A Principal-Agent Theory Perspective on PPP Risk Allocation
Shrestha, A. and Tamosaitiene, J. and Martek, I. and Hosseini, M.R. and Edwards, D.J. (2019) A Principal-Agent Theory Perspective on PPP Risk Allocation. Sustainability, 11 (22). p. 6455. ISSN 2071-1050
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Abstract
This study proposes a framework for the allocation of risk in public private partnerships (PPP) projects. Its contribution lies in the recognition and incorporation of risks introduced by project stakeholders, and as articulated by the principal-agent theory (PAT). The framework assesses risks and routes these risks to those parties best equipped to mitigate their impact on the project. This allocation of risk is facilitated by a thirteen-step process. The practical benefit of this study lies in outlining a clear, systematic method for allocating risk efficiently to both the government and private enterprise parties of the project. In so doing, risk mitigation can be expected to improve project performance, optimize stakeholder goals, and enhance sustainability objectives, including improved operational life-cycle efficiency and elevated social and community benefits.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.3390/su11226455 |
| Date: | 16 November 2019 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | risk allocation, public private partnerships, PPP, principal-agent theory |
| Subjects: | K900 Others in Architecture, Building and Planning |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Computing, Engineering and the Built Environment Faculty of Computing, Engineering and the Built Environment > School of Engineering and the Built Environment |
| Depositing User: | Euan Scott |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Jul 2020 11:19 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Jul 2020 11:19 |
| URI: | http://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/9532 |
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