

# RMCCS: RSSI-based Message Consistency Checking Scheme for V2V Communications

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**Abstract:** V2V messaging systems enable vehicles to exchange safety related information with each other and support road safety and traffic efficiency applications. The effectiveness of these applications depends on the correctness of the information reported in the V2V messages. Consequently, the possibility that malicious agents may send false information is a major concern. The physical features of a transmission are relatively difficult to fake, and one of the most effective ways to detect lying is to check for consistency of these features with vehicle position information in the message. In this paper, we propose a message consistency checking scheme whereby a vehicle acting independently can utilise the strength and variability of received signals to estimate the distance from a transmitting vehicle without prior knowledge of the environment (building density, traffic conditions, etc.). The distance estimate can then be used to check the correctness of the reported position. We show through simulation that our RMCCS method can detect false information with an accuracy of about 90% for separation distances less than 100m. We believe this is sufficient for the method to be a valuable adjunct to use of digital signatures to establish trust.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Message-based Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communications have been proposed as means to address issues in Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) such as accident avoidance, traffic monitoring and transport efficiency (Boban, Kousaridas, Manolakis, & Xu, 2018). In V2V, vehicles broadcast safety messages to exchange information about themselves and perceived road conditions. These messages form the basis of several road safety and traffic efficiency applications that are designed to improve safety on the roads. Because safety critical decisions are made based on the content of these messages, it is important to verify as far as possible that they can be trusted. Clearly, it is important for the receiving vehicle to check that a message has been signed using valid credentials that correspond to the sender identity used. However, given the large number of vehicles on the road, it is unwise to discount the possibility that a

malicious agent can acquire legitimate credentials by some means and use them to broadcast false information. It seems prudent, therefore, for the receiving vehicle to check whether the message contents make sense in the light of other knowledge available to it. The threat scenario addressed in this paper involves the malicious agent representing the existence of a vehicle in a dangerous location in order to cause accidents or widespread disruption to traffic. Typically, this will involve the malicious agent pretending to be closer to the target vehicles than it really is. The solution approach we explore here is for the receiving vehicle to check that the position claimed in the message is consistent with the strength and variability of the received radio signal.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First we present our method, which we call RMCCS; RSSI-based Message Consistency Checking Scheme for V2V Communications. It is based on the well-established log-distance path loss

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model with Gaussian noise, but with the additional assumption of a relationship linking the path loss exponent (which governs the rate of signal attenuation with distance) to the standard deviation of the Gaussian variable. This method is then compared with approaches taken previously by others. Next we validate the assumption and evaluate the method using simulation software that embodies a faithful representation of signal propagation in representative conditions. A discussion of the relative effectiveness of the method and how it may be combined with other techniques to provide an effective defence against misinformation in a V2V context then follows.

## 2 THE RMCCS METHOD

The received signal strength indicator (RSSI) is a commonly used measure of the power of a received radio signal. It is the ratio of the power measured at two different points, e.g. at the transmitter and the receiver, expressed in dB, i.e.  $RSSI = 10 \log_{10}(P/P_0)$

In the case of a non-directional signal broadcast through a uniform medium, the so-called log-distance path loss model (LDPLM) is widely used to estimate the RSSI at a receiver (see for example (Fernández, Rubio, Rodrigo-Peñarrocha, & Reig, 2014) and (Giordani, et al., 2019)):

$$RSSI \approx A - 10B \log_{10}(d/d_0) \quad (1)$$

where  $d$  is the distance from the transmitter,  $d_0$  is a reference distance that is usually taken to be 1 metre, and  $A$  and  $B$  are positive constants.  $A$  depends on the transmitter and receiver characteristics, and  $B$ , the path loss exponent, depends on the transmission medium. This is a monotonically-decreasing function of  $d$  and can readily be inverted to obtain an estimate of  $d$  given a measurement of RSSI provided  $A$  and  $B$  are known. Taking  $d_0$  to be the usual value of 1m:

$$d = 10^{((A-RSSI)/10B)} \quad (2)$$

This estimate can be compared with the distance between the known position of the receiver and the claimed position of the sender as a consistency check.

