immediately recognisable to the teenage audiences of the play, or adults as well, and may offer probably an opportunity to connect themselves with the Story.

Another point to be made has to do with the possible dramatic function of the sheet,
and the role it plays in the Story. The company did not identify that overtly till this point; but in their comments on the play, it is striking that the sheet is used for making a bed for Liz’s coming baby in the first panel; it is ripped off in order to cover Dan’s wounds in the second, but also so that Liz may hang herself; and finally the sheet strips are used by Dan to tie Richard onto the chaise-longue in the third panel. One way or another the sheet is an object that runs through the play, changing uses and meanings. If a Drama Event’s aim is to expose the gap of meaning that ideology seeks to hide (Bond, 1998a:304), the sheet might be a possible central object in this process. In that sense it might be seen as containing the Site of the conflict between the existential and the ontological. Richard initially forces onto it values constructed by ideology, the city, whereas Liz still questions the grounds or implications of those values. Liz’s conflict develops in essence around the definition of the values related to the concept of ‘mum’, similar to the conflict presented between Dan’s and Richard’s definitions of ‘dad’ above. The sheet is a component of those human values which Liz struggled to define in the first panel, and which she failed to sustain or uphold, and ultimately it is ‘contaminated’ by ideological values, it is de-cathcted.

Her actions in ripping the sheet in the second panel, to cover Dan’s wound but then to hang herself with the strips, may however be seen as acts aimed at deconstructing the ideologically de-cathcted object (i.e., the sheet) because they may reveal the deadlocks that ideology led her to. The sheet is an object that may carry, in that sense, the ideologically defined motherly care which still cannot ‘see’ the real needs of the child and is overly concerned for what the neighbours would say. Motherly care feels like blinding your child, a paradox that Liz is still able to sense.

The conflict or crisis that the company is after is made clearer or more Extreme the
case of Liz. The combination of the extremity of Liz’s inner conflict between the existential and ontological, concentrated in the sheet when she tries to commit suicide, might offer an opportune occasion for a potential Drama Event, as the director proposed (App. C.1.a, par.22, p.15); and her sheet by association may ‘contaminate’ all other family sheets in audience’s minds. The audience may thus see their ideologically confined lives within and through it.

At the moment there is an attempt to circumvent ideology by deconstructing the de-Cathected object of the sheet, but it is not clear how the process will turn towards pushing an audience to re-construct meaning or re-cathect the object. Moreover there is the question of how the Invisible Object would be made visible for the audience. The sheet may be similar to the stick that kept St. Lawrence on the grid to be burned in Donatello’s *Martyrdom* (see p.127 above), though it is not of course forcibly wrapped around her neck by anyone. But the sheet is not or cannot by itself reveal the Invisible Object, in the same way in which the stick in the *Martyrdom* cannot by itself reveal ‘an almost bureaucratic attitude’ of the society that used it. Practically this is connected with the Extreme nature of the situation, as well as with how the actress is going to perform the actions and Liz’s speech.

How this is done in the particular scene will be examined in later phases of the production process, and it is going to be followed in its development throughout the rehearsal phase.

*Continuing exploration phase: Day 2 (02-09-2009), first session, DVD 2*

Richard, for the group, sees only his immediate needs, the practical side of living: money and survival. He sees Liz’s handbag and the money in it but he is not moved
by or cannot empathise with the mother in the reported story of the blinding (App.D.1.b, par. 8, p.77). According to the company he is ‘our cultural worst at the moment’: we see him, a corrupted person, trying to corrupt Dan in turn with ‘half truths’ and money, while teaching him that you need to ‘screw whoever you can to survive’ (App.D.1.b, par. 27-33, p.79).

The group has noticed that although Richard is not capable of seeing either Dan’s or Liz’s image of him, or the child, the mother and their needs, even he is forced to embark on a journey where he is finally ‘caught in the line’; this is related especially to the scene when he is bound onto the chaise-longue waiting to be blinded by his son (App.D.1.b, par. 79-87, p.83):

Richard  Son son don’t -- yer ’arm yerself -- no one’s there --
Dan  I know! Ain mad! ‘S all thass left! Tell ‘er!
Richard  Sorry sorry sorry --
Dan  Look at ‘er - -say it!
Richard  O god why did I come -- for a few bloody rags -- sorry sorry
– (Bond, 2011:206)

**Commentary**

An interesting implication of the above remarks is that the crisis, fundamentally, is not confined only to Liz. Richard is not a one-dimensional character; he is also a subject affected by the crisis. All of the characters of the play do find themselves sooner or later in the Centre of the conflict between the existential and the ontological. The difference between them lies in how they handle the existential/ontological conflict that clashes with their personal lives. Richard’s imagination is corrupted but he is still capable of seeing, although he consciously doesn’t take the required leap. One implication of this is that basically there are no
clearly defined ‘bad’ or unlikeable characters. Such a suggestion is in agreement with Bond’s argument against the belief that human beings are naturally ‘bad’.

**Continuing exploration phase: Day 2 (02-09-2009), first session, DVD 2**

In relation to Dan, there was a question from the group about whether he knows that Liz’s suicide is coming when he goes to sleep on the chaise-longue (App.D.1.b, par. 16, p.78). Another member noticed that he consents to bringing drugs for his mother though he apparently doesn’t want her to inject them in front of him (App.D.1.b, par. 18, p.78), since in the text he demands of Liz that she take them to her room (Bond, 2011:189). Moreover he carries a cosh which he hides, and some members expressed their doubt in relation to how ignorant or self-blinding he was about Liz’s prostitution:

**Ca:** I want to say something about Dan, [on] how he is not seeing or how he hides things from himself. Like his wound. He is seeing his wound under his jacket but then he hides it. He puts the packet on the table. That is to be seen. But then he says ‘go to your room’. He doesn’t want to see that. And he bows his head and he sleeps in exhaustion …

**Director:** He hides the cosh.

**Ca:** Yes! He hides the cosh. And I can’t accept that if she has been on the game [prostitution] he hasn’t known about it (…). It is like self blinding. He doesn’t see, thinks he doesn’t want to see. And he is clear about other things he doesn’t want to see, doesn’t want to be seen. (App.D.1.b, par. 18-20, p.78)

The fact that there is a crash and loud music (Bond, 2011:195-196) while Dan is apparently sleeping on the chaise-longue, and Liz is attempting to commit suicide in the room, again aroused the suspicion of the group about whether Dan is really unaware of what is going to happen. The director believed that this note lies at the Centre of the play:
**Director:** That is right at the centre, isn’t it? It is where the story with the blinding of the child, the speech that we have identified as the central speech, meets with their situation. Because the point is that the mother blinds the child as an act of seeing in order to protect and love. And here at this moment is he seeing or is he not seeing? Like is he in denial or is he experiencing? Is he in the sleep or literally in a different space as he is coming out? It is all there, isn’t it? (App.D.1.b, par. 76, p.82)

But on the other hand for the group Dan is rejecting violence or vengeance in the last panel. Although he had the opportunity to blind Richard, he has chosen not to do it. This action is interpreted as inexplicable or insane if compared with the logic of the city (App.D.1.b, par. 35-42, pp.79-80). He also in the end of the play manages to see the world outside the room through the window and to understand it. He has an insight into the ‘patterns people are going’ (App.D.1.b, par. 92, p.83).

**Commentary**

The interpretation of blinding as an act of love is a controversial description of the action reported in the newspaper. A mother is realising, thus seeing, the corruption of the city that her child would have to enter, and in order to protect it she blinds it. Nevertheless whether the child is corrupted by entering the city and thus figuratively blinded or ‘protected’ in physical blindness has the same effect: the child cannot truly see. The physical blinding is a desperate act stemming from seeing or feeling the truth.

Liz is capable of seeing that dead end as well, but she decides finally to commit suicide. It is another desperate act when confronted with a deeply felt impasse between literally or metaphorically blinding Dan, and it cannot be explained in ideological terms. In combination with the use of the sheet as explained above, the attempt is made to circumvent ideology, and in that way to eradicate it for the
audience. They are not left with stock rational means to explain it and would have to produce their own.

Dan is again seen by the group as living on the edge of corruption, as is Liz, but only till the third panel. He finally declines to follow the same path, where he chooses not to revenge himself on Richard and, through Richard, on the city. He instead manages to face the world outside, in contrast to Liz who chose to withdraw into her room even from the first panel. As mentioned in relation to Richard above, the group has noticed that there is no inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ characters and ultimately that all of them had to experience the conflict between the existential and the ontological. The gap of meaning is thus present to Dan as well. I think that in this way the group comes closer to identifying a Centre for their play which is applicable for every character in there.

Exploration phase: Day 2 (02-09-2009), second session, DVD 2

The director asked the group to create five images relating to the whole notion of seeing and not seeing for the play. This time, however, he asked them to work ‘instinctively’, making the images more graphic in the way a painter might. They should have worked on their images ‘in such a way you would see the use of light and composition where blindness is or where the light is shed’ (App. D.1.c, par.3, p.85); this is because he believes that Edward Bond’s major influence derives from ‘the imagery created in his work’ (App.D.1.c, par. 1, p.85).

He also gave five titles for each image they would have to create: ‘a) Blind lead the blind, b) blind fury, c) short-sighted, d) damascene conversion and e) clear-sighted.’ (App.D.1.c, par.1, p.85).

The group presented the following images:
a) Blind leading blind: Liz and Dan. The packet with the drugs is on the table. Liz is entering the room. With her left arm she pushes the door. Dan looks like he sweeps his forehead with his arm (see Picture 1).

![Picture 1](image1.jpg)

b) Blind fury: Richard and Liz. Richard is entering the room after he has taken the bedding out. A sheet is caught on his leg and he brings it with him unknowingly. Liz is sitting on the chaise-longue and is looking out the window. With her right index finger she touches her left arm at the veins (see Picture 2).

![Picture 2](image2.jpg)

c) Short sighted: Richard and Dan are fighting over the pillow (see Picture 3).

![Picture 3](image3.jpg)

d) Damascene conversion: Dan on the couch sleeping, Liz standing by him holding a sheet. Her eyes look at him while she bows her body slightly (see Picture 4).
c) Clear sighted: Dan is looking out the window while Richard, on the floor, is trying to get the rest of Liz’s clothes (see Picture 5) (Fieldnotes 02-09-2009, second session).

In their final presented images, the group acknowledged that there was a similarity between the Renaissance style (App.D.1.c, par. 3, p.87) and that of Francis Bacon (App.D.1.c, par. 4, p.87), and that the images made the concepts of seeing and not seeing explicit (App.D.1.c, par.8, pp.87-88). But the most interesting comment that followed the discussion was made in relation to how immediate and earthly they seemed:

R: (...) I mean like Goya made the paintings about the brutality of war rather taking it away and seeing 'sugar ass’ [According to Urban Dictionary (n.d.) it...
means ‘A Gorgeous Girls Amazing Ass’] people on horses. He kind of transformed it to the battleground (...). And this is what the Renaissance did as well, wasn’t it? They brought it to earth (...). (App.D.1.c, par.9, p.88)

**Commentary**

The comment above is probably related to the intention not to glorify or glamorise the events, but to present them in realistic fashion with their true Extreme implications. The company didn’t expand on that, but the immediacy and the extremity of the events are probably some of the elements that they are after.

Goya, a painter of the Spanish Enlightenment, has presented war in a different fashion from how it was presented in the pre-Enlightenment period. For example Goya’s piece *The Third of May 1808* (see Picture 1 bellow) depicts the execution of members of Spanish armed resistance to Napoleon invasion of Spain.

![Picture 1](Fr. Goya, (n.d.), The Complete Works: El Tres de Mayo)

Goya’s painting presents the brutality of war in a more graphic way than the epic portrayal of the pre-Enlightenment period would do.

Strong imagery is thus another element that for the company is very important to look
at. This is not a new dimension in Drama in Education though. In related bibliography, imagery is normally seen as a fundamental means of creating meaning (Heathcote, 1984:160). The dimension that might interest this study however is related to whether there is a special Bondian way to create this imagery. The company gave a basic direction on that which relates to the prospect of immediacy and extremity of the image, an image which shows reality rather than glamorising it. As Bond argued, reality may force imagination to reflect on itself through the Tragic (2000a:114). In that fashion, strong but immediate, earthly and Extreme imagery may be regarded in Bond’s work as one way to evoke reality and the tragic and compel the audience to reflect upon themselves. Finding ways to create these kinds of images is then essential for drama work.

*Exploration phase: Days 2, 3 and 4 (02-09-2009 third session, 03-09-2009 and 04-09-2009), DVDs 2, 3 and 4*

The members of Big Brum started a long discussion centred on the Edward Bond’s letter about the play (see App. F, p.224 for the complete letter and App. D.1.d, p.9 for group’s discussion on it) which concerns its ‘meaning and purpose’ (App. F, p.224).

The group seemed to pay great attention to Bond’s notes in their exploration, and the relevant discussion lasted two and half working days. Because of their extensive attention to Bond’s notes, it is appropriate to present them in brief before the presentation of group’s discussion on them. Hence the arrangement of the exploration phase will continue from this point onwards by inserting grey boxes which refer immediately to Edward Bond’s notes. After each box there is the summary of group’s discussions and then my commentary box on the specific section.
Reading Bond’s letter on the play

In these notes the room is depicted by Bond as enveloped by an illusory *cordon sanitaire* which in the first panel tries in vain to keep ‘the threat of the city at bay’ (App. D.1.d. par. 18, p.91). The pressure from the city remains, however, and infects Liz through the incident of the blinding of the child by its mother. This incident together with the inability of Richard to find a job indicates for Bond that the ‘city itself seems not to work’ (App. D.1.d. par.1, p.89).

One of the members of the group then acknowledged that in the whole play there are moments where the apparent normality of the room is broken by the Invisible Object. The Invisible Object in the particular case is explained as Liz’s realisation of the city’s blindness (App.D.1.d, par.2, pp.89-90). Accordingly the director argued that it is of great importance for the production that it manage to reveal the tension between the room and the city even in Liz’s very first but simple actions – where for example she makes the bed on the chaise longue or she closes the door when Richard returns into the flat (App.D.1.d, par.9, p.90). Moreover he acknowledged that the same tension is present in or realised through in the position of the table and the chair, but didn’t expand further on this except to note that ‘from the table to the far corner of the room there is massive emptiness screaming at us. That is what we need to create in the site.’ (App.D.1.d, par. 10, p.90). The group seemed generally to agree that Liz is obsessed or infected by the newspaper story because she is able to understand her responsibility towards the child she has in her womb whereas Richard cannot (App.D.1.d, par. 12-21, pp.90-91).
Commentary

Some of the objects used in the play have attracted special attention from the group in their comments recorded above. So the director argued that even objects such as the chair and the table should expose the tension between the city and the room. Hence simple daily objects as well as simple actions, like the way Liz is making her bed or closing the door of the room, drew the interest of the group as possible fundamental means to reveal the Invisible Object. The manner in which these objects are used or deployed seems to be vital for unpacking the process of production, and they are therefore going to be followed more closely henceforth. It is interesting for example to examine whether these two objects, the table and the chair, as well as the related actions could be used in terms of deconstruction and Cathexis in order to create a Drama Event.

The element of the Site is also appeared in a more evident way in this part of the exploration phase. When the director referred to the position of the furniture as part of the Site he probably meant the specific Site of the play, Site B according to Bond. Site B is related to what is happening within the room in the specific flat as a part of the specific culture, or in other words the tension that is experienced between the city and the room. In that sense the director thinks that these objects or actions should relate to and serve to convey the Site of the play.

At the same time the above discussion about the significance of the story with the blinding as well as the joblessness of Richard also refer or relate to the Site, but this time to the Site A – which for Bond is the social Site that connects with the ‘city, era, culture, etc’ (Bond, 2000a:10). Both the story and the fact of Richard’s
unemployment may convey, according to Bond’s definition of the Site (ibid), what the society outside the room is like, and this is self-evident for the audience. The blinding of the child, although Extreme, is not alien to the audience at least in its meaning. A mother’s worry over the possible threats of the outside world to her children is generally not unusual. The blinding, certainly, is not a common action performed to protect a child, but its meaning is not too distant from keeping children overprotected, disconnected from the outside world and in deep ignorance. Artists have used the same idea in a less or approximately extreme way to Bond in the past or present. Shakespeare has Prospero in the *Tempest*, who has experienced the malice of the wicked world, keeping his daughter, Miranda, isolated and protected on an island and thus unaware of the evils of the external world. The Greek film director Lanthimos in his movie *Dogtooth* (2009) has presented a family living in Athens, Greece, where the parents prohibit their children having contact in any way with the real world, and instead they teach them a way of life and a language that is made up by them. In another film, *The Village* (2004), a group of elders, who all had a traumatic experience in the real world, have created a village completely isolated from the rest of humankind where the youngsters know nothing of its existence. The elders keep their children under control by creating imaginary monsters that allegedly live around their village. It ought to be noted however that the Extreme of the blinding event contains the seeds of what is required for alienating the Story later from within.

The last point to be made for the specific section is that the identification of the ongoing tension between the city and the room is related to the fundamental conflict around nothingness, between the social and the personal, and it is accordingly very important to detect how it is going to be developed in practice.
In Bond’s notes the presence of money, which relates to the fiscal value of things, is apparent already in the first panel. Bond considers that Richard sells himself to Liz, he often takes money from her, but ‘he avoids the consequences’, which is the child (App.D.1.d, par.36, p.93). Richard in that sense is part of the city’s dysfunction: Liz’s hand bag is described as a coffin where the ‘life-giving money-drug is buried’ (App.D.1.d, par.23, p.91), which Richard discards in the end of panel one as an addict ‘might discard a needle’ (ibid). But the difference with Richard is that Liz cannot yet avoid responsibility for the future since she is pregnant. Hence for Bond in the first panel, although they all exist in the middle of a monetary system, there is the possibility of giving birth, where ‘giving = not buying or selling’ (App.D.1.d, par.47, pp.93-94). In that sense the chaise-longue ‘might suggest a brothel in a city where everything is sold but it is also the domestic bed – a centre of humanness’ (App.D.1.d, par.36, p.93). In the second panel though the room for Bond has changed and ‘needs money’ because of Liz’s drug addiction (App.D.1.d, par.47, pp.93-94). On the other hand if the threat of the city was present as a pressure in the first panel through the story of the blinding, in the second panel the threat is entering the room clearly with Dan’s wound (ibid). Giving now has become manipulative, and Liz’s narcotic is ‘like a drug “born” of another drug (the effects of money) but the narcotic itself costs money’ (ibid). The room is, according to Bond, in the second panel like a ‘grave inside a grave’ and needs money (ibid).

In the group’s discussion of the above notes Chris Cooper has noted that the function of money for the play is recognisable for us today, but it is almost addictive in itself (App.D.1.d, par.24, pp.91-92). Earlier the director had noted that Richard’s throwing
Liz’s handbag on the floor, after he took some money in the first panel, is a possible Drama Event (App.D.1.d, par.32, p.92). After reading Bond’s related notes above he added:

**Director:** What I was taking that to mean is that the money is like a grave, the handbag, is been cathecting into the room itself, almost. The handbag is like a grave because it contains the addiction that is money but there is even within that a further addiction which is like another grave which is drugs. So to reach one you have to go through both. Because you can’t do it without money. And so the room now itself now needs money. The room is been cathected by the handbag. So it is a grave within a grave. (App.D.1.d, par.48, p.94)

The discussion did not continue with further explanation of the specific argument but throughout the exploration one member of the group has asked persistently to define exactly what the threat is that comes from the city because ‘this is site A’ (App.D.1.d, par.49, p.94). The response of the director was ultimately that the city is threatening the human values that Liz is trying to create in the first panel, related to giving birth without manipulation or money intervention (App.D.1.d, par.67, p.95).

**Commentary**

The way Bond explains the chaise-longue encapsulates a contradiction or a conflict about values. On the one hand it could suggest a brothel where money defines the contract between the two partners, but on the other hand it can still suggest a possible birthing bed for Liz, a Site of humanness. It may hold both Sites and their conflict at once.

Bond’s notes did push the group toward recognising the possibilities for the chaise-longue and the meaning of the handbag. The latter object is seen as a fundamental means for Cathecting the whole room, but it is not clear yet why and how this is possible. It is not made clear till now to which areas of human interest these actions
may relate, but it is likely that the absence of a clearly defined Centre for the whole play is the reason that it is not yet possible to define them. The uses of the handbag and of the chaise-longue are some important points to consider in the rehearsal process since the company, and especially the director and Edward Bond himself, defined them as such.

The possible function of the chaise-longue in particular seems promising for clarifying the use of Cathexis. It may hold the Site of the conflict between the social and the personal, the object Cathected with human values by Liz, a birthing bed, but still existing in the middle of money-based culture, and reminiscent of furniture in a ‘brothel’.

The handbag may be intended to fall on the floor as part of the social intervention which is de-cathexing the whole room of its human values, the prospective birth protecting the whole *cordon sanitaire*, including the chaise-longue; it re-establishes the socially-defined fiscal values of things. In that sense the particular action of throwing the handbag may be used as a Drama Event in revealing the Invisible Object for each one of the members of the audience.

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*Reading Bond's letter on the play*

Still though there are eruptions of Radical Innocence in the second panel according to Bond. In Liz there is a residue of ‘maternal responsibilities’ (App.D.1.d, par.85, p.96); although corrupted, she can still recognise innocence in others and subsequently she can identify the need of the mother who blinded her child in order to protect it from
the crime of the city. But this action brings her to an impasse in contrast to Richard who ‘could just shrug off the crime or cope with it by violence’ (ibid). Liz does not look for revenge, which for Bond is the ultimate corruption. The paradox though lies in the realisation that her innocence has become a threat because it creates demands for understanding, a personal responsibility that she doesn’t seem to be willing or capable to accept. These demands are what she tries to avoid by taking drugs. Liz can still recognise Dan’s innocence too, but in this case it reminds of her own innocence and this is why she tries to destroy him by persuading him to take drugs (ibid); she hopes in this way to annul or preclude the possibility of him judging her (App.D.1.d, par.115-118, pp.99-100).

With the help of Bond’s notes the group has noticed that the opening blinding of the child by its mother has its parallel in Liz’s addiction and her insistence on offering drugs to Dan (App.D.1.d, par.95, p.97); both mothers blind or attempt to blind their children:

**L:** Do you think that it has to do with her making him [Dan] depend on her, be with her, the same way that mother did through blinding her child. It’s like her addiction is the blinding.

**Director:** You are right! That is how you [Liz] should repeat yourself. Second time as farce! (App.D.1.d, par.86-87, p.96)

Liz’s attempt to give drugs to Dan might be an attempt to keep him dependent on her (App.D.1.d, par.86, p.96). But what the group thought about the reason for both actions was related to a paradox created by the conflict between their Radical Innocence and the city (App.D.1.d, par.95, p.97). What both mothers do is first of all spurred by their realising the threat to their children represented by the city, the corruption of ideology. In fact the action of blinding is described as a desperate ultimate action to save them from corruption and at the same time to ‘punish’ the city.
There was a suggestion from one member of the group that drugs have become in the second panel the means to create or sustain the _cordon sanitaire_ which Liz from the first panel appears to wish for; some of the other members seemed to agree: ‘The _cordon sanitaire_ has become a mental one. The drugs have become the _cordon sanitaire_’ (App.D.1.d, par.89, p.97).

The group seemed also to agree that the threat or the corruption of the city that both mothers try to protect their children from is the money culture which should be seen as the Site A of the play, and which is brought into the imaginary _cordon sanitaire_ by Richard (App.D.1.d, par. 96-101, pp.97-98). As the director eventually defined it:

> In contemporary capitalism, money has gone from being a means for circulation or representation or exchange to becoming a thing in itself. Which then has all kinds of psychological as well as social and economical implications. This is why our society is so fetishist. Class struggle is more complex today because [although] there is still a contradiction between those who (Inaudible [consume?]) and those who produce, the problem is that it becomes integrated into to the self, to ideology. And this is the big problem we have with the society. (App.D.1.d, par.97, p.98)

**Commentary**

The way that the company described the condition of Liz and of the mother in the newspaper is probably very close to the human paradox that Bond is after. In this instance, blinding as saving is a paradoxical condition that is produced by the impact of ideology on these two mothers because it may relate to the conflict between their corruption and their radical innocence. Once more it seems that the company is drawing closer to defining the Centre for their production.

On the other hand there was an immediate connection between the Site A, the social Site of the play, and modern capitalism. The threat of the city that a member of the
group has earlier asked persistently to identify is now defined as a threat related to the psychological as well as the social implications of money becoming ‘a thing in itself’. Accordingly, for Bond, the power of money has, beginning about two centuries ago, changed everything in our culture. It reversed the process of a child’s creativity projecting onto the world a ‘good place’ (App. I, par.15, pp.235-236), instead imposing the money’s needs onto the child. Money, according to Bond, breeds, and it has a logic entirely of its own (App. I, par.16, p.236). The director confirmed completely the above assumption in defining the Site of the play:

I think the site of the play, crudely, is exactly what he [Bond] was talking about when he was demonstrating the relationship between the two chairs in the REP. When he was trying to connect the pieces of cloth with the two chairs and then he said ‘But then 250 years ago everything changed. I think that is the site A that dominates and penetrates everything throughout the whole play.
(App.C.1.d, par.64, p.34)

The important conclusion from the above remarks is that Site A for Bond and, as it seems, for the company too is always related to the particular view of the social condition infused by the money ideology that de-cathexes objects of their human values – those values created by the ex-monad child – and imposes the fiscal ones on them. I suppose, of course, that in every case/play this Site A relates to different forms of this money logic, but it seems that this social condition is the primary cornerstone of the Site A for *A Window*.

A last point to be made for this particular section of the exploration phase relates to an apparent disagreement between Bond’s expansion on the grounds that led Liz to attempt to corrupt Dan with drugs and the one offered by some members of the group. In Bond’s justification of Liz’s attempt, as the director verbally transferred it to the group, there is an effort to corrupt Dan in order to invalidate his possible judgement
on her in the same way that alcoholics:

**Director:** ... need you to drink with them because they are as bad as you are. And if they are as bad as you are then they can’t sit and be judgemental with you [he means you can’t be judgemental with the alcoholic]. Because the problem with his [Dan’s] innocence is: it judges her [Liz]. So by taking drugs, if she could persuade him in that moment on the chair, she could destroy his innocence and couldn’t accuse her. And his innocence is agitating her own innocence. So the very presence, the fact of it, is agitating her.’ (App. D.1.d, par. 116-118, pp. 99-100)

Some members of the group have made a suggestion that drugs might constitute for Liz a new form of a *cordon sanitaire* which she is attempting to build in order to protect herself and her child. Doubtless there is an apparent contradiction with Bond’s clarification; but I don’t think this need remain unresolved: in both cases there is a withdrawal from the social or from the responsibility of Radical Innocence to make the world its own. Whether Liz is trying to build a *cordon sanitaire* for her and Dan with the use of drugs or corrupt her son has the same effect, since they amount to the same refusal of personal responsibility for creativity.

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**Reading Bond’s letter on the play**

In Bond’s notes the tension in Liz’s character between recognising the innocence of others while at the same time being tempted to corrupt her son could be enacted on stage through the chair, which should dominate the room after it has been isolated from the table:

In P1 [Panel 1] the *room’s* site is socially normal, and so it’s the site of the kitchen table, the first pole of drama. In P2 the site is now the edge of the universe, the second pole of drama. These are also the poles of the self, the ontological and the existential. Human meaning comes from the relation made
Hence the chair, for Bond, becomes a diagram or structure of the universe (App.D.1.d, par.139, p.101), which Liz uses in order to recreate herself through suicide. Through this action she tries to restore her innocence, to ‘desperately build herself in the ruins because this is all she has’ (App.D.1.d, par.141, p.102). Standing on the chair she manages to see the city, not now through the newspaper story of the blinding that she was reading in her room, but from the edge of the universe which is the chair (App.D.1.d, par.146, p.102).

The group thought that the above comments generate an imperative to see the ontological in the chair and the existential in the table. In a sense these two poles are, according to the director, the imaginative and the rational respectively; and in between them lies the self where it is been created (App.D.1.d, par.129, p.101). Ultimately Chris Cooper noted that the point at which Liz is using the chair to stand on and commit suicide is the point where the Invisible Object should be revealed, and that her action is also a ‘very generous act’ because in this way she manages to give Dan his life back (App.D.1.d, par.143, p.102). Suicide for the group seemed to be an action beyond the control of authority, something with which authority ultimately cannot deal (App.D.1.d, par.144-145, p.102). Liz lives in pain and within a contradiction, but she wants to ‘blank out’ the city. The act of suicide might be a gift, but only in terms of the perverse situation that she finds herself in, and certainly cannot represent or prescribe any universal human value (App.D.1.d, par.158-168, p.103).
The contradictory situation in which Liz finds herself is a condition that the group detected early in their exploration phase. In the particular section this contradiction is reflected in the use of the objects, chair and table. It is interesting to note that the whole work concentrates on making this contradiction tangible through the use of objects, rather than keeping it moored in abstractions. The use of the chair and the table therefore becomes a priority matter for this study, since these seem to constitute the objects in which potentially to locate the contradiction between the existential and the ontological that forms the self. Hence they are going to be examined in the company’s practice.

The central event that provides this opportunity relates to the actions taken by Liz around the chair and her suicide. The director has already defined the specific scene as a possible Drama Event early in his first interview (App.C.I.a, par.22, p.15), and he repeated the opinion in essence when he argued that the actress who plays Liz should manage to reveal the Invisible Object in this scene. As mentioned in the literature review, making the Invisible Object visible is the ultimate aim of a Drama Event.

