A Principal-Agent Theory Perspective on PPP Risk Allocation

Shrestha, A. and Tamosaitiene, J. and Martek, I. and Hosseini, M.R. and Edwards, D.J. (2019) A Principal-Agent Theory Perspective on PPP Risk Allocation. Sustainability, 11 (22). p. 6455. ISSN 2071-1050

[img]
Preview
Text
sustainability-11-06455 (3).pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

Download (774kB)

Abstract

This study proposes a framework for the allocation of risk in public private partnerships (PPP) projects. Its contribution lies in the recognition and incorporation of risks introduced by project stakeholders, and as articulated by the principal-agent theory (PAT). The framework assesses risks and routes these risks to those parties best equipped to mitigate their impact on the project. This allocation of risk is facilitated by a thirteen-step process. The practical benefit of this study lies in outlining a clear, systematic method for allocating risk efficiently to both the government and private enterprise parties of the project. In so doing, risk mitigation can be expected to improve project performance, optimize stakeholder goals, and enhance sustainability objectives, including improved operational life-cycle efficiency and elevated social and community benefits.

Item Type: Article
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.3390/su11226455
Date: 16 November 2019
Uncontrolled Keywords: risk allocation, public private partnerships, PPP, principal-agent theory
Subjects: K900 Others in Architecture, Building and Planning
Divisions: Faculty of Computing, Engineering and the Built Environment
Faculty of Computing, Engineering and the Built Environment > School of Engineering and the Built Environment
Depositing User: Euan Scott
Date Deposited: 13 Jul 2020 11:19
Last Modified: 13 Jul 2020 11:19
URI: http://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/9532

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Research

In this section...