

Understanding the Changing Voter Attitudes and Perceptions Toward Brexit

By

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Contents

Declaration.....	5
Elegy for Ed Rowe	5
Acknowledgements.....	6
Tables	7
Figures.....	7
Abstract.....	8
Chapter 1: Introduction	10
Introduction	10
Intended Contribution to Academic Literature	10
How Political Discourse Shapes Voters Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit.....	12
How British and European Society Influence Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit.....	14
How Social Identities Moderate Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit.....	16
How Collective Narcissism Impacts Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit.....	18
Research Motivation	20
Research Problem Statement	21
Research Questions	21
Research Objectives.....	22
Structure of Thesis	22
Chapter 2: The Analytical Challenges of Social Identity.....	25
Introduction	25
Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 23rd January 2013 to 24 th May 2019	29
Understanding Social Identification and Its Consequences.....	32
What is Social Identification?.....	33
How Social and Political Discourse Influences Social Identification	35
How Perceptions of Social Change Influence Social Identification.....	37
How Does Social Identification Influence Voting Behaviour?.....	40
How Narcissistic Social Identities Can Influence Voters	40
Voting Choice as In-Group Favouritism Behaviour	42
Voting Choice as Out-group Derogation Behaviour.....	44
Study Design.....	47
Participants	48
British Attitudes Survey	49

European Attitudes Survey	55
Psychometric and Demographic Materials	60
Voting Behaviour.....	61
British Attitudes Survey	61
European Attitudes Survey.....	61
Social Demographics	61
Psychometric Indicators.....	62
Indices for Social Identification	62
Indices for Collective Narcissism.....	63
British Attitudes Survey	64
British Social Identification	64
British Collective Narcissism	64
European Attitudes Survey.....	64
European Social Identification.....	64
European Collective Narcissism.....	65
Scale Reliability Analysis	65
British Social Identification	66
British Collective Narcissism	66
European Social Identification	66
European Collective Narcissism	66
Pearson's Correlation Coefficients.....	67
British Attitudes Survey	67
European Attitudes Survey	68
Exploratory T-test Analyses	69
Findings	70
British Attitudes Survey	70
European Attitudes Survey	71
Discussion.....	72
Conclusion.....	74
Chapter 3: Wider Methodological Considerations	77
Introduction	77
Research Design	78
Procedure for Conducting Studies	92

Ethical Considerations.....	100
Chapter 4: Textual Analyses of Electoral Manifestos	102
Introduction	102
Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 23 rd July 2019 to 29 th October 2019.....	105
How Party Manifestos Influenced the Debate around Brexit.....	107
The Prospective Impact of Brexit on Voters	124
Study Design.....	128
Findings	132
Pro-Leave, British Unionist Parties.....	132
Pro-Second Referendum, British Unionist Parties	136
Pro-Second Referendum, British Separatist Parties	140
Discussion.....	144
Conclusion.....	148
Chapter 5: Focus Groups on Aspects of Brexit and Identity	151
Introduction	151
Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 1 st December 2019 to 1 st January 2021.....	154
British and European Social Identities	155
How the British Institutions and Wartime History Influences British and European Identities	156
How Race and Social Class Influence British and European Identities	158
How the British Monarchy Influences British Identities	162
How EU-based Euroscepticism Influences British and European Identities	164
How Cultural Euroscepticism Influences British and European Identities.....	168
How Attitudes toward Globalisation Influence British and European Identities.....	170
Study Design	171
Eligible Participant Characteristics.....	171
Participants' Pseudonyms, Codes and Demographics	174
Focus Group Questions	176
Procedure for Thematic Analysis	177
Findings	177
How did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?	177
British Identities	177
Leave Voters.....	178
I Construct my British Identity by Preserving British History and Traditions.....	178

My British Identity is Constructed Based on a Fading Ideal of Britain	179
Remain Voters.....	180
I Construct my British Identity by Embracing Contemporary British Multiculturalism	180
My British Identity is Constructed in the Shadow of the British Empire.....	182
European Identities.....	183
Leave Voters.....	183
I Do Not Construct a European Identity for Myself	183
Remain Voters.....	185
Being a Member of the EU Allowed Me to Construct a European Identity.....	185
My European Identity is Less Significant than Other Identities in my Self-construct	186
How Did Voters Perceive the Potential Social Impact of Brexit?	188
Leave Voters.....	188
I Will Lose Relationships Because of Brexit.....	188
Brexit Will Make Me Feel More Connected to Fellow Leave Supporters	190
Remain Voters.....	191
Losing Freedom of Movement Will Make Life Worse for Me and My Family	191
Brexit Will Make Society Unsafe for Vulnerable People	192
Discussion.....	193
Conclusion.....	197
Chapter 6: Conclusion	199
Overview	199
Findings	201
Wider Ambitions of the Study.....	203
Contributions	205
Contribution to the Study of Brexit.....	205
Contribution to the Study of Social Psychology.....	206
Limitations of the Study	206
Recommendations for Further Research.....	207
Chapter 7: Bibliography	209
Chapter 8: Appendices.....	248
Appendix 1: Exploratory T-tests Data	248
Appendix 2: British Attitudes Survey	256
Appendix 3: European Attitudes Survey	271

Appendix 4: Focus Group Transcripts	284
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

Elegy for Ed Rowe

The following is a short elegy for my dad, Edwin Fitzgerald Rowe. He was born on the 11th of July 1965 and passed away on the 28th of July 2021. A big-hearted man who loved to entertain and will be missed by countless people who knew him. Beloved as the drummer for Mystic Foundation and Asetaman, and as DJ EDRO. Thank you for everything, Dad.

Elegy for Ed Rowe

*He woke July's eleventh night,
A birthmark golden on his right,
To teach a sister how to read
But learn from others when to lead.*

*Guitars and keyboards whistled tunes,
His kickdrum roared at Handsworth's moon.*

*On wheels he raced to practice faster,
How soon he jammed with reggae's masters-*

*McGregor, Isaacs and John Holt,
Japan would join Jamrock's revolt.
A rebel, tall with dreadlocked hair.
His parents new to England's air.*

*A pub, a drink, in time a wife,
His three sons celebrate his life.
He taught me always to explore
And cherish times together more.*