At the same time I believe the above discussion came even closer to defining a Centre for the production, since the conflict between the existential and the ontological potentially lies at its heart. Detecting comparable conflicts, which relate to the conflict between the existential and the ontological, seems to be a fundamental path to follow in drama in order to maintain the coherence of the whole work. The director for example asked the following of his actors in a later session (Day 7, 9-9-2009):

**Director:** The thing I want us to keep concretely finding through the action of the play is this clash between (...) the ontological and the existential. This is my words on it but actually I just spoke to him [Bond] (...) and he got quite enthused by this. I was saying that for me she [Liz] is a visionary in the ontological sense and that she has that vision which incorporates what the whole
thing is about. Every bit of cruelty is like that. It’s in the story basically. It’s like dealing with the questions of existence in the most profound way. Even though it’s driving her to a terrible corner. (…) But that vision keeps coming and going out of focus. So there is moments of incredible seeing but there is also the blindness can reassert itself if you think of how the blindness literally throws a veil over her. (VII.1.15:45-17:08)

The last part of the particular section, related to the value of Liz’s suicide, makes sense if we place it in the context of paradoxical acts that people feel compelled to perform when they see the impact of ideology onto their lives. Killing yourself in order to re-create yourself is a very contradictory explanation, and rather difficult or impossible to understand in ideological terms. The extremity of the situation may in that sense force the audience to bypass their own ideological structures and try to explain this event with a new way.

Reading Bond’s letter on the play

In Bond’s notes Liz, in the second panel, uses the violence offered by the city, which is defined as the ‘narcotic/money’, against her own self and this shows the ‘effects of the city’. According to Bond ‘The situation [Liz’s suicide] is extreme. Liz gave Dan life, she goes near to destroying (blinding) him, and then she gives him his life again’ (App.D.1.d, par.169, p.103); but this could happen only because her son asserted his right to his own life, an action that is radically innocent on his part (App.D.1.d, par.175, p.104). Liz also rediscovers her innocence and manages to see the world, but this time her insight is combined with the weight of the responsibility ‘of being in the city’ (ibid). As the writer argues, ‘she sees the invisible object’, and this means that ‘she and the chair become the invisible object for the audience’; the chair is in
Accident Time crucial (ibid), not because of the extremity of her death but because of the extremity of ‘life made living’ (App.D.1.d, par.180, pp.104-105).

According to these notes special attention should be given to the scene of suicide. Bond is proposing that the suicide attempt should be ‘an absolute image of a woman giving birth to death. (Drama accommodates paradoxes.) So she also wants to “give” something else, some parting gift. It may [be] best if Dan is never aware of this’ (ibid). She ‘performs the drama act of entering the logic of the primal self, when the neonate is becoming aware that it is acting’ (App.D.1.d, par.182, p.105). The writer suggested that her action could be performed as ‘Her fingers tying the rope might seem to be scratching at the sky to uncover something’ (App.D.1.d, par.180, pp.104-105).

Dan is crying and dancing after Liz’s suicide; but it is better or dramatically more successful if he is not aware of her death, as Bond argues. He doesn’t yet know his or the city’s reality; moreover, it looks like the two poles of the tragic and the comic are not resolved in him yet (App.D.1.d, par.182, p.105).

The director of Big Brum thought, in the following discussion, that in Dan’s crying and dancing there is a Drama Event, and that the noose that Liz used to hang herself brings to his mind ‘a long cord like the umbilical cord’, cut off after birth, at the point when baby opens its eyes and cries (App.D.1.d, par.170, p.104). Dan is thus seen as reverting to the state of a neonate, after Liz’s death, where his dancing and crying correspond to pleasure and pain stage in Bond’s theory (App.D.1.d, par.171, p.104). The city, according to the group, is dead in him now like in all newly born children, and this is the birth of Radical Innocence (App.D.1.d, par.194-195, pp.105-106).
There was special attention given by the group to how Liz and the chair may become the Invisible Object for the audience. The director argued yet again that the actress should enable the audience to see the Invisible Object; hence she needs to experience this first; but the director did not elaborate on how this experience would be dramatised (App.D.1.d, par.176, p.104), except perhaps in referring to enacting, but again without expanding on that (App.D.1.d, par.181, p.105). He did though mention that:

The invisible object means revealing to yourself [the actress playing Liz] and us socially what objectively is happening here, what it means. That is where the truth about a situation is revealed and the ideology cannot function in there … (App.D.1.d, par.176, p.104).

The group added that at this point the audience wouldn’t know where they are. The play started as a kind of soap opera but ‘suddenly you are in the wilderness’ (App.D.1.d, par.199, p.106)

**Commentary**

Two scenes were highlighted for possible development of Drama Events: the scene with Dan’s crying and dancing, and the actions of Liz around the chair. The latter scene discussed in previous sections and I think its possibilities are made clear above.

The importance of how the scene should be performed, however, must relate to the function of the sheet, and may indicate another important dimension of Bondian theatre that relates to the Invisible Object. How comparable is this object to the stick of Donatello’s *Martyrdom* (see Picture 1 bellow) as presented in the literature review? Is the sheet, in strips or not, an object with a similar function? Maybe Liz is ‘kept’ on the chair with the sheet in the same way as St Lawrence is kept by the stick on the grid to be roasted.
Of course in Liz’s case there is obviously not a concrete person to hold the sheet strips; but as Bond has suggested above, there should be special attention paid to how Liz is performing this action. It seems that there is something to look at here in the way Liz is using her fingers and the strips. Is she trying to uncover the Invisible Object on the top of the chair? Is she trying to uncover who or what drives her on the chair and what or who keeps her there?

The group has here for the first time noted rather explicitly one of the cornerstones of a Bondian play. The Story starts as soap opera, easily recognisable to any audience in our modern, at least westernised, culture; but it gradually leads the audience to a place of ‘wilderness’, of disorientation, with Liz’s suicide. The particular comment probably relates to the idea that this ‘wilderness’ corresponds to a place where ideological narratives are not adequate to or are incapable of explaining the event.

There is last note on the role of Enactment. This particular device or element of Bondian practice was initially consciously excluded from this study, because it was
thought that this is not a proper area to investigate in view of the fact that participants in DIE do not act in the sense of an actor’s acting. It seems that it is an important element to explore, however, because if Enactment is the way in which to reveal the Invisible Object to an actor or the audience, then there should be a parallel in DIE. This particular element thus needs to be further looked at in later sessions.

*Reading Bond’s letter on the play*

Panel three is for Bond the site of radical innocence. The city re-enters the room with Richard in the third panel; he is a ‘symptom of the city’s malaise and now its agent’ (App.D.1.d, par.201, p.106), and tries to dominate the room. But as the city enters the room with its attendant threats to the self, Dan is driven back to a still more fundamental level, that of the monad stage. Bond mentions, for example, that Richard and Dan use Liz’s clothes for different purposes. Richard wants to complete his revenge, the ‘corruption of his RI’ (ibid), to dominate the room and create an empty universe by negating his opposite polarity which is Liz. He does that by trying to erase the ‘world-home’ as the site of justice ‘for a few rags and their street-value’ (App.D.1.d, par.216, p.107). The important action that is spotted by Bond in his notes is Richard’s sitting on the chair which Liz used to commit suicide. ‘But this obsessive need shows the indestructibility of innocence (which he will later assert)’ (ibid). His return to the flat shows that he cannot achieve the corruption of his and the room’s radical innocence. For Bond the site asserts itself, which relates to the site of radical innocence, not to a supposedly human nature in Dan that expresses itself or finds itself at the expense of others (App.D.1.d, par.219, p.108). In this panel, according to
Bond, the ‘early self’s confrontation with reality is dramatised, and this may happen only if consciousness enters reality. The meeting with reality amounts to an encounter with pleasure and pain, or else the Tragic and the Comic. The end product of this process is the creation of consciousness, namely the dramatisation of the self (ibid).

Once more the director of the company noted a new possibility for a Drama Event in relation to Richard’s sitting on Liz’s chair when he enters the room in panel three; again, he didn’t expand on it (App.D.1.d, par.218, p.107).

In relation to Dan’s ‘rebirth’, it was clarified in the discussion that he is not confronting himself but reality, and that Dan’s state is also part of the relationship or conflict between the ontological and the existential dramatised earlier in Liz:

**L:** It is seeing the world rather seeing himself [Dan].

**Director:** So the process is not about confronting himself, it is about confronting reality.

**R:** Because he hasn’t become conscious yet. He is at fault.

**Director:** ‘This dramatises the self.’! Yes it does because …

**L:** [Inaudible] … to be able to confront himself …

**R:** Is that related to the comic then? Because what he is actually seeing is comic. [Inaudible] not tragic, it is the comic of the people … He doesn’t say that this is fun but it is funny, isn’t it? And tragic. Reality that it hasn’t yet the pain of … that is mean, that is hers …

**Director:** And also it is what it is the tragic reality of drama in terms, as expressed earlier, of Liz. It is the same process.

**R:** It is the relationship of the ontological and the existential, isn’t it?

**Director:** I think I have got that now. (App.D.1.d, par.220-228, p.108).

*Commentary*
The new event that captured group’s attention as a possible Drama Event relates to Richard’s sitting on the chair; but it is not clear what the Invisible Object to be revealed with this action actually is. Similarly, I am not sure at all if there are here the other components that contribute to construction of a Drama Event like the Extreme, Accident Time, etc. It looks like Richard is creating the conditions for Dan, and maybe for the audience, to enter a Drama Event rather than being himself in a Drama Event when he sits on the chair. *If the assertion of Radical Innocence is one part of the Drama Event I can’t see how Richard is asserting his own in the particular moment* (Fieldnotes, 03-09-2009).

In Bond’s notes there is at this point a brief summary of his theory. The indestructibility of Radical Innocence in Richard tunes with Bond’s idea that this particular element cannot be corrupted, and Richard in the third panel reencounters this part of himself when he is tied onto the chaise-longue. Dan, and through him the audience, is confronting reality, the Tragic and the Comic, as though brought to a similar reversion to the monadic state, before ideology’s full impact. This means that ideology is supposed to be bypassed; hence he manages to see reality in a new, radically innocent, way. The question left unasked by the group, however, is how this is going to be made possible for the audience. It seems that Enactment is again the basic means to make this take place, which at the moment is still under consideration and not yet fully explained.

There is another question to be posed about this section that relates to the intention of the third panel itself. If Liz, through the actress’ Enactment, could in the second panel have revealed the Invisible Object that relates to the impasse and the paradox that ideology brings in to people’s lives, what is the need for the third panel dramatically?
As Bond explains in his notes, Dan enters reality and, it is hoped, the audience will have followed him in this entry into or confrontation with reality. His and their consciousnesses are thus confronting the Tragic and the Comic through an unmediated contact with reality; hence axiomatically consciousness enters their selves. Ideally in the third panel Dan and the audience are seeing the world from a perspective comparable to that of a monad. But the question persists as to why Dan, and the audience, has to go through the peripeteia of Dan’s meeting his father and fighting over Liz’s clothes. In other words, what is the need to portray Dan’s dilemma in choosing between blinding or sparing his father?

As shall be explained later, Dan, for Bond and for the company, chooses not to take revenge and blind his father toward the end of panel three. At first sight the particular choice may seem rather didactic, issuing from outside the Story we have until now experienced. It may look like the writer has a didactic agendum here, aimed at the teenage audiences of the play: teaching, for example, that we should never choose revenge. But is that so? The particular question seems to be important for understanding the structure of the play as a whole, and thus it will be further explored in the next part of Bond’s notes and the group’s discussion.

Reading Bond’s letter on the play

In the next part of Bond’s notes, it is argued that money turns ‘everything into commodities’, whereas the neonate is ‘always concerned with the nature of reality – the meaning of things’ (App.D.1.d, par.230, p.108). Drama hence is required to ‘see
the ontological in the existential’ (App.D.1.d, par.232, p.109) and to ‘get at the political through the personal’ (App.D.1.d, par.238, p.109).

For Bond, Liz’s clothes represent or symbolise her, and they become the centre of attention for Richard and Dan in the third panel. The chair, on the other hand, is ‘already cathected (from P2) with the reality of the universe (the dramatic pole)’. When Liz’s clothes are on the chair they are part of the pole of the universe, whereas when they are on the floor they are just rugs [In the third panel Liz’s clothes are put on the chair by Dan and addressed as Liz herself, or are conversely dropped onto the floor, mainly by Richard] (App.D.1.d, par.244, p.110).

Dan is seen by Bond as radical, as a neonate who attempts to make the world his home. His radical approach though may become ‘the violence and terror of revenge’, which he wishes to show to Liz’s rags, the symbol and residue of her being. But he doesn’t ‘pursue the intention to kill’; he takes a ‘huge step into innocence when he says “We’ll (not I’ll) kill him”.’ His Radical Innocence instead ‘pushes Richard into his own primal situation’ which is strongly connected with the city (App.D.1.d, par.246, p.111).

For the director the entire focus or driving feature of the third panel is based on the quest for ‘the nature of things and what they mean’ (App.D.1.d, par.231, p.108); by reflecting on Bond’s notes he argued that drama ‘can recognise how innocence can become impotent’ (App.D.1.d, par.233, p.109); but again, he didn’t explain what he meant by this.

There was a further special note by the director on Dan’s condition in the third panel, after Liz’s death, which in some way concludes the last two or three sections of the
discussion. With her suicide Liz has given a gift to Dan – she is giving him his life back – but at the same time she is ‘also giving him a burden’ (App.D.1.d, par.242, p.110), forcing him to confront the city and its confusion of justice and injustice. Ultimately the whole view concluded in arguing that:

**Director:** (…) She is giving his life back by birthing him but she can only do that if he claims it in the first place, if he claims the right to it. You can force that will on someone [but] they have got to have the will to take it. I think that this is the most important thing in this. (App.D.1.d, par.243, p.110)

The idea that Liz’s clothes in fact represent Liz when they are on the chair, but become just rags when on floor, made the director assume that the room is still a coffin and caused him to speculate on the possible relationship between the two, the chair and the room. He ultimately continued by claiming that the fundamental polarity between the existential and ontological develops between the two objects, and this is the reason that the clothes ‘can move’ from the one to the other (App.D.1.d, par.245, pp.110-111). This is why he insisted that the group needed to follow the journey of the rags around the room (App.D.1.d, par.261, pp.112-113). Hence a member of the group added that there is a question about how the clothes would be put on the chair (App.D.1.d, par.262, p.113), and connected them to the sheet from the first and the second panel. The connection relates to the journey of the sheet as it ‘becomes Liz’ but which is literally ripped apart by her in the second panel, forcing her to see ‘herself all over the place’ (App.D.1.d, par.264, p.113). It is through her ripping apart her own self that she enters radical innocence.

But then, in the third panel, she is ‘like the same’, ‘split up but in dresses’ (ibid). Hence the director mentioned that he could imagine Richard pulling Liz’s clothes off the cupboard and holding them like ‘mum’s spilt guts’, like ‘He is holding her guts and he is holding her shape.’ (App. D.1.d, par.263, p.113). These clothes, another
member noted, were Liz’s palimpsest self, something that made the director wonder how this view could be conveyed in the performance:

**Director:** This is something for us to think about. For example, is there a journey through the things on the hanger that suggests different experiences or clothes for different moments? For example, something is very prostitute-like, something is more formal, something is more motherly. I think that it is an interesting, complex but detailed question in terms of the site. And then how you are moving it, how you enact this reification or not of the self. It is fascinating! I can see how reification of the self can be manifested in complete violence. You’ve got to find the invisible object. (App.D.1.d, par.267, p.113)

Another interesting point related to Radical Innocence as a possibly destructive drive, because is seen as having violence in it: ‘It is a force of nature that can rip, rage, destroy, in order to create.’ (App. D.1.d, par.247, p.111). Ultimately, if it is not confronted, it ‘will fix the self almost in a meaning that is destructive’ (App. D.1.d, par.255, p.112).

**Commentary**

There is a new point of interest in relation to how Liz’s clothes are used in the last panel. As the director argued, the group of actors are required to find the Invisible Object again. The interesting connection could here be made to one of the very first comments made by the group in the beginning of their exploration phase, when they thought that in the third panel Liz had to ‘be dragged over and killed again …’ (App. D.1.a, par.58, p.74). It seems that for the group their initial thinking is confirmed once more in this session. Liz still exists in the third panel, and the fight over her clothes is the fight over values. As the group noted Richard and Dan have a completely different stance towards the clothes; they see in them different meanings. Richard sees them as rags to sell, where Dan looks beyond their immediate monetary value. In that sense the conflict between the existential and the ontological is once
more present.

The most interesting point though in this discussion is that the group attempts to reify the particular conflict in objects, in this particular case Liz’s clothes; but the seeming contradiction between the chair and the table or the room and the chair, both described above, are analogous examples of a possible reification. The use of objects is, hence, a very important element in the group’s work: not of course just any kind of use, but a particular manner of charging the objects with meaning that clearly relates to Cathexis. What could be identified in the above discussion is very close to Cathecting objects from the perspective of the pre-real child, as described in the literature review. Ideally Dan exists in this state and confronts Richard who brings in the ideologically imposed fiscal values, according to which Liz’s clothes are to be sold.

The sheet may also be seen in the same way, as it might concretise Liz’s own passage and deadlock. It still, however, has a dramatic function beyond her presence since it is being used to bind Richard in the third panel.

In this particular section there is a kind of an answer to the question posed concerning the purpose of the third panel earlier. It seems that for Bond it is not enough to reveal the Invisible Object in this play. He probably likes to push his audience further and point to the responsibility they have towards the city. In fact, they need to confront reality, as Dan does with his father, and in that sense the play can be said to exemplify Bond’s theory. The Tragic is present in order for consciousness to enter the self, and this may turn out to be possible only when the monad is realising that it can or does act. As the playwright mentions in his notes, if there is anything to be taught in this
play it is probably this need for creativity through confrontation with the tragic (App. D, par.232, p.109). If Radical Innocence is not faced, it may become a power of violence and corruption.

Yet the presented answer that Dan decides against revenge may still leave a door open to didacticism. Or is it simply that the audience would be compelled either to agree or disagree with the possibility of their corruption?

Reading Bond’s letter on the play

The scene where Dan ties Richard onto the chaise-longue is described by Bond as ‘the baby who blinds the dictator’. This makes the site of the third panel the site of Radical Innocence which activates a ‘neonate’s huge concentration’ where the ‘distinction between humans and objects can vanish’ (App. D.1.d, par.268, p.113). Dan/neonate hence cathects the chaise-longue as the ‘foundation of the universe which is the creation of the self’ (ibid). It is like an explosion seen from within in accident time (ibid).

In this site of Radical Innocence the objects, like the chaise-longue and the sheet, as well as the space in between, become animated; they become acting objects (App. D.1.d, par.270, p.114). The whole site becomes an enactment; it exist in action, resembling [or becoming] the state of a ‘neonate when it is creating its world as the process of creating itself’ (ibid). Dan in that sense ‘becomes the scene of the action, or the site where the universe, or reality, acts on him’ since the site and the self in the earliest stages of life, according to Bond, become one; this is why an ‘infant does not
flee the Tragic (or enter it for the sake of revenge) and does not compartmentalise its experience as adults do (App. D.1.d, par.274, p.114). Thus Dan has to meet three ‘jugged flashes’, ‘his father, his mother and then himself’, which create the accident time (App. D.1.d, par.284, pp.115-116).

For the director of Big Brum there is no separation between Dan and the universe in this scene, and this is why the ‘child’ is not frightened by ‘reaching the universe, testing nothingness, owning nothingness, he steps into it’ (App. D.1.d, par.275, p.114-115). While the child exists in an act of self-creation and creation simultaneously of its own world, it has to ‘re-arrange the social world’ (App. D.1.d, par.271, p.114). The director argued, however, that since we adults tend to compartmentalise a new experience, assimilating it to older or acquired knowledge, we lose the ‘freshness’ of that first moment and we ‘become alienated from our experience and reality’ (App. D.1.d, par.279, p.115). Although we ‘cannot experience everything as a first time’ this is, according to the director, what Bond wants the audience to get back to, ‘to that state of childhood or actually that first pregnancy’ (App. D.1.d, par.275, pp.114-115) where ‘you can experience your whole humanness in a completely different way’ (App. D.1.d, par.277, p.115); or, as another member of the group put it, to ‘seeing through the eyes of a child’ (App. D.1.d, par.276, p.115).

The state of Dan in the third panel is described as total, dynamic and fluid, where there is no separation between his body and the chaise-longue; he is the Site (App. D.1.d, par.281, p.115) and brings with him the ontological truth about the object of the chaise-longue: it is just a man-made shape of a thing (App. D.1.d, par.282, p.115). The director finally argued that if the group manages correctly to perform the scene where Dan ties Richard onto the chaise-longue, then ‘the audience will experience the

**Commentary**

For Bond the chaise-longue is Cathected by Dan, the child, as the foundation of the universe, in the process of the child’s creating its own world. As mentioned earlier, Dan is expected to enter the Site of Radical Innocence where extreme concentration is created. Within that state objects and actions become one and, as the director explained, there is no separation between the body and the chaise-longue. In a sense Dan becomes part of a full Site of radical innocence. This state is very close to what is set out in the literature review in relation to Accident Time, where experience seems slower in moments of extreme concentration. The Extremity of the scene lies in the confrontation with Dan’s father and reality in the last panel.

As one of the actors mentioned above, the object of the chaise-longue acquires, through Dan’s actions, a new significance, one which relates to ontology. I assume that this remark relates to the ambiguity of the object earlier in the first panel, where the chaise-longue ‘might suggest a brothel in a city where everything is sold but it is also the domestic bed – a centre of humanness’ (App.D.1.d, par.36, p.93). In that sense there was a kind of a struggle enacted over the meaning of the object, between existential and ontological values, present even in the first panel and reaching its climax in the third. The specific member of the group did not expand on this, but the idea seems relevant because it concerns the point where the object is disconnected from socially-constructed meaning, and the person who manages to do that is Dan, the child, when he enters the state of radical innocence. Theoretically he is re-cathecting
an object, the chaise-longue, with human values.

These objects in Bond’s play though are not the strong and commonly recognised dramatic or social symbols. They are not for example an axe, a diamond ring, a rose (O’Toole and Haseman, 1988:112-116), a dove or a flag with already strongly associated meanings. They are mostly ordinary objects that their significance escapes our attention in daily life. In a sense they are not consciously ‘compartmentalised’ in our thinking because maybe their meaning is long forgotten or alienated as the group has noticed above. The chair, the table and the sheet in A Window are some of this kind of objects that although have some ‘buried’ meaning they are not consciously recognised as symbols as the director confirmed too (App.C.1.c, par.12, pp.20-21). In a sense they are made ‘transparent’ in daily life but they can still hold values to be deconstructed. As the director mentioned for the use of the sheet: ‘So the sheet is cathected with all the pre-conceptions we have about family, about home, and it is literally ripped to pieces in front us and we have to take a stance on how we feel about that.’ (App. C1.c, par.42, p.22).

In my view this choice is consistent with the critical function of the Story in Bond’s plays. Audience in a sense may perceive these objects as ordinary as familiar as a Bondian Story would provoke them to do. But in a rather paradoxical way their attention is ‘destructed’ in not getting vigilant with the power of a symbol. A gun or a flag for example would definitely grab their attention and make their values, created by reason or ideology, dominate their thinking and expectations. In an exaggerated example it would be comparable to using the symbol of a swastika in front of a Nazi audience in order to deconstruct it; I could guess that the audience would unquestionably resist any attempt of criticism and experiencing would have fallen
back into already existing beliefs, what the group mentioned as compartmentalisation. Instead Bondian objects seize the audience with an only apparent incorruptibility or neutrality that later may become the noose or a step to hang oneself as in *A Window* or kill young people as in the *Children* (Bond, 200b) where a father who lost his child in a fire kills one by one a group of young people, whom he considers responsible for his son’s death, with the use of a brick but covered by a towel. The towel is one of these daily ‘transparent’ objects which in the play attain meaning beyond its ordinary one, it may hold the Site or even, in Bond’s terminology, the ‘universe’.

However the chaise-longue in *A Window* may seem to resist such an interpretation. It is not an object that goes unnoticed, it could be argued, in a performance. It could bring in mind a middle class decorating aesthetic, as it did for me, or even a brothel but I doubt that it could connect to a hypothetical neutrality or unrecognised significance of an object as the sheet above could do. It may, on the other hand, be seen as a carrier of something from the social Site but it provokes at the same time some claims on the particular family’s past. How did it get there?

Maybe Liz and Richard have dreamed and planned formerly a middle class image of a household in accordance to advertisements. If this is so their early dream became a nightmare and the chaise-longue is transformed into brothel equipment as Bond has argued above. I would suggest thus that the chaise-longue is again another of these possible objects which bear social meaning to be deconstructed during the process. It has to be noted furthermore that the particular object is been used in the third panel, together with the strips of the sheet, in a different way than simply to make the Invisible Object visible. Richard is bound on it with the strips but ultimately he is not blinded. But still the question rather remains in relation to how suitable was the
particular object since it still makes an audience to be consciously aware of it from the very beginning of the play.

I would think that the chaise-longue is rather very similar in function to the story of the blinding. Both hold something familiar and unfamiliar at the same time. And I think that both are used later in the play as the seeds for alienating the Story from within.

Reading Bond’s letter on the play

If Dan was blinding Richard, this would mean that he was ‘blinding’ his innocence as well because for Bond ‘innocence as a human characteristic isn’t divisible, my offence against you is actually an offence against myself’ (App. D.1.d, par. 292, p.116). For Bond, Dan in the third panel ‘is in danger of becoming a symbol and so entering ideology’ (App. D.1.d, par. 294, p.117). But in the state of radical innocence, he becomes ‘objectified and the object becomes humanised’ (App. D.1.d, par. 300, p.117) and ‘his power to destroy becomes a power to create’ (App. D.1.d, par. 298, p.117). In the same passage Bond explains that the ‘drama tool’ is that Dan becomes the ‘scissors that blind’, and he is ‘helped because the chaise-longue becomes the drama tool’ (ibid). According to the writer Dan in the final image in front of the window ‘has freed himself from the bad paternal incubus and the need for revenge. Now he can see the city for himself.’ [It has to be remembered that in the text Richard attempts to corrupt Dan by teaching him how life is.] (App. D.1.d, par. 312, p.118). Thus he ‘will make his home here. The spectator sees himself or herself.’ (ibid).
Hence, panel one is ‘a domestic room in the corrupt city, P2 the site of the self in the corrupt city, p3 the site of radical innocence’ (App. D.1.d, par. 314, p.118). The last significant notes that the writer included state:

The meaning is created by the actors and their use of objects, which are pared down to be tools. I put things as simply as I can, but drama clarifies far greater complexities. Ideology hides its petty crimes in back alleyways but hides its greatest crimes on the open city square. Drama clarifies the subterfuges of concealment. Just remember three pictures. (App. D.1.d, par. 322, p.119)

There were very few comments on the above from the group. The first of them was in relation to the indivisibility of innocence where the director mentioned that an offence against Richard is ‘self destructive’ (App. D.1.d, par. 293, pp.116-117). Dan in this situation is in danger of becoming a symbol and enter ideology if, according to the group, he chooses to follow the ‘path of revenge’ (App. D.1.d, par. 295, p.117); our culture, they argued, ‘broods on that’ and ‘puts it on a pedestal for us’ (App. D.1.d, par. 296, p.117).

The last comment concerned the final scene by the window and it is seen as ‘extreme, the final confrontation’ by the director (App. D.1.d, par. 311, p.118); again, however, this wasn’t explained further.

**Commentary**

Although the members of Big Brum seemed to follow Bond’s notes and agree with his arguments, they didn’t expand much on why and how save for a few brief comments, which again were not fully explained. I will try to interpret them in relation to the whole of the work up to that point.

For the group it seemed that Dan would have become a symbol by taking revenge and
blinding Richard. Revenge, according to Bond and Big Brum respectively, is an ingredient of the ideology of the city; so by this action Dan would have entered it, and by so doing would have submitted to it. Such an interpretation is of course in agreement with Bond’s theory, where the state of Radical Innocence is the felt recognition that the self cannot exist or be conceived apart from the other, and thus any offence against the other is an offence against yourself; living in ideological terms, on the other hand, is understood as individualism, or antagonism toward and separation from the other. This seems an essential comment in Bond’s extract above, but I think that the group did not expand adequately on the reasons for their agreement with Bond’s notes.

The extremity of the last event at the window, which the group mentioned, is probably the extremity of confronting reality outside the room and perhaps relates to Dan’s ‘seeing the city for himself’. Once again the group did not explain sufficiently this particular comment, but it seems that Dan’s decision not to take revenge and instead confront the city is for them a vital action and vital element of the play.

**Exploration phase: Day 5 (07-09-2009), first session, DVD 5**

On the fifth day of the exploration phase the director Chris Cooper asked the group of actors to look at Richard and Liz in the text and note down when they are blind and when they are seeing (Fieldnotes, 07-09-2009, first session).

The group has noted the following moments in the text of A Window:

The first moment was in relation to Liz, when she relates the incident she read about in the newspaper – about the blinding of a kid by his mother – to Richard. The
particular extract that the group noted was ‘every bit a’ cruelty’s like that’ (Bond, 2011:185-196), which shows a moment of seeing for Liz. Her speech that contains the particular phrase is, in full:

Liz (Voice half-raised) . . . it’s the way she said it . . . as if yer’d know why the kid ‘ad t’ be . . . she scared me. . . every bit a’ cruelty’s like that — every time -- don’t matter what it is -- but no one sees it -- (Bond, 2011:185-196)

The next moment is a phrase of Richard’s, when Liz tries to explain to him that she needs some time alone in the beginning of the panel one. He doesn’t understand why and he then says ‘Then it’s someone else.’ (Bond, 2011:182). Richard unjustifiably thinks that there is another man in her life, and thinks it is this that made her want to separate herself from him. The group thought that the particular moment shows a blinded Richard.

A few lines later Richard prepares to leave the flat after asking Liz for some money. The stage directions note ‘(Silence. He stares at her)’ (Bond, 2011:183); Richard then continues with trying to convince Liz that her wish for quietness is untenable in the area they are living. The group thought that this is a moment of seeing for Richard.