However, there are complications that make this approach difficult to use in practice. Firstly, the LDPLM only really applies to propagation in free space. For example, one correction that is frequently applied is to allow for interference between the radio waves travelling directly from sender to receiver and those reaching the receiver after reflection from the road surface. Even if the LDPLM is a good approximation at long distances, the presence of static and moving obstacles such as buildings and vehicles not only tends to attenuate the signal, but also

introduces considerable variation of RSSI due to absorption, reflection, refraction, and multi-path interference. Indeed, a more general form of LDPLM adds a Gaussian random variable with a mean value of 0 to the right-hand side of (1) to take such effects into account. This may be interpreted as a margin of error on the expected RSSI value at a given distance of  $\pm\sigma$ , the standard deviation of the random term. This can be translated to an uncertainty on the estimated distance between sender and receiver, the magnitude of which is proportional to the estimated distance, i.e. the ratio of the uncertainty to the distance is constant for a given  $\sigma$  and  $B$ .

So, obstacles on or near the line of sight (LOS) between sender and receiver modify (usually reduce) the effective value of  $B$  and introduce variability into the RSSI that has the appearance of random noise. The idea that we explore in this paper is that if these two phenomena are correlated, we could use measurements of RSSI variability alongside its mean value to obtain estimates of distance and the associated uncertainty that could be used to assess the likely truth of a reported position and give a measure of confidence on this assessment. Suppose that  $B$  and  $\sigma$  are functions of a common hidden variable,  $\gamma$ , that characterises the nature of the obstacles on or near the path between them, for example,

$$B = \gamma B_0 \text{ and } \sigma = k(\gamma - \gamma_0) \quad (3)$$

where  $\gamma = 1$  corresponds to LOS conditions,  $k$  is a constant of proportionality, and  $\gamma_0 \leq 1$  allows for the possibility of variation in RSSI even in LOS conditions. Given measurements of RSSI and  $\sigma$ , the distance between sender and receiver, can be estimated as:

$$\bar{d} = 10^{((A-RSSI)/(10(\sigma/k + \gamma_0)B_0))} \quad (4)$$

and the uncertainty on this value as:

$$\sigma_{\bar{d}} = \bar{d} \cdot (10^{\Gamma} - 10^{-\Gamma})/2, \text{ where } \Gamma = \sigma/10B_0(\sigma/k + \gamma_0) \quad (5)$$

If  $d_r$  is the distance based on the position of the sender as reported in the message, then  $|\bar{d} - d_r|/\sigma_{\bar{d}}$  provides a measure of the inconsistency of the reported position and the measured signal strength and variation. Note that, due to the logarithmic dependence of RSSI on distance in (1), if  $\sigma$  is independent of distance, then  $\sigma_{\bar{d}}$  increases linearly with distance. Thus, a given discrepancy  $\Delta d = |\bar{d} - d_r|$  may be regarded as inconsistent for small  $\bar{d}$  and consistent for large  $\bar{d}$ .

The receiving vehicle will need to extract estimates of the mean RSSI and the corresponding standard deviation from the noisy RSSI signal, but we propose this can be done using standard signal processing techniques such as Kalman and Savitzky-Golay filtering algorithms.

Below, we assess the validity and effectiveness of this approach using data obtained from a simulation, but first we review other work that has used RSSI measurements in the context of V2V.