*A journey to ancestral land
To build a house then find a band.
Contagion stole his breath away.
Now each spin brings a broken day.*

by Jay Edwin Moses Rowe

né Jahmahl Edwin Moses Rowe

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Tables

TABLE 1 TIMELINE OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS REGARDING BREXIT: 23RD JANUARY 2013 TO 24TH MAY 2019 (UK PARLIAMENT, 2020; EUROPA, 2020)	32
TABLE 2 PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS FOR SURVEYS	49
TABLE 3 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY CONTINUOUS VARIABLES	68
TABLE 4 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY CONTINUOUS VARIABLES	68
TABLE 5 FOR EXPLORATORY T-TEST M AND SD	70
TABLE 6 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY	71
TABLE 7 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY	71
TABLE 8 FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS	90
TABLE 9 COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM QUESTIONS (GOLEC DE ZAVALA ET AL., 2009)	90
TABLE 10 SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION QUESTIONS (ELLEMERS ET AL., 2002)	90
TABLE 11 TIMELINE OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS REGARDING BREXIT: 23RD JULY 2019 29TH OCTOBER 2019 (UK PARLIAMENT, 2020; EUROPA, 2020)	107
TABLE 12 NATIONAL IDENTITY IN GREAT BRITAIN (YOU GOV, 2020)	122
TABLE 13 CASE STUDY MANIFESTOS FOR THEMATIC ANALYSIS (UK PARLIAMENT, 2020)	130
TABLE 14 TIMELINE OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS REGARDING BREXIT: 1ST DECEMBER 2019 TO 1ST JANUARY 2021 (UK PARLIAMENT, 2020; EUROPA, 2020)	155
TABLE 15 PARTICIPANT PSEUDONYMS AND DEMOGRAPHICS	176
TABLE 16 BRITISH SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION FINDINGS	248
TABLE 17 BRITISH COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM FINDINGS	249
TABLE 18 LEAVE BRITISH FINDINGS	251
TABLE 19 REMAIN BRITISH FINDINGS	252
TABLE 20 EUROPEAN SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION FINDINGS	253
TABLE 21 EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM FINDINGS	254
TABLE 22 LEAVE EUROPEAN FINDINGS	255
TABLE 23 REMAIN EUROPEAN FINDINGS	256

Figures

FIGURE 1 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY MEAN AGE	49
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FIGURE 2 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY 2016 VOTE	50
FIGURE 3 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY GENDER	50
FIGURE 4 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY ETHNICITY	51
FIGURE 5 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY SOCIAL CLASS	52
FIGURE 6 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY REGION	53
FIGURE 7 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY REGIONAL MOBILITY	53
FIGURE 8 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY 2019 SECOND REFERENDUM PREFERENCE	54
FIGURE 9 BRITISH ATTITUDES SURVEY 2017 GENERAL ELECTION VOTE	55
FIGURE 10 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY MEAN AGE	55
FIGURE 11 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY 2016 VOTE	56
FIGURE 12 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY GENDER	56
FIGURE 13 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY ETHNICITY	57
FIGURE 14 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY SOCIAL CLASS	58
FIGURE 15 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY REGION	58
FIGURE 16 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY REGIONAL MOBILITY	59
FIGURE 17 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY 2019 SECOND REFERENDUM PREFERENCE	59
FIGURE 18 EUROPEAN ATTITUDES SURVEY 2019 GENERAL ELECTION PREFERENCE	60
FIGURE 19 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDY	82
FIGURE 20 ANTI-UNIONISM IN WALES, NORTHERN IRELAND AND SCOTLAND (BBC WALES, 2020; LUCID TALK, 2020; DRG GLOBAL, 2020)	121
FIGURE 21 FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS' 2016 VOTE	172
FIGURE 22 FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS' GENDER	172
FIGURE 23 FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS' 2016 RACE OR ETHNICITY	173
FIGURE 24 FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS' AGE RANGES	174
FIGURE 25 BRITISH SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION FINDINGS	249
FIGURE 26 BRITISH COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM FINDINGS	250
FIGURE 27 LEAVE BRITISH FINDINGS	251
FIGURE 28 REMAIN BRITISH FINDINGS	252
FIGURE 29 EUROPEAN SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION FINDINGS	253
FIGURE 30 EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM FINDINGS	254
FIGURE 31 LEAVE EUROPEAN FINDINGS	255
FIGURE 32 REMAIN EUROPEAN FINDINGS	256

Abstract

On June 23rd, 2016, the electorate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland voted to leave the European Union in a referendum; that political date would create seismic changes in how the UK was governed, on how its citizens related to their country and their continent and concerning how the UK would function as one of the world's largest economic,

normative and military powers thenceforth. This research sought to understand how Leave and Remain voters constructed and reshaped their British and European identities in the half-decade following the Brexit vote, and how voters and parties perceived the social impacts of Brexit in the immediate and longer term. This author of this thesis attempted to contribute to the growing body of research in the social psychology of Brexit and Western state nationalism in the post-2016 era. This was achieved by conducting primary data analysis of five focus groups, nine electoral manifestos and two surveys consisting of 148 and 157 participants, respectively. The study made consistent use of secondary research in empirical experimental psychology, social statistics, political science, cultural studies, and sociology to contextualise the findings of the mixed methods primary data. The findings suggested that the psychological trait of collective narcissism coupled with continued support for Brexit influenced strong support for Leave supporting parties (Conservatives, UKIP, *The Brexit Party which became* Reform UK) in the post-2016 era. Moreover, social attitudes in line with, firstly, national traditionalism in Leave supporters and, secondly, multiculturalism liberalism in Remain voters, sat either side of Brexit divide for voters while pro-Leave Parties and Pro-Second referendum voters sought to construct contrasting perceptions of the societal impact of Brexit; being largely positive in the former, and considerably more negative in the latter. Based on these findings, this thesis highlights the persistent division in social attitudes toward Brexit among the British electorate while illuminating no clear path to repairing a divided nation. Recommendations for further research include a call for a more longitudinal data collection with a wider variety of psychological variables that would enrich the academy's understanding of the group and individual thought processes that might construct voters' attitudes toward Brexit going forward.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

This chapter presents an introduction to the subjects that will be investigated, analysed and reported within the chapters of this thesis. This thesis is written to better enable the reader and the researcher to understand the changing voter attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in the years after the 2016 European Membership Referendum which resulted in the UK voting to Leave the European Union (UK Parliament, 2020). The data collection period for the empirical, primary research of the study was March 2019 to November 2019; the justification for this period will be revealed throughout the chapters of this thesis.

The researcher presents secondary research which will demonstrate and communicate the context within which this overall study takes place. The motivation for the research will be established and codified within a set of research questions and objectives, and the structure of the written thesis will be set out for the reader.

Intended Contribution to Academic Literature

The researcher intended to contribute to the academic debate on the influence and persistence of British nationalism and pro-Europeanism throughout the Brexit era of British politics. This study will examine how the cognitive centrality and realistic appraisals of both British and European identities can influence voting behaviour relations between different identarian in-groups in society. This will be achieved by building upon the primary, experimental research of Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al. (2009) and Postmes, Haslem and Jans (2013), as well as upon subsequent studies that incorporated the work of those scholars.

Moreover, the researcher will attempt to how the academy understands British attitudes toward Europe, the European Union and the future of EU integration. This element will build upon the theoretical social research of Nye (2017) and Joppke (2004) which examines the formation of identities in Western Europe and, also, explores the social impact of these identity formations. The research will attempt to unify the understanding of how Brexit-related social attitudes are formed in concert with party political discourse in the United Kingdom. This research will be founded upon the work of Stephens (2016), Brown (2017), Henderson et al. (2016) among others who have previously contributed to this area of study.

Additionally, the researcher indented to contribute to the understanding of time-specific perceptions of the social impact of Brexit. Participants in this study were recruited in the “Brexit Year” of 2019, and the party manifestos of the 2019 General Election in the UK were also selected, to give the researcher and the present reader a snapshot of a short period of time in British history while remaining cognizant of the long-term effects and historically precedents of Brexit.

This thesis will be positioned within an emergent body of research which uses psychological research to investigate the two intertwined, transatlantic socio-political phenomena of the Brexit movement and the Trump movement, both of which became most prominent in 2016.