When Liz finally admits the reason she wanted to sleep alone in the room, she describes the scene of the blinding of the kid in the newspaper and the stage directions again note ‘(She slaps her hands on to her face)’ (Bond, 2011:185). According to Liz this is what the child did when his mother took his eye out with scissors. This is another moment which the group thought of as a moment of seeing for Liz.

After Liz has told Richard that she is pregnant, the stage directions for Richard note that he ‘Picks up the pillow.’ (Bond, 2011:186). This is, according to the group, a
moment of seeing for Richard. Immediately after this, Richard will argue that Liz should get rid of the baby.

In the beginning of panel one, when Richard enters the room for the first time, and after he has asked Liz why she didn’t respond to him when he called for her, the stage directions note that he ‘Sees the bedding.’ (Bond, 2011:181). In the group’s account this is a moment of seeing for Richard.

Towards the end of panel one and after Richard has left the room with the money he has taken from Liz’s bag, the stage directions note that Liz ‘Puts her hand in [her bag] to touch the money.’ (Bond, 2011:188). For the group this is an act of seeing for Liz. She has asked Richard before that he leave some money in the bag for her.

In the very beginning of the panel Liz is making a bed. She then hears the door of the flat, which means that Richard has returned. After the sound of the door the stage directions note that ‘Liz goes to the door of the room. Closes it.’ (Bond, 2011:182). Once more the group thought that it is a moment of seeing for Liz.

Before Richard finds out the real reason for Liz’s feelings, he has gone out of the room. Then ‘Liz lies face down on the bed.’ (Bond, 2011:183). That was for the group a moment of blindness for Liz.

In the subsequent discussion the director noted that there are two interesting points to be made in relation to the above. First of all, there is a contradiction in all of them in the sense ‘that what can be a moment of seeing can also be a moment of blinding, depending where you are looking at the moment’ (App. D.1.e, par.1, p.120). The director argued that this is a useful point to think about.

The second is related to the ‘ways of seeing’ that exist in the above actions. He wondered what the level of seeing was in every moment that the group has chosen, and the idea of seeing ‘beyond a kind of a conventional moment of anticipation’ to a point where the characters may ‘dramatise’ a crisis and live it (ibid). Vision in Liz, for the director, keeps coming and going out of focus:

So there is moments of incredible seeing but there is also the blindness can reassert itself if you think of how the blindness literally throws a veil on her. It is almost like the sheet is an ideological veil/sheet (App. D.1.e, par.2, pp.120-121).

Chris Cooper asked the group to keep finding moments in the text where there is a clash between the ontological and the existential, in ways similar to that in which this clash is reflected in Liz’s vision and blindness above (ibid).

**Commentary**

In this session, Chris Cooper has set the group a specific task that should influence the whole of the exploration as well as the rehearsal work. For him it is important for the group to keep finding moments where the clash between the existential and the ontological is especially prominent. I think that this task sums up the work that has so far been done by the group, and it focuses on practical matters henceforth. The tendency of the group to identify moments of a conflict between the existential and
the ontological is already noted in previous sessions, and I think that fundamentally this confirms the idea that this is an important ingredient for a Bondian way of working. For this reason I feel this clash must be at the centre of all of the group’s remaining work.

It is an open question as to why there wasn’t any kind of explanation of the reasons for the group’s choosing the specific moments they did, or even explain how they think these moments reflect seeing or not seeing. All of the moments were concrete, but the justification for the group’s identifying them as they did was missing.

I think though that as an observer, it is possible to understand what they were after. I was enabled to see what images each of the two characters were able to form in their minds during the actions. For example, when Richard picks up the pillow after Liz has informed him that she is pregnant, the image that was stuck in my mind was of an infantilised adult who cares only for his comfort – as the director argued above – but at the same time I think I saw what this person feared most and how he sees life. And I should add as well that I did recall some of my personal experiences.

I would not think it relevant to detail my images here, but it may be said that it might expected for the audience to have a similar experience. Personally involving the audience by connecting to their personal lives is one of the fundamental cornerstones of Bond’s work. Hence locating these images of seeing and not seeing, of a clash between the ontological and existential, is a very helpful way to think about and to organise a drama work.

*Exploration phase: Day 5 (07-09-2009), second session, DVD 5*
Immediately after the above discussion the group had a walk-through of the first panel without interruptions. The director first reminded the rest of the group that the Site of the first panel is social, and this is the pressure of the city, and then he rearranged the configuration of the room, but without explaining why he had done so apart from saying that he was still not sure about ‘what goes where’ (Fieldnotes, 07-09-2009, second session). After the first walk-through the director asked the actors who play Liz and Richard to walk through the text in short parts, and he again reconfigured the room.

In between the short stages of the walk-through, the group commented on how they felt or what they saw in them. The comments focused mainly on why Richard and Liz do what they do. One of the short scenes that drew the attention of the director was the one where Richard is reacting verbally to Liz’s request for some quiet:

Liz Want a bit a’ quiet. Not a crime.
Richard Quiet!
Liz Please. I juss need a bit a’ space for meself.
Richard What’ve I done now?
Liz Nothin --
Richard Then what the bloody --
Liz Please please. I dont want t’ row.
Richard Looks like it! (*Sits at table*) I come ’ome. Trampin all day. Got nowhere. Yer’re turnin the place upside down. Yer don’t want t’ row?
Liz Sorry yer day wasn’t–
Richard Don’t change the subject! Sorry me day -- ? Lot yoo care!

(Bond, 2011:181-182)

The director commented that:

…the city I think (...) is really beginning to assert its pressure there! That sense of actually ‘That is why I do feel like this because actually this is what the city is like, and this what you have to plug [connect] with. You are fucking locking yourself away but..’ There is a real experience that he actually has to offload. (...) But that is the pressure of the city. (V, 3, 42:30-43:30).
Later in the same dialogue Richard is complaining about Liz’s attitude and takes it like as evidence that has found another man:

**Richard** Then its someone else. *(Liz makes a dismissive gesture)* Yer’d like it if I went off! Vanish god knows where. Ain see me for weeks. I turn up n’ say I juss wanted a bit a’ space for me ‘ead! More like a bit a’ life! Bit a’ fun for a change! Stead a’ the misery a’ this place! *(Bond, 2011:182)*

The director once again located a kind of infantilisation of Richard in these words:

> It is so horrible, isn’t it? But it is horrible with that kind of self-centred … I can only describe it with … just as a big overgrown kid. (…) We talk about how our culture infantilises us. He is like the living proof of how infantile relations can become. And then he starts talking all these kinds of clichés as well. We have got this classic cliché that ‘if we have a problem we ought to talk.’ [A phrase told by Richard to Liz just before the above extract]. It is so obvious you can’t talk! *(V, 4, 46:30-47:30)*

A member of the group mentioned that the situation between the couple is very common and another mentioned later that he could ‘empathise’ with Richard. The director added that there is a clash between two different worlds in this argument between Liz and Richard. Both, according to the director, exist in separated ‘bubbles’ and that ‘this is a very male-female thing’. He then recognised some of the presented elements as familiar or relevant to himself as a man. The particular input provoked similar reactions for the rest of the group. ‘It is not a dysfunctional couple’ the director added, but certainly it is a ‘gender thing’ *(V, 5, 02:00-14:00)*.

Further, Richard’s proposal that Liz needs to go the doctors provoked more comments from the group in relation to the issue of gender. A member mentioned that statistically women take more antidepressant pills than men and added: ‘I think that is the city. Because the typical female response to, what we understand by, the city is to cry, to [inaudible], where a man responds by getting angry, to hit, to get violent.’ *(V, 5, 14:30-16:30)*.
Commentary

In their session the group started defining the Site of the first panel in practical terms. Richard is bringing the city’s pressure into the room by ‘offloading’ the social pressure which he accumulated with his experience of the city. This is in contrast to Liz who isolates herself he is exposed to the city’s malfunctions. In a sense the group located in Richard’s words and attitude to Liz the ‘smell’ of what is it to be out there struggling.

The important element for practice here is that every bit of action, every word and image that Richard is bringing in is considered as an opportunity to reveal the pressure of the city, which is defined as the Site of panel one. The gender subject is again regarded as part of the differing experience men and women have within this social context. It is not a concern of this research to examine whether the description of the group in relation to gender experience is accurate. The point is that every bit of detail is fitted in this wider context which the Site A, in Bondian terminology, may describe. In that sense the group may have identified some actions, words and images that could be used for conveying Site A to the audience. For example, the above verbal attack by Richard needs to be carefully signified.

The director explained Richard’s mindset: ‘That is why I do feel like this because actually this is what the city is like, and this what you have to plug [connect] with. You are fucking locking yourself away but…’ The director’s elucidation of Richard’s attitude shows basically that even this simple scene is important in bringing in the Site for the audience. The way an actor could manage to convey these two Sites of the play, A and B, to the audience in fact involves Site C for Bond. It comprises the
practical choices followed in a production and it seems that signification is an important element for doing so.

Another interesting point is the oblique acknowledgement that the Story of the play is not only common and easily recognisable, but that the members of the group had a degree of insight into it since most of them identified some facets with which they were familiar or could compare to situations from their own experience. This comment relates first of all to the function of the Story in Bond’s plays, as well as to the commonly recognisable quasi-‘clichés’ that are being used in the beginning for connecting to the audience’s life. Richard is part of Site B of the play, the particular Site of the play (Bond:2000a:10), but who is immediately related to Site A, the social Site of the play. As some members of the group could empathise at least partially with some of his expressions, the same could happen with at least some of the audience. The crucial issue in this respect is how the actor would manage to do that.

The last session focused exclusively on the Site of the first panel and offered interesting directions for locating it; still, it is rather questionable why the group didn’t create the Centre for their work first before they proceeded with rehearsing. And it is obvious, I think, that the specific session did look like rehearsing.

*Exploration phase: Day 6 (08-09-2009), first session, DVD 6*

Finally the Centre of the play is described in few sentences on the 6th day of the rehearsals by Chris Cooper:

*Ideology hides its petty crimes in back alleyways but hides its greatest crimes on the open city square. Corruption blinds us to reality governing what is seen and unseen. In the confrontation with the city the self is balanced between innocence and compromise, it is a confrontation between surviving and living.* (Fieldnotes, 08-09-2009, first session)
The first sentence is taken from Bond’s notes on the play, whereas the next part was produced by Chris Cooper (App. D.1.f, par.2, p.122). The director explained that the petty crimes are the actions we perform without ever realising that they are reflecting the wider social crimes (App. D.1.f, par.3-4, pp.122-123). At the same time, surviving and living relate to radical innocence, as we are born in that state, though gradually forced to consider the living practicalities since we can’t live with ‘pure innocence’ alone (App. D.1.f, par.5, p.123).

Commentary

The formulation of the Centre of Big Brum’s production, as it is described above, manages to describe it in terms of a conflict between the existential/surviving and the ontological/living. All of the three characters do seem to be confronted with corruption and innocence in their lives. On the other hand the idea that the wider context, the biggest crimes, are reflected in the petty ones that are hidden in back alleyways is one that is applicable to any personal life that exists in this wider context. In a sense Cooper’s Centre attempts to depict the specific or personal in the social or vice versa. I think that the particular formulation attempts to capture the conflict that affects every individual in our modern world, and Edward Bond in his interview mentioned that the particular formulation is ‘fine’ (App. C.2, par.49, p.45).

The problem with this formulation however is that it seems too general, failing to focus on the condition that the play describes. For example, as it can be seen in the process till now, all of the characters of the play experience a profound crisis that leads them to either death, as with Liz, to an affirmation of corruption, as with Richard, or finally to the re-assertion of radical innocence, as is the case with Dan.
This crisis, and its impact on people’s lives, are lacking or not adequately addressed in the statement that ‘the self is balanced between innocence and compromise’. In other words the formulation is missing the clarity of the paradox produced by living in context where, for example, a mother is driven to blind her child or commit suicide in order to protect it.

Further, the particular Centre seems one which could potentially be used for any piece of work in Bond’s repertoire, since it looks as if it could fit strongly with the most profound directions of his theory. I would think that every play may tackle the same problem, though reflected in different situations.

In practical terms such a formulation does not help much in planning every decision for a possible drama work – and maybe for a drama in classrooms. I would think that the Centre should be defined in more detail than a general statement which looks more like a political declaration to be learned or assimilated.

**General commentary for the exploration phase**

There are some important lessons learned for planning drama work in the exploration phase of Big Brum’s work. Locating paradoxes that reflect profound conflicts between existential and ontological questions in people’s lives is one of the fundamentals, perhaps even the most important task to consider. The importance of that specific task affects all of the other elements of a drama work and may for that reason be described as a Centre. This direction might be expected of course, since it is made clear in Bond’s writings that this ought to be the way a production proceeds. The group is willing, at least in their theoretical exploration, consciously to relate
even the slightest detail of the text to the Centre, and these details includes named objects as well as actions and images.

The Site also seems to be of particular concern for the group, especially when considering the introductory scenes and panel one in general. The analysis of the Site A, especially, would appear to be of central importance. The newspaper article about the blinding of the child which disturbs Liz’s life; the city’s pressure that Richard brings in; or the existence of the chaise-longue and its possibility for creating ambiguity about the nature of the room, all are features that were given special attention.

The careful exploration of the objects and their use is another important lesson to consider. When I was reading the plays of Edward Bond, and in particular *A Window*, I rarely noticed the use of objects or reflected on their possible function in the plays. As a reader or even viewer I was normally taken up with the actions, and neglected the objects as such. I suppose that my inattentiveness somehow relates to the apparent ‘insignificance’ of the Bondian objects; but Big Brum has demonstrated an acute awareness of them and their potentials.

Again, this was another point which theoretically might be expected of a company involved in a Bond production; but the decisive or innovative element here is that all the objects are equally significant, for the reason that they may become the self – not merely symbols of the self but the self itself – through the use of Cathexis. The group has notably focused on every single object there is in the play, from Liz’s handbag to the chaise-longue and the sheet strips, and analysed them in terms of the Centre to explore their possible use and meaning. There are still a lot of questions in relation to
how these objects are going to be used in practice, however – for example, the sheet and the chair.

I think that in their theoretical exploration the group has located the areas which for them are the most important for working practically on the play and the programme. All of these elements were identified as important in the literature review except Enactment, which was not included initially in my particular selection.

**Story**

In relation to the Story, the group mentioned that it starts off with an ordinary scene, reminiscent of a soap opera, but leads the audience into wilderness. I think that this is an important element to incorporate into practice or staging in the next steps. Hence the question with which this study must engage is how Big Brum develops this Story in practice. How is the apparent ‘soap opera’ initially sustained, and how it is later developed into the intended ‘wilderness’?

**Centre**

The Centre of the whole production is already set up (though the director stated that this is still open to changes). It should be mentioned here that there wasn’t any change in the subsequent stages of the production process, and the Centre was kept intact till the end of the programme. The interesting question that this study needs to try to answer though is how Big Brum uses the Centre in practice, that is, how the rest of the practical choices pass through it.

**Extreme and Accident Time**
In relation to the Extreme the group focused among other things on the reported incident of the kid’s blinding that disturbed Liz’s thinking, and on Liz’s inner conflict between ontological and existential questions which drives her toward her eventual suicide on the chair. The recognised extremity of the above situations will be followed and monitored in order to identify a possible way of developing it. Accident Time on the other hand is the intense but lucid awareness that is supposed to be provoked in the audience when the Extreme enters the on-stage situation. So in all of the above cases of extremity, Accident Time is a potential effect to examine.

_Cathexis_

For the element of Cathexis the group concentrated their attention on the use of the sheet, the table and the chair, the chaise-longue, and Liz’s handbag and clothes. The chair, according to Bond and the group, should be Cathected by Liz in the second panel and the chaise-longue in the third by Dan. Both are Cathected as the edge of the universe, or with human values. Liz’s handbag on the other hand is an object that, according to Bond’s notes, Cathects the room in the first panel with socially-constructed meaning. The sheet for its part is from the beginning a central object in the group’s interpretation. It was mentioned in all three panels in the group’s analysis and seems to them to hold rich potential. So how are these objects being Cathected in practice and how is the company using them?

_The Site_

The Site primarily occupied group’s attention in the first panel, when they considered the pressure of the city brought into the room. Thus I think it is important to look at how this Site is created in practice – particularly in the first panel, since the group concentrated their attention on this – and how this Site is conveyed to the audience. In
fact it is more correct to ask how Sites A and B, according to Bond’s (2000a:10) own analysis of the terms, are conveyed to Site D, that is the audience as a Site of imagination, by Big Brum.

Drama Event and the Invisible Object

The group has explicitly identified some possible Drama Events in their theoretical exploration. These events are primarily the scenes that develop around the chair in the second panel, while Liz prepares to commit suicide, and the last part of the third panel, where there is a physical struggle between Richard and Dan. Other potential events included the throwing of the bag onto the floor by Richard when he leaves the room in the end of panel one; Dan’s dancing and crying in the end of panel two after Liz has committed suicide; and Richard’s sitting in Liz’s chair when he enters the room once more in the third panel. Locating and developing a Drama Event is of course of central importance for this study. The point to consider then is how and if these scenes which the group identified at the outset as fertile occasions develop in practical terms.

Enactment

The last area to be explored is the area of Enactment, which rather incorrectly was not taken into account in my initial view. Enactment is strongly associated with Drama Event, since in Bond’s writings it is the way that an actor would find the Invisible Object and thereby make it visible for the audience. The focus of attention is thus on the conditions that allow enacting to take place.

These basic questions define the key areas which will guide the investigation and analysis of the next steps. The rehearsals and preparation of the programme was a
very long process, which lasted nineteen full working days and resulted in approximately one hundred and twenty hours of recordings. In that sense it is impossible to manage to present, even in a summary, the whole of their progression. For these reasons I have selected only those parts of the process which seem to be very important for further monitoring in the rehearsal phase, and are relevant to all of the main elements of interest for this study. This selection was based on what seemed, according to the exploration phase and my analysis of it, to be of most importance in understanding how Big Brum employs Bondian theory, and therewith discerning how it may help in planning drama work for classrooms.

The first of these areas is the intention to bring in the Site, for which the group has focused especially on the first panel. So I think I need to follow their located concern and explore their work on the first panel in relation to this area of interest.

The scene which develops around the chair in the second panel while Liz prepares to commit suicide is going to be further examined in relation to the creation of Drama Events. This scene, among others, was explicitly identified by the group as a fruitful opportunity. If it does develop into a Drama Event, then other elements of Bondian practice will naturally surface and be explored such as the Enactment, the Extreme and Accident Time, Cathexis and the notion of Invisible Object.

In relation to Cathexis the objects which are going to be explored are the ones that are used in the above scene; these are the chair, the table and the sheet. The main reason I have chosen these three objects is that the group focused on them, and because they are contained in that scene which is the specific Drama Event. Liz’s handbag and the chaise-longue are some other important objects, according to the group’s analysis of
the play; for reasons of concision they are not going to be used extensively for exploring Cathexis.

So this study will from here on out examine the first two panels and, will not analyse the third one; this is because it is apparent that the material till now has indicated that the two first panels may already contain all the areas of interest. In a communication with Edward Bond he agreed that the chosen elements ‘would be adequately represented in the two earlier sections [panel one and two]’ (App. G, p.231).

3.1.2 Rehearsal phase

Rehearsal phase: Day 6 (08-09-2009), second session and Day 7 (09-09-2009): Rehearsing Panel One.

The group proceeded to rehearsing the first panel of the play; before their first rehearsal, the director has set some basic directions and presented to the group the division of the panel into three sections. These sections are, according to Chris Cooper, the 1st from the time Richard is entering the room till he is saying ‘What is it?’ (Bond, 2011:181); the 2nd till the point when Liz is saying ‘I am going to have a baby’ (Bond, 2011:186); and the 3rd till the end of panel one where Richard is taking the money from Liz’s bag leaves her alone in the room. Liz then checks the remaining money in her handbag and goes off (Bond, 2011:188). (Fieldnotes, 08-09-2009, second session).

The director mentioned that even in these three sections ‘there are some contrasting discourses’ which are defined as the ‘course of the clash’ between Liz’s vision and Richard’s ‘lack of vision about the nature of the city’ (App. D.2.a, par.2, p.124). The argument between the two contains two layers. In the first layer the argument is
defined as a domestic one: ‘well, look you know I don’t like being “skint”, I can’t get
a job, I can’t do this, I can’t do that because the city doesn’t function’ from Richard;
this is set against Liz’s ‘I pay everything. This is my flat’ (ibid). And the second layer
is defined as ‘I hope you’d understand for once, you don’t understand me’ which is at
the base of both reactions, Richard’s and Liz’s (ibid).

The director’s primary concern was focused especially on the first section of the
panel, where Richard is entering the room for the first time, something which
‘explodes in panel three’ and relates to the course of the clash but in terms of the Site

Later, following the first rehearsal of the first section of panel one, the director
commented that when Richard sits at the table for the first time, after he realises that
Liz is having ‘one of her things’ and puts ‘Elbows on table. Head in his hands’ (Bond,
2011:183), it seemed to Cooper that this ‘was utter rationality round the table’ (App.
D.2.a, par.5, p.125). He proposed that the particular scene ‘made the space change’,
but that there is still ‘an abyss separating’ Richard (ibid) from the chaise-longue that
Liz has created as a Site of humanness (App. D.2.a, par.1, p.124). From the very
beginning, the director noticed, Richard employs ‘ideologised clichés’ in his reaction
to Liz’s making a bed alone, and summarised the clichés involved in Richard’s
attitude towards Liz’s need for some quiet with: ‘You have made your point. You
want quiet in a place where you can’t [get] quiet… let’s drop it’ (App. D.2.a, par.6,
p.125). Cooper noticed that with these two characters, there is a marked difference in
how they seek for or find the solution to the problem:

Hers [Liz’s] is to stay with the problem, yours [Richard’s] is to survive. So it is
so logical when you look at it like that. It is like ‘I see what you are saying
now.’ (…). But what you [Richard] do now is you recognise you are in the
situation so ‘Let’s drop it and we will solve the problem by eating. Are we going to eat?’ (…) He is like always hungry. I don’t think that hunger is ever far away from Richard. And then it felt like it was the table and the chair that were giving you that. It was almost like you [Richard] understand the logic of being in that unit, of the table and the chair, but she was dragging you away from it. Into a space you don’t want necessarily to be in but it does make you ask a question (App. D.2.a, par.7, p.126).

Commentary

The ‘unit’ of the table and the chair have already been noted as a focus of attention in the group’s theoretical investigation, as the Site of authority and rationality. At this stage these details still attract the interest of the group and the conception of the objects begins developing, at least theoretically, as the opposite of the chaise-longue as the Site of humanness. Now it seems that it is clearly defined that these two ‘units’ are in a sense the antithesis of what they would have been intended to be or represent in a domestic setting. This is another clash between oppositional ‘units’ of the situation. The Centre of the play is again apparent in this sense, since these two conflicting poles define a new set of a ‘confrontation between surviving and living’ as the Centre of the company defined.

Richard hence brings in the Site A, the Site of the city, as explained already earlier, which is something he takes as an unquestionable fact. Liz on the other hand raises a question provoked by the report of the blinding; she broaches the paradox that exists already in Site A, but which is made invisible by ideology and which, as we will see later, Richard struggles to keep hidden or veiled.

These objects above are not to be conceived of as symbols. They are to be Cathected, and they would therefore be and not ‘stand for’ something, for example rationality and humanness. If in practice they were to be used as symbols, imposing something
on the audience, then a serious problem might arise: the meaning of the object would be provided to the audience, and a crucial personal identification between the audience and the object would be lacking. As the playwright mentioned in his interview when the particular question was addressed:

**Researcher:** Is the chaise-longue standing for humanness and the table for the structure of society or something like that?

**Bond:** Rubbish! (…) That is the way people start thinking. I understand that. [Returning to the question] No because you have to dramatise it. In a way you can say that the chaise-longue does come from the Centre of the play, but what is important is the discrepancy between the two things. That comes from the Centre. They don’t hold together. One is a sleeping place and one is an eating place probably in that house. So they are two sorts of basic elements.

**Researcher:** So it is their relationship that defines them. They are not symbols.

**Bond:** They are never symbols. Symbols are something that I never use. You could say ‘Yes, but it is functioning like a symbol’. I wouldn’t mind but I am not a symbolist in the sense of (inaudible) dramatists would do. In the *War Plays* the soldier gets shot because he won’t pick up the cigarette packet. You could say that it symbolises humans or something like that, but I would say no. What is interesting is the dramatic situation. Because in the end who is the Centre of the play? You! Ultimately that is what it comes down to. But then you may also say the contradictions within you or the contradictions between law and justice in you [my emphasis]. Those things make it possible for the play to get to its Centre. The aid to get to the Centre. But then we have to have the characters moving and those things. (…) So you set up the situation which is in many ways a conventional or recognisable situation, but you have probably altered something in it. So it doesn’t quite run on the rails as it should, but then you put actors in that situation. That means you put the audience in that situation. That is what creates the invisible object. (App. C.2, par.90-93, pp.50-51).

So it is the dramatisation of the objects that makes them ‘become’ the audience and not stand for something, a relation or a contradiction and conflict. An audience’s active personal engagement with the objects, as well as with actions, is very much a desirable effect, an engagement much preferable to imposing a readymade meaning on them. This means that for every member of the audience, the object would be something of their own self that they would fix on. Although meaning attached by the
audience to an object could not be described, since it is not possible to identify it, it
contains by definition the contradictions within the viewer. In a sense these
contradictions relate to the conflict between the self and the social, or in other words,
the gap between the existential and the ontological as it categorically, according to
Bond’s theory, resides in each one of us.

It is worth noting that in a later discussion, Chris Cooper mentioned that in a
conversation with Bond, the playwright conveyed to Cooper his approval of the
relation between the chaise-longue and the table that the group has worked out above

Continuing on 08-09-2009

According to the group’s detailed reading of the second section of the first panel,
which followed next, Richard keeps resisting going into the area Liz has put forward
from the beginning. Furthermore, when Liz eventually mentions the blinding incident
that she read of in the newspaper, he, though recognising that she has a point, turns to
explaining the ‘logic of the city’ (App. D.2.a, par.9-11, p.126). Richard’s voice is
‘filtered through something already’ and in a sense it is the ‘voice of reason’ (App.
D.2.a, par. 57-58, p.130) which tries to explain the incident of the blinding as an
accident: ‘Chriss if there’s bin ‘n accident n’ er kid’s -’ (Bond, 2011:184). He doesn’t
‘want to engage with why’ it happened (App. D.2.a, par.87, p.133) and instead is
trying to interpret the event for Liz (App. D.2.a, par.59, p.130); but above all he
prefers to solve the problem by letting authority deal with it (App. D.2.a, par. 60-62,
p.130) in terms of punishment. In his effort to convince Liz not to be upset about the
incident, he even cautions against believing everything read in the newspapers, since
‘The papers get it wrong. Bad as telly’ (Bond, 2011:184) – something which for the group is another ‘thing of the city’ (App. D.2.a, par.54, p.129).

Liz, on the other hand, tries to understand the event for herself; she doesn’t accept Richard’s explanation, as she insists that ‘It wasn’t n’ accident!’ (Bond, 2011:184). For the director that argument over the causes of the particular crime has to do ‘with the whole set of rational values and the imaginative values crashing together’ (App. D.2.a, par.69-70, p.131 and App.D.2.a, par. 99, p.134).

The clash between Richard’s rational but ideological explanations and Liz’s reluctance to accept them, sustains the presence of the story of the blinding, even as Richard adopts an ‘ultra rational’ attitude in order to normalise it or divest it of its singularity and horror, an attitude bound to conventional ideas of law and justice and conveyed in his corrupted terms. The group has noticed that although Liz is bombarded with ‘reasonable’ arguments, she insists on asking some time to meditate on and understand the event. Consequently she, and the event itself, become ‘implacable’ for Richard, and that causes him to ‘run out of reasons’ and hence to try to ‘stop it’ in ways other than making a reasonable case. He realises that he ‘can’t deal with it rationally’, and reacts rather aggressively to Liz’s insistence on describing it in detail, especially when she seems to ‘have gone into the story literally’ (App. D.2.a, par.80-89, pp.132-139):

Richard All right we don’t need t’ know all the --
Liz It was both eyes.
Richard Stop it !
Liz If she’d done one. If the kid could’ve talk. Tol’ ‘er no no please mummy not two mummy leave one so --
Richard Stop it ! I tol yer t’ stop it!
Liz -- I can see yer face mummy -- she didn’t -- she took the other one with the -- then bang (She slaps her hands on to her face) -- its ‘ands on ‘er face n’ said feel feel yer can still feel mummy’s face -- !
Richard Stop it!
Liz Seein it in me ’ead all afternoon
Richard Stop it! Chriss why’re we arguing bout this? Look, yer read that – it said all that in the paper -- ? (Bond, 2011:185)

This is, according to the director, what forced Richard out of the room in order to find the evidence, the newspaper, which describes the event (App. D.2.a, par.91, p.133). He doesn’t succeed as there is no paper in the flat and he therefore returns to the room. He becomes exhausted by the effort to construct an adequate explanation, but this is nevertheless a point at which he has one of his moments of reflection (App. D.2.a, par.99, p.134). For the director, when Richard is leaning in the doorway is in fact reflecting on his life and the life of the city:

Richard comes back. He leans in the doorway.

Commentary

Again Richard is seen as bringing in the logic of the city, which corresponds to the Site A of the play. He struggles to explain the incident of the blinding in terms of authority and reason. In Lacanian terms, Richard attempts to bring about the foreclosure of the event in defining it through terms provided by a certain ideological vocabulary, which still cannot define or explain it completely. Corresponding also to Bond’s theory, the residue of the event still insists in and retains its reality for Liz, as the group has noticed above, and nullifies the rationality of Richard or even exemplifies the impossibility of describing the event in that rationality’s terms. It is not by chance that it is at this moment that Richard is pushed into a moment of reflection. Consequently, how the actor who plays Richard is going to convey his frustration and inability to describe the event in every scene of the panel becomes of
major importance, because this is one of the possible ways to bring in the Site of the city and the grounds of its conflict which dwells unseen.