### 3 RELATED WORK

Several existing research studies have used RSSI-based techniques to provide solutions to issues in V2V. Such techniques are popular as they have low computational cost and require no extra hardware. The main applications are Sybil node detection and localisation of vehicles:

#### 3.1 Sybil Node Detection

RSSI-comparison techniques have been proposed as a means of detecting non-existent vehicles fabricated by malicious agents (so-called Sybil nodes). The core idea behind this approach is that as the messages apparently sent from multiple Sybil nodes are actually sent by the same physical node, they share similar signal characteristics with each other and with genuine messages from that node. For example, (Yao Y. , et al., 2018) record successive RSSI values to obtain time sequences apparently corresponding to different vehicles. If identical (or at least very similar) sequences are observed, this is taken as a sign of Sybil activity. In case malicious nodes perform power control to avoid their Sybil nodes being detected by such means, (Yao Y. , et al., 2019) proposes a complementary method that finds Sybil nodes by detecting abnormal variations in the RSSI time series.

#### 3.2 Localisation of Vehicles

Several schemes that use RSSI to estimate the location of vehicles have been proposed previously. For example, (Garip, Kim, Reiher, & Gerla., 2017) describes an approach whereby neighbouring vehicles collaborate to determine the location of a target vehicle. Each vehicle estimates its distance to the target vehicle using the LDPLM formula and then sends the estimated distance and its current location to a chosen vehicle called the observer. The observer processes the aggregated information and advertises the target vehicle’s actual location. Also, (Ahmad, et al., 2019) describes an RSSI-based localization mechanism that uses nearby stationary roadside units (RSUs) to estimate the location of a target vehicle. Each RSU measures the RSSI values of transmissions from the target and uses them to estimate its distance.

Schemes like these are cooperative in nature, meaning that they rely on information received from nearby nodes to function, and are vulnerable to collusion attack. Moreover, there is no means to guarantee the credibility of nodes’ measurement reports. Besides, transmission of the distance estimates adds more traffic to the network, increasing bandwidth consumption. A latency penalty is also incurred as the observer must wait to receive distance estimates from other nodes. In our RMCCS method, a receiving vehicle acting alone can determine whether another vehicle is lying about its position.

### 4 SIMULATION AND EVALUATION

To obtain RSSI measurements, we use the GEMV<sup>2</sup> simulation software of (Boban, Barros, & Tonguz, 2014), which incorporates a range of propagation effects including transmission through materials, diffraction and reflection. In particular, it models the impact of the presence of vehicles, buildings and foliage. The developers of GEMV<sup>2</sup> have validated it against measurements performed in urban, suburban, highway and open space conditions.

To generate data for the evaluation we used models of real locations taken from Open Street Map (OSM) that include representations of building geometry and road networks. In particular, we selected locations in Newcastle, UK, that represent distinct types of environment. The locations are (a) a city center area (b) an inter-city highway, and (c) a suburban area. We then used SUMO, which is a widely used road traffic simulation tool, to generate mobility traces of vehicles trajectories in these locations. The mobility traces are then converted into floating car data (FCD) format and used as input to the GEMV<sup>2</sup> to calculate the RSSI. The number of vehicles used in these locations and other parameters used in the simulation are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Simulation Settings

Parameters	Value
Number of vehicles	2 – 200
Communication range	300m
Message frequency	10Hz
A	-39dBm
Operating frequency	5.9GHz
SUMO simulation time	3600s




Figure 1: RSSI vs Distance

The RSSI data generated from each of these scenarios was plotted against the distance between sending and receiving vehicles. Fig. 1 is an example of such a plot generated for a city center scenario in high traffic density conditions. It is apparent that the plot can be divided into distinct segments, which were found to correspond to line of Sight (LOS) conditions (characterized by absence of noise-like variability), obstruction by traffic, obstruction by buildings, etc. Each RSSI trace was divided into segments by eye. Curves of the form (1) were fitted independently to each segment to obtain values for  $B$ , with  $A$  being held fixed at a value (given in Table 1) determined from typical vehicle characteristics, and  $d_0 = 1$ . The root mean square deviation of RSSI points from the fitted curves was then calculated to obtain  $\sigma$  values for each segment. It may be seen from Fig. 2 that the segments appear to be distributed about a straight line in  $(B, \sigma)$  space. We therefore assumed the parameterisation of (3) with  $B_0$  being the least value of  $B$  for any segment, and  $k$  and  $\gamma_0$  being determined from a least-squares fit through the points of Fig 2.