The research intended to utilise a three-element mixed methods approach, being online social surveys, focus groups, and the textual thematic analysis of electoral manifestos) to contribute to methodologies that can give significant insight into the psychological processes that relate voting behaviour to social discourse and social cognitive processes.

How Political Discourse Shapes Voters Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit

The researcher intended to investigate the influence of political parties on shaping voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit; this was to consider whether political influence is as significant a factor on voter behaviour as social influence. The following brief analysis of the political discourse around Brexit and Europe should help to illuminate the debates that were prevalent during the period of 2016 to 2019 in British politics.

A number of the architects of the Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 EU referendum influenced the manifestos and policies of two of the pro-Leave parties in the 2019 General Election; these were special adviser Dominic Cummings, and politicians Michael Gove and Boris Johnson of the Conservatives, and Nigel Farage of the Brexit Party. Furthermore, Labour's Jeremy Corbyn arguably played an incidental role in the outcome of both the 2016 referendum and the 2019 General Election, because of his party's failure to convince voters of the merits of voting Remain, in the first instance, and of voting for a Labour Party that supported a second referendum on EU membership, respectively (Whittle, 2020). The Conservative Party's General Election victory in 2019, with an 80-seat majority, demonstrated the concept of a Brexit being a 'critical juncture' in UK politics (Zappettini and Krzyanowski, 2019, p.382). A critical juncture occurs when a small group of political actors take a political system, such as that in the UK, in a direction that it would not have done otherwise; in this case, that direction was leaving the European Union, (Zappettini and Krzyanowski, 2019, p.382). It was an aim of this study to explore how the leadership of the Conservative Party were able to create positive perceptions and attitudes toward Brexit amongst enough voters to win the 2019 General Election. The resultant effect of the party's success was the exit of UK from the European Union on 31st January 2020.

During the campaign, national sovereignty (*the full right and power of the nation to self-govern*) and parliamentary sovereignty (*the full right and power of Parliament to govern the nation*) were elevated to a position of high salience in the public discourse by both sides of the argument, *Leave* and *Remain*. (Pencheva and Maronitis, 2018). The salience of the concept of sovereignty, particularly national sovereignty and parliamentary sovereignty were popularised by the Dominic Cummings-helmed Vote Leave campaign (Pencheva and Maronitis, 2018).

Pencheva and Maronitis suggested that the Remain campaign, and the consequent pro-Second referendum parties, also used the concept of sovereignty very prominently in their discourse to counter the discourse of the Leave campaign. In other words, the Remain campaign suggested that leaving the EU posed the greater threat to the position of the British Parliament as the supreme authority in the United Kingdom, than did remaining in the EU, because it would make the British state less powerful on the world stage, and, consequently, less able to assert its sovereignty against external threats and enemies. Moreover, the pro-second referendum parties used their own rhetoric and imagery to construct perceptions, among Remain voters and pro-second referendum supporters, that Leave voters possessed a myriad of undesirable character traits; these included the traits of anti-intellectualism, racism and general xenophobia (Moore and Ramsay, 2017). These traits were often ascribed to Leave supporters of the regions (outside of London) and of working (and under-) class social status within British society.

The Remain campaign was branded, both from within and without, as being vulnerable to allegations of elitism. For critics, the Remain campaign's use of celebrities, business leaders and global politicians fueled the narrative that the campaign, was the domain of 'self-interested elites' (Moore and Ramsay, 2017, p.7). One of the central reasons for this elitist perception was its direct juxtaposition against the Leave campaign; while Leave discourse was presented as the

language of a social movement, driven by promotion of (predominantly) white nationalism and working class revolt aimed at non-elite voters, Remain's campaign consisted primarily of macroeconomic discourse, concerns about trade, and worries about the diminished reputation of the United Kingdom on the international stage (Iakhnis et al., 2018).

How British and European Society Influence Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit

The researcher questioned how a generation of Britons would perceive life outside of the European Union in the foreseeable future, and if the intensification of social divisions, which have been evident since the vote in 2016, would continue to manifest or, rather, desist. These chapters will allow the reader to engage with arguments about the influence of history and social change in the country upon attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in the UK.

Waves of inward economic migration often reshape the ethnic and cultural make-up of the receptive country. Reactions to this, among the existing population, can result in ethnic, cultural and social class-based conflicts within the society. Malory Nye (2017) considered the societal rejection of Commonwealth migrant workers and their families, during the twentieth century, as a having a last impact of Britain's contemporary attitudes toward British and European identities. Post-World War II migration, particularly from South Asia and the West Indies, constructed the experience of multiculturalism in Britain differently to that in any other country in Europe; this led to the UK's development of divergent attitudes toward contemporary patterns of migration from Eastern and Central Europe (Nye, 2017, pp.110-122). For some Britons, anti-migrant sentiment toward A8 EU member states stemmed from a legacy of anti-migrant sentiment and widespread social conflicts that involved migrant citizens from the Caribbean and south Asian in the post-war period; a European identity that consists of an

advocacy for free movement between European borders could be seen as antithetical to these forms of British identities that are built around the rejection of out-group (*non-British*) migration.

Social inequalities based on social class and ethnicity are intrinsically linked in western societies. The experience of social deprivation can lead to the construction of a positive or else negative national social identity. Ron Martin et al. (2016) wrote that de-industrialisation did not produce a ‘uniform decline’ in large urban spaces; instead, towns, cities and counties which were unable to adapt to the deindustrialisation process declined and became ‘shrinking cities’, whereas those which adapted well to service economies and new technology industries grew into ‘re-invented cities’ with stronger innovation infrastructure than their *shrinking* counterparts (Martin et al., 269-289, 2016). An overwhelmingly negative locally based experience, consisting of an experience of economic stagnation or decline, increases in crime and deviance, homelessness and redundancy, can lead Britons to construct national identities that are linked to the negative appraisals of their lived experience; the British social identity would probably be more positively constructed if these qualities of the lived experience were reversed. For some British citizens, conversely, the quality of life in the given city, town or village of the UK in which they live and work, had scant influence on their construction of a social identity. Goodhart’s (2016) analysis contrasted localist (*somewhere*) voters, who were more likely to vote Leave, and cosmopolitan (*anywhere*) voters who were more likely to vote Remain in 2016; the latter group are citizens who are comfortable moving large distances for work and who were unlikely to develop local place-based and industry-based identities (Goodhart, 2016). Citizens who do not develop strong place-based social identities are likely to construct a British identity from other sources of information, such as media and news discourse, interpersonal dialogue and popular culture. This

distinction between localist-based and cosmopolitan-based identity constructs problematises the suggestion of a uniformity in British and European identity construction.

Ultimately, discourse economic anxiety was used, to great effect, to shape attitudes toward Britain and Europe during the 2016 EU Membership referendum. Goodwin and Milazzo (2015) found that a strong desire to ‘fundamentally reform the terms of its (EU) membership’ was pervasive in the UK and stemmed from the ‘perceived economic costs’ of membership and from a distaste for the ‘seemingly distant EU institutions’ (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015, pp.2-9). These perceptions were informed by British nationalism that was driven by economic anxiety among large swathes of the population. For voters without a strong foundational understanding of the British economy, the economic views of these Leave and Remain voters is shaped by popular discourse; this suggests that political and media organisations that promoted EU-based Euroscepticism, and pro-Leave sentiment, were able to better convince the electorate of the validity of their message when compared to those organisations that used economic anxieties to endorse continued EU membership.