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After their reading of the script in detail, the group had a couple of new run-throughs in the light of their previous considerations of the second section of panel one, and then a new reflection on what went on. In their reflection, the members of the group located the points in which they could observe in practice the application of their theoretical suggestions and, moreover, build on new insights on the text (Fieldnotes, 08-09-2009, second session)

In one of the last rehearsals, for example, the actor playing Richard has scooped the bedding like he is holding up a body (see Picture 2) in the middle of the room. That was the first time the actor did this, occupying the middle of the room. (…) The director stopped the walk-through at the point when Richard takes the bedding and goes out of the room. He then stated in regard to this specific action that the actors have started using the space more creatively, but he mainly focused on the spatial relations between the objects (Fieldnotes, 08-09-2009, second part). (For an updated configuration of the room see Picture 1 bellow).
He thought that these relations were made clearer to him, the ‘relationship between the door, the chair and the table’ in particular (App. D.2.a, par.110, p.136), but he didn’t explain what was meant by that, except to note that the chaise-longue looked like Liz was ‘defending it’ (ibid). He also noticed that in the room there was a ‘different dynamic between the door and the middle of the space as opposed to the chair and the table’ and that the space started becoming ‘quite diagrammatic and quite graphic’, something which ‘has the real effect of opening the space out’ (App. D.2.a, par.112, p.136). He again didn’t explain what he meant by that or how this might work for the play.
Commentary

The spatial relations in the room seem to be another central focus for the director. As mentioned already, the configuration of the room and of the objects in it is not created accidentally or arbitrarily: they do have to correspond to the Centre. The interesting point here is that the director seems to seek a graphic form of these relations. Although the director didn’t explain what he meant by the desired graphicness, I would deduce that it has to be demonstrated explicitly how these objects are used by the actors since, as it is noted in the director’s comments, they have started using the space more creatively. The point hence is how these objects are being used and not what they mean already. In a sense this is a kind of solution to the problem raised in the commentary above relating to the use of symbols.

On the other hand the much wanted graphic quality of the actions is immediately connected with creating and delivering the Site of the room to the audience. In a sense this is related to the Site C of Bond’s theory, in which it is the means of conveying Site A and Site B to the audience (Bond, 2000a:10).

Unfortunately at this point the director did not refer to a particular action with an object as an example which could illustrate the developing graphicness of the room, restricting himself rather to general observations.

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Soon after, though, the group again became interested in the scene where Richard is leaning in the doorway. It is the point where Richard comes back into the room after
failing to find the newspaper that Liz told him about, and he is talking about his day out in the city (See Picture 3 bellow).

![Picture 3](image3.png)

**Picture 3**

The director argued again that the leaning, together with Richard’s short speech, ‘made the city much more graphic’ (App. D.2.a, par. 112,114, pp.136-137). He then demonstrated the action in a more graphic fashion (see Picture 4 bellow); he proposed that the actor ‘play with it’ more, and finally suggested that the only means for the actor to find the right way is by ‘doing it’ (App. D.2.a, par.117, p.137).

![Picture 4](image4.png)

**Picture 4**
Chris Cooper then asked the actress playing Liz to be more graphic when her character slaps her own face while dramatising the details of the blinding of the child by his mother for Richard. As he mentioned: ‘We don’t do expressionism, but you have to have that sound [of the slapping]’ (App. D.2.a, par.117, p.137).

In the next run-through, the actor playing Richard took the following position (see Picture 5) when Richard seems exhausted, as the group mentioned above, by his effort to resist the story of the blinding:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liz</th>
<th>It wasn’t an accident.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>I can’t cope with this. Yer need ’elp. Yer bin upset -- now yer makin yerself more upset for nothing ! ‘S mad ! Yer trouble is no one never knocked any sense in t’ yer ! (Slight pause) Was this tart local ? God ‘elp’er if she’s from round ‘ere. She’ll ’ave it comin t’ ’er. The lads wont put up with ’er caper. I’ll give ’em a ‘and. (Bond, 2011:184-185)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Picture 5]

The director stated however that this position made him lose the Site and again demonstrated an alternative one (App. D.2.a, par.119, p.139), one which for him seemed closer to it (see Picture 6 bellow). The particular position exemplifies, according to the director, the attitude toward Liz that could be summed up as: ‘I am really tired of what you are saying’ (ibid).
Commentary

This section offers the first concrete examples of what the director is after in relation to the graphic fashion he desired developed in the panel in order to make the city’s existence present. Whether the specific alternative positions by the director are adequate or not is unimportant. What is important is that the actor needs to find a way to make things more graphic, a way to convey explicitly and adequately the Site of the play. Richard, as mentioned above, is bringing in the Site of the city and his leaning in the doorway while talking about the experience of the city is, presumably, a key scene for accomplishing that. How could someone do that? Perhaps by leaning heavily as though exhausted by the experience of the city, or instead by adopting more macho stance and bearing, as the director proposed? If we take into account Bond’s interview above on the non-use of symbols, it seems that we need recourse to a posture that embodies or suggests contradictory things; and one which could portray an experience commonly recognised by the audience, as the Centre of the play themselves, who as well are carriers of the same contradictions. Any sign, from sound to gesture, needs to
Continuing on 08-09-2009

Later the group started the reading of the last section of panel one in detail, as they did with the second section above. The central points in this process referred to Richard’s effort to occupy the space again and ‘clear the room now to some kind of order’ (App. D.2.a, par.121, p.139-140); this was an effort which, it was commonly agreed, corresponded to a kind of a rational operation aimed at putting order into the room (App. D.2.a, par.125-127, p.140). Ideology and the voice of the city are present, according to the group, through his words, especially when he is offstage after Liz has told him that she is pregnant, and after he has scooped the bedding out and returned to take the fallen pillow out as well (App. D.2.a, par.130, 133, 134, 140, pp.140-141). He then demands that she get rid of the baby, before going off again with the pillow and speaks the words:

*Richard looks at her. She doesn’t react. He goes out with the pillow.*

**Richard** *(Off)* Least thass somethin we don’t ‘ave t’ put up with these days. Go through life with an unwanted brat ‘angin round yer neck. Chriss its quite a day yer set up for me. First the traffic jam. Still smell the stink on the bus. Then the kid in the paper. Wonder she never ‘ad twins ! Now this. -- Go t’ the doctor’s with yer. Case she asks questions. I can explain the financial situation. *(Bond, 2011:186)*

This moment made clearer for the group the notion of a *cordon sanitaire* that is being infected by the city (App. D.2.a, par.141-142, p.141), something Bond suggested in his notes above. When Richard speaks from offstage, according to one member of the group, it approximates a film convention where a character is presented and then a voiceover communicates what he or she is thinking (App. D.2.a, par.130, p.140). The same member wondered if the particular convention is employed in this scene, but in
this case with Richard’s words offstage conceived of as the conscience of the city (App. D.2.a, par.131-134, p.141). In that sense, the member noticed, ‘it feels like it is the voice of the city’ (App. D.2.a, par.141, p.141). The director added that in the particular scene, there ‘is something about the trivialising of it [Liz’s pregnancy] from off which is extraordinary’ (App. D.2.a, par.150, p.142).

The next day (09-09-2009) the group continued their detailed reading of the third section with one of Richard’s longer speeches. Richard becomes aware of Liz’s intention to keep the baby; he asks if she is serious and gradually turns more aggressive. At the same time he is making a case against the idea of keeping the baby since, as he puts it, ‘what use is a kid?’:

Richard  

(...)(Goes to the table. Sits) What use is a kid? Mess n’noise. Snot one end, crap the other end n’ piss all over. Clean up after ’em, break yer back, sacrifice yer life -- so they can grow up n’ blame yer for bringin’em in t’ the world. Always attackin. “Other kids’ve got this, yer never give me nothin.” Well I’m not ’avin some little gangster sponge off me. Kids used t’ support their parents. Now its all want want want gimme gimme gimme n’ the shelves ‘re empty. Kids on the bus today. Don’t need their mobile-this-n’-that: yellin their ‘eads off, they could ‘ear’em alfway round the planet. No consideration yer spent the day lookin for work n’end up with nothing. They ‘ave all the advantages. Few years time when they ‘ave t’fend for theirself they’ll end up on the rubbish ‘eap. (Puts his forearms flat on the table) Don’t want all this. Struggle all me life t’ get a roof over me ’ead. Not sharing it now. Cant afford it. If I could I still wouldn’t. I knew something ’d ‘appen today. Knew by the time it was over things’d be changed. Funny ’ow yer know. Feel it in the pit a yer stomach. . . (Bond, 2011:187)

This speech, for the group, once more brings in the voice of authority and the city (App. D.2.b, par.34-37, pp.148-149). For the director, the particular extract relates to the bed that Liz was trying to make in the beginning of panel one, and it echoes the attitude adopted by Richard’s when he first confronted Liz’s about this (App. D.2.b, par.15, p.146).
The group identified some similarities of Liz to Antigone at this point, on the grounds that both exemplified silence in their responses to authority – Creon and Richard respectively – but which, in its turn, embodies strength (App. D.2.b, par.17, p.146).

The director expressed the particular similarity earlier:

**Director:** I am saying Antigone because that is what she does. She confronts Creon. Blinding the dictator in the only way she can. That is the thing about her, she has to do it. She is going to have a child. She is going to try to understand this story [of the blinding in the newspaper] and understand this other mother [who blinded her kid]. But she actually doesn’t articulate it in Richard’s terms (App. D.2.b, par.11, p.144).

Later the group found a connection between Liz, and the mother who blinded her child, and a general, assumed feeling common to all parents when faced with the possibility of losing their kids and being left alone:

**Director:** (…) I think that every parent goes through a psychological level, however conscious it is, of that fear of losing your child. I don’t mean to death but I mean when they break away from you. Whereas some parents resist that like hell. They never let their kids go. Particularly fathers with daughters. Mothers as well. I think that sense of loss, loneliness, is right in there [in the script] (App. D.2.b, par.27, p.147-148).

This statement prompted the members of the group to identify here a relation to possession and ownership (App. D.2.b, par.28-29, p.148). Richard’s stance meanwhile was connected to another general, commonly assumed attitude of men which uses the argument against having or keeping a child, as Richard does with his shouted argumentation, ‘We can’t afford it’, at Liz’s face (Bond, 2011:187).

Another seemingly important point was that Richard is giving his long speech against the idea of keeping the baby from the place where the table is. For the director, the subject is handled in a ‘knife and fork’ manner by Richard, something which could only be done from the position of the table (App. D.2.b, par.33, p.148), associated earlier with reason and authority. He, according to the director, demonstrates from
this site ‘the logic of how [he] sees the world. This is [his] philosophy’ (ibid) which
again was immediately connected to the city’s voice earlier.

Later in rehearsals, the actor who played Richard sat at the table and gave his speech
with his arms and elbows on the table, a space between them, like he was waiting for
a plate of food (see Picture 7 bellow).

![Picture 7](image)

The director’s feedback on this action was that:

**Director:** It is absolutely right of him sitting there at the table, that irritation in
his being, right the way down to when he finally makes that statement. Then
you [actor playing Richard] put your forearms on the table. It is such a defining
action. But there is nothing there. The table is literally bare. You could see the
security of his most basic need’s been [inaudible: taken? withheld?] from him.
(App. D.2.b, par.44, p.150)

**Commentary**

In this section the group is following the same procedure and principles as before in
approaching their work. Richard’s role is totally suffused with ideology, and now
clearly becomes the city’s mouthpiece, as its voice invades the room. On the other
hand, Liz is identified as the ‘Antigone’ of the play, her silence as a sign of strength
and a challenge to authority and the city. She has become, as the director argued
above, the implacable for Richard.

The group has identified some points in the play through which their particular
considerations could be worked out, and which serve to define or construct the Site.
The most important of these was the scene where Richard sits at the table and
articulates his argument against the idea of keeping the baby. Again the whole
attention was drawn to how this should be staged, i.e. the manner of his sitting. As the
director argued, the action is a defining one, likely meaning that it is definitive for
building the Site A. In the second interview with the director, he mentioned that this
particular scene, through how Richard sits at the table, offers an opportunity for
revealing the Invisible Object; hence it is another potential Drama Event (App. C.1.b,
par.14-24, p.18-19).

The image that was created (see Picture 7 above) seems interesting given what is
happening. Waiting to be served, Richard seems a person always hungry, expecting to
be fed in the same fashion as an infant. His open arms and the slight leaning over the
table, together with his rather ‘lost’ gazing into space may indicate a person
confronting a dead-end, a confrontation made more intense by the bareness of the
table. Is this a kind of a gap that is opened by the inability to explain the event or
adequately confront the situation, a gap which is intended to be reified in the scene as
the frustration of his expectations for ‘food’? If this is so the above scene, although it
seems to hold little in the way of an immediate link to matters of ideology, attempts to
objectify an abstract concept via an everyday, commonly recognised situation. Certainly the above image does illustrate rather graphically a cancellation or frustration of expectation, though there is no way, at the moment, we could identify how it is going to be perceived by an audience.

It has to be noted additionally that the group sought to connect Liz’s and Richard’s attitude towards the baby to a more general one which is assumed present to a degree in how most parents may react to the prospect of losing their children. The point here is that the particular assumption may be part of a the wider social context, what we could consider as our social Site, something the group still keeps in mind for further enrichment of the drama; I might note, however, that the above theory didn’t seem to be entirely justified.

Continuing on 09-09-2009

The director then asked the group to go through an exercise on the first panel as a whole. They had to follow the text and the stage directions, but they were instructed to make the sheets of the bedding ‘the pivotal axis in the struggle between’ Liz and Richard (App. D.2.b, par.45, p.150). Chris Cooper’s guidelines for the exercise were:

It is following the stage directions; but if for example he [the actor playing Richard] goes and takes them off, then you [actress playing Liz] can, in your own time, go and get them and retrieve them and put them back. You may start putting them back on there [onto the chaise-longue] but then Richard might start taking them back again. It is doing the play but it is not doing the play. I want the words and I want the stage directions but I want the fight over these [the sheets]. These are the site of humanness. This is your [Liz’s] nest. If you like, when they are in your [Richard’s] hands, let’s say it is necessity; when they are in your [Liz’s] hands, it is freedom. (App. D.2.b, par.49, p.150)
In their improvisation some of the images that the two actors produced were\(^7\): Richard and Liz struggle for the bedding while they argue about the reliability of the newspaper article. Richard is on the floor trying to keep the sheets (see Picture 8).

![Picture 8](image)

Richard manages to recover the sheets and is folding them tidy, but then covers Liz tenderly with one of them and speaks about life having to go on. He then argues that Liz needs some help, and that she becomes upset for no reason (see Pictures 9 and 10).

![Picture 9](image)

\(^7\) For a fuller account of their particular exercise see App. D.2.b, par. 52, pp.150-158
In the ensuing discussion the director noted that the actors managed to get into the Centre ‘in terms of what is at stake. The two completely different things became explicit; the two stories, the two arguments …’ (App. D.2.b, par.53, p.159). Additionally the director argued that most of the tension in their improvisation took the form of suffocating by Richard, in his trying to change the meaning of the sheet into something that suits him, like ‘I am trying to drape it in the logic of the city’ (ibid). The exercise made the other members of the group realise that Richard actually owns nothing, not even himself, (App. D.2.b, par.56, p.159), and that he is consequently a naked oppressor: when his nakedness is recognised by Liz, then there is a point at which she ‘stops arguing with him. He has gone [she has excluded him from her life], and he doesn’t even know it’ (App. D.2.b, par.58, p.159).

**Commentary**

Beyond the rehearsals which could be included in some sense in an experiential approach, this exercise is one of the few not based on discussion and theoretical
analysis. I have chosen to present this specific one not only because of what it generated in terms of how the group understands the situation of the play, but also because of what the experience might have contributed to how the actors thought of the play.

In the present study I have come to consider that the basic pivot of Bondian practice in theatre relates to how we can create the conditions for the actors to enact the situation that will bring in the audience as well. As mentioned before, Enactment was mistakenly excluded from the initial list of the most important Bondian elements. If this is so, a similar attention to Enactment should be part of drama in classrooms.

Considered in this light, the particular exercise likely aided the actors in experiencing the situation, rather than simply talking about it. Their improvisation was certainly not an Enactment, because it escaped the logic or the realism of the situation, but it could be seen as a stepping stone towards it. Of course the acuity of the results presumably stemmed from the work done till now; but the point is, as the director commented above, they managed to enter the Centre of what is at stake here. Moreover they managed to bring out a side of Richard that was hidden until now: they saw that in his conscious identification with the city, he has ended up owning nothing, not even himself. This is, I think, a profound insight that may to some degree approximate the Invisible Object.

Continuing on 09-09-2009

The next exercise was for the two actors playing in the first panel to watch the director and another actor performing their roles. As the director said, the purpose of this exercise was for him to understand the play from the inside and for the actors to
have an outside view of the panel. After the end of the exercise there was further reflection on what went on. (Fieldnotes, 09-09-2009).

The most interesting comment in the following discussion was that the Site of the space, the relationships of ‘things to each other’, didn’t seem vital; hence the emotion dominated the room rather than the space itself. One of the actors, having watched the scene, specifically argued that although the emotion of the journey in the room is necessary he had felt ‘a little alienated from this space’, and couldn’t read the ‘graphic’ of it (App. D.2.b, par.65-67, p.160). For example, pacing the room for the sake of it does not attain the required effect (App. D.2.b, par.73, p.161). The actor then concluded that it is ‘worth trying out how much you can do’ from the door for the role of Richard (ibid).

Commentary

The interesting point to make here concerns the possible relation between the space and the emotion generated in the audience. They don’t seem to be excluding each other in Big Brum’s work, but the graphicness of the room seems to be of greater importance. In their words, the group wants not the emotion but the space to dominate the work, even where the emotion may be present and perceived simultaneously. Unfortunately, again, the actor who made the comment did not offer a specific example of where he felt the alienation from the space. He did however imply that actions need to be performed with a concern for the character’s relation to the room, and follow the logic of it. In a sense he is referring to the Site of the room which imposes its logic on every choice made in there by the actors.

Continuing on 09-09-2009
It has to be noted that in the rehearsal procedure the company frequently devoted time to understanding the immediate or hidden reasons behind the actions of the characters, or the grounds of their decisions. For example, there was a question about whether Liz knew that she was pregnant before her first interaction with Richard (App. D.2.a, par.22-23, p.127), or whether her claims reflected her desire to get him out of the house (App. D.2.a, par.32-34, p.128). Similarly, the group wondered about the presence of Richard in the flat generally. They argued, for example, that he seems often absent from the flat and that he merely stays rather than lives there; in that case, it is likely he doesn’t have to pay the bills or keep the flat tidy (App. D.2.b, par.22-24, p.147).

In relation to the room, the group also assumed that it is a space that it is rarely used by the couple, and that consequently it lacks any sense of cultivated domesticity; the couple never sit and eat around the table, for example (App. D.2.b, par.25-27, pp.147-148). In another case, it was suggested that when Richard leaves the room after his long speech about ‘What use is a kid?’ he does so not only because he runs out of rational explanations but also because:

**Director:** (…) it is connected logically with the handbag. She has told you [Richard] that the handbag is by the fridge. So ‘I am going to take what I can’, which is what always he does. I think that story [Liz’s pregnancy] in your [inaudible: mind?] must give you the right to go and take the handbag, ‘because of this then I have to do this. This is always what I have to do, this is why I always have to rob you and take what I can. I give you nothing. And only if you could see that then I wouldn’t have to do it. And that is where I am in the world.’ So Richard then of course he is off, he goes. (App/D.2.b, par.37, pp.148-149)

**Commentary**

What the company has tried to do with these questions is to clarify the logic of the
situation and then attend to it in their choices. They went as far as creating back-
stories for the objects in the room, as well as for the actions of the couple. In that
sense, they don’t exclude the realism of the Story; rather they endeavour to create a
readable one for the audience. The clarity of the situation is closely related to the
clarity of the Story that Bond is after in his plays. So in Big Brum’s practice, this
element is carefully cultivated; it could be argued that the logic of the situation and
the Site of the play, of the Site B in particular, are interrelated, not to say overlapping,
because all the above observations of the group could illuminate either of the two.

Rehearsal phase: Day 8 (10-09-2009), Day 9 (11-09-2009), Day 10 (14-09-2009),
Day 11 (15-09-2009) and Day 12 (16-09-2009): Rehearsing Panel Two

The group continued working on the second panel of the play in a manner similar to
the approach to panel one; they divided it into smaller sections and analysed the text
in between rehearsing the panel. So there was an ongoing discussion and rehearsing
of extracts from the text (Fieldnotes, 10-09-2009).

The main points of their discussion found initial focus in the detection of a parallel
development in panels one and two. The second panel seemed to have moved from
the social Site to the self Site, but ‘it has gone through a transition of ownership too’
(App. D.2.c, par.1, p.163). Liz has turned away from herself as she was presented in
panel one (App. D.2.c, par.66, p.169), having moved from the site of the chaise-
longue to the site of the table and the door that were occupied by Richard; in fact, the
group noted, she now often speaks ‘Richard’s words’ (App. D.2.c, par.3-5, p.163).
The argument that started up between Liz and Richard in the first panel, and the
tension it caused, is continued in the second panel; now, however, it is between the
mother and the son, and is transformed into a dispute that, on the surface, is concerned
with how Dan is judging Liz’s addiction (App. D.2.c, par.9, p.164). The challenge that Liz represented to Richard in the first panel, Dan now represents to Liz in a different form. In a sense, Liz occupies the role and even spatial position of Richard, whereas Dan occupies a similar position to that occupied by Liz in the first panel.

The group noted several features which support this view. When, for example, Liz realises that Dan is wounded, she reacts in much the same way Richard did in panel one when Liz related to him the story of the blinding which tormented her (App. D.2.c, par.55, p.168). So when Dan reveals his wound to her, she uses the same words as Richard did previously. ‘Liz: This place! I can’t cope with any more a’ it!’ (Bond, 2011:189); Richard in the first panel had also complained about the place as, articulating his frustrations in the phrase: ‘I cant cope with this.’ (Bond, 2011:185). In other instances, Liz gets irritated in the same way Richard did (App. D.2.c, par.73, p.170); she tries to manipulate Dan as Richard did with her (App. D.2.c, par.61, p.61), and even speaks with the voice of the city (App. D.2.f, par. 9-10, p.175). Thus it is almost as if his corruption ‘was passed onto her’ (App. D.2.c, par.5, p.163); but Liz can be said to be even more corrupted now than Richard was before (App. D.2.c, par.61, p.169). For example in the beginning of the panel she can’t even speak openly about what she wants, or admit that she merely wants to take the drug, to shoot up (App. D.2.c, par. 23, p.165), where Richard bluntly but honestly articulated his immediate desires, to eat or take money from her handbag (App. D.2.c, par.63, p.169). Instead she makes a pretence of maternal concern for Dan, ‘when actually what she is doing is the absolute opposite’; again this is similar to when Richard pretended that there was a sincere and ongoing relationship between the couple (App. D.2.c, par.5, p.163). Thus when she first enters the room and sees Dan, her line is: ‘O ‘ello luv. Thought I ’eard yer. What kept yer ? Bin with yer mates?’ For the group this was a
rather hypocritical reaction, one which tried to conceal the fact that her first concern is for the drug that Dan left on the table before she came in. She glances at it but does not take it immediately, as the stage directions indicate (Bond, 2011:188).

For the group, consequently, Liz is deemed manipulative in a room where manipulation is everything (App. D.2.c, par.7, p.163). Later, for example, she uses the word ‘dear’ in a effort to appear solicitous when she addresses Dan (App. D.2.c, par.40-43, p.167); or she asks Dan why he doesn’t take his jacket off, again out of a concern we sense is almost wholly feigned; later still she will hypocritically get upset when Dan reveals that he keeps a cosh:

Dan     Got a cosh. If there’s bother I --
Liz     A cosh ? One yer --?. . . Whass goin t’ ‘appen t’ us? I don’t see any way out! -- nowhere t’ turn. . . Sometimes I wish I’d never bin born --. (Bond, 2011:190)

Further, when Dan’s wound is eventually revealed, she reacts with: ‘O god! --Yer sit there n’ let me talk ‘bout my troubles --. (Puts packet on table) Its got t’ be wash.’ (Bond, 2011:190); she then starts complaining that there are no bandages in the house and brings the sheet to tear in order to create some. For the group, she is once more ‘indulging in an I-am-a-good-mother fantasy’ (App. D.2.c, par.68, p.170); she seems to have ‘different selves to activate, and she keeps falling back into different roles’ (App. D.2.c, par.65, p.169).

Commentary

The observation that Liz in the second panel occupied a similar position to Richard in the first seems very helpful for clarifying and exploring the process from now on. It is interesting that in stage directions for the beginning of the second panel, there are no
changes in the room, despite the fifteen years elapsed since Richard left it. Although identical to the first panel, in relation to its configuration, the room has changed with regard to the positions that the characters occupy. The situation is nevertheless rather similar: there is a corrupted person, Liz, and a person closer to innocence, Dan, engage in an argument, exactly as happened in panel one. The argument, though it has a different ground, reflects, as did that between Richard and Liz, the Site of the city and its effects on these two people.

From this perspective, the second panel accommodates conflicts just as panel one did, and develops them in another form that could still be familiar to audiences. It is the relationship between a mother and her child that the majority of us could identify with; but through this relation the Site of the city continues to be made visible, as the group notes in the next section.

It also must be noted that, although the group did not signal it, a mother’s asking of her child that he provides her with drugs is an Extreme situation, one which is bringing the audience closer to the Bondian Extreme. A question to be posed here, however, is whether the extremity of the situation could alienate the audience, in causing them to resist the spectacle of a deeply corrupted mother and therefore become very critical toward her – to the point of rejecting completely the idea of seeing themselves in the situation.

I think however that the foundations allowing the particular extremity to connect with an audience’s imagination ought to have been laid in the first panel. The story of the blinding that Liz read in the newspaper describes another mother led by her love and concern for her child to take its eyes out. Of course, though this act is also Extreme, it
is not presented but only reported on stage; it took place outside, and for that reason exists at a safe remove from the direct or experienced action of the play. It could still prepare the audience for later acceptance of a subsequent extremity which is now within the room. As the new Extreme situation enters the room, and the lives of Liz and Dan, it may resonate more immediately with an audience because of the groundwork laid in the first panel.

Hence although the extremity of the two events is of comparable severity, the first one remains at a remove from the room, entering it only in verbal form. This description is doubtless graphic, but it is revealed in segments rather than all at once, somewhat diluting its extremity. In fact it is in the second panel that the specific event obtains its most graphic form, as Liz is describes it in even more explicit details: ‘She carried its eyes t’ the toilet. They was in a saucer. ’Ad to, ’ad to. The eyes said no mummy not the toilet. Not the water. She flushed ’em down the toilet with its tears’ (Bond, 2011:194). The point is that although the Extreme is an element to consider for drama work, Bond’s play seems to build to it gradually, in carefully handled stages, rather than immersing the audience in it from the very beginning. In that sense ensuing events are related to and dependent upon preceding ones, to the point that the whole experience of the play is threatened if each of the events is not efficiently presented. Obviously such an observation suggests an abiding concern for the coherence of a dramatic work’s structure.

Continuing rehearsal process

As the group noted, the Site that was built in the first panel, the social Site, is still present in the second panel; the wound that Dan bears means he bears on his body the mark of the city itself (App. D.2.c, par.11, p.164). Later the group added that the city,
in its turn, has ‘contaminated the area completely’ (App. D.2.h, par.2, p.186). We learn that was Dan’s friend Arnie, a trusted mate, who stabbed him:

Dan Arnie. Yer know Arnie! ‘E comes with me when we buy the --. Two a’ us in case --.On the way back ‘e asked for the lot. Tried t’ grab it. ‘E ‘as t’ give ‘is girl -- ’arf is family. ‘E was high. Tell ‘im not t’ take nothin when we’re out. No one listens. Wouldnt give ‘is knife on me. (His voice sinks) No police. (Squeezes bloody water from the cloth) Me mate did this t’ me. (Bond, 2011:191).

This event made Dan reflect on his world as a place where ‘no one listens’, and which feels ‘more and more suffocating’ (App. D.2.d, par.2, p.172). Hence Dan’s wound, together with the story of the blinding from the first panel, is the event on which the tension of the panel is focused.

After Liz has taken her dose off from the room, she returns and continues ripping the sheet up for bandages, while there is a dialogue between the two:

Liz (She tears more strips from the sheet) Please don’t argue with me. . .let me enjoy the benefit after yer took the risk. . . (She tears more slowly)
Dan I don’t do yer any good.
Liz Yer do. If I could give it up it’d be ‘cause yer ask me to.
Dan Im not fetchin anymore.
Liz (Giggles) Yer said that before. Yer only sayin it now cause yer bin scratch.

(Bond, 2011:193)

The director then pondered the logic of the particular situation:

Director: (…) And then he says ‘I don’t do yer any good.’ and she says ‘Yer do. If I could give it up it’d be ’cause yer ask me to.’ I must admit I am trying to follow the logic of that and I am finding that more difficult. I can follow the logic of the others. He says ‘I don’t do any good’ and you can see it because she is literally tearing their life to shreds before his eyes. So I can see why he says that. But she says ‘Yer do. If I could give it up it’d be ’cause yer ask me to’. What she is getting at there?
R: Isn’t that what the infantile parent does though, makes it the child’s problem that they are infantile? When the parent becomes the child they actually blame the child.
O: She puts the responsibility on him.
R: She says ‘all you got to do is to ask me to give it up and I will do it’.
**Director:** But he already said that. I can’t quite follow the logic of that. I suppose she is saying ‘you do do me good because I love you but at the same time you can’t do me any good because this is unalterable. So if I could give it up it would be for you’. And then he says ‘I am not fetching any more’ and she says ‘you said that before, you are only saying it now because you are scratched’. Do you thing he asked that [not fetching drugs] before? He must have done. That is the harshness of the hostility. ‘It is a scratch’ and actually it is the wound that brings the city into the room, that is making her just as the baby inside her. Now she is reducing it to a scratch. It is hostile to him. How often these things have been said and is it different this time and if it is different this time what is it that is making it different?