From (5) we see that the ratio of the uncertainty on the distance estimate ( $\bar{\sigma}_d$ ) to the distance estimate itself ( $\bar{d}$ ) is dependent on  $\sigma$ . For  $B_0=1.4$  and using  $k=3.89$  and  $\gamma_0=1.00$  from the least squares fit, the ratio is about 0.14 for  $\sigma=1$ dBm, 0.38 for  $\sigma=5$ dBm and 0.49 for  $\sigma=10$ dBm. If we use a 3 sigma criterion for consistency, then for  $\sigma=1$ dBm, the discrepancy between claimed distance and true distance would need to be greater than 42% of the true distance to be judged to be lying. For  $\sigma=3.75$ dBm, the required discrepancy is about the same size as the distance itself. As the main threat comes from vehicles claiming to be closer than they really are, then the proposed technique is only useful for  $\sigma < 3$ dBm. Reducing the inconsistency criterion extends the applicable  $\sigma$  range, however, albeit at the cost of increased false positives.




Figure 2: Least Square fitting of  $(B, \sigma)$




Figure 3: Mean RSSI and standard deviation data generated from the filtering algorithm

To use (4) to estimate its distance from a moving transmitter, and (5) to estimate the uncertainty on this value, a receiving vehicle must extract mean RSSI values and the corresponding standard deviations from a 'noisy' sequence of RSSI measurements. Furthermore, these values must be updated continuously. Two alternative algorithms were tried for this purpose, a Kalman filter and a Savitzky-Golay filter. The filtering algorithms were reset at the boundaries between segments, which were detected as a rapid alteration in the rate of change of the mean RSSI. Fig. 3 shows a sample trace overlaid with the values extracted using the Savitzky-Golay filter. As may be seen, the algorithms are reasonably effective at tracking the mean RSSI value and the corresponding standard deviation.

The distance between the sender and receiver was estimated using (5) and then compared with the true distance calculated based on the reported position in the received message. Fig. 4 plots the estimated distance against the true distance for the sample trace. It can be seen that on average, the estimated distance and true distance are equal, but the margin of error increases with distance. The estimation error, defined

as  $|\bar{d} - d_r|/d_r$ , was found to be less than 25% everywhere and is below about 12% for separation distance less than 50m. Also, the overall average estimation error was found to be 7.5% for distances up to 250m.




Figure 4: Estimated distance vs True distance

To assess the probability of true negatives, TN, (and false positives, FP) for different inconsistency criteria, we calculated the proportion of data points in the sample trace for which the absolute difference between the true and estimated distance exceeds various multiples of  $\sigma_d$ . To assess the probability of true positives, TP, (and false negatives, FN), we used threat scenario in which a static malicious vehicle simulates a Sybil vehicle following the target vehicle at various fixed distances. TP is calculated as the proportion of data points in the sample trace for which the difference between the reported distance and the estimated distance exceeds various multiples of  $\sigma_d$ . The results are shown for various following distances and inconsistency criteria in Fig. 5.




Figure 5: True Positives for the evaluation scenario

To get an overall assessment of TP for a given inconsistency criterion, we took the average over the various following distances up to 250m. Because it is reasonable to suppose that detecting fictitious vehicles that are faraway is less important than detecting ones that are nearby, we also calculated the averages over following distances up to 100m. Having obtained TN and TP values for a range of inconsistency criteria we calculated accuracy values:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Accuracy} &= (\text{TP} + \text{TN}) / (\text{TP} + \text{TN} + \text{FP} + \text{FN}) \\ &= (\text{TP} + \text{TN}) / 2 \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The results are shown in Table 2. As can be seen, an inconsistency criterion of  $|\bar{d} - d_r|/\sigma_d > 1$  appears to give the best accuracy of approximately 90% for distances up to 100m and about 83% for longer distance up to 250m.