How Social Identities Moderate Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit

The researcher intended to explore how manifestations of nationalism can affect both referenda and elections, as in the 2016 EU membership referendum and 2019 UK General Election, as well as impacting life as it exists outside of such political events. The researcher also sought to gauge how Leave and Remain voters placed value on national pride and tradition, and how they each perceived the notions of self-governance and self-interest in socio-political decision-making. The following paragraphs explore the influence of social identity on this subject.

Self-identities help produce social identities that are formed in relation to others within their society; Social Identity Theory is concerned with the ways in which individuals relate to

pre-existing collective identity groups; individuals can associate with these groups, by becoming an *in-group* member, or they can reject, or be rejected by, these collectives, in which case they become an *out-group* member. Kay Deaux (2001) that later 20th Century developments in social identification had evolved to include intersectional and multiple identities (Deaux, p.16, 2001). Well defined social identity differences divided voters in their Brexit choices in 2016; those self-identifying as male, white and working class were significantly more likely to vote Leave when compared to those who identified as female, non-white (BAME) and middle class. However, the Brexit vote's relationship with intersectional and other less common identities was more difficult to ascertain (Dorling, 2016).

Obst and White's (2005) concluded that the three dimensions of social identification which predicted overall psychological sense of community were cognitive centrality (or the cognitive prominence of membership within an in-group), in-group affect and in-group ties (Obst and White, 2005). The cognitive centrality of any of these social identities can be measured using Naomi Ellmers et al.'s (2002) Four-Item Social Identification (FISI) scale to understand the significance of their cognitive centrality of a given demographic variable. Social identity theorists have recognised the importance of individual agency in influencing behaviour independently but concurrently with collective action and agency. Individuals retain their desire for social individuality, and their social identification processing involves the extension of the 'self beyond the individual' which can involve primary demographic or intersectional social identities which 'orbit' the individual (Brewer, 1991, p.476). Marilynn Brewer's (1991) influential article also presented the *optimal distinctiveness theory* which argued that social identity was derived from both the human need for similarity with others and validation, *and* the need for individuation and uniqueness. Brewer's theory complicates our understanding of the

nature of the relationship between social identification and individual action; individual differences in behaviour, within in-groups, may be the result of either low cognitive centrality of in-group membership, or a result of the desire for optimal distinctiveness.

Overall, cognitive centrality of an in-group domain, and the desire for optimal distinctiveness within the confines of an in-group, are influenced by external stimuli as well as individual cognition. Abrams and Hogg (1990) identified two competing causal influences on the formation of social identities: *conformity* and *information*. Conformity was more coercive and driven by interdependence, a desire for social acceptance and a need for societal approval; whereas informational or ‘true’ influence was based on the interpretation of external stimuli produced by the in-group; these include information about values and norms (Abrams and Hogg, 1990, p.216). In voting behaviour, social identity can promote uniformity in voting choice by reinforcing social and political values which one campaign endorses, while individuals can also interpret political information differently and change their voting behaviour divergently from their in-group norms.

How Collective Narcissism Impacts Attitudes and Perceptions toward Brexit

The researcher wanted to understand how British, and Europeans living in the UK, would be impacted by Brexit, and how unhealthy social identities could have a significant impact on the lives of vulnerable people in the UK. These queries were concerned attitudes to both changes in demographics and pre-existing social attitudes among the people resident of the UK. The following paragraphs explore collective narcissism as a distinctly unhealthy form of social identification and seeks to present its consequences for the Brexit-era UK.

Voting behaviour can be influenced by the salience of social identities and the norms and values of self-identifying in-groups. However, some social identities are reinforced by

narcissistic attitudes and beliefs about the in-group and its members. One of the most frequently cited studies in this resurgence of scholarship about narcissism was ‘*Collective Narcissism and its Social Consequences*’ by Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al (2009). Golec de Zavala defined the term *collective narcissism* as an ‘unrealistic belief about the in-group’s greatness’ (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Collective narcissism was associated with traits of right-wing authoritarianism, blind patriotism and social dominance orientation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). These associated traits are often associated with support for populist movements, as Golec de Zavala and her colleagues have observed in studies concerning the Brexit Referendum and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). Natasha Frederic and Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor (2018), additionally, investigated heterogeneous national in-group identities, to understand if they led to increases in out-group derogation among those with more conservative values. A combination of high in-group heterogeneity and high individual right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) predicted more prejudice toward immigrants in general, and against non-EU/EFTA migrants specifically (Frederic and Falomir-Pichastor 2018). Voters can respond approvingly to discourse that exhibits RWA principles, such as traditionalism, conservatism and authoritarianism, as well as a hostility toward real-world factors of liberal societies, such as large-scale migration, freedom of speech and globalised capitalism.

Finally, Mark Rubin et al (2014) observed that ‘competitive’ in-group behaviour, being behaviour, which allowed groups of lower status to compete with higher status groups, and ‘compensatory’ in-group behaviour, which allowed said groups to ‘do as well’ as the higher status groups, were two most salient forms of in-group favouritist in-group behaviour displayed by study participants (Rubin et al, 2014, pp.572-575). Voter can engage in voting behaviour that

they feel will give their in-group an advantage over an out-group; this attitude is often observed in the domain of migration discourse; members of new communities in a country become an out-group over whom anti-migration supporters seek to gain a social advantage. This beneficial in-group, and derogatory out-group, behaviour discourages immigration by voting for parties that advocate policies that are hostile to economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

Research Motivation

This section explores the motivation that the researcher had for conducting this study into changing voter attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in the post-referendum period; the motivation will provide a basis for the research problem statement, research questions and research objectives.

Firstly, the researcher opted to conduct this study because of the unprecedented and unpredicted nature of Brexit; well-known forecasters and commentators considered the UK's vote to leave the European Union to be a unique moment in peacetime European history, and the outcome was widely deemed to be unlikely before and throughout the 2016 campaign (Lee, 2017; Hobolt, 2016). Moreover, the prospect of the UK leaving the EU has, alongside it, brought predictions about political, social and economic decline in the UK (Li et al., 2019; Pryce et al., 2019; Boleat, 2019; Breinlich et al., 2017). These predictions motivated the research to seek to understand how voters perceived the risks of these predictions actualising, and how these perceptions changed their attitudes toward the process of Brexit.

The UK is, at the time of writing, the only full EU member state to vote to, and complete the negotiating process to, leave the European Union (UK Parliament, 2020); the researcher

considers this a strong incentive to gauge voters' attitudes and perceptions toward leaving the European Union in novel ways.

Research Problem Statement

In this section, the researcher will clearly state the research problem that will be resolved using the research questions, methods and analytical techniques. The research problem statement is as follows:

“The UK has chosen to leave the European Union by voting Leave in the 2016 European Union Membership referendum; the winning option, being Leave, received approximately 51.9% of the vote. Brexit, as it is known, presents myriad challenges to the economy, political system and society of the UK and Europe. The study needs to understand how voters perceive the costs and benefits of Brexit, and how it changes (or does not change) their attitudes toward the United Kingdom and Europe.”