**O:** It’s got to be the cut.

**Director:** Yes! And the fact that Arnie…

**O:** It is the cut, Arnie, the sheet all over the floor… it depends what it looks like.

**Director:** I think that Arnie is ‘my mate did this to me’. The infection has spread everywhere now in his life [Dan’s life]. (...) So the wound makes the difference, but she then says it is only a scratch. (...) (App. D.2.f, par.36-44, p.178).

On the other hand the story of the blinding is still present in this panel since, according to the director, it is one event that is tormenting Liz. The story is in fact the city’s story, but captured imaginatively, since there is no way ‘that the newspaper could have said all the things she has said’ about it when she described it – first in the details given Richard, and later when she makes the speech where she mentions that ‘She carried its eyes t’ the toilet. They was in a saucer. ‘Ad to, ’ad to. The eyes said no mummy not the toilet. Not the water. She flushed ’em down the toilet with its tears.’ (Bond, 2011:194). So for the group the particular story did not only capture her imagination, but keeps giving her ‘jagged flashes’ (App. D.2.h, par.3, p.186).

**Commentary**

Although the group had a lot of work done on the Site in the previous panel, the concept still commands their attention. Even if the approach to the first panel was occupied largely with defining the social Site, Site A, the group keeps identifying its presence in the Site of the self, which the second panel is supposed to be, and its
influence on Liz’s and Dan’s selves. By this time, however, the social Site has contaminated everything around them; the most interesting point is that it is brought into view by a physical mark, Dan’s wound. As was seen above, the group concluded that Dan’s wound, created by his mate Arnie, is the catalyst that made him see his present condition differently. In a sense what makes the particular argument between Liz and Dan different from any other that might have occurred in the past is Dan’s realisation of the immediate pervasiveness of corruption in his own life; he comes to this realisation through the wound which makes him refuse to bring any more drugs for his mother.

There are some interesting comments made in the discussion which brought the group to its conclusion above. First of all it seems that the members of the company devote a lot of time to clarifying the logic of the situation they are looking at. As with the example of Dan’s wound the director, as well as the other members, often address an issue that relates immediately to the logic of the scene they are exploring. In this particular example, the discussion started with a question about one of Liz’s lines which initially didn’t make sense to the director, and concluded in creating a backstory of sorts for Liz and Dan. The story of the blinding and the wound are in essence the motivating events for the two characters, proven of fundamental importance for both since both seem to touch or bring to the fore issues which haunt the characters.

It is worth noting that throughout the treatment of panel two the director and the rest of the group frequently addressed similar questions concerning why a character is doing or saying something, hoping in that way to ‘get the logic’ (App. D.2.f, par.26, p.177) of any situation in the play.
This practice of addressing questions raised by the text is not something extraordinary, of course, since most theatre production does work this way. The difference here is that the group is working toward understanding and creating the logic of the play, and their consequent choices in performance prioritise the Site as they have defined it and not some psychological conditions of the characters. The wound as well as the story of the blinding are seen as part of the Site A, and not as events created by coincidence or by psychology alone. I wouldn’t argue though that the characters are deprived of any psychology, but that their psychology is conceived or theorised only in immediate relation to the Site A in the group’s approach.

Dan came to a point of no return with the incident with his best mate, Arnie, and Liz is still haunted by the story of the blinding. These things are not explained by the group with reference to psychology, for example that Liz was since birth a very sensitive woman, or that Dan is a responsible teenager with a deep faith in friendship. As Edward Bond (in Davis, 2005) argued, ‘Site and situation replace the reduction to character’; this is because ‘Concentration on characteristics obscures the wider situation on site’ (p.87).

Another interesting dimension of the above extract from the production process is the form that the Site A is taking in this panel, especially in regard to the wound. This is a visible corporeal mark that cannot be disregarded, and one would assume that this visibility by itself tends toward, or draws the viewer toward, the Extreme. The Extreme now is made palpable and experienced directly on the body.

I am also assuming that there is a comparable development for Liz in regard the story of the blinding. This is the first time that the event is described in such graphic detail;
I would think that this heightens its extremity for Liz, and like Dan’s wound might be expected to provoke visceral reactions in an audience. The group interpreted the intensification of the description as Liz capturing the event imaginatively; but the crucial point is that they recognised that the event keeps giving her ‘jagged flashes’ – another term used by the director, which is related to the sort of Damascene conversion that was invoked in work at the exploration phase (Day 2, 02-09-2009, second session).

This comment is very important because it raises the idea of Accident Time in relation to Liz. The felt Extreme creates the conditions for Accident Time in Bond’s theory, and it is possible the ‘jagged flashes’ are the effects of it. In that sense, perhaps Dan’s ‘jagged flash’ was produced by the bodily experience of the wound at the moment it was inflicted, and it was this that made him decide to change his life. The same effect is perhaps expected in the audience as well.

Continuing rehearsal process

In Day 11, (15-09-2009), second session, when the actress playing Liz was rehearsing the speech delivered while Dan is sleeping onto the chaise-longue, and Liz is led to mount the chair to hang herself, the director noticed a fundamental change in her actions from previous rehearsals. The particular scene contains one of the points where Liz regresses, moving from caring for Dan to trying to convince him to take drugs, or accusing and being aggressive to him: [Liz] ‘(Lifts the cover) Asleep. Drop off like a child Thass all ’e is, a child. (She walks away) I know where yer get the money. Yer not discoin when yer say. Yer out on the street muggin some poor sod so yer mum can --.’ (Bond, 2011:194). The actress at this point walked away from the
chaise-longue where Dan was asleep and went to the left front side of the room (see the red circle and the arrow in Picture 2 bellow).

The director commented then that he felt that the actress was ‘beginning to find’ her ‘way around the site’ (App. D.2.g, par.7, p.182).

The text continues with: ‘One day it wont be yer arm. *(She goes back to shake him awake. Instead she wrings her hands over his head.*) Don’t go. Don’t go. If yer don’t go I’ll ’ave t’ stop it ! Don’t go!’ (Bond, 2011:194); here the actress moved close to the chaise-longue and performed the actions called for by the stage directions (see Picture 2 bellow).
The director then added that in this way the actress ‘allowed us the time to come back to him and you did this thing with your hands. It was almost like a prayer.’ (App. D.2.g, par.9, p.184). The discussion that followed the director’s comments developed in the following fashion:

**Director:** (...)So you have gone from trying to entice him, then trying to show that you are not actually like the other mothers, you are decent, to then trying to entice him again, to then saying ‘look, I have my shame at least I never did this to you or this to you’. Then you go back to ‘he is asleep. He is just a kid, he is just a kid’ but then you are starting to blame him almost. I don’t know if that was the quality of the shift.

**R:** It might have been, yes.

**Director:** That sort of ‘I know where you are getting your money from…’ And then you came back and pleaded ‘don’t go, don’t go …’. You went at the table and that was real anger in the ripping up [of the sheet]. ‘Yer ’ate me! See it in yer eyes! Yer think its luv! Its ‘ate. Yer don’t know the difference -- yer too young. Yer father ‘d teach yer.’ [the next words spoken by Liz] had real venom I thought. ‘Your father run away, your father will teach you about hate and confuse it with love’ is actually ‘your father knows about all that’. And she was tearing [the sheet].

**R:** That is a hot line ‘Don’t go. Don’t go. If yer don’t go l’ll ‘ave t’ stop it! Don’t go!’

**Director:** At first we thought that it was ‘don’t leave, don’t leave’. But if the logic of it is ‘don’t go to fetch it’ [the drug for her] then ‘I’ll have to stop’. It is actually pleading for him to stay in the house as opposed to ‘don’t go’. At first we were interpreting it as a kind of begging … because he said he wants to get his own life back. But if you read it like that [like don’t go fetching] it has more logic. ‘If you don’t go I’ll have to stop because I won’t have any. So don’t go’.
And she gets no response which is why [she turns to] ‘he hates me’. ‘You hate me because you go and fetch me. You think you are doing it for love but it is not. You don’t know the difference, your dad can teach you that’.

R: Isn’t it like ‘don’t go… if you don’t go I will have to stop’? (…)

**Director:** That is another interesting interpretation. How does that relate to the wringing of the hands?

L: I have no idea.

**Director:** You use the phrase ‘hand wringing’ when people are anxious and frightened and very worried.

L: It could be [that] she likes to wring his neck.

(Pause)

**Director:** That is another interesting point, isn’t it? (Pause) The hand wringing will tell us a lot. (App. D.2.g, par.9-15, pp.183-185)

According to the director Liz is tormented in this panel by the story of the blinding as well as by her addiction, which is the city itself, and by the contrast between Dan’s innocence and the city and her addiction (App. D.2.h, par.3, p ?). His refusal to bring drugs to his mother again, his innocence, is what made Liz come very close to blinding him, and ‘that is why we have to see that’ (App. D.2.h, par.3, p.186). The story of the blinding and Dan’s wound are both there, and it is between these two that Liz is finally ‘torn apart’ (App. D.2.h, par.7, pp.187-188).

**Commentary**

This is the beginning of a scene that is of great interest for this study, as it was defined in the exploration phase as a possible Drama Event. The process is in one way not very different from what has been described above, and I think that most of the comments to be made could approximate previous commentaries; the group still works at finding the logic of the situation, for every piece of action and word of the text, in accordance with the Site. Liz exists in an Extreme situation, between Dan’s wound, his innocence and the story of the blinding, which ultimately tears her apart.
Another concern that emerged in the course of the company’s work on the play was whether the actors devoted enough time to experiencing the situation, or to finding their way around the Site of the play during rehearsals. This ‘experiencing’ of the Site is what was noted by the director in relation to the actress’s actions. It seems that the ultimate aim of the company is for the actors to experience the events; this experience is immediately connected to the Enactment of the situation. If this scene is to be developed into a Drama Event, it seems that Enacting the situation is of fundamental importance. The director seemed pleased with the actress’s rehearsal, feeling she had begun to ‘find her way around the site’, something that seemed to be the beginning of experiencing it in terms of Enactment. The question that arises, then, is how Enacting is made possible for the actress in this sequence.

As the long process we have detailed to this point may have illustrated, the group bases their work around discovering the Site of the play, mostly through alternation between discussing and analysing the text and then rehearsing it. In this process, understanding the Site and the logic of the situation is the initial step, incorporating but developing the Centre which the director might give and which is closely connected to the Site A. So understanding the Site is of primary importance for the company in terms of creating the conditions for Enactment to take place.

It might be questioned whether understanding the Site by talking about it is the right way to go, especially if we take into account the experiencing quality that Enactment demands, as well as, as Bond’s theory suggested in the literature review, the already ‘corrupted’ nature of language in terms of understanding something. The alternation between talking and rehearsing is the company’s working model for this production; but could the rehearsing part be regarded as an experiencing at least to some extent?
The particular extract above does provide us with a hint, since the actress started ‘finding her way around the site’ while she was rehearsing; however if rehearsing could be amounted to experiencing would require considerable further exploration which, although very interesting, is not of an immediate interest for this study.

Continuing rehearsal process

I think it is essential to present here the director’s approach to the particulars of the second panel, as he offered it at the beginning of the Day 12 (16-09-2009), first session, as a recapitulation of the aims for the group’s work.

In his approach, the second panel is in essence in two halves. The first relates to Liz’s ‘itch’ for drugs and Dan’s story about his wound that was caused by his best mate, Arnie. After Dan’s experience on the streets, the director stated that he is absolutely convinced that Dan is persuaded to stop bringing drugs to his mother. This is Dan’s innocence emerging, and this is why Liz thinks of blinding him (App. D.2.h, par.3, p.186).

In this first half, Liz is like a terrified child faced with ‘this rather parental/judgemental figure of her son’, in whom she recognises innocence. Although she is playing the role of the mother at that stage, she is manipulative and is not truly immersed in the maternal role in the scene at the table where she attempts to dress Dan’s wound. She is clumsy and spills the bowl of water, and she then uses this accident as an opportunity to go off and shoot up the drugs. In a sense the first half is about someone who is trying to deny what she is, who tries to ‘dress it up with’ a pretence of motherly care (App. D.2.h, par.4, p.187).
But the drug, according to the director, heightens the extreme of her behaviour (App. D.2.h, par.6, p.187). In the second half of the panel after Liz re-emerges, there are four distinct states which she oscillates between:

**Director:** ... it is the imaginative row which is the story’s reality, it is the manipulative/persuasive role play. There is the jagged flashes in which she sees herself and then there is the edge of the universe which is the difficult one. (App. D.2.h, par.6, p.187)

It seems that the second half of the panel starts when Liz comes back into the room, after having shot up offstage; according to the stage directions, she comes back in the room looking serene, but continues to tear strips from the sheet. According to the director, Liz’s serenity is only an outer expression which ‘in a funny way just heightens her awareness of reality’; this serenity is contrasted with the tearing of the sheet which is ‘part of the self, as she is doing it’ (ibid).

The decisive turn in the situation is prompted by Dan’s refusal to continue providing her with drugs. His general attitude to Liz is different this time from any other in the past, owing to his experience of betrayal by his mate Arnie. Dan is asserting himself and trying to regain his life; this assertion is taken by Liz as an intolerable judgement, because she has ‘never experienced that pain like that’ (App. D.2.h, par.7, p.188). Liz then has to work this out. She realises that the solution of blinding a child is not right or, as the director mentioned: ‘what the mother [the mother of the blinding incident] is doing in order to love and protect the child she [Liz] recognises as a lie, because it is better to know yourself’ (App. D.2.h, par.8, p.188). This is why Liz places the chair in the middle of the room and prepares to commit suicide, thereby giving Dan his life back:

**Director:** This is why she then transforms the space by stepping into the edge of the universe, by brusquely, as the stage direction says, thumping the chair down. It is like splitting the atom. Bang! And the room just goes [imitates an
eruption]. It’s reacted of course because the chair is the self site in the city, it is balancing on the edge of, above the universe. So the city is lost, it is dead. That is the big death in this panel, the city is dead to them both. It is dead to her because it is killing her and it is dead to him because you know it will kill you. (ibid)

Liz moves from the existential to the ontological and the ‘chair enacts for her a return to an elemental self’ which is ‘life made living’, the ‘ultimate extreme’ (App. D.2.h, par.9, p.188). From atop the chair she can engage with the whole of the universe. In a sense Liz is given birth a second time through her death, by giving Dan his life back again.

In Bond’s notes, what Liz does with her hands on the chair when she tries to ‘hitch it overhead’ (Bond, 2011:195) is a play within a play. For this comment the director mentioned that:

**Director:** She can see everything from the top of the chair. Not from her narcotic high. It is a real view of the world but actually it is a point of which she can engage with the whole universe. I think that is why he [Bond] says that her hands are like a play within a play. It starts with wanting to wring his [Dan’s] neck but actually her hands wring her own neck. And they [her hands] are going through so much work even when you [Liz] are serene and calm until you see the truth. (…) That is the play within the play I think. This is a thing that I found interesting, it is almost like she is seeing with her hands. (…) It is almost like she has been dispossessed by what her eyes see, but what her hands see is the possession. So she is seeing with her hands right to the point where she can see him, she can’t touch him, and then she can shape everything through what she does with her hands. So it is a different kind of seeing. But I think, what Edward [Bond] is saying in his notes again, this is the absolute image of a woman giving birth to death. That is what is happening on the top of the chair. (App. D.2.h, par.9, p.188)

Later, as a reflection on director’s comments, there was an interesting dialogue between the director and one member of the group which led to further clarifications of the use of the sheet by Liz, the configuration of the room and the relationship of the objects within it. I am quoting the biggest part of their discussion because I think it is central to understanding the approach of the group for the whole procedure:
R: Can I just check? What you were saying about the ripping [of the sheet] is that in the creation of the self, because she is destroying herself in order to create herself? Is that what you were saying?

Director: I think what I am saying is that it is a duality. That is why he [Dan] can see so clearly that she is actually tearing herself or sentencing herself to death. But it [the tearing of the sheet] is also contradictory because it is a kind of an almost impulse action that started out in a role play about bandages but then became something else. It also gives her a kind of calmness through which she will begin to use her hands to see rather than what she cognitively takes on board. This is what I am saying with she begins to see through her hands. I was trying to make sense of that [he wrings his hands].

R: So it is more of a kid’s play. The appearance of a play but actually for them they are marking their way in the world. I am not saying it is a game, I am saying it is a serious play!

Director: It is only a game in the way he [Bond] talks about life being a game in his notes. That is what I am saying by seeing in a completely different way.

R: That is what kids do. They are actually engaged with the creation of themselves through their engagement in the world. That is what she is doing. They [kids] manipulate the use of objects. (…)

Director: I think that if we have a kind of framework one thing that would really free you [the actress playing Liz] is to get a sense of this as a journey that I can understand as a map in the space that I can refine and develop but it also means I can start stop being [inaudible] by the text. (…) So what I thought was to provide that space dramatically for us. If we were to accept the following as the ground rules and then we will break through. I am also offering this to [the actors playing Richard and Dan] as well. So this is a development of the discussion we had the day before about the space. So there is the Centre which is the edge of the universe. It will be enacted by the chair. People do not transgress that, certainly not until the third panel. If I understand black holes properly it is almost like this spot in the middle. In the third [panel three] it becomes the whole room, it kind of turns inside out. So rather than being this area here [shows at the middle of the room] it is like mutually everything is in it. So literally Dan himself becomes the site of Radical Innocence but Richard is part of that, the chaise-longue is part of that, the table, the chair, everything is part of the totality of the meaning. But at this stage in one and two [panels one and two] we know Richard’s journey, I think this is accurate from the work we have done with one [panel one], is located around here [he points at the area around the table]. Utilitarian, the functional, the kitchen table, the food, the relationship to the city and ‘my need to be fed’. And what we have found is that Liz has created the seat of humanness here [he points at the chaise-longue], that is what she does. But still this [the centre of the room], the centre of the universe, is utterly inaccessible to both of them.

What we get in the second panel is that that relationship [the objects’ relationship] has changed. It has, in a Hegelian sense, being negated because now the person who can occupy the space is the child, the child whose bed was first laid on this chaise-longue, the site of humanness. So it is still the site of humanness which is why he has to birth/die on it and which is why he has to be made to sit on the chair in the panel. It is an order [when Liz asks Dan to sit on the chair and take care of his wound] which he accepts because actually he wants his mother’s attention. There is nothing abstract about it. She is saying ‘I
am going to take care of you’ and actually as a child that is what he wants but it means he has to go over to here [to the table]. So in effect I think these are the areas for this panel. Edge of the universe [shows at the centre of the room], site of humanness [touches the chaise-longue], utilitarian [touches the table] the logic of the city, but interestingly the chair is on the boundary between the two. And the chair is on the boundary because it is literally the seat of the story that keeps obsessing her and what she is able to do with the chair is enact humanness and move it to the edge of the universe [he moves the chair to the centre of the room]. Literally she breaks it away from the logic of the city [the table]. So in effect here [chaise-longue] you have got the logic of the self, and you have got here [around the table] the logic of the city and the chair a kind of a boundary between the logic of the city and the inner site and then the centre of the universe [the centre of the room]. So there are four distinct areas (see Picture 3 bellow). (App. D.2.h, par.19-25, pp.190-191)

In an interval I asked the group for some further clarification of the above definition of the space and of its objects’ relations.

**Researcher:** All these things you have said were very interesting. The site of the city, the site of humanness etc. But, to clarify for my understanding, all these become what you are saying they are in previous panel one…

**Director:** Yes.

**Researcher:** … gradually through cathecting them?

**Director:** Yes.
**Researcher:** I mean how they are been used.

**Director:** Yes. It is Richard who establishes the table’s functional functionality!

**Researcher:** So it is very important how the actors are going to use these sites and how they are going to build them for the audience?

**R:** For themselves as well.

**Director:** Yes. I think we might have not been as graphic about it. What I am saying is, at the risk of sounding mechanical ‘manoeuvrer’ of things, we need to be graphic about it because that is the thing about map making. It is about putting your mark down and just following that trajectory. I think you [actors] were really finding that round the table for example and [the actress playing Liz] was really finding it around the chaise-longue. (...) I think in panel one we have been there consistently. I think for panel two we are been prevented from getting there consistently because it is so complex and it is the most difficult panel of the play. (...) (App. D.2.h, par. 26-36, pp.192-193)

It has to be noted here that on an earlier day, Chris Cooper mentioned that the chaise-longue is the most important object in the room, and this is why Edward Bond envisaged it in the left side of the room: because, according to a conversation that the director had with him, in our culture we read from the left to the right. This is why the final configuration of the room was altered again from this time onwards (App. D.2.e, par.1-3, p.173) (For the final configuration see Picture 3 above).

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**Commentary**

I have included the lengthy description and quotes from the discussion of the group because I think that, since the company pays special attention to the logic of the situation of the play, this logic needs to be explained to the reader as well. Moreover if the logic of the situation is important in terms of creating the conditions for Enactment and for Drama Events, then it is essential to provide as comprehensive as possible a view of this logic.

As the director commented above, it is the function of the parts of the room that makes the difference in meaning; and this function relates obviously to their use.
Hence the use of objects by the actors is of fundamental importance for Cathecting objects and creating the Site in the space.

As mentioned, it is Richard who establishes the Site of the table as the Site of the city in the first panel. In a similar way it is Liz who establishes the Site of the chaise-longue as the Site of humanness, through her trying to make a bed on it. Similarly the centre of the room, including the chair, becomes what the director described above through how the actors use them. The actress playing Liz then has to find a way to put the chair in the middle of the room so it can become, in the director’s words, the centre of universe. This way has to be relevant to the Site, it has to be graphic and it has to be enacted. The stage directions ask for it to be brusquely deposited in the centre of the room. If this is so then it seems that it should approximate an eruption, as the director graphically stated; at the same time centre of the room should never figure in the interaction between Dan and Liz before this action. It could be conjectured that up to this point none of the characters had anything to do with this area because none of them was in touch with their radical innocence. In a sense then maybe the cautious non-use of the middle space of the room before the particular scene could be a way to Cathect it.

In a similar way the sheet, if it is to be part of the self, needs to be used and Cathected as such even before the second panel. How Liz is using it while making a bed or how Richard is holding it when he takes it from the room are important actions to consider.

The most interesting point in the above, however, is that the director has explained Liz’s use of the sheet as a kind of play in his comment on the role of her hands in this whole panel. The whole action with the sheet started, as the director commented, as a
kind of role-play while Liz is unsuccessfully pretending to be a ‘good’ and caring mother for Dan, later becoming something that led her to seeing, and which eventually led to her decision to commit suicide and give Dan his life back. In the director’s and Bond’s words her hands should perform a play within a play, but one which seems to escape her rational control. The change in her comes not through her reason but through her hands, in other words through her body. Overcome by a role-play that is based on a caring-mother-game with the sheet, she finally discovers the truth for her and her son. In that sense experiencing through the body is identified as the way to true understanding, which is accomplished through the use of a Cathected object. Of course such a function describes the sort of experience that is produced by all the other elements beyond Cathexis – the Site, the Extreme, the Accident Time and its consequent ‘jagged flashes’, and does not describe in itself the whole procedure of seeing the truth, or does not constitute another element of the process. It is rather the ultimate condition required for the Invisible Object to be made visible for the actors and the audience. In fact it describes a condition in which the ideologised reason is bypassed by a built-up-to, intense experience that forces Liz to enter into the gap of meaning and imaginatively see the truth.

If the member of the group who argued that this is similar to kid’s play above is right, then Liz is creating herself as kids do, by manipulating objects and engaging with the world. In that sense the extremity of the situation, like that of Dan’s wound and the tormenting newspaper report, forced her into a role-play with the sheet that created the conditions for bypassing her rational structures. The Extreme in Bond’s theory creates Accident Time, which in its turn could make possible for her a glimpse of the Invisible Object, and this is how she comes to her decision – a decision that is as
provocative as the choice of the students in the Palermo improvisation. This is because Liz decides to kill herself in order for Dan to live.

Continuing rehearsals

Later, the director in collaboration with an actress worked through Liz’s central speech phrase by phrase, to determine where the actress should move or stand. Every sentence was located at a different spot or in a trajectory between the different sites in the room, according not only to the stage directions but also to the logic of the situation as the group had interpreted it. So after Liz said ‘don’t go’ to Dan but received no response, as he is asleep onto the chaise-longue, she moves to the table and tears more strips from the sheet (Bond, 2011:194). But, as the director commented, she is actually destroying herself and again recurs to the story of the blinded child from the first panel, this time going through graphic details where the kid’s eyes were thrown in the toilet, while seeing at the same time the ‘need to blind him’ (App. D.2.h, par.39, p.194). The particular actions of destroying herself and realising the impulse to blind Dan seemed logical to position by the table than anywhere else in the room. The same recognition was made clear for the section where Liz goes back to the table and prepares a noose to hang herself: Suddenly brusquely picks up the chair. Takes it further into the room. Thumps it down. Goes back to the table. Ties strips together to make a rope (Bond, 2011:194-195). According to the director, although the room has once more changed after Liz places the chair in the middle of it, the table is still in the site of social reality where Liz ‘has got a practical job to do which is “I am going to make a noose”’ (App. D.2.h, par.41, p.194).
Similarly, Liz’s final envisioning of Dan’s blinding is tied to a kind of ‘chaise-longue close-up’, as the director has named it, where for the actress playing Liz:

**Director:** … [it] is the point where you have to work out how to cut his eyes out. I was all worrying about the stage direction about being vague. I reckon that the only way you can become vague is when you have actually worked out what you are going to do and so we have to see you are really working at his eyes. It is that thing of ‘which one?’ [which eye I should take out first]. ‘How am I going to do it?’ It is that. When we will do it you can really take your time. It should be almost unwatchable. Because that is the DE. Because the story [of the blinding] is DEing the site. Because we cannot watch you do anything with the scissors round his eyes without knowing about this story that we just heard that they [kid’s eyes] went down the toilet in a saucer. It just gets worse. (App. D.2.h, par.40, p.194)

Interestingly, the particular extract ends, for Cooper, with a ‘jagged flash’ which is connected to a state where Liz ‘sees herself’ (App. D.2.h, par.6, p.187). The ‘chaise-longue close-up’ section consists of the lines: ‘The neighbours’d drive me out on the street. I’ll look after yer. Always take care a’ yer. Luv yer. I promise. See the needle in me ‘and. I got the skill. Stab. Stab.’ The ‘jagged flash’ which Cooper identifies is the line ‘I cant. . . (Vague) I cant’ (Bond, 2011:194).

**Commentary**

As has been noted, the configuration of the room is of fundamental importance for the group. Mapping Liz’s journey onto the room helps to make this journey clear for the audience, and helps the actress to experience and explore.

The point to be made is that the director discovered another Extreme in the scene which intensifies the situation. This is Liz’s preparation to take Dan’s eyes out. And this preparation has to be in practice unwatchable. The scene is explicitly acknowledged now as a Drama Event, created through the story of the blinding that
returns to Liz and tempts her to now execute it on her own son. As the director asked of the actress, she has to enact a mother who is working out in her mind how to put her son’s eyes out. This is naturally an Extreme situation, one described and therefore present from the very beginning of the play and which now seems about to be recreated on the stage. This Extreme is however the catalyst for Liz seeing herself in a new ‘jagged flash’; the envisioning of taking the eyes out, though it remained imagined and was not carried out, has made Liz see herself in the position of the mother who did blind her kid in the newspaper story; she states: ‘I’ll look after yer. Always take care a’ yer. Luv yer. I promise.’ In her imagination she reproduces the sentiments of the first mother, and she can now see herself as the same mother that she was questioning in the first panel – a questioning which pointed to the residue of her maternal instincts and innocence. In fact this is the turning point for Liz; from that point onwards she will never recur again either to the idea of literally blinding Dan, or to the act of figuratively blinding him, and the next thing she does after few lines is to place the chair in the middle of the room.

Here the motif of blinding is brought to another level. It started in the first panel as a description that gradually became more graphic. In the second panel it became extremely graphic, making us see the eyes going down the toilet flushed with tears, and now the event is expected to be made fully present in front of our eyes. This is again a confirmation that the Extreme in Bond’s work builds carefully to a climax; this could be compared with the development of the Story in his plays, because it begins apparently innocuously but eventually produces a profound challenge for the audience. The experience of the expectation of the blinding might be terrifying for the audience; but the point is that for Big Brum, finding and using the Extreme of the
situation is one of the pivotal ways to create a Drama Event.

At this point, we can see that the elements which emerged in our analysis of the exploration and rehearsals cover the spectrum of interests for our research. As detailed above, the Site, the Story, the Centre, the Drama Event, the Invisible Object, Cathexis, the Extreme, Accident Time and Enactment were all satisfactorily located; on this basis, we may now draw significant conclusions.

The study will continue by identifying and validating the findings presented thus far. This validation will be done in combination with Bond’s analysis of involvement in the rehearsal process, as well as by using other collected data such as interviews and the findings from the literature review.

3.3 Conclusion: Summary of findings for the whole process

In this section I am summarising the analysis of data on the basis of the nine elements of practice that I have identified for this research. In that sense I am trying to identify in general terms the central process of working in a Bondian way, based on how Big Brum approaches the subject and the nine central elements of practice. The summary of findings is organised into nine sections, each corresponding to one of the elements but cognisant in each case of the overall approach. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, I attempt some conjectures about the possible implications for drama in classrooms.

As mentioned in the chapter concerning research methodology, Edward Bond helped in shaping the performance of the play by visiting the company during the rehearsals and participating in the process. That offered a unique opportunity for monitoring the playwright contributing to the realisation of a specific text and for observing his general method directly. But his participation offered another unique opportunity for
assessing the soundness of my findings on Big Brum’s practice. This is what I am trying to do in this section.