Table 2. Evaluation parameters of RMCCS for three inconsistency criteria:  $|\bar{d} - d_r|/\sigma_d > N$

Metric	Distance(m)	N = 1	N = 2	N = 3
TN	up to 250m	0.9551	0.9708	0.9809
TP	up to 250	0.7195	0.4344	0.2051
	up to 100	0.8441	0.4834	0.1119
Accuracy	up to 250	0.8373	0.7026	0.59303
	up to 100	0.8996	0.7271	0.54641

## 5 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we describe RMCCS – a mechanism that utilizes RSSI measurements to detect when vehicles are lying about their position. Like many other methods, RMCCS makes use of the LDPLM RSSI formula. However, by proposing a linear relationship between the path loss exponent and the standard deviation of the noise component in this formula, the RMCCS method enables a receiving vehicle to estimate distance independently without prior knowledge of environmental conditions such as the current traffic conditions and building density in the vicinity. The assumption of a linear relationship is justified by empirical evidence obtained from a realistic simulation. The estimated distance and associated uncertainty provide a means to judge whether the sender is lying about its claimed position. As a measure of inconsistency, we use the ratio of the magnitude of the difference between reported and estimated distances to the uncertainty on the estimate. The sender is judged to be lying if the inconsistency is greater than a threshold value. Lowering the threshold tends to increase true positives, but reduce true negatives. The threshold can be varied to obtain an optimal value that maximises accuracy (which is proportional to the sum of true positives and true negatives). This provides a way for vehicles to detect misinformation without the need for support from their neighbors or any nearby infrastructure.

Contrasting the previous works described in 3.2 with the RMCCS method, (Garip, Kim, Reiher, & Gerla., 2017) require collaboration among neighboring vehicles to estimate the distance of a target vehicle whereas in RMCCS the estimation algorithm is purely local. The accuracy of this approach depends on number of vehicles reporting

their individual estimated distances to the target and the correctness of the reported information. When a large proportion of neighbours report incorrect distance estimates, the estimated target position will deviate from its true location. Such approaches are unreliable when vehicles fail to collaborate or their messages are lost. Furthermore, the same fixed path loss exponent is used by all collaborating vehicles, whereas, as we have seen, its value depends on the obstacles on or near the transmission path. In contrast, RMCCS is able to extract a dynamic value for the exponent from the RSSI data using the linear relationship. In (Ahmad, et al., 2019), cooperation is also required, this time among RSUs. Again a fixed path loss exponent is used to estimate the distance to the target vehicle. A further disadvantage is that it is unrealistic to assume that RSUs will be available in all locations.

In terms of evaluation, the previous works assessed their methods using simulators such as NS-2, employing simple statistical propagation models. In contrast, our RMCCS method was evaluated using GEMV<sup>2</sup>, which accounts for RSSI variation caused by obstruction by surrounding objects. Studies in (Mir, 2018) show a significant difference in received power when comparing the performance of GEMV<sup>2</sup> and the propagation models built into NS-2. This indicates that performance estimates obtained using NS-2 are questionable, and that when the previous work is evaluated with a more realistic simulation environment, performance will reduce.

Another work that also checks consistency of messages in V2V by using physical signals is (Lin & Hwang., 2020). This work exploits angle of arrival measured using a multi-antenna configuration, which requires vehicles to have special hardware. This increases the complexity and cost of the vehicle's onboard units. RMCCS, however, is compatible with existing in-vehicle units.

We have shown through simulation and evaluation that RMCCS performs well in terms of distance estimation and ability to detect false position reports with an accuracy level of about 90% with separation distances under 100m. We believe this is sufficient for the method to be a valuable adjunct to use of digital signatures to establish trust between vehicles, which will not only enable effective defense against malicious vehicles but also improves traffic safety significantly.

As a future work, we aim to investigate the application of RMCCS method in combination with a symmetric cryptography based security scheme similar to TESLA in order to provide low-latency message verification in V2V.

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