Research Questions

In this section, the four research questions that will be answered, in resolution of the research problem, are presented for the reader. These research questions will be frequently revisited throughout the thesis, and they will feature especially prominently in the three empirical chapters that present the findings, discussions and conclusions of the primary data collection. The four research questions are as follows:

1. To what extent did social identification and collective narcissism predict voting behaviour differences in the UK voters?
2. How did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term social impact of Brexit?

3. How did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?
4. How did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?

Research Objectives

The researcher addresses, in this section, the research objective that arise out of the motivation and the four research questions for this study. The desiderated aims of the research are expressed, for the reader, in advance of the primary research being conducted. The research objectives are as follows:

1. To understand how salient social identities influenced voters' attitudes toward the United Kingdom during the Brexit-era.
2. To understand how salient social identities impacted voters' attitudes toward the Europe and the European Union during the Brexit negotiations.
3. To gauge how external stimuli allow voters to construct British identities in the contemporary UK.
4. To consider how popular discourse impacts voters' attitudes toward Europe and the EU.
5. To recognise how political parties in the UK sought to affect voters' attitudes toward Brexit.
6. To identify the differing perceptions of the most significant social impact of Brexit among voters of competing ideologies.

Structure of Thesis

In this section, the researcher demonstrates how the thesis is structured, describing the content of each of the chapters that follow this introduction.

Chapter 2 presents the findings from the online social surveys which were conducted in pursuit of resolving the first research question: *To what extent did social identification and collective narcissism predict voting behaviour differences in the UK voters?* The researcher discusses the findings with the aid of secondary research into Social Identity Theory, collective narcissism, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodological choices that were considered when conducting the primary and secondary research of this overall study. The research illuminates the methodological choices with which the research is carried out, while validating the chosen research methods and discussing the ethical considerations which arose.

Chapter 4 presents the findings from the textual analyses of the 2019 General Election manifestos, which were analysed in pursuit of resolving the second research question: *How did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term social impact of Brexit?* The researcher discusses the findings with the assistance of secondary research about communications theory, British political theory and socio-economic analysis.

Chapter 5 presents the findings from the focus groups which were conducted to resolve the third and fourth research questions: firstly, *how did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?* And secondly, *how did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?* The researcher discusses the findings in conjunction with secondary research into British social and cultural history, in addition to academic discourse about Euroscepticism and globalisation.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusion of the study, examining the findings of each of the three primary research methods and attempting to provide summaries of the contributions and limitations of the present study, before recommending further directions and avenues for investigation into both the study of Brexit and of social psychology more broadly.

The researcher culminates the thesis by presenting the appendices that accompany the main body of the study, and, ultimately, presents the reader with a full bibliography, much of which was used within the main chapters, which consists of academic, journalistic and state official texts that helped to construct the knowledge base for this study.

Chapter 2: The Analytical Challenges of Social Identity

Introduction

This chapter explores the findings that were generated in an attempt to resolve the first research question for this study: *To what extent did social identification and collective narcissism predict voting behaviour differences in the UK voters?* By resolving this research question, the researcher will be better able to resolve the overall question of how voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit have changed since 2016. This will be achieved by gaining insights into how the traits of British or European collective narcissism and cognitive centrality of British or European identity differ between Leave and Remain voters, and how these traits might influence how voters process information regarding Brexit. The inferential statistical analysis of two large data sets used to the relationship between voting behaviour and the cognitive centrality and group-level narcissism of voters in both the British and European identity domains, respectively.

The study consists of two inferential statistical analyses conducted before the 2019 European Parliament Elections and 2019 United Kingdom General election, respectively, in an attempt to understand the relationship between these two cognitive measures and voters' voting behaviour in these elections and in those which took place precedingly and subsequently.

The study was conducted over two waves; the first took place in the Spring of 2019, just before the 2019 European Parliament Elections, while the second took place in Autumn 2019 ahead of the 2019 United Kingdom General Election. The first cohort consisted of 148 participants who took part in the *British Attitudes Survey*. This collected data about participants'

demographics and voting behaviour before participants completed two psychometric surveys, the *Four-Item Social Identification (FISI) scale* (Postmes, Haslem and Jans, 2013) and the *Collective Narcissism Scale* (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), both of which were modified to position the *British* identity group as the surveys' in-groups. Furthermore, the second cohort consisted of 157 participants who took part in the *European Attitudes Survey*. This collected data about participants' demographics and voting behaviour before participants completed two psychometric surveys, the *Four-Item Social Identification (FISI) scale* (Postmes, Haslem and Jans, 2013) and the *Collective Narcissism Scale* (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), both of which were modified to position the *European* identity group as the surveys' in-groups. These surveys help the researcher to investigate whether there is a statistically significant relationship between voting behaviour and cognitive centrality of identity *and* in-group narcissism. The statistical analysis is supported by secondary research about the nature of social identity; this study of the nature of the phenomenon will provide invaluable insight into the psychological processes which influence and determine attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit.

A range of social identities are identified which are derived from both biologically and ideational differences within society (Deaux, 2001). The theory of optimal distinctiveness, which distinguishes individual identity from social identity (Brewer, 1991) and the influence of in-group conformity and influence of both identities are examined in greater detail (Abrams and Hogg, 1990). Moreover, the researcher explores the importance of the cognitive centrality of in-group identities in the construction of the self (Obst and White, 2005).

The relationship between competing social identities and common demographic differences is studied in further detail. The researcher investigates the importance of cognitive centrality of gender identity, and how higher cognitive centrality of the female identity

influences women in society (Cameron and Lalonde, 2001). Likewise, the higher cognitive centrality of ethnic identities among marginalised ethnic groups is analysed regarding ethnocentric social interaction and relations (Perrault and Bourhis, 1999). The researcher investigates the importance of poverty and low social status in moderating the salience of one's social identities (Doosje et al, 2002). Finally, the importance the relationship between old age and *certainty of identity* is examined in order to illuminate both the spectrum of social identities and the movable nature of them (Hogg and Mahajan, 2018).

The researcher explores the tensions that often arise in intergroup (between social groups) relations. In principle, the higher the status of the social group the higher the levels of in-group satisfaction amongst members (Ellemers et al., 1988). The importance of in-group homogeneity of norms and values is explored relative to what Marques et al. (2001) termed the undesirable *black sheep effect*. The researcher scrutinizes the association between high in-group homogeneity and low levels of desire for individual social mobility (Ellemers, 1997; Kelly, 1993). In addition, the correlation between in-group biases (that can often be discriminatory in nature), and social group mergers is explored to understand how contemporary social change influences social attitudes (van Leeuwen, 2003).

Moreover, the analysis is further supported by secondary research into the nature of collective narcissism (or group narcissism), being a belief among in-group identifiers that their in-group is exceptional or worthy of special treatment relative to others. The definition of the concept and seminal study in the field are considered in relation to the social indicators of the Brexit Leave vote (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The influence of collective narcissism in creating a win-lose dynamic within the in-group is also investigated (Schreijers, 2015). Also, the

influence of collective narcissism over both the in-group's image and the in-group's wellbeing are critically compared (Cichocka et al., 2016).