One of the novel areas that this study has treated is the important role of Enactment in the realisation of a Bondian drama work. This area was initially incorrectly excluded from the investigation but it proved to be fundamental in Big Brum’s and Bond’s approach to the work. The actors need to enact the situation, and that makes fundamental demands regarding conditions under which this Enactment may be effected. It is noted above that this process seems important for experiencing the situation in a Bondian drama and revealing the Invisible Object. Hence I would assume that the same should apply in the context of drama in classrooms as well. But what are the conditions that foster Enactment on the part of the actors? I could deduce from the process till now that Enactment has to do first of all with understanding and experiencing the situation of the play in detail. As straightforward and acceptable as this is as a start, this issue is rather more complicated.

**The Site**

As the analysis of the process revealed, the company gradually became more concerned with questions which address the actions and the situations of the play in more detail, and sought clarity through making them more graphic and diagrammatically unambiguous. The group focused their attention, even from the very beginning of the process, on the pressure of the city on the room, which finally affected every choice taken. For instance the story of the blinding, Richard’s talk, as well as Dan’s wound and even the furniture were conceived of and discussed in terms of the Site.
This directorial tendency can be confirmed in the practice of Edward Bond, a frequent active visitor later in the rehearsal process. It has to be noted that most of the questions which Bond addressed to the members of the group began with ‘why’. So when the actors were rehearsing the first panel, Bond commented that ‘You have to say to yourself why am I coming in the room at that moment, why am I leaving the room at that moment, why am I making the bed at this moment?’ (App. D.2.i, par.24, p.198). In many cases, as we will see below, the playwright had to explain or illustrate to the actors some action or situation, something the director consciously avoided during the rehearsals (App. C.1.b, par.14, pp.18-19).

Later a similar ‘why’ question was addressed to the actor who played Dan in the second panel; this was at the point when Liz is off and Dan explains to her who wounded him: ‘When Liz goes out why do you [Dan] start talking about Arnie?’

**O:** Because she is out.

**EB (Edward Bond):** I don’t understand that.

**O:** She is not there.

**EB:** Now, come on, he has got a cut. So we are going to take this cut as real. If she is not any good apparently in this scene, and she is right, why didn’t you [Dan] come in and start doing it [cleaning his wound] straight away? ‘I have to hide it from my mother’, you have to keep it secret until she has gone off to have her drugs. At the moment she goes you want to take control. You want to be in charge of your wound. She is going to need some explanation about this [Dan’s wound]. But the main thing is the wound. It [the text] says very often that he [Dan] half raises his voice, five or six times in the play. It seems to me that when you tell that to her it is just to shut her up, although it does turn into a story about the violence of the city. He [Dan] actually makes a joke about it. His only joke in the whole play, ‘this is done by my friend’. Who shot you? My friend. (…) You have got to concentrate on this cut. We have got to believe this cut. She says ‘few more inches and it could have gone through there [heart]’. So there is real danger. (…) Knife crime is one of the things you can get a response from the audience, I presume, being in the papers every week, it is on the news every day. The big thing in the play seems to be the hanging but it won’t be there unless its opening is there, unless we can understand about fraud and how secret and hidden and deceptive the relationship between these two people is. He [Dan] is taking wounds for her, he is sacrificing himself for her but he
knows at the same time doing that it is the worst thing you could do for her. The big thing is the hanging but actually this is telling us why that happens. So in a way it is the opening of the scene the bigger part. When he [Dan] says ‘I am not going to do that anymore’ is he telling himself that or is he telling her that or is it both or whatever? ‘I am not going to do that anymore’ is like Richard saying ‘I am not having a kid in this house, it is not going to be’. (App. D.2.i, par.35-40, pp.200-201)

This extract is a typical example of the process that the company followed, regardless of the presence or absence of Bond, and it is interesting to note that formulating an answer to any of these questions was not as undemanding as it may seem at first glance. Bond for example seemed to be extremely persistent in pushing the actors to go beyond their initial, sometimes superficial answers. None of the actions or words in the play should be taken as any kind of rhetorical description of the situation. The actors had to discover or create the logic of every single unit of the text. It is interesting to note for instance that in the above example, special attention was given to making Dan’s explanation to Liz believable for the audience.

In a way similar to the work of the company, the playwright insisted in connecting actions to Site A and the logic of the situation. Although Liz’s hanging, according to Bond, is the ‘big thing’ in the scene, it is Dan’s wound that explains why it happens and that is why it has to be made believable for the audience. In a sense the playwright identified for the group the sequence of events in the Story, and their significance, such that one could coherently reconstruct definite causes and effects. As mentioned already in the analysis, although the group also identified Dan’s cut as a very important event, altering the course of the action and propelling it toward Liz’s death (App. D.2.f, par. 41-49, pp.178-179), in the rehearsal of it Bond argued that the event was not yet made believable for the audience. In Bond’s analysis the Site A should be again present in the narration of Dan. As the playwright explained, Arnie’s attack on his best mate with a knife ‘is one of the things you can get a response from
the audience with’ as it is ‘in the papers every week’. I would assume that our society’s Site is again brought on stage here, and that the recognisability of the Story is especially relevant to a teenage audience. The director had the same opinion about the audience especially when the programme toured schools:

**Director:** They recognise [teenage audience] their own lives in it. And they say that all the time. They recognise things that they have either experienced or that they know of other people. All the time. I think this is very palpable (App.C.1.d, par.94, p.38)

Site B is also identified in the particular scene. The deception, the dishonesty and the fraud between Dan and Liz constitute a part of Site B of the play, or more correctly, how the Site A is reflected or contained in Site B, as the director, Chris Cooper, argues (App. D.1.d, p.95). As the Site A has to be clearly displayed, the same applies to Site B, since if this is not clear the hanging later cannot be understood. Actors thus have to find the cause of their actions, not in any set of Stanislavskian ‘private experiences’, or in ‘private and often esoteric imagination’, as with the Theatre of Performance (Bond,2000a:11); this was something Big Brum had already concluded and practised. Bond rather claims that a theatre that must ‘relate to the world’s present state, its political, military and cultural situations’ (ibid:12); this is what is encapsulated by the term Site A in his work.

As the playwright claimed in one of his visits during the rehearsal process of the play, there is a subterranean influence in *A Window* which most of the time is the city itself (App. D.2.i, par.33, p.200). One of the most illuminating applications of this argument relates to one short phrase of the second panel where Liz orders Dan to sit in the chair so she can clean his wound: ‘Sit ‘ere.’ (Bond, 2011:190). The order, according to Bond, is simply part of the Site of the city that saturates the play. Liz’s command is not that of a caring mother (ibid); it is the city struggling to regain control of the
situation through the mask of a caring mother. So, even this very short phrase needs to be connected to the Site A, and not simply to some aspect of Liz’s character, say, bossiness, or to the desire to reappear as a mother. In fact she is trying to do the latter, but, without her being aware of it, it is the city that intrudes or emerges with her attempt. In that sense the personal is immediately related to the social.

How then might the city become apparent for the audience in this phrase? Certainly the answer has to be found once more in Site A. Language, as part of signing, could be brisk or authoritative; I would think this is already indicated in the text. But it has a lot to do with how the actress would convey an impression of the city’s presence in gestures, images and actions, and how the audience might recognise that. Could Liz utter the phrase as a teacher? Or as a doctor? Or maybe as a policeman? Or maybe just as a mother? Or could all of these be used as preparation exercises for incorporating them into the final choice?

There is another, even more revealing example of how the playwright approaches the actions in the text, one which provides a solid hint as to how to answer the above question. When, later, still in the second panel, Liz is delivering the long speech on her and Dan’s life, she puts the noose round her neck and goes to the chair that she has earlier placed in the middle of the room:

(She puts the noose round her neck. Goes to the chair. Stands on the seat)

**Liz** Cant take ’is eyes out. Done that already. Undreds a’ times. When yer went fetchin. When I shouted at yer. When I cursed yer. When yer looked at me wrinkled --. When yer saw me ’ands shakin. When yer cried. Thass ’ow yer grow up t’ be a man. (Bond, 2011:195)

The author explained the scene as:

**EB:** … She sees very, very clearly without any romantic illusion. ‘Cant take ’is eyes out. Done that already. ‘Undreds a’ times. When yer went fetchin.’ It [the
text] doesn’t say that he went fetching her drugs but it is like any child runs an errand. (App. D.2 j, par. 36, p.214)

Again, in the above context, the fact that the text doesn’t define what is meant with ‘fetchin’ is not rhetorical and shouldn’t be taken as such. The sentence ‘When yer went fetchin’ is missing its object, and that is why it may refer to any number of things. Fetching could refer to something other than drugs, as for example when an exhausted parent orders its child to fetch a glass of water or the newspaper from the table. In that sense the sentence attempts to adhere to elements of the universal experience of a parent-child relationship. How many times does an adult order a kid to fetch something? And isn’t that already teaching them to obey orders to fetch? How far or near is the fetching of the newspaper for an exhausted-by-the-city parent to the fetching of drugs for your exhausted-by-the-city mother? When and how are children taught to obey these orders? In fact, finding the meta-text of the action is the way to find an answer for this question, which yet again should be part of Site A.

Interestingly the above comments create a situation that ‘contaminates’ other parts of the play. Once the ambiguity or broad range of potential meanings for ‘fetchin’ is acknowledged here, its variations or camouflages cannot go unnoticed in other scenes. For example, Dan earlier in the second panel declares three times that he will stop fetching drugs for Liz but she doesn’t believe him:

Dan:  Im not fetchin anymore.
Liz:  (Giggles) Yer said that before. Yer only sayin it now cause yer bin scratch.
Dan:  I could leave. Not stay ’ere n’ watch yer fall apart. If yer was on yer own yer’d ’ave t’ make an effort.
Liz:  . . .Yer father ran away.
Dan:  Don’t like goin out in the streets no more. Used to. Now they don’t lead anywhere. Sun juss shines on the dirt. Take-aways drop in the gutter – bits a’ animal bodies n’ ‘uman sick. Shows it up. Want me own life while Im still young enough t’dosomethin with it. I mean it – not fetchin anymore.
The dialogue between Dan and Liz should certainly be seen in the light of the universal experience between parent and child. But why does Liz giggle?

As the playwright argued:

**EB:** I think that the most awful and decadent line in the play is that she giggles. That is awful. She doesn’t even take him seriously, trying to manipulate you. It is a terribly decadent line. It is a corrupt line, that giggle. (App. D.2.i, par.41, p.201)

Liz’s manipulation is for Bond the natural reaction of a parent who is deeply corrupted. She insists with sarcasm and an apparent, superior certainty that ‘Yer will, yer will’, and this is something that is not extraordinary or unfamiliar for the audience. Again the above scene should develop as the others, cohering with the other scenes and general course of action in the play.

Basically Bond aims to foster or promote a state of mind that keeps questioning everything in the work, and refers not only to the audience but to actors as well. His attitude holds special potential for artists willing to develop imaginative ways of seeing, aimed at creating conditions under which the audience can share in this seeing or insight. In fact this ability coincides with the relentless need of the dramatic child, discussed in the literature review, to question the world we are living in and take nothing for granted. Of course it is a very demanding state, but is, according to the playwright, our ordinary, early state of being that is long forgotten when we enter reality and de-cathexis has begun to define our meanings and values.

Thus the most important dimension exemplified in the particular examples above has to do with building the logic of the situation and the Sites A and B in immediate relation. Site C for its part refers to the practical choices that the production team will
make in order to communicate the first two Sites to the audience as the site of imagination – for example the final decision the company would make about how actress playing Liz delivers the ‘Sit ‘ere’ line.

The elementary significance of making the Site present, recognisable and believable for the audience is something new to me in realising Bond’s work. I thought I could understand the Site before as a theoretical concept, but in practice the fundamental role of understanding and thus experiencing or enacting the Site was an unanticipated revelation. Bond’s (in Davis, 2005) assertion of the importance of the Site and the situation is helpful and concise:

Site and situation replace the reduction [sic] to character. The site is everything to hand in the play’s subject (theoretically this is everything). This gives great facility because anything on site can be used to create meaning. (p.87)

Another dimension of the work on the Site that has to be noted relates to the continuous pursuit of it as a presence on stage, rather than as a separate element that should be, for example, dealt with in the beginning of the play as a set-up before being discarded, allowing us to focus on subsequent events. The Site has to be present incessantly on stage, even in the heart of a Drama Event and in close relation to other elements. In one example discussed above, Liz’s recognition of her own responsibility in making Dan fetch drugs and the revelation of the meta-text of the action is taking place in a Drama Event. Or, as the group has noted in their work, the second panel still holds the social Site, since Liz adopts the position of Richard and continues to make the world of the city tangible in the room.

As I have noted repeatedly, understanding the Site seems to be the fundamental condition required to enact the situation for the actors and the audience. But Site A and Site B cannot be narrowed down to what is mentioned above. Theoretically, as
Bond argued, the Site and the situation contain everything and this suggests that they form a kind of an umbrella for all other elements such as the Extreme. In other words, the element of the Extreme is created within and from the situation as part of the Site; for instance, it appeared in the room through the story of the blinding and Dan’s wound, both of which are Extreme events.

*Extreme and Accident Time*

The Extreme in a Bondian approach cannot be examined separately from other elements since it is an effect of the situation and the Site. The group located early in the process the possible extremity of various events including the story of the blinding, Dan’s wound and Liz’s finally unpractised intention to blind Dan. But the point to be made here is that these events of extremity were figured as stemming primarily from the city, the Site A. With the help of Bond’s notes the members of the company were acutely aware from the very beginning of the process that there was pressure on the room from the city ‘as if say the room were on a mountain side and over time the mountain’s weight had distorted the walls’ (App. F, p.224).

The remark has crucial implications for any drama work. First of all the Extreme does not come as a kind of a surprise or sudden inversion of the plot of the play. It lurks within every detail as an indispensable part of the Site and the Story. It is there from the beginning, though it may not be felt as intensely or profoundly in the opening scenes.

As I noted in the analysis I believe that the element of the Extreme, although present from the beginning, is gradually built toward a revelation in a climactic scene. The situation that hatches the Extreme is already there in the opening scene with Liz making up a bed on the chaise-longue, but its full impact is reified carefully and
progressively later. The story of the blinding is a good example to illustrate the process. It started off in the room as an event described in words, but gradually became more graphic and hence more ‘present’ within the room. The event returns in the second panel as a prospective re-Enactment by Liz during the final scene around the chair and it emerges again in the third panel where Dan is preparing to blind Richard. On this third occasion the action of blinding Richard comes even closer to its materialisation on stage, but again it is finally stopped by Dan.

In Bond’s intervention there was a lot of attention given to those moments where the Extreme was present. Another word that the playwright consistently used in the rehearsals, beyond the questions starting with ‘why’, was ‘believable’. As mentioned above with the example of Dan’s wound, the audience, as well as the actor, has to believe the wound is there (App. D.2.i, par.39, p.201), because if this is not there Liz’s later suicide cannot be fully understood. In that sense the first Extreme builds towards the second; again this indicates a necessary sequence of coherent choices causing the intensification of extremity, based on generating believability in the situation.

How then could the actions be made believable for the actors and the audience? I have already located in Big Brum’s practice the need for graphicness and clarity, but Edward Bond insisted on being even more vivid. In one of the examples in the rehearsal process, during the scene where Liz is talking alone and Dan sleeps on the chaise-longue, the story of the blinding reappears. It is the moment where Liz is considering blinding Dan:

Liz:  

(…) She carried its eyes t’ the toilet. They was in a saucer. ‘Ad to, ’ad to. The eyes said no mummy not the toilet. Not the water. She flushed ’em down the toilet with its tears. Cause she luv it. Cared for it. Always
look after it. Yer’ll never leave me. I couldn’t live ‘ere on me own.

(Picks up the scissors. Goes to Dan) The neighbours’d drive me out on
the street. I'll look after yer. Always take care a’ yer. Luv yer. I
promise.’ (Bond, 2011:194)

The prospective blinding of Dan is already an Extreme situation. But beyond clarity

Bond proposed for actress to imagine herself the eyes talking:

**EB:** (…) She has got the eyes talking again. I think it is very important. That is
the ultimate reality for her, when the eyes talk. She says ‘The eyes said no
mummy not the toilet.’ These are very extravagant ideas. You got to be very
clear about that. It helps if you have seen the eyes in the saucer ‘no mummy,
don’t take them to the toilet’ and she took it to the toilet and she turned the thing
and let them go plop, plop in the toilet. And then she pulled the toilet and toilet
flushed with tears. That is very creative use of language she has got. (App.
D.2.j, par.25, p.212)

The story of the blinding is following Liz through the whole play (App.D.2.i, par.10,
pp.196-197) but obviously it is here moving to a more intense level than we saw in
panel one. It becomes more graphic. But Bond is asking of the actress that she create
Liz’s imagery in her own mind.

The playwright’s description above may seem cynical and blatantly graphic at first
glance; but it rather attempts to ‘engrave’ images and maybe sensations on the
actress’s mind. I think that it is impossible not to have some kind of reaction,
affecting or not, to this description, and certainly this reaction is not within the realm
of reason alone, because the event is inexplicable in rational terms. How is it possible
for a mother who loves her child to blind it, and drop the eyes in the toilet like
dropping pebbles or rotten food? This corresponds, I think, to a method of ‘pushing’
the actress to face the implacably tragic in the scene for herself.

For ideologised reason this action might be simply a crime that should be punished or
a psychological irregularity to be treated, and it may never ask why it happened in
terms of the social Site – in a similar way, perhaps, to what the British prime minister,
David Cameron, has done with the mass looting and rioting that took place in August 2011 in various cities around the UK. The prime minister rather cynically claimed that these riots were ‘criminality pure and simple’, and the reason that these riots took place was because there weren’t enough policemen in the streets (BBC News, 2011). Cameron did not ask what drove these people to become as cynical and violent as the mother who blinded her child in the play.

But I would argue that Bond’s ‘cynical’ extremity is of rather a different kind. It does not permit reason to take exclusive hold of the situation, but follows another route to our minds; that is imagination. Bond sees Liz’s ability to form these images as creativity, and is asking from the actress the same. This can only happen for him through imagination. But the interesting point to be made here is that the particular description of the event, both in Bond’s and Liz’s words, has an impact primarily on the body. The possible reaction to seeing the eyes crying, speaking and being flushed down the toilet with this special sound, could be comparable to Garner’s (1990) ‘neuromimetic transferral’ – akin to the flicking of the eyes while witnessing an onstage blinding, which does not only reveal an ‘aversion’ but a ‘deeper defence against its sympathetic arising within the field of one’s own body’ (p.161).

Believability comes through the body and imagination for Bond, and not from reflective reason. In another example earlier in the same scene, where Liz had already started delivering her long speech while she is tearing the sheet into strips, the playwright commented after the rehearsal that:

**EB:** At the moment we will talk about the tearing [of the sheet by Liz] because that is a very strange and noticeable thing. We have got to make it more useful for you [actress]. At the moment it gets reflective somehow as if you could reflect on the business. But it isn’t reflective. (App. D.2.k, par.24, p.219).
This indicates that being reflective is not a desired state on the part of the actress in the particular scene. Being reflective in a sense is distancing the actor from the action and could lead to her becoming critical towards the role. If the actress is performing in this way she becomes apparent on stage, the division between the actress and her role becomes noticeable, and hence it may become a Brechtian device. In that sense the actress does not experience the situation but reflects on it ‘as if you could reflect on the business’. For this reason he insisted to making the eyes ‘talk in the saucer’ (App. D.2.j, par. 30, p.213) rather than have the mother reflecting on the story. The director made an even clearer statement about reflective acting: ‘By being reflective the actor then begins to interpret it for the audience and then begins to put sentiment into to it when actually they don’t need reflection they need to experience it’ (App. C.1.d, par.24, p.28).

It is through the Extreme of the imaginatively illustrated story with the eyes that Liz enters Accident Time. After she contemplated blinding Dan she decided not to do so. How did she come to this decision though?

As Bond argued in the rehearsal Liz initially concentrates on the event of blinding and wonders how this mother could have done this (App. D.2.i, par.10, pp.196-197). The event keeps reappearing in all its graphicness, but in the second panel, during Liz’s long speech around the room and on the chair, the event creates the effect of Accident Time for her. The group has already identified the effect of the story of blinding and Dan’s wound as creating a conflict between existential and ontological questions in Liz in their previous work. They identified that the combination of these two Extreme events produces ‘jagged flashes’ that eventually make her see the Invisible Object. But, as mentioned in their work, it is the possibility of blinding Dan that gives the
final push to enter into Accident Time. The imaginative envisioning of taking Dan’s eyes out places Liz into the position of the mother that she was wondering about all the way through. She now can actually see herself in that other. The Invisible Object is in fact the realisation that what is happening in the Site was never irrelevant to what was happening in the room as well; Liz can see that she is or always was in the same sphere as the blinding mother with the scissors, or she can see that using scissors in that way is not an impossible action for her. It was there even when she was first isolating herself in the room or when she was ordering Dan to fetch things for her. I would assume that the same condition should be felt by the audience as well.

As Edward Bond confirmed in his intervention, this realisation has been produced ‘as if the shock that she is going through has set this clarity. That she almost blinded him and that is a huge sobering experience’ (App. D.2.g, par.36, p.214). As the writer moreover argues in his notes, ‘she sees the invisible object’ and this means that ‘she and the chair become the invisible object for the audience’ (App. F, p.226). It is like waking up with a bloodstained kitchen knife in your hand, or perhaps similar to the shock that Germans felt with the revelation of the Nazi extermination camps after WWII.

It has to be noted once more, however, that this effect is impossible to create for the actress as well as for the audience if the building blocks of extremity have not been made believable beforehand. The Extreme has to be felt and believed for Accident Time to take place. And I would think that another element that works for making the Extreme believable is Cathexis of objects.

_Cathexis_
As Big Brum’s practice illustrated, one major point always to keep in mind is that objects in Bond’s plays are not symbols. They are largely ‘unnoticed’ things that don’t carry with them straightforwardly recognisable meanings to be symbolically constructed and symbolically perceived by the audience. This doesn’t mean of course that there is no meaning attached to them, since there is no such thing as a genuinely neutral object for a ‘meaning seeking and meaning imposing species’; but I would think that they are closely related to private experiences. For instance, although it is not widely recognised as such, the sheet may hold meaning with it for every individual in the audience. It is difficult, for example, not to commit to memory the feeling of lying on clean, warm soft sheets in a family house.

On the other hand how many times has a sheet been used in advertising a cleaning product? Its freshness and its smoothness are often associated, in our consumerist culture, with the so called extraordinary power of a good detergent that brings, for instance, the smell of the countryside or of the sea breeze. In that sense I assume that there is a conflict around the meaning and the value of the sheet: between the personal value that a child or an adult has attached to it, or else Cathecting it, and society’s effort to impose its own, or de-cathecting it of human values and re-cathecting it with fiscal ones. The problem is that, as mentioned in the literature review, since the Cathected objects become parts of the self and are fundamental means for understanding the self, the meaning imposed on them by society is in fact a way to control people through the way they understand themselves.

As mentioned above the objects in Bond’s play are used for making the situation and the conflict in it tangible and prevent it lapsing into abstractions. The sheet in that sense makes the conflict tangible for Liz and the audience. This is obviously
connected to or dependent on how the actors are using them. Edward Bond offered an
interesting example, this time with the table. The example refers to the scene where
Richard in the first panel sits at the table when Liz has already told him that she wants
a bit of quiet:

**EB:** The first time when you [Richard] sat down in the chair, first of all, [was
like] ‘I am having a sort of discussion, some kind of argument’ (see Picture 1
dellow).

![Picture 1](image1)

**EB:** And then it [the text] says you sit down [in the chair by the table] and say
‘what the bloody hell am I doing? I have got this table and I am here and that is
that …’ But what you did was you sat down and watching her. Do you know
why you are sitting down in the chair? But if you are sitting down in the chair
and say ‘what the hell would I do?’ you now have a new map of the campaign
(see Picture 2 bellow). (…) (App. D.2.i, par.67-68, p.205)

![Picture 2](image2)
Later the playwright argued that ‘in a strange way the table becomes Richard’s world, he needs it’, and that the actor needs to make the object work for him (App. D.2.i, par.69, p.206).

Obviously in the first image the actor is not using the table at all. He sits in the chair with crossed legs staring at Liz as if he is considering her argument. Bond instead proposed a use of the table that approximates a person thinking or planning his next move, and a person rather separated from the other in the room. Richard in the second picture seems self-absorbed and disconnected from Liz. This is an image that may convey the rationality of Richard and therefore of the city which he embodies. If the table is to be the Site of the city this is probably a way to draw it into the picture. So Bond has used the table in a working way for the role, in the sense of making the object part of his world. The table may now hold something of Richard’s self and as such it is exposing something of him for spectators. The table objectifies in that sense parts of him and henceforth anything happening to the table may have implications for Richard as well. As the playwright commented:

It is wonderful in the last scene [panel three] when he [Richard] comes in and look at its drawer [in the third panel when Dan leaves the room for a while Richard who visited him opens the drawer of the table (Bond, 2011:196]. Seeing what is left for him in the drawer. (App. D.2.i, par.69, p.206)

In the same way in another example, concerning the handbag this time, Bond demonstrated once more the action of Richard when he throws the handbag to the centre of the room and leaves in the end of the first panel:

**EB:** … It is sometimes very useful to let the object do the work. Don’t look [Richard] at her [the writer demonstrates a way to throw the handbag in the middle of the room in the end of panel one by Richard.] The action is simple [see sequence of images in Picture 3 bellow]. It is like that. Let that [the handbag] do the work, ‘…look at you… that’s that!’ (App. D.2.i par.62, p.204)
The handbag once more becomes part of Richard’s world. Earlier he was continually asking for it in order to get money for the pub and escape the situation. But when he throws it in the middle of the room, it is like throwing a bomb given to him by the city. In that sense the fiscal values of the city are landing on the floor and reminding us that they are still present where Liz thinks that she has created a cordon sanitaire for her and her child. And although Richard has left in the end of the first panel the money-culture persists in the room as can clearly be seen in the second panel.

A similar situation is illustrated in another example referring to the use of the sheet, this time by the actress. When Liz stops herself from shaking Dan, she goes back to the table and tears more strips. Once more the author asked the actress to make the object work for her and commented: ‘Make the object work for you. First with the hands. What the hell happens with these hands, god only knows.’ (App. D.2.j, par.18, p.210). This comment is very close to what the director, Chris Cooper, mentioned about the play within the play performed by Liz with her hands in the analysis that is leading her into experiencing rather than being reflective, as Bond also remarked in the rehearsal process above. The sheet is becoming part of her through Cathecting it in the first panel, and now whatever happens to it has implications for her.
In the sheet’s journey, though, there is a kind of deconstruction taking place. As Bond stated of Liz: ‘And then she is just tearing the house into bits. Tearing out the wedding present or something. It is quite ironic in a way.’ (App. D.2.i, par.32, p.200).

This ‘wedding present’ brings in once more the Site of the city. When in the first panel Liz is making up a bed with the sheet she is Cathecting it with values of caring and protecting, but the city is already there in the room. There is a threat which she is trying to keep at bay by isolating herself and her nest for the newborn, but she in fact underestimates and misunderstands the situation; she thinks she can only protect her child by isolating, protecting and loving it. But can a family be isolated from the reality of Site and thus kept loving, safe and ‘healthy”? And how different is that to blinding your child?

Maybe the sheet is a ‘wedding present’ because it brings with it the expectations of society about a family house. But for Bond although it may be about a self-contained family love, it cannot give an answer to Liz’s ontological questions and the paradox she is still able to feel. Instead it is ripped off, its inadequacy and its ideologised meaning is deconstructed and shown to the audience. The object in that sense is de-cathected of its social values. But together with the city Liz is ripping off the imposed values that she unconsciously or consciously used to identify herself with, and that is a very severe situation because it is like tearing apart the ideology that became her own ‘second skin’. Reason is bypassed by ‘distracting’ the attention to an object at first, the sheet, but this object, because it is Cathected with personal values, refers back to the self. In that sense the Cathected object is working as a kind of protection against immediate critique and exposure of ideology in the self, but still works obliquely in destabilising it. This is Bond’s way of exposing the ideological from within, rather than from outside the Story and the actions of the character.
Liz then uses the object once more to give birth to Dan by killing herself; I don’t think that it is accidental that see uses the sheet to do that. But the point to be made here is that the assumed deconstruction is just part of the process and does not complete the work, because Liz is re-cathecting it with human values, this time in relation to the world outside.

Objects thus need to be used by actors in a way that does not reflect on the process but experiences the situation, performing the actions with them and not acting. In that sense they become part of the self which is taken outside it in order to reify their situation and put it to the test. Using these objects though has some important implications for enacting the situation.

**Enactment**

There was an interesting definition of Enactment offered by the director of the play, Chris Cooper:

> It is a dialectic between the rigidity of site, you know the structure of the play and all it demands, and the flexibility to actually enter it yourself. So you would allow yourself, like the objects, to be used by the situation. The play speaks through you rather than you interpreting it for the audience and explaining it.

(App. C.1.c, par.66, p.24)

The company did identify several dimensions for Enacting. Experiencing the situation and the Site is the fundamental part. Similarly Edward Bond has further illuminated the condition of Enactment by arguing for the actors to find their way in the situation and make the objects work for them. In his intervention there were a lot of examples selected to encourage the actor to enact and abandon conventional acting. One of these examples is the scene with Richard sitting by the table in Pictures one and two above, as well as the throwing of the handbag in the middle of the room.
In another example he asked the actress playing Liz to find in herself the attitude which contradicts essentially the pro-life real self she inhabits (App. D.2.i, par.7, p.196). He then argued that for Liz there is a noose hanging ‘on that ceiling when she is in the room’, and that the actress may find it useful to ‘hang it there’ for the second panel:

**EB:** (...) I know that is naïve but I find naïve things often very useful, very helpful just to remind you. When this woman [Liz] comes in [the room in the beginning of panel two] she just thinks she will get a Christmas present and half an hour later she is going to kill herself. (App. D.2.i, par.9, p.196)

The presence of the noose in rehearsals is certainly a condition that creates some kind of experiencing of the situation by the actress. It could be used as a constant reminder of where Liz is going but at the same time it is a powerful feature that may evoke strong feelings on the part of the actress. The idea is that authentic Enactment should not be analytical, reflective or rhetorical acting. It approaches the events through imaginatively understanding and experiencing rather than methodically thinking. So when Liz is finally explaining to Richard the story of the blinding in the first panel, Bond asked the actors once more:

**EB:** But why tell him [Richard]? It is not the sort of argument he responds to. I can understand why she does that, it is a short of plea for help, isn’t it? ‘Somebody tell me, somebody explain this to me, let me know what …’ And it is authentic. And you [actress playing Liz] could feel that? (App. D.2.i, par.46, p.202)

The same approach could be detected in the example with the talking eyes on the saucer which the actress should have imagined in the example above.

I think that the most interesting and illuminating example came from the director of the play when he was explaining the work of Liz’s hands. As he mentioned, the hands perform a kind of a role-play seemingly uncontrolled by Liz’s reason and consciousness. In a sense Liz is Enacting the situation of being a caring mother but
this leads her to a new and clearer perception of reality. The object, the sheet, that she is using in this role-play is taking her somewhere else, it is imaginatively guiding her into final consciousness of her actions and of the world. But this is made possible only with Cathexis. Although she is using the object, the object eventually refers back to her because it is Cathected already as part of herself, right from the beginning of the first panel. When she rips it up she is ripping herself, or better she is ripping up the self she knew till that moment as a corrupted self by the city. Consequently she is entering a Drama Event and I would assume that the same state is required of the actress.

One problem with the rehearsal development is that on the whole it didn’t seem to allow the actors imaginatively to enter the play, even when Bond intervened in the process. There were points where the playwright and the director tried to create conditions for experiencing but I doubt that these were adequate. Bond used language and imagery in a very different, maybe experiential or indexical, way sometimes, like the examples of the eyes plopping in the toilet or the noose hanging from the ceiling, but still these interventions were limited and rather fragmentary. Ultimately, understanding the Site, as part of creating the conditions for Enactment, was mainly approached through questioning and discussions.

Similarly the director in the beginning of the process did use some techniques to help the actors to experience the situation, like the one where the actors explored the play in extreme graphicness or when he asked them to create the room intuitively; but still, I would think, the preliminary work in the case of A Window was rather ineffective because it was based mainly on rehearsing and talking.
I would assume that there should be another way to do that, but it cannot be confirmed in the process, since the examples above may indicate a direction but are not enough to generate an argument. It could merely be noted as an assumption that activities which make use of indexical and experiential techniques might be of use here.

Similarly, Bond in his interview implied that for the Palermo improvisation there was a kind of preparation for the final scene where the students would have to choose which of the two babies they would kill following the orders as soldiers:

It is really important that you have the whole scene. You have to do the preliminary, be given this order [the students were in role as soldiers who were given an order to kill a baby in their street], it is very useful to have an officer delivering the order, do this and so on. (App. C.2, par.72, p.49)

So for the students of the Palermo improvisation, Bond did use other experiential techniques to build the Site and the Extreme for Enactment to take place. But in the rehearsal process when he was referring to creating the Site there was another comment which was more ambiguous:

If I talk about creating the city outside what we are going to do? Having car-boots or something. I will shoot you [director] if you do that! But you can see how by allowing him to concentrate on their own problems it can be created out there. (App. D.2,i, par.10, p.197)

**Drama Event and making the Invisible Object visible**

The ultimate purpose of a Drama Event is to make the Invisible Object visible for the actors and the audience. As the director clarified in one of his interviews ‘The invisible object is what is revealed to us in the Drama Event which happens through communicating the site of the drama to audience’s imagination.’ (App. C.1.b, par.18, p.19). The Invisible Object is thus closely related to delivering, or better experiencing, the Site of the play imaginatively. In Bond’s words a Drama Event:
… really consists of two things. One is the setting up of a situation and that very often means taking away something that the people would expect to be there or putting something there that they would not expect to be there. So you disturb the expectation. It is a bit like if you went into one of your rooms you knew about it and something was not the furniture you would expect. I organise the event. (App. C.2, par. 80, p.49)

Later in the interview when I asked him to identify a Drama Event in Big Brum’s production of A Window, Bond clarified further that:

**Playwright:** (...) When I first thought of the idea of Theatre Event I was thinking sort of moments within a drama specially set up to deny the normal expectation. So the audience and the actors had to think about it and relate to it.

**Researcher:** This is what I thought as well.

**Playwright:** You are right but I think I wanted to supplement this with the other thing which I would call the invisible object. When the two come together then you have the drama event. Obviously that is meant to happen in specific moments in specific points in the play. (App. C.2, par.100-102, p.52)

As Bond argued, the Drama Event has to come through the Centre of the play (App. C.2, par.83, p.50), which is about conflicts and paradoxes of society and as we have seen, the Site of conflict between the room and the city should be made already apparent even in the very first image of the play. The Drama Event is thus intended to disturb expectations; but the point is that in fact this disturbance is coming from within the situation and the Site, and consequently from within the Story, which is supposed to be experienced by the actors and the audience. The Invisible Object is felt and seen by each member of the audience differently and I think that it would be interesting to offer one example here from the director himself; when I asked him in an interview what the Invisible Object was for him in the scene where Dan is tidying up the room after Liz’s suicide, he said:

I think at certain points, in certain stages, it was the sheet. Particularly for me personally, when he [Dan] was picking up the pieces in the end. I was devastated by that dancing and the cleaning, I still I feel emotional thinking about it, because for me it revealed what Liz means. What this situation really means (...) that mess. I was thinking about my children, where are we leaving
them? That is what I was thinking. So it came right from the domestic. And of course it is very moving because it is the mother and the son, and as we said about seeing our mums knitting, women making quilts [referring to the reflection of the group on the scene]. All of that is invested in. But I was seeing the destruction of the planet [laughs] potentially. But I can’t put precise worlds on it. I don’t think that in the hidden [invisible] object there is an exactly defined meaning. In a way the analysis of the DE can go so far but you can see how it gets behind ideology because you can begin to see how tearing a sheet can bring about the end of the world if you are not careful. So you see the significance of those things in a new way, don’t you? (…) It is not that you can prescribe what people see but you lead them to the site of humanness or made them less human. That is why it can’t be prescribed. And that is why it is different to anything else. (App. C.1.e, par.86, p.25)

In fact a Drama Event can only work if all other elements have been properly created and lived. So the Site and the Extreme of the situation need to be already there in the audience’s and actors’ experience. This could be made possible in Bond’s form of working through Enactment, which in its turn depends on Cathectic of objects in order fully to develop. Hence the reality is that each of the elements needs to lead to the next one, and all must hang together as a coherent whole to build the way to a Drama Event. As Bond once more claimed:

So all these devices like accident time, invisible object and so on, they are just dramatic devices that one should lead to the other. I don’t want anyone sitting in there and say ‘Oh! We have arrived at the drama event’ (App. C.2, par.121, p.55)

The important point to consider is that a Drama Event cannot be taken for granted. If the Invisible Object is ultimately revealed, it can only be seen when the event is taking place in practice. Moreover it addresses each member of the audience individually. In that sense there should be a different kind of research in order to check whether it worked in the assumed way in the present production.

The company and especially the director of the programme did identify several occasions where a Drama Event may be created in performance. It is interesting to
look at one of them, the movement of Liz around the chair in the second panel, in order to clarify how a Drama Event is considered.

As already explained above, the built-to extremity of the image of taking Dan’s eyes out creates an implacable tragedy for Liz. This is what forced her into Accident Time. Before Liz reaches the point where she thinks of blinding Dan in the second panel, she considers that her son might hate her for what she has done to his life:

**Liz:** Yer ’ate me ! See it in yer eyes ! Yer think its luv ! Its ‘ate. Yer don’t know the difference – yer too young. Yer father ‘d teach yer. *(She sees the scissors. Picks them up. Tries again to cut the sheet with them. Cant. Puts them back on the table)* The woman ’ad a kid. She took out its eyes. *(Bond, 2011:194)*

The playwright commented for this scene in the rehearsals:

**Bond:** *(…) Every time you mention eyes I want to know more on this. She is a specialist about eyes, isn’t she? And she says ‘love is only ever hate’. If he [Dan] loves you [Liz], you can be absolutely certain that at times he hates you. She has seen that, ‘I see it in your eyes’. Now she begins to say actually things that are very surprising and it comes with her experience. She is going to begin to become creative. She says ‘you think it is love but actually it is hate and you are too young to know the difference. So she goes to the chair and takes the scissors. Now you can see how she gets back to that woman [the mother who blinded her kid]. We haven’t heard about that woman for a long while. You [Liz] remember that woman for fifteen, sixteen years and it comes from the scissors. *(App. D.2.j, par.19, pp.210-211)*

The Extreme event of the mother who blinded her kid returns to Liz through another object, the scissors. But Liz has already started being creative; she has gradually started seeing the Invisible Object and thus describes the paradox of love being hate in the Site A, something that Dan’s father, Richard, knows well and would be competent to teach. The reality of the city outside the room is now fully present to her consciousness. Hence her own question from the first panel of how is it possible for a mother to perform the action of blinding her kid out of love is now answered – because she can see herself in the same position, she can see the Site in her. She can
identify that mother in herself and she can understand the conditions that drove her to the act. This is why Liz claims for that mother that:

**Liz:** (...) She said she did it so she’d always look after it. Not true. She didn’t know ’erself. She did it so it’d never get away from ’er. She’d never be alone. They took it away. Put it in a ‘ome. Where is it now? Tap tap tap on the street like a clock. Its better t’ know yerself. (She goes to the table. Puts the scissors on it. Tears more strips) I wish I could comfort ’er. Wash ‘er ‘ands. Not judge or condemn. (Bond, 2011:194)

Liz is thus starting to understand the situation she is in. She sees the world as it is through understanding or seeing the ‘other’ mother. The personal in that sense is immediately connected to the social, or Site A.

Edward Bond commented on the above scene:

**EB:** (...) And she can go back now to tearing those sheets. When she goes back to the sheets she is very, very trained. Because ‘I wish I could comfort ’er. Wash ‘er ‘ands. Not judge or condemn.’ That is neither love nor hate, that is understanding. There is this wonderful practical thing about this woman that she always sees the practicalities of things, you would have to put the eyes in the saucer [when Liz imagines how the mother took the eyes of her kid out and carried them to the toilet]. Now she [Liz] wants to wash the woman’s hands. (…) She knows that this is what she would like to do to this woman, not contemn her. Not judge her [but] wash her hands. It is from that moment she decides that what she must do now vis-à-vis her son is [to] kill herself. (...) There would be two things, in a way she cannot trust herself, she works only on blinding him. Could she take that risk again? And the other thing is that we have to understand this woman and make eyes talk in the saucer. In a way it is like she wants to give him the biggest lesson she can given the circumstances they are in. She gave him his birth and now she is going to give him her death. And he would have to come into terms with that. So in one way she is making life easier for him. She is not going to blind him. In another way she is making life very difficult for him because she is presenting him with this huge problem that he has got to solve. I think you can find this in the last section [last scene of panel two where Dan dances and cries after Liz committed suicide]. (…) She takes the chair … The reason it [the text] says ‘brusquely’ [is that] she doesn’t want to do anything ceremonial. Also she doesn’t want to do anything [like a] huge panic. It is as if she has decided to do this. (...) (App. D.2.j, par.30, p.213)

Understanding the situation imaginatively, then, impacts on Liz’s reason. This is not romanticism, according to Bond, but a felt logic of the situation that led her to the decision to save Dan by killing herself. As Bond mentioned, she realises that she was
condemning Dan to corruption even when she was asking him to fetch things as a kid, and she is connecting that to the production of obedient children: ‘She now seems to get a new sense of the factory. So she says ‘I can’t take his eyes out, I have done that every day’ So ‘She puts the noose round her neck. Goes to the chair. Stands on the seat’ (App. D.2.j, par.34, p.214). From the point where she places the chair in the middle of the room, there is no return for her.

What Liz is seeing is the Invisible Object, which is the reality of the Site A and her responsibility in this. It seems that Edward Bond has described the Invisible Object in some sense in the following:

**EB:** So now it is this thing about dropping the stone of ripples. So I think she is saying there that some aspects of life are necessarily of blinding experience that they [inaudible] suffering. It is not just time [inaudible]. We are watched over by the [inaudible] of death ironically. And we have to get our humanness in our cities out of the fact that we know we are mortal. But it is painful to see someone you love their hands getting old and whatever. Life is going to be painful anyway. Not completely. When you [Liz] say ‘When yer looked at me wrinkled --. When yer saw me ‘ands shakin. When yer cried. Thass ’ow yer grow up t’ be a man’ is a sort of a positive thing, that is the cost. But it is a matter of growing up. And then it is not just this city. She is going to bring that out to the whole human society. This is as if the shock that she is going through has set this clarity, that she almost blinded him and that is a huge sober experience. And she can forgive this other woman, she can forgive herself. And now she seems to see things very clearly and describe them like her eyes now become the eyes on the saucer. She sees very, very clearly without any romantic illusion. ‘Cant take ’is eyes out. Done that already. ‘Undreds a’ times. When yer went fetchin.’ It [the text] doesn’t say that he went fetching her drugs but it is like any child runs an errand. ‘When yer looked at me wrinkled --. When yer saw me ‘ands shakin. When yer cried. Thass ’ow yer grow up t’ be a man.’ The reality is at your eyes, the world is at your eyes. But you have to do that otherwise you will never achieve the maturity of being a proper human being. You can’t look away. Then she tries to tie the thing [the noose] up. [Then the playwright proceeded to the next lines of the text] ‘Yer see it everyday’ I like the ‘everyday’ very much. ‘Famine.’ And that is awful, everyday you see famine, you see ‘Kids’ bones wrap up in old skin. War. Fightin. Tanks bouncin in the dust -- clouds a’ it. A piece a’ bread in the street. The long streets with a piece a’ bread drop in ‘em for the fillin. The city’s a stone sandwich.’ And so the city becomes a sandwich. Normally we have all these divisions, it is true of course that the city has to have shops, slaughter house, it has to have all these things. She puts them all together and says think of the city as a sandwich. (…)
All is got is a scrap of bread dropped in the street. This is not a really good sandwich. (…) ‘It is not easy to die, I have got the right to die but the world is under the chair for me to act.’ (…) It is as if she is looking now at the whole world because she is thinking in terms of the world all the time. We need to experience that under that chair there is this huge space. Because she is been talking about the world. (App. D.2.j, par.36-37, pp.214-215)

This was the description of the world for Bond, a ‘stone sandwich’ which is seen from the top of the chair. Liz is seeing life as it is, mortal and cruel, without ideology hiding its essence. She is in fact entering the gap that ideology sought to conceal with shops, tanks, famine and slaughterhouses, seeing that the truth is that we are still mortal and we need to face our mortality by acting and making our cities, the ‘stone sandwich’, more just and more human. In a sense Liz has entered the gap of meaning imaginatively and knowingly, and faced reality without ideology being in the way. The ‘stone sandwich’ is what her Radical Innocence has produced as an original metaphor to capture this city or Site A, our whole world.

The specific description of course refers to the experience of Liz, or maybe Bond’s, and not to the Invisible Object of the audience. Bond is hoping that through the enacting of Liz’s journey, the audience would have to produce their own metaphors or see the Invisible Object in their own lives. In his interview Bond answered a similar question in a comparable way:

**Researcher:** You said before that you want your plays to evoke somehow the judgement from students and being creative. How is this process reflected in the A Window? What is it the students have been called to form a judgement on?

**Playwright:** I don’t care is an answer to that! One of the discussions after the Window was what I was virtually trying to teach them. You know my answer to that. What I want to do is to try to make the situation creative. I want to let them see the structures of their lives, the structures that they are involved in. They are not fate or something imposed on us but things that human beings make, that are responsible for making or for maintaining or for changing. It is almost the physical awareness of that. Once you have said that what else is fed in to that? (App. C.2, par.19-20, p.41)
The physical awareness of creative responsibility towards ourselves and the world is thus what we could locate as the overall aim of any drama work based on Bond’s theory, which Cooper as the director of the production recognises and accepts (App. C.1.a, par.16, 18, p.14, 15). This includes of course the ability to see the structures in which we are involved. The physicality of this awareness on the other hand refers probably to the bodily and imaginative approach based on experiencing pain and pleasure, as this was explained in the literature review and in the analysis of the data above.

The last comment on this section relates to the role of the Story in the whole process. It is true that if all elements are not there the Drama Event cannot take place; but by the same token it is the Story that makes possible the establishment of the entire situation and the elements in it. The Drama Event comes as a ‘disturbance’ within the Story; hence if the Story is not there from the first, any attempt to disturb is loses its basis and potency.

**Story**

From the very beginning of the process, the company realised that the Story of *A Window* starts very ordinarily as a kind of a soap opera but gradually leads the audience to wilderness. At the same time the group noticed that even from the beginning this Story contains forms of pressure and conflict in the situation, pressure that seemed present in furniture as well as words, actions and images brought from the city outside.

Similarly Bond in rehearsals noted that the play seems ordinary, a bit like soap opera, but that it is wrong to consider the play in a soap opera realist fashion. The aim is to create a situation the ordinariness of which becomes recognisable by the audience:
**Bond:** (...) But what I could identify very much is this woman in this ordinary flat is very ordinary because the people bring all the ordinariness with them. That is established by all of them [the roles] very, very clearly. (App. D.2.i, par.10, p.197)

Making the Story realistic is a foundation for developing the whole play but it doesn’t stop there:

**Bond:** (...) It [the Story] takes this very conventional situation, terribly conventional, *Coronation Street*, and then it will push into another dimension by hanging in this scene. For the hanging to work we have to believe in the realism of this section. (App. D.2.j, par.8, p.208)

So realism is not disregarded, but is rather the base on which the disturbance would have to develop later. In fact the playwright used the words ‘maximum of realism’ to describe his approach (App. C.2, par.38, p.43). The audience has to commit somehow to the situation; they need to understand and sense it, if the challenge and disturbance coming later is to have full effect. In a sense the spectator has to identify with the situation at hand and that is made possible by its apparent ordinariness and its being similar to the lives or experience of audience members. For the director of the production, *A Window* comes even closer to ‘the site of kids’ lives in the terms of the logic of the situation’ (App. C.1.a, par.30, p.16).

Nevertheless very soon the apparent ‘normality’ and the well-recognised domesticity of this situation is going to be put under severe pressure, and become profoundly unsettled; that may well be related to the first confrontation with the Extreme and the tragic that Bond uses in his dramas. Few pages after the opening of the panel one there is an incident reported in a newspaper which cannot be fitted into the ‘domestic routine’ as Bond mentions (App. F, p.224). The incident refers to an assault, specifically a mother’s blinding of her loved child using scissors. The particular incident is one which makes demands on the audience in relation to why it happened. In a sense this first tragic confrontation with a paradoxical action may be a spur to the
meaning-seeking need and ability inherent in them as human beings. As Chris Cooper mentioned in the rehearsals, such stories, like that of the blinding of the child, cannot simply make us say that the mother was a monster; they just stay with us (App. D.1.a, par.53, p.73). In the same way this story stayed with Liz in the whole play as a residue, it penetrated her. The event keeps visiting her throughout the first two panels. In the first panel she cannot stop thinking about it although Richard demands an end to the discussion:

| Liz       | She did it with scissors -- |
| Richard   | All right we don’t need t’ know all the – |
| Liz       | It was both eyes. |
| Richard   | Stop it! |
| Liz       | If she’d done one. If the kid could’ve talk. Tol’ ‘er no no please mummy not two mummy leave one so – |
| Richard   | Stop it! I tol yer t’ stop it! (Bond, 2011:185) |

Even in the second panel, fifteen years later, the event is still troubling her mind and revisits her when she is looking at Dan laying on the chaise-longue:

| Liz       | (... She said she did it so she’d always look after it. Not true. She didn’t know ‘erself. She did it so it’d never get away from ‘er. She’d never be alone. (Bond, 2011:194) |

As mentioned earlier the Story in Bond’s work is used as a starting point for the audience and not as an end in itself. The intention is to put the Story and the apparently ‘normal’ situation under pressure, to the point where its events cannot be understood in terms of a soap-opera story or by ideology: both are to be bypassed. Thus, although the play resembles a soap opera in the beginning, it does not follow a plot similar to TV dramas. What would be commonly considered as a strictly family matter, which is contained and resolved within the family, follows a different course in this play. The social context, the city, is brought into the room and the events are explored as closely related to the outside world and ideology.
As Bond noted the room is an imaginary *cordon sanitaire* which supposedly keeps the threats of the city at bay. But Liz is still infected by the city through the incident of the blinding. The ideology that describes a family in a self-sufficient and autonomous normality in terms of warmth, affection, love, protection or familiarity cannot explain the tragic brought from outside the flat. Hence the dispute between the couple around keeping the baby cannot be looked at as a common family routine after the story of kid’s blinding.

Other crucial events likewise are not given a usual resolution and answer. Why is Liz so disturbed and haunted by the incident in the newspaper? Why does Liz attempt to give drugs to her son? Why does she commit suicide? Why does Dan addresse Liz’s clothes as being Liz in the third panel? Why does Richard return to the flat after Liz commits suicide? These are some of the questions that were addressed by Big Brum members during the process, but obviously we cannot rely on ideological explanations of what a family is to explain why the characters behave as they do. In that sense the audience’s possible rational approach to the events would be similarly inadequate to offer an explanation, because the events subvert a typical domestic narrative.

In some sense I would think that Bond, with the seemingly ordinary Story that gradually builds the tragic and the implacable, is creating a ‘scaffolding’ of a sort for the audience later to access and actively respond to more complex situations or higher levels of consciousness, similar perhaps to the methods of Vygotsky (1987). As Bond commented in his interview when he was explaining the idea of the Invisible Object by using Donatello’s image of The Martyrdom of St Lawrence (see Picture 1 below):
Researcher: It [the situation in the image above] is very violent and makes you feel and see the cruelty in there.

Playwright: But it is also very cool. You don’t see the flames or anything like that. It is incredibly cool.

Researcher: You can see the suffering to him [St Lawrence on the grid burning] but the rest are like watching a normal daily action.

Playwright: Exactly. That could be in the kitchen.

Researcher: Yes, exactly.

Playwright: That is the sort of effect that I want to go for because I always try to make it realistic. I put those things in, like the bellows there, which absolutely normalise it for the audience, they can recognise it. I think it is very important in the A Window that it begins with the two characters talking in clichés. If you look at the Tune, a play I wrote for Big Brum before that, I liked very much the opening scene there because it is all clichés.

Researcher: It is very similar to audience’s experience in daily life.

Playwright: They would have heard all these things in previous week and use these phrases themselves. They would know exactly where they are. In that sense is TV. It is not in being Tom Stoppard and clever. But then I can use those situations to say ‘A Tank bouncing in the dust’. The language has to come from these people. What we can’t have in our theatre is that second language. You put the two together and you should get the language of reality (…). (App. C.2, par.109-116, p.54)

So the Story should work by using the daily routine in a different way in order to expose the reality behind its ordinariness, reminiscent of a ‘scaffold’ for higher
consciousness; a consciousness of the extraordinary that resides the mundane. The realistic Story allows the Extreme images created later to evoke or convey the cruelty in our own ‘kitchen’. Our ‘kitchen’ becomes part of the whole, it becomes the edge of the universe, and thus we can see our responsibility in it. But on the other hand it is through the same Story that it is made possible for the audience to understand or respond to the implacable tragic with creative images and language, or even gestures (App. C.2, par.67, p.48) and actions, comparable to ‘A Tank bouncing in the dust’ or to the ‘stone sandwich’.

**Centre**

As mentioned above, every choice in the production needs to go through the Centre of the play which is defined by the company. The company located their Centre by identifying paradoxes and profound conflicts between existential and ontological questions in the characters’ lives in the play. That seems to be fundamental if working in a Bondian way. The Centre for the specific production was defined early in the process, and never changed again, as:

> Ideology hides its petty crimes in back alleyways but hides its greatest crimes on the open city square. Corruption blinds us to reality governing what is seen and unseen. In the confrontation with the city the self is balanced between innocence and compromise, it is a confrontation between surviving and living. (Fieldnotes, 08-09-2009, first session)

If we examine this formulation, which Bond himself approved (App. C, par.48-51, p.45), we can see that two out of the three sentences refer to the description of what is assumed is happening in society today. In a sense these two sentences describe the Site A of the play. The third sentence refers, though in very general terms, to how the Site A impacts on the self, in other words the implications on our lives and the condition we are called to confront. The confrontation with the city has implications
for our corruption and our innocence which is in fact a conflict between surviving and living.

The last sentence is not far from Bond’s theory on the gap of meaning, on how culture shapes or defines our needs and how a constant conflict between them is taking place. In Bond’s interview on the particular Centre the playwright expanded:

**Playwright:** I think that is all right. That is fine.

**Researcher:** Should the Centre always be defined as this one?

**Playwright:** I think so. I think you could do that. You see your cultural being [is] a form of ideology that it will explain the world you are in. It gives it a certain reality and that will be unjust because society must be administered and therefore there is law and the law is always unjust. It has to be unjust at least in the societies that we are able to create at the moment. Society can maintain its [Inaudible], it can be thorough and convincing. It will have explanations. It will seduce you to its way of seeing things. But in the end it doesn’t work because all societies are changing. They are always in tension. So they can’t be helped in that way. And the more societies try to hold onto those things then they tend to be the most reactionary environment they can become. The necessary advantage that drama has over that is that it will not allow illusions to be maintained. It will insist on describing things in creative terms. That means in terms of humanness. That means, in normative terms, what is just. It will try to do that as accurately as possible. Society won’t do that. It will want to reward and punish. So I think the business of being able to see, this is why I talk about the invisible object… It is possible for language to lie very easily. In a way that is recoverable from because you can use language to change language. But if you look at that thing, that it is ultimately inhuman, and you cannot see its inhumaness then what you do? You can’t say, ‘well I will give you a third eye’ and then see it differently. We are corrupted by sight more than by language. All these about the corruption of language… but of course it is very important (…). But to see is power to speaking. (…) Make something seeable and then language will consent, will describe that … (App. C, par.49-52, p.45)

The fact is that the Centre should describe the gap of meaning, but as this is captured by the overall situation of the play; the aim is for the audience and the actors to enter this gap in the production. In a sense it distils the conflict between existential and ontological questions in a situation into few sentences. The conflict then should saturate or shadow every piece of action, every image and word, and make the situation believable for the audience and the actors.
In one of the rehearsals which Bond attended, the playwright commented that in order to make everything in the play believable for the audience it is necessary for the company to identify the overall situation (App. D.2.k, par.1, p.217). The point is that no matter how short the actions or sentences are, they have to accord with the whole. In fact it is the logic of the situation that has to be exemplified clearly to the audience, and that has a lot to do with play’s own Sites and the Centre. As Bond mentioned: ‘Somebody once said to me, and it is absolutely true, you have to get the small things right in their place because they are not rhetorical in an ordinary way.’ (App. D.2.i, par.34, p.200).
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS: POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR DRAMA IN CLASSROOMS

4.1 Defining the frame

The overall aim of this research was to distinguish and outline the main areas of the theory and practice of the theatre writer Edward Bond, for the purpose of establishing the fundamentals for possible future applications of this approach in the context of drama in classrooms. My concern for Bond’s method of working came especially from his arguments for the importance of imagination in drama as well as in young people’s lives, which I regarded as a promising framework for working with pupils. Hence in the present section I am trying to locate possible directions for drama work in classrooms and note crucial areas for further investigation.

The present study started with an extended literature review on Bond’s writings, as well as on other views of his work by various authors. After locating and selecting, through the preliminary research, what I have considered the most important elements in Bond’s approach to drama, the study continued by monitoring and analysing the case of the TIE Company Big Brum. At this phase the research outlined the way Big Brum approaches the rationale of Edward Bond in their work, in light of the initial eight elements of Drama Event, Site, Extreme, Accident Time, Invisible Object, Cathexis, Story and Centre. The analysis of data revealed a ninth element, Enactment, which proved to be essential for any drama work based on Bond’s theory and practice. The analysis of the production process concluded by clarifying, to a certain extent, these areas of interest. The playwright’s eventual participation in the process helped even more in confirming the basic directions for translating his theory into
practice, while it validated and even further developed most of Big Brum’s early choices.

As the whole process demonstrated, Bond’s approach to drama is based on provoking and accommodating questions, conflicts and paradoxes relating to society and people’s lives in it. In fact the approach regards questioning as the fundamental right and duty of human beings, and as a prerequisite for changing the world we live in. For Bond, questioning constitutes the inescapable state of imagination that people master from very early infancy. In fact our definitions of values and humanness stem primarily from our imagination’s access to reality and its lack of meaning, but society and ideology interferes early on and imposes its language and fiscal values, thus hindering the crucial task of imagination. This social intervention has both positive and negative implications, because it humanises and at the same time dehumanises people, by providing the means to live in this world and by controlling any aspect of change, respectively.

For Bond, we can’t remain or become human if imagination is not free to reunite with reason, and constantly recreate and redefine our values and our humanness. If change is not made possible, our definition of humanness becomes deeply corrupted. This is why Bond is arguing for keeping the possibility for change open in society, and claims that drama has an important role to play in this process because it is a close ally of the imagination. Actually, drama is imagination reified; and as such it can accommodate children’s, as well as adults’, questioning. Ultimately the playwright is aiming at generating the conditions in his dramas that may push audience to bypass ideology and face the gap of meaning by themselves, and consequently create anew their humanness. Finally, for Bond human beings are a dramatic species, and drama is
the device we have created out of our need to change the world we are living in and bear witness to life. This need for questioning and drama is the Site D for Bond’s theatre work, the needs of the audience as the site of imagination (Bond, 200a:10): ‘Drama is the absolute basis of humanness. That is the formal process of creating humanness, is drama’ (App. C.2, par. 18, p.41).