Examining the influence of collective narcissism on in-group favouritist behaviour helps the researcher to understand how voting behaviour can be used to shore up the ingroup's wellbeing, image and status. The researcher explores how collective narcissism can influence in-group behaviour that is intended to maintain in-group distinctiveness (Voci, 2016). Furthermore, the analysis delves into how collective narcissism influences behaviour that psychologically compensates in-group members who feel lowly in status (Rubin, 2014). This in-group favouritist behaviour can also have the unintended consequence of diminishing trust between the in-group and a variety of out-groups (Brüß, 2005) and fosters negative, often stereotyped perceptions of out-group members (Rutland, 1999).

Lastly, the researcher examines the connection between collective narcissism and out-group derogatory behaviour, being activities (such as voting behaviour) that is designed to ill affect out-group members. The hostility that is derived from this out-group derogatory behaviour is explored in depth (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). The effect of collective narcissism on this form of discriminatory behaviour can have a severe influence on out-group attitudes and treatment by in-group members (Marcu and Chrysocchou, 2005). Ultimately, the researcher investigates how the effect of poverty and low social status (Pettigrew et al., 1998) as well as the psychological trait of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Frederic and Falomir-Pichastor, 2018) can moderate the likelihood of high collective narcissists engaging in harmful out-group derogatory behaviour.

Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 23rd January 2013 to 24th May 2019

The following table presents a series of significant events related to the historic course of Brexit and analyses the relevance of these events to shaping voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This table spans from former Prime Minister David Cameron's declaration of support for a referendum on EU membership in 2013 until his successor Theresa May's resignation as Prime Minister in 2019.

Date	Event	Impact on Brexit
23rd January 2013	<i>David Cameron Declares Support for In/Out Referendum on EU Membership at Bloomberg London</i>	Prime Minister David Cameron attempted to resolve the conflict between pro-EU and Eurosceptic members of the Conservative Party by offering a referendum that was ultimately pledged in the 2014 European Parliament Elections in the UK.
23rd May 2014	<i>UKIP wins 20% of the vote at European Parliament elections, Becoming the Largest Party.</i>	UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) was the most prominent, constitutionally Eurosceptic Party in the UK; this electoral victory placed greater pressure on David Cameron to hold the in/out referendum on EU membership.
7th May 2015	<i>Conservative Party Wins 330 Seats at General Election, Gaining Outright Majority</i>	The victory of the Conservative Party and the increase in voting share for UKIP, both of whom were committed to a referendum, virtually guaranteed that a poll on EU membership would take place within the fixed-term Parliament.
19th February 2016	<i>David Cameron and Donald Tusk Sign 'UK Renegotiation of European Union Membership 2015-2016'</i>	The UK Prime Minister and European Council President Signed the agreement that was conditional upon a Remain vote in the referendum. This

		promised UK voters: a freeze on EU in-work benefits, reduced child benefit payments to EU citizen's children living outside the UK, delays in new Eurozone regulation implementation and exemption from the motto of ' <i>ever closer union among peoples of Europe</i> '.
23rd June 2016	<i>Leave Wins the 2016 EU Membership Referendum with 51.9% of Vote</i>	The referendum victory for the Leave campaign, <i>Vote Leave</i> , sets in motion the process of Brexit and brings about the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron the next day.
13th July 2016	<i>Theresa Elected Conservative Party Leader and UK Prime Minister</i>	The election of Theresa May signals a premiership committed to carrying taking the UK out of the European Union. Although Theresa May was a Remain MP and Cameron's Home Secretary for six years, she was a peripheral figure in the referendum and not closely tied to the defeated Remain campaign, <i>Britain Stronger in Europe</i> .
3rd November 2016	<i>Gina Miller Wins High Court Battle vs Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union</i>	Gina Miller's victory in her UK High Court case against the government means that May's government cannot implement Brexit legislation without the approval of the UK Parliament (i.e., without a meaningful vote).
29th March 2017	<i>Theresa May Triggers Article 50</i>	This process involves writing a letter to the European Union which formally begins the two-year process of negotiating the Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK.
18th April 2017	<i>Theresa May Calls General Election</i>	After consistently high opinion poll ratings, the Prime Minister seeks to increase her parliamentary majority to ease

		the passage of Brexit legislation.
8th June 2017	<i>Conservatives Lose Majority in Hung Parliament</i>	The loss of 13 seats from the 2015 General Election makes it more difficult for the Prime Minister to pass Brexit bills through the House of Commons; the Conservatives must rely on a confidence-and-supply agreement with the pro-Brexit Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland to form a working parliamentary majority.
14th November 2011	<i>Theresa May's Withdrawal Agreement in Agreed and Published</i>	Theresa May's November 2018 version of the Withdrawal Agreement becomes unpopular within the House of Commons, with a good deal of distaste concerning the 'backstop' which was an insurance policy that ensured the UK would remain in a 'single customs territory' with the EU if the UK and European Union failed to reach a free trade agreement after the transition period; the backstop was primarily designed to ensure no hard border existed on the island of Ireland (between Northern Ireland and the Republic) in any possible event.
16th January 2019	<i>Theresa May Survives a Parliamentary No Confidence Vote after Losing Vote on Withdrawal Agreement</i>	After Parliament rejects the Withdrawal Agreement, which included a rebellion by Conservatives and the DUP, Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn Calls a <i>no confidence vote</i> in the Prime Minister. This is May's second vote of confidence in two months; the Prime Minister won an internal party vote after 48 Conservative MPs sent letters to the backbench 1922

		Committee to request such a vote. These votes of confidence keep the Prime Minister in position.
1st April 2019	<i>Last of 3 Meaningful Votes and 8 Indicative Votes Fails to Gain Parliamentary Majority</i>	Three meaningful votes on the Withdrawal Agreement have failed to pass through parliament and, by this date, the eight indicative votes on an alternative to the Withdrawal Agreement fails to gain a majority of support in Parliament. The eight indicative options are: <i>a public vote on the Withdrawal Agreement, a permanent customs union, Labour's renegotiation, a common market 2.0, to revoke Article 50, a No-deal Brexit, Fysh's standstill agreement and Eustice's EFTA and EEA proposal.</i> There is no clear direction forward for the Prime Minister having been granted an extension to the Article 50 negotiations.
24th May 2019	<i>Theresa May resigns as Prime Minister</i>	The Prime Minister clears the way for a successor in the role, with no clear plan of what will next occur with Brexit. The two final candidates will be Jeremy Hunt and Boris Johnson.

Table 1 Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 23rd January 2013 to 24th May 2019 (UK Parliament, 2020; Europa, 2020)

Understanding Social Identification and Its Consequences

The following sections explore the concept of social identification, exploring how social identities influenced, and we influenced by, discourse surrounding the UK's exit from the European Union.

What is Social Identification?

In this section, the researcher investigated the seminal research that constituted the basis for the study of contemporary social identities; the foundation of this school of research spanned over two decades.

Ones' social identity begins with their self-identity and is formed in relation to the self-identities of others within their society; Social Identity Theory is concerned with the ways in which individuals cognitively process and observe pre-existing collective identity groups; individuals either associate with these groups, by becoming an *in-group* member, or else they do not identify with, or be rejected by, these collectives, in which case they become an *out-group* member. Kay Deaux (2001) identified the original gender binary identities (male and female), ethnic and national identities, and some sexual orientation identities (predominantly gay and straight) as those to which society-at-large often affixes meanings and associations; the researcher noted that later 20th Century developments in social identification had evolved to include intersectional and multiple identities (Deaux, p,16, 2001). Clearly defined social identity differences divided voters in their Brexit preferences in 2016; those self-identifying as male, white and working class were clearly more likely to vote Leave when compared to those who identified as female, non-white (BAME) and middle class; while the Brexit votes relationship with intersectional and less perceptible identities was more difficult to ascertain (Dorling, 2016).

Furthermore, the researcher's ability to investigate the relationship between in-group identity and is moderated by the saliency of the group identity in the individual, and the level of commitment that they feel toward their in-group. Obst and White's (2005) study concluded that the three dimensions of social identification which predicted overall psychological sense of community were cognitive centrality (or the cognitive prominence of membership within an in-

group), in-group affect and in-group ties (Obst and White, 2005). The cognitive centrality of any of these social identities can be measured using Naomi Ellmers et al.'s (2002) Four-Item Social Identification (FISI) scale; participants mean scores in this scale can be analysed in relation to their voting behaviour data or scores in other socio-cognitive measures to understand the significance of their cognitive centrality of a given demographic variable. However, while understanding social identities can give researchers valuable insight into understanding their behaviour, social identity theorists have recognised the importance of individual agency in influencing behaviour independently of collective agency. Individuals need to retain their desire for social individuality, and, with this, their social identification involves extending the 'self beyond the individual' which can involve primary demographic or intersectional social identities which 'orbit' the individual (Brewer, 1991, p.476). Marilynn Brewer's (1991) influential article also presented the *optimal distinctiveness theory* which argued that social identity was derived from two competing social needs: firstly, the human need for similarity with others and validation, *and*, secondly, the need for individuation and a sense of uniqueness. Brewer's theory complicates the researchers understanding of the nature of the relationship between social identification and individual action; differences in individual behaviour within in-groups, such as one member voting Remain and another Leave, may be the result of either low cognitive centrality of in-group membership, or a result of the desire for optimal distinctiveness.

Moreover, one's cognitive centrality of an in-group domain, and their desire for optimal distinctiveness within that in-group, are influenced by external stimuli as well as individual cognition. Abrams and Hogg (1990) identified two competing causal influences on the formation of social identities: the influence of *conformity* and *informational* influence. Conformity was more coercive in nature, and was fueled by interdependence, desired social acceptance and a

need for approval in society; whereas informational or ‘true’ influence was based on valid, albeit subjective reasons for an individual to closely identify with a social group, including for reasons such as a confluence in values and norms (Abrams and Hogg, 1990, p.216). In voting behaviour, social identity can promote uniformity in voting choice by reinforcing social and political values which one campaign endorses, while individuals can also interpret campaign information differently, then alter their voting behaviour in a distinct manner that diverges from their in-group norms.

How Social and Political Discourse Influences Social Identification

In this section, the researcher analysed how one’s social identity is determined and influenced by the variety, complexity and salience of their various in-group identities; this analysis gave the researcher insight into the factors which influence the make-up of contemporary British and European social identities in an increasingly multi-cultural continent.

One’s cognitive centrality of their social identity can be influenced by the prevalence of social and political discourse in contemporary society; acceptable in-group norms and values can make some individuals feel a greater sense of belonging to the group, while simultaneously making other members feel more distant toward the in-group. Cameron and Lalonde’s (2001) study of gender-derived social identification sought to understand differences in men’s and women’s differences in the cognitive centrality of gender. The study found that women had an overall higher cognitive centrality of gender than men, albeit ‘feminist women’ had a significantly higher cognitive centrality of gender than ‘traditional women’ (Cameron and Lalonde, 2001, pp.59-65). Differences in the cognitive centrality of an in-group identity can moderate the influence of that in-group identity on shaping the social behaviour of members; frequent exposure to either progressivist and traditionalist discourses can make in-group

members feel more connected to, or more alienated from, the norms and values of the group. While Cameron and Lalonde's study looked at the influence of discourse of gendered social identities, further research could be conducted into its influence on ethnocentric, class-based and cultural-specific social groups.

Compellingly, an earlier study by Perrault and Bourhis (1999) sought to understand how the *minimal group paradigm* was related to contemporary discourse and social behaviour within psychological experiments; this paradigm stipulated that the minimal condition for observing group biases is group membership, rather than any other social or ideological factors. Perrault and Bourhis (1999) found that individuals who higher levels of ethnocentrism (cognitive centrality of ethnicity) were more likely to engage in discriminatory regardless of the ethnic make-up of their minimal group (Perrault and Bourhis, 1999). If the results of this study were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it would suggest that social discourse that observes, and often inflames, ethnic tension and conflict in society, will, by turns, override the minimal group paradigm within an experimental design, and promote generally discriminatory behaviour between ethnocentric social groups. Furthermore, the experience of harmful ethnocentric discourse and treatment can lead to out-group rejection among marginalised ethnic minority persons in a given society. Nyla Branscombe (1999) found that citizens, by and large, saw racism as 'illegitimate' and contradictory to 'fair treatment', but, significantly, one's own experience of prejudice also caused 'resentment of the dominant group' and closer exclusionary in-group identification (*based on their ethnic group membership*) (Branscombe, 1999, pp.142-147). Intergroup relations, that are influenced by toxic (or divisive) political and social discourse, can lead to out-group rejection by members of both the dominant ethnic group and the marginalised ethnic groups in society.

Ultimately, however, the influence and social and political discourse, social identities and intergroup relations on the construction of the self will diminish over time because of the life stage and the psychological development of adults those living in a society. Hogg and Mahajan (2018) illuminated the importance of age and self-construction on in-group social identification. Focus groups and surveys concluded that older respondents had a ‘more clearly defined sense of self’ than younger respondents; this self-certainty was measured across the domains of the ‘individual’, ‘relational’ and ‘collective’ self (Hogg and Mahajan, 2018, pp.68-73). As people grow older, the *certain* and *individual* self-construct will outdistance the *relational* and *collective* self in its influence on social behaviour; older citizens grow less concerned with adhering to group norms and values, and their social behaviour comes more determined by individual rather than collective thought processes.

How Perceptions of Social Change Influence Social Identification

In this section, the researcher investigated how perceptions of social change, and one’s perceived risk during experiences of social change, can influence the salience and construct of their social identity.

Differences in the levels of perceived social status, among groups in society, can influence their attitudes toward social change and intergroup relations; in principle, those of higher status are less resistant to social change that is resultant from higher levels of out-group contact. This was exemplified by Naomi Ellemers et al. (1988); conducted a series of experiments to investigate the link between social status perceptions and group permeability. The resultant findings uncovered that the respondents who were assigned to the ‘high-status’ and ‘high performance’ group conditions identified more strongly with their group and perceived their personal influence as more beneficial to their in-group relative to ‘low status’ groups

members, and, furthermore, members of the low status group expressed ‘dissatisfaction with permeable group boundaries’ (Ellemers et al, 1988, pp.509–512). Personal aversion to large scale immigration, that leads in due course to the formation of multicultural communities, can be understood as an effect of lower status group dissatisfaction with permeable group boundaries at a community level; as was observed during the Brexit campaign, support for anti-migration policies is often prominent among the group known as the *white, working class* that is considered to be a lower status group in the UK. Contrastingly, individuals within low status groups, and who are low in-group identifiers, are more open to social change relative to low status, high identifiers; however, this desire for social change is exemplified by support for their own individual mobility within groups rather than with intergroup mergers with their own social groups. Ellemers et al (1997), in their investigation of the psychological determinates of members’ group commitment, and, individuals’ mobility between groups found that high identifiers expressed higher commitment to their in-group, a greater perception of in-group homogeneity and a lower desire for mobility to a group of higher perceived status, whereas, low identifiers desired greater individual mobility between groups when group status categorization was highly ‘salient’ (Ellemers, 1997, p.623). In layperson’s terms, those individuals of lower status in society, who are not deeply committed to their social groups. desire to move into higher status groups, whether the status is determined by wealth or perceived social class; on the other hand, those two have higher levels of in-group commitment are less likely to seek social mobility regardless of the social class or financial consequences of remaining with the lower status group.