Theoretically Bond’s view on questioning is not unfamiliar for drama in classrooms. It is true that Drama in Education is not a unified area with commonly held definitions and practices, but it is interesting to link the significance of Bond’s questioning to that of Dorothy Heathcote’s (1990) crucible paradigm as the preferred view of children by adults and education. Heathcote (ibid) states for example that:

My own instinct is to work with the child as crucible, where “me and you have to keep stirring everything around”. I don’t regard knowledge as ever “finished”, and I consider it important that the pre-knowledge children have, the pre-understanding, the pre-attitudes they bring, I have to somehow discover rather than to begin by laying some new thing upon them. (p. 28)

It is interesting to note that for Big Brum it seems that this is the paradigm with which they consciously identify their work: ‘Philosophically we start from the premise that we work from the “crucible” paradigm’ (App. C.3, par.22, p.59).

So for Heathcote the teacher and the students together should keep ‘stirring everything around’; and this stance may appear very close to Bond’s view of questioning everything in order for change to take place. This is of course just an initial thought on the possible connection, but it is possible Heathcote (1984) did have a similar attitude in mind since in another article earlier in her carrier she wrote:

Let us look at what is special about drama itself. The most important manifestation about this thing called drama is that it must show change … teachers have to be able to trap the people into an agreement that for now they will believe in ‘the big lie’ in order that they will fight through to the process of change and not say, ‘I don’t like this, Miss’, and go away. (p 115)
Interestingly Bond used a similar phrase to describe the art of drama: ‘The art of writing drama is to set up a situation that you cannot escape from’ (App. C.2, par.29, p.42).

Additionally Heathcote, at that early time, argued for the importance of discovering children’s pre-knowledge rather than prioritising the imposition of new knowledge upon them. Maybe this is another common point for the two authors, since Bond consistently insisted that Cathexis of objects in the pre-real stage, before ideology hijacks meaning, is the source of our humanness. This is however a rather difficult thing to verify, since Heathcote never offered an explicit overview of her political and philosophical view as Bond did. The point to be made though is that the audience and the participants in Bond and at least early Heathcote are seen as meaning-seeking species that need to be addressed as such by drama work.

4.2 Possible directions for Drama\(^8\) work

First of all there has to be a strong, clear and recognisably ordinary Story for the participants. It is fundamental for the Story to describe realistic situations which should be made believable. But at the same time it must contain the seeds of its own subversion. It should be realistic but as with any real event in social life it should also reflect the fundamental conflict taking place in the world it attempts to describe. Hence any particular action or event in it should make it possible to grasp the overall social Site, even from the very beginning of Drama. The development of this conflict is ultimately how the Story is put under pressure. However, if believability were not set up adequately, none of the challenges to the Story could be made possible later.

\(^8\) From now on Drama instead of drama in classrooms.
I think that the most important direction here has to do with the relation of the Story to the Site A and the conflict that comes from within. So the Story is not interrupted by the action in order to expose the ideological, but it is revealed as a consequence of the Story itself. As Katafiasz (in Davis, 2005:36) argues, Bond’s approach is based on projecting the conflict onto an object which, as the present study exemplified, is lived through Cathexis and Enactment. In a sense the Cathected object is working as a seemingly ‘protective’ device, which in essence protects the character and thus the audience from the immediate control of reason.

The kinds of objects that could be used in a Drama must be apparently ordinary and recognisable by the participants, with no socially-constructed symbolic meaning, because they need to ‘protect’ the individuals from their conscious, ideologically-constructed views and direct their attention to a seemingly ‘neutral’ area. These objects should offer a fertile ground for becoming, through the interactions with them in the process of drama, parts of the participants’ ideological self, even as participants are not consciously aware of that, at least in the beginning. On the other hand objects should contain the conflict of the situation within them. They reify the paradox of the situation and of the Site, which is gradually becoming more intense and Extreme. So the paradox is made present and liveable for the self as well. These objects work as a kind of a trap that makes ultimate responsibility for the situation apparent for each of the individuals.

The above could be made possible in conditions that promote Enactment. I would think that Enactment may approximate lived or authentic experience in some sense. Now this could mean that the planning of a Drama should manage to connect the participants in a ‘believable’ and authentic way to the situation and the Site. As
mentioned above, it is the Enactment of the situation that brings the actors closer to a Drama Event and the felt experience that Bond is after when he argues that ‘It is an imperative of imagination to seek reason through experience’ (Bond, 2000:142).

It is not clear what kinds of tasks or activities could engage the participants with Enacting, but certainly they could not be based on a reflective manner. A reflective activity would immediately address their reason and not their imagination seeking reason. Another interesting question may relate to the role of the participants for which Bond’s approach seems to favour an in-the-event position rather than a kind of distancing frame – but the particular area needs to be further explored in order to reach a definite conclusion.

The bringing of Site A as well as the creation of Site B is fundamental for every Drama. Site B may relate to the dramatic or fictional context of the Drama but Site A refers in fact to the implications of ideology in our lives; if someone doesn’t accept the possibility of changing it, then he/she may rely exclusively on re-creating it as a given condition. Furthermore the Site A has to be present all the way through a Drama and not just in the beginning of it. As the director claimed when commenting on the use of the sheet, the Site ‘has to be there and if it is not there then it won’t mean anything which has to do with the values in the sheet’ (App. C.1.c, par.64, p.24).

Again there is a question about how the Site A may be created in practice. Some practitioners use the term pre-text to propose a similar approach but it is not clear if it may suit Bond’s view. In an example offered from Cecily O’Neill (in Taylor and Warner, 2006:9), the first episode of a Drama started with the Teacher in Role assuming ‘the role of a recruiting officer entering a small town’ and addressing the participants as young volunteers joining up. In her address the teacher in role
mentioned, among other, that ‘I know times have been hard here’ and that ‘I know there’s not much employment. I know some of your families are in want.’

The speech of the officer above certainly referred to the world of the young people in some sense and the Site B of the Drama. Bond’s approach though would rather bring in the Site as a conflict and a paradox already, as for example with the blinding of the child in *A Window*, and wouldn’t stay with the description of the condition outside the room only – something which in *A Window* Richard has offered. One of the differences is that the tension in the example relies on the description of the situation, whereas in Bond’s method an Extreme event is used which rather makes the situation felt than simply describing it.

Furthermore, every Drama has to have a Centre that defines a fundamental conflict in Site A, in other words in society. On the whole the Centre has to define somehow the implications of this conflict in people’s lives, the fundamental crisis and paradox that they face within this Site. Every structural detail of a Drama needs to pass through the Centre, though the best way to formulate it remains undefined, just as it is an open question whether the Centre precedes the dramatic context. In the case of Big Brum, the play defined the Story and the situation so the company had to analyse it and then find the Centre for their production. The work of the drama teacher though contains, at least in a preliminary way, the role of the writer as well. A teacher has to choose a situation as well as the conflict or the tension in it. Of course someone may ask the participants to invent a situation, but this doesn’t change much since in most cases the participants may never define what the Centre is or create a situation full of conflicts and paradoxes.
On the other hand the Extreme in Bond’s work could refer to a situation that creates tension in a Drama. It probably comes initially from the Site as the blinding of the kid in *A Window*, but it develops in an organic way into a personal occurrence; it impinges gradually on the self, and it is through this personally felt Extreme that Accident Time is created for the participants and our responsibility to the social is revealed.

In an even earlier article Heathcote (1984) noted the worthwhile tension that drama needs to contain in order to ‘be felt, seen and experienced’. In one of her examples she illustrated this tension as ‘The tension when a class say ‘We want a bit of peace’, and the teacher says ‘Do you want the peace of before birth, or after death?’; but she concluded by arguing that ‘Most dramas, like most things of value, often start very ordinarily and grow into experiences of value.’ (p.34). Obviously there is a clear connection between the two authors, at least on a theoretical level, in terms of how they explain the aim of a drama. But although Bond’s felt extremity of the situation projected onto the self seems a moment that calls for a firsthand experience may have similarities to early Heathcote, it is not sure at all whether Heathcote’s later development of Mantle of the Expert may still be said to go in the same direction. It is interesting to note for example that one of her first comments on the this later method of exploring an event was that the students would be in control as ‘experts’ rather than ‘suffering a crisis’ (in Bolton, 1998:240). Perhaps, as Davis (2005) argues, the assumed expertise of participants’ role in Mantle of the Expert works as a safety net that distances them from apprehension of the ‘totality of their own personal site’ (p.173). There isn’t yet any examination of these matters that could prove Davis’ suppositions.
Certainly the relation between the two authors, Heathcote and Bond, needs to be further explored and researched especially when referring to the Mantle of the Expert approach or Heathcote’s early work, the ‘living through’ or ‘man in mess’ approach (Bolton, 1998:173-244), especially with regard to the aim of making the Invisible Object visible for the participants. If the Invisible Object comes through the felt experience of the Site in our selves, then we need to explore further whether this could be made possible from a position distant from the event, which an expertise may generate for the participants, and whether it could be enough to experience the implications of the event in such an oblique way. For instance, if we were planning a Mantle of the Expert by keeping the event of the blinding in A Window, could the expertise of some family counsellors or police officers generate the same experience on the part of the participants? Or is this approach a kind of a rational dealing with the event?

On the other hand a Drama Event may be seen as a central event in a Drama through which the whole Story is essentially challenged through the physical awareness created by all the elements above. It is similar with the questions addressed earlier: I wonder how such an event could be created in terms of a Mantle of the Expert and how it could be made possible for the ‘experts’ to get a physical awareness of the event they are examining through their expertise. Of course it is not only a Mantle of the Expert approach that should be further researched but other various approaches in the field of process drama as well.

A case of Drama

A few years ago I tried to construct a Drama for a group of teachers in Greece, based on Bond’s approach as I could interpret it in those times. The specific Drama
developed from the first scene of Bond’s play *Eleven Vests* (Bond, 1997). In the scene a head teacher is ‘interrogating’ a student for vandalising a book, despite there being no clear evidence that the student was the culprit. The student rarely reacts in any way to the head’s accusations. The head constantly changes attitude from openly accusing the student to being friendly towards him. He even confesses ‘something’ about his life to the student, that once he was concerned with pupils like him, and hoped that he ‘could help’ him and the other students to survive in a world that ‘he didn’t make’ as it is (p.4). The head tries to make the student confess about the book, even struggles to bring out a reaction, any reaction, from the student. He never manages though and decides therefore to put the student down ‘as one of’ his ‘failures’ (p.5).

The event seemed to me very powerful and possibly fruitful for using in the context of teachers’ training, in terms of creating the conditions for them to see their role and responsibility in education and student’s life. The student’s silence and unresponsiveness exemplified a power over the head to which the latter was unable respond, and could not dominate in any rational way; the head’s reason proved to be inadequate in explaining the world to the student, and thus failed to impose the head’s own values on him. At the same time the head’s little speech repeated any known justification of Site’s power over students. It seemed to me that any teacher might have repeated the same words or any students might have heard the same arguments from their teachers. The story seems ordinary and recognisable for teachers, as well as students, so I decided to use the above event in a Drama. The Drama did not develop in the same way though. The purpose was to create a similar meeting between teachers and students where I hoped that the teachers/participants would manage to
see their role in school and society. The structure of the particular Drama is offered here in a very brief form.

I started the Drama by assuming the role of a head teacher of a secondary school, where violence and vandalism is a major problem among the students, addressing the rest of the teachers in a staff meeting. The pre-text here was that the school building was taken over by its students for few days, during which extensive vandalism took place. The police finally got involved, after the head teacher’s repeated fruitless efforts, and restored order in school. The staff meeting is taking place after the school was evacuated of the squatters. The head-teacher’s address developed roughly as:

My dear colleagues, I admit that I am almost overwhelmed by the latest events. I can’t remember in my career before such a pernicious and inexplicable act taking place in a school setting. The parents of the rest of the students are furious and I am sure that they are seriously thinking of suing the school for not calling the police earlier to invade and arrest the vandalising squatters. I have tried to make clear to them our continuous and sincere hard work to prevent violence and vandalism in our school, but they insist that we hold the main responsibility. I am quite sure though that the officer’s investigation will certainly absolve our school of blame, and our efforts to control violence will be validated soon. Why should we be blamed for bad parenting and for a world that promotes violence to young people? We teachers try to do our best, and we have proved that all these years. We even brought specialists for counselling disruptive students, a practice that very rarely can be seen in public schools in this country.

I know though that we were struggling all together all these years to create a school where children will make the most out of their time, and now we are having this meeting amidst the remains of a vision. I can sense your disappointment as I am sure you can sense mine. But, dear friends, I am entirely convinced that even if our school is in an extremely difficult position we cannot

\[9\] For a person foreign to the Greek context, this situation may seem exceptional. But it has to be noted that it is rather a common phenomenon in Greek secondary education. In fact it is considered ‘ordinary’ for a school to be taken over by its students for few days every year. In some cases there is vandalism as well. The point is that these actions have gradually become, in my view, so ordinary that most teachers and society take them for granted and never dwell much on their true causes. I have heard a lot of opinions arguing that students just want to miss lessons and that is why they are just making insincere demands for missing books, extra toilet paper or for permitting smoking in school, etc., and take over buildings. For an example of these actions as covered by the media watch the images in [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p68Hf2ZdZs](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p68Hf2ZdZs) (You Tube, Sky News, 2011). It has to be noted too that the Greek far right party of Golden Dawn has officially ‘warned’ that they would organise ‘visits’ to those schools which may demonstrate ‘offensive behaviour’ (see [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9jJ3A1d0kA](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9jJ3A1d0kA), You Tube, Parliament Channel, 2012).
abandon our vision. We can’t leave the school in the hands of some misled teenagers. I think we need to make them understand that this establishment is created for their own good out of our best intentions. I think that we need to make this clear to them now although we have lost a battle in making them see it. This is why I am appealing to the best of your abilities as creative teachers. I need your help in finding ways to make this obvious to our students and to convince them to be creative rather than destructive. I appeal to your skills and your morale to find new, more effective ways of making this school important and meaningful for them.

Later there was a discussion in role between the head and the teachers of the school on the events and the possible ways they could tackle the problem from now on. There were various initial suggestions from the participants, for which the head asked the teachers to form smaller groups to research and write a detailed proposal. Before the participants split into groups the lesson attempted to create the fictional context of the particular school. Among other things, the participants in small groups and out of role created and shared events from the daily routine of the school. Some of the events were located in classes, some in the yard during a break time and some other in teachers’ room. Then the group created the outside wall of the school on a large piece of paper stuck on the wall. They had to draw graffiti or write words and sentences found on this outside wall. In small groups again, they had then to create and share with the others some still images of teachers passing by this wall when they come to or leave the school. The question was how these teachers react to what is written or drawn on there.

The lesson continued by going back to groups’ suggestions as to how they think they could tackle the problem of violence and vandalism. In small groups they drew up detailed proposals and presented them in role in a new staff meeting where they had to choose which suggestions to put into practice.
The lesson relied on what the participants would have suggested and continued by using their ideas. The lesson was taught twice in different groups; the first time, the group decided to formulate a new policy statement with the basic principles that the school had to follow from now on and made it known to students by displaying it publically in various places inside the school. The second time, the group decided to create some ‘opinion boxes’ and place them around the school for students to write up their own suggestions. The boxes were decorated and carried written messages encouraging students to participate.

Although the two lessons made use of these different suggestions, they continued in both cases by challenging them in an almost identical way. I have narrated and performed at the same time the brutal destruction of any of the two suggestions in front of the eyes of the participants. For instance:

Narration: A few hours after the teachers placed the boxes (or the policy statements) around the school the students seemed to have been drawn to these objects. They gathered around them when suddenly one student performed a rather provocative action…. Look what he did. (The teacher in role as the student brutally destroying the objects)

The head teacher then called for a new school meeting and informed the rest of the teachers that the boxes, or the written statements, were brutally smashed by a student in common view. He placed one of the smashed objects in the middle of the meeting table and informed the teachers that he knows who did it because other ‘sincere students’ let him know. But he preferred not to take immediate action because he first wanted to share his knowledge with the rest of his colleagues, and then decide together how to handle the situation. In both lessons though the head teacher implicitly insisted that the teachers should call the suspect to their meeting and try to understand why he did it. In the first lesson the teachers accepted and the student was
brought into the meeting room with the teacher in role as the student. In the second lesson the participants refused and instead proposed that a counsellor should take responsibility for meeting the student. So in this case the lesson continued by dividing the group into pairs, one being the counsellor and the other being the student who smashed the objects. The pairs were initially separated for giving directions to the ‘students’ while the ‘teachers’ had to prepare for their meeting.

In both lessons the attitude of the student was the same. In the second case the student had to remain silent, almost still, never following any suggestions or orders and without ever looking at the other, but they had to remember everything of the counsellors’ words and attitudes. In the first case the teacher in role as the student kept the same attitude in the meeting with teachers of the school in the staff room.

In the second example, after the event took place I asked the ‘counsellors’ to write a full report of their meeting with the student and the ‘students’ had to write something on the meeting they had in their personal diary. They both had to mention things that stayed with them and how they saw the ‘counsellors’ or the ‘students’. Then both subgroups out of role shared their written accounts and a discussion followed by comparing the two.

In the first example the group had a discussion, in role as teachers, on their experience after the meeting with the student. The teacher in role as the head addressed some questions about why the student reacted in a particular way and what they could do from now on. Later the participants improvised a short scene where the teachers explain the events to their children back home. The improvisation wasn’t shared but we came back to a whole group discussion on how the teachers interpreted the events.
to their children and how these children may have perceived them and reacted to them.

Both lessons concluded by creating a single still image by the whole group with a teacher and a student, and putting a title on it. Using two volunteers, one as teacher and the other as student, the group had to explore various ways of representing the relationship between the two.

The description above is not complete; but while participating in these two lessons, I noticed that there was a lot of tension. The scene where the teacher in role as a student smashes their objects was really shocking for the participants. The same tension was made obvious in the scene where the teachers or counsellors meet the student and fail to produce a response or a contact with him.

Initially I thought that both lessons were strongly felt but I noted that I couldn’t detect any serious change taking place in the participants. Instead, I think I saw people confused and rather upset in the end. Some of them, I would think the majority, had retreated rather easily to familiar patterns of behaviour and opinions toward the student, and most of them didn’t seem to have a clue as to why the student behaved in this way in their last meeting with him. In both examples the last image between the student and one teacher presented them at a noticeable distance either looking away from each other or looking at each other in a very hostile position. But, most importantly, I don’t think that this was an effect of the lesson; I am not sure that the participants weren’t replicating or being influenced by their prior experience and opinion from their own schools. Certainly the above lessons were not monitored as part of a research programme, and thus there is no detailed analysis on which to base
definite conclusions, but I suspect now that there might be some serious mistakes taking place in their structure.

First of all it seems that the challenge, the smashing of objects, that was presented came neither from the Story itself nor from the participants through their experience of the Story, the Site or the situation. The development of the Site in this respect was rather weak. Probably the head’s speech in the beginning was not enough for this task, and the activities relating to the school did not make important or realistic enough connections to the outer world.

The Story and the situation are fairly recognisable for the participants, but I wonder if it could work in protecting them from their own preoccupations. The smashing of objects worked in a way rather contrary than that desired. I think that most of the participants felt insulted and really threatened when I performed the smashing, and hence they reacted by falling back or confirming their previous stances. Although such a shock doesn’t seem to be incorrect from a Bondian perspective, since Liz also had the shock of envisioning Dan’s blinding by her, I would think now that the challenge was either imposed superficially on the Story or that it wasn’t gradually built from within it. The event did not come from the participants but from me, and additionally they were not carefully prepared in terms of the ‘scaffolding’ process to experience it. The Extreme hence did not come as an effect of the situation or the Site; hence Enactment wasn’t addressed properly, even when the participants were meeting the student in pairs or as a whole group.

On the other hand the meeting room may have worked as an assumed secure place for the teachers; but I believe that there should be some focused actions taking place in there beyond simple staff meetings. The room may offer fertile and interesting ground
for developing Cathexis, but again there should be other objects which might add to it. Maybe we should have used the space in a more graphic and diagrammatic way than simply to host our meetings. Maybe some apparently neutral objects like pens or paper or even cups, notice boards, chairs, tables and books could have been used for participants’ personal investment, by their ‘investing’ in them their own values and ‘dreams’ for education.

The paper with the new policy statement may have been an interesting object for this process; but the approach in asking them to create it was, I think, too reflective, because I believe the teachers/participants had to think and organise a response likely based on their knowledge of the situation as real teachers, as they were educators in real life. Hence none of the objects was treated in an experiential way for the participants and therefore, I think, they did not create a physical awareness of the Site.

Additionally I can’t locate at the moment if an Invisible Object was made visible for the participants in terms of seeing their responsibility for the situation in Site B, the Site of the specific drama, and Site A, the Site of our social context. Such a claim would have needed a proper research programme to sustain any assumption. I would think that a serious problem of the lessons was that there wasn’t an adequately defined Centre from the beginning. In that sense there wasn’t a clear direction for holding the lesson together in a well-chosen structure, such that it could lead towards the Invisible Object and the Site.

As the study has demonstrated, cathecting objects is of major importance in Bond’s approach. I would think therefore that what was also missing from the above lessons is some objects which can act as a focus for the whole Drama and the actions in it.
Certainly managing to structure a Drama in Bondian terms needs further investigation and research.

4.3 Evaluation of the research methods

The central focus of this study was Edward Bond’s approach to drama, aiming to outline a model for possible application to drama in classrooms. The research developed through a case study of the practice of Big Brum TIE Company in terms of the Bondian theory. An instrumental case study was chosen as the research method because it deals with a particular case while seeking an understanding of something else (Stake, 1994:237). The specific company, Big Brum, is of secondary importance, but it was researched and scrutinised in depth because it could help in pursuing an ‘external interest’ (ibid), which in this case was the work and practice of Edward Bond, with whom the company has a strong and stable collaboration.

In this context, case study proved to be adequate in researching the phenomenon and for garnering deeper knowledge of the subject – this despite a vast amount of qualitative data gathered and the analysis which posed the risk of the study losing its focus. In some instances for example the analysis ran the risk of getting bogged down in evaluating Big Brum’s theatre performance rather than trying to tease out the basic directions for the way of approaching the material. The purpose of this research was not to look at acting, for example, but to outline Bond’s rationale in theory and practice for drama in classrooms.

The method of carefully choosing the critical events which could reveal the essence of this mode of working helped a lot in maintaining the focus of the study while I was observing the process, as well as while I was analysing the chosen parts and watching over again the collected videos. Of course the critical events were chosen on the
grounds of the literature review and the initial eight basic elements of interest which constituted the units of analysis. The process of analysing though had to be open enough to detect other elements which the preliminary research may have not revealed in the first place. This was true of the ninth element for study, Enactment. Certainly triangulating data especially through the interviews with the director and the playwright was very helpful in keeping the analysis open to other elements.

There was another problem that this study had to tackle. The company was working on a form, Theatre in Education, which it is not identical to drama in classrooms and that proved to be more difficult than initially thought. The aim in the particular TIE programme was to create experience for the audience through performing a text, whereas in drama for classrooms the participants are taking part in the process of creating the text and experiencing the situation directly. I can’t be sure at the moment if these two forms create different ways of experiencing for the participants, and this is another area to be researched further; but the point is that in practice they are different when regarding the role of the participants in them.

This problem was tackled in the research by focusing on how the actors were experiencing the situation, especially when the group entered the stage of development of the production. In other words I regarded actors as participants in the process, so I took note of how the situation was built for them to experience and enact it. So part of my focus during the production process was directed towards monitoring the tasks that the actors had to perform, and analysing how these tasks could serve the conditions for Enactment.

On the other hand I have tried to tackle the problem of validity through methodological triangulation by collecting data from the researcher, the director, the
members of the company and the playwright himself. The advantages and disadvantages for each of the data collection methods are presented below. Bond’s unexpected but valuable intervention in the process was particularly helpful in triangulating the findings because, although it wasn’t planned in the initial outline of the research, it offered a straightforward reference immediately derived from the playwright’s approach in practice. This is why his intervention was widely used in the final triangulation and conclusion of the findings.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
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<tr>
<td>Non-participant observation</td>
<td>It provided a direct approach to the process while it was taking place. The immediate experience of the process offered valuable understandings which could not be replaced by simply watching the video recordings. The usefulness of the method becomes even more important when it is combined with the keeping of fieldnotes and the diary.</td>
<td>There was a danger stemming from the long period of observation on a daily basis of obliquely influencing the process. The role of the observer needs to be clearly defined from the very beginning to the members of the company. The clarification needs as well to be repeated occasionally when this is needed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Video recording</td>
<td>It offered the opportunity for a second observation to take place. Furthermore it enabled the transcription of the critical events in the process and the possibility of re-checking these events numerous times. The digital camera also offered the possibility of simultaneously taking snapshots from the process while it was taking place or during the second observation.</td>
<td>Although there was a danger that the members of the company would experience the presence of a camera as something out of their ordinary working routine, there wasn’t any sign of this reaction in the process. This was the second observation I had with the group and the members easily accepted my and the camera’s presence in their working room. Moreover another factor that helped a lot was that they, as actors, were trained by their profession to be observed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fieldnotes</td>
<td>In combination with the firsthand experience of the non-participant observer fieldnotes, produced a rich record of the process. Patterns and critical events became easier to follow</td>
<td>This method cannot follow the process in detail. In such a lively and dynamic process, the researcher had to rapidly make a note and then go back to observing. This means that a lot</td>
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<td>and identify. of the information had to be coded and hence lost much of the vividness or important details of the situation. Video recording as well as complementing the fieldnotes immediately after the day’s process helped in recovering some of the lost details.</td>
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<td>Research diary</td>
<td>Among others things it contained the researcher’s reactions and personal engagement with the process, which proved to be useful in combination with the non-participant observation in terms of taking the researcher back to the experience. When referring back to entries based on experience and feelings there is a danger of the researcher becoming fixated on sometimes false impressions of the process, sometimes due to personal bias. The combination with all other techniques, however, eliminated this possibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interviews with the director and the members of the company and the playwright</td>
<td>It helped the interviewees to answer questions in their own terms and thus helped the researcher to obtain deeper understanding since the relative freedom in responding allowed further clarification and elaboration of the answers immediately. There was a danger that the interviewees might entice the interviewer into an irrelevant area and so into losing sight of the initial task and aim. That was especially noticeable in Edward Bond’s interview. It was thus crucial for the interviewer to keep referring back to the initial areas of interest with the use of a written form with the units of analysis during the interview. Another method that helped with controlling the direction of the interview was the satisfactory preparation of questions as well as the ability to adequately interpret the responses and continue to instantly forming the next relevant question. Though when I now read the transcribed interviews I can see that I lost in some cases the thrust, which is more obvious in the first interview with the director.</td>
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<td>Informal discussions with the members of the</td>
<td>Beyond the immediate observation there were a lot of cases where I had short, informal discussions with the members of the group, during Sometimes I thought that I might have been a burden for the members of the group in their break time.</td>
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I think that all the above methods were helpful for practicing the methodological triangulation and concluding into a validated outcome in the context of qualitative research of this instrumental case study.

With regard to the weakness of the non-generalisibility of case studies, the specific research does not declare that it offered an ‘absolute claim on knowledge’ (Bassey,
1999:12) concerning Edward Bond’s approach. Instead it offers a possible proposition as a starting point for applying the method in a Drama context. It concluded in a sort of fuzzy generalisation of Bond’s approach to drama and it is to be hoped it may contribute to a relevant discussion in the field of Drama, and constitute from then on a starting point for further research.

4.4 Further Research

One of the aims of this study was to locate the basic directions and elements of a Bondian way of working in drama; as such it may establish parameters for further research in this field. As can be seen already in the above, there are various research areas that need to be investigated in order to make the method fully workable in a Drama context:

- The present study focused mainly on one of Bond’s plays. Further research concerned with all of the author’s plays, or especially with the ones written for Big Brum, may illuminate or test more adequately the basic structure of his approach.

- I would think that in some sense the present case study could constitute the first, preliminary step for organising an action research programme in structuring, implementing and evaluating the basic directions of the approach in a classroom setting. Bond’s approach needs to have a working parallel form for drama in classrooms, and action research seems to offer an adequate method for exploring that. Action research is identified as a spiral or cyclical process allowing planning and the application of new ideas in practice in order to solve an identified problem or in order to introduce innovation while
monitoring the process, collecting and analysing data, evaluating the results and re-planning new interventions for improvement (Costello, 2003:7-13)

- Another area that needs further research is the need to analyse similarities between Bond’s approach and the approaches of other authors and practitioners in the field of Drama. The work of Dorothy Heathcote, for example, seems an area that may offer interesting connections and contrasts. Such comparative research could be further used in clarifying the grounds for an action research as described earlier.

- There might be a viable connection of Bond’s practice to Vygotsky’s and Bruner’s scaffolding approach in teaching. This is another area that should be researched in the context of education with the help of another comparative study and an action research.

I believe that these proposed areas for further research are fundamental for applying Bond’s model in the educational context, especially in the present social conditions, our Site A, where economic crisis and social disintegration ought to call for the redefining of our values and our views of our humanness.

Once in my early classroom experience, the parents of one of my pupils were charged with exploiting their child while begging for money in the streets of Athens, Greece. They had been unemployed for a year or so, with three kids to support. Their exploited child was kept in social services for a week away from its parents. Later, social services asked me unofficially, on the phone, as the teacher of the child, to cooperate and help them in convincing the parents to return to their country of origin since they were immigrants. I have chosen to end this study in a fairly unconventional
way by posing a rhetorical question concerned with the ‘city’ in relation to the above event:

Is there not something suspicious, indeed symptomatic, about this focus on subjective violence (…)？ Doesn’t it desperately try to distract our attention from the true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view other forms of violence and thus actively participating in them? (Žižek, 2009:9).
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**Internet websites**