Moreover, when in-group members perceive that their social group possesses an ethnic or cultural superiority to out-groups, particularly with regard to migrant communities, their highly salient social identities can inform their likelihood of rejecting social change. Studies conducted

by van Leeuwen et al. (2003) concluded that in-group bias was positively correlated to ‘perceived continuation’ of the pre-merger in-group and negatively correlated to ‘perceived change’ in the in-group and, moreover, these relationships were strengthened when the pre-merger group identity was perceived as ‘superordinate’ to the post-merger group identity (van Leeuwen et al., 2003, p.687). Greater social change can result in heightened and intensified discourse aimed at limiting, rejecting or reversing social and cultural changes that the in-group feel is a to a historic norm; these behaviours often instigate an alienation and marginalisation of out-group members in post-merger communities. Additionally, when in-group identifiers reject social change and attempt to marginalise out-group members, this behaviour is often driven by in-group expectations rather than by an interpersonal antipathy between the individual and the out-group members. In establishing their work on the *black sheep effect* in social categorisation, Marques et al (2001), theorised that individuals regulate their own behavior in line with social context-dependent norms, and those who portray signs of anti-norm deviance are rejected by those with whom they identify, thus triggering the black sheep effect (Marques et al., 2001). The black sheep effect, and specifically the desire to avoid such an effect, leads to heightened in-group bias and extremitised attitudes toward out-group members. In-group members’ fears of the black sheet effect within the in-group domain can solidify attitudes toward a desire for in-group homogeneity of norms, of values and often, in extreme cases, of demographics such as ethnicity.

The social construction of attitudes about ethnicity and interethnic differences informs the formation of social identities and can moderate attitudes toward ethnocentric social change. Caroline Kelly’s (1993) analysis found that, regarding in-group identifiers for whom race is an important source of their identity, a tendency to accentuate ‘perceived similarities within minority out-groups’ serves a dual function: firstly, these thought processes help to maintain a

perceived status superiority for the in-group and, secondly, they act as resistance to social change that might have benefitted lower status out-groups (Kelly, 1993, pp.65-75). The use of detrimental ethnocentric out-group stereotyping can result in marginalising of ethnic minority out-group members by preventing these individuals from achieving social mobility and disallowing the society-at-large from collectively constructing a heterogeneous social identity for members of ethnocentric minority out-groups.

How Does Social Identification Influence Voting Behaviour?

The following sections investigate how social identities can influence individual behaviour in ways that benefit one's in-groups and derogate against their out-groups; this theory and empirical research is used to investigate the potential influence of socially constructed identities upon voting behaviour during the 2016 referendum and beyond.

How Narcissistic Social Identities Can Influence Voters

In this section, the researcher analysed how constructions of healthy social identities can be influenced by constructions of a more corrosive form of social identification: collective narcissism. The relationship between these two socio-psychological processes can influence voting behaviour.

Voting behaviour, along with other social behaviour, can be influenced by the salience of one's social identity and the norms and values of their given in-groups; however, some social identities are underpinned by narcissistic attitudes and beliefs that can have negative consequences for in-groups, out-groups and for society-at-large. One of the most oft-cited studies in this resurgence of scholarship about narcissism was '*Collective Narcissism and its Social Consequences*' by Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al (2009). In this study, researchers defined the term as an 'unrealistic belief about the in-group's greatness'; studies found that, although

collective narcissism was not intrinsically connected to individual self-esteem, it was closely associated with traits of right-wing authoritarianism, blind patriotism and social dominance orientation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). These associated traits are often associated with support for populist movements, as Golec de Zavala and her colleagues have observed in studies concerning the Brexit Referendum and the U.S. Presidential Election, both of which occurred in 2016 (Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017).

Furthermore, collective narcissism within social identity constructions does not always serve as a belief system that is designed to protect the wellbeing of in-group members, but rather to satisfy in-group vanity. Alexandra Cichocka (2016) wrote that defensive forms of group identity possess a ‘compensatory function’ which stems from individualistic frustration; in this circumstance, collective narcissism predicts a greater concern how the image of the group reflects upon the individual, rather being focused on the needs of the group (Cichocka, 2016, p.312). Voting behaviour that is motivated by collective narcissism can, in turn, have the reverse effect of that which was intended; to take the 2016 referendum as a hypothetical example, if Leave voters were motivated, by high levels of British collective narcissism, to vote in a way that improves their individual wellbeing, the predicted detrimental economic and social consequences of Brexit would be an unintended consequence that would harm other British in-group members. Moreover, when collective narcissism influences the behaviour and decision-making processes of in-group members, it often leads to detrimental outcomes for the in-group and its members; that is to say, behaviour that is intended to satisfy in-group vanity can inadvertently harm the wellbeing of in-group members. Sandra Schruijer (2015) aimed to introduce and demonstrate the notion of narcissistic group dynamics, distinguishing the phenomenon from individual-level narcissism by use of an experimental research design. Schruijers found that, rather than ceding

power, and, working within an intergroup dynamic, group-level narcissism led to ‘win-lose’ decision-making patterns which created ‘tunnel vision’ for groups, making it difficult to keep perspective and to successfully resolve the problem (Schruijer, 2015, p.317).

It remains likely that national collective narcissism was merely one of several motivating factors behind the referendum outcome, however, its influence in discriminatory voting behaviour will be further examined in two contrasting domains: in the domain of in-group favouritism and within the domain of out-group discrimination.

Voting Choice as In-Group Favouritism Behaviour

In this section, the researcher analysed if, for voters, the choice of one 2016 referendum option over the other (*Leave over Remain, or vice versa*) might be defined as a behaviour driven by positive in-group regard and in-group favouritism.

Discriminatory voting behaviour can be used as an attempt to protect in-group members and to instill favourable conditions for low status in-groups; voters select options that will improve their groups status relative to a distinguishable out-group. Mark Rubin et al (2014) conducted two experiments into this practice, ultimately observing ‘competitive’ in-group favouritism which allowed groups in the lower status conditions to outperform higher status groups, and ‘compensatory’ in-group favouritism which allowed said groups to ‘do as well’ as the higher status groups; the low status groups did not show out-group favouritism in any condition (Rubin et al, 2014, pp.572-575). Voting choice can be determined by selecting the party or referendum option that the voter feels will give their in-group an advantage over an out-group; this attitude is often observed in the domain of migration discourse; members of new communities in a country become an out-group over whom anti-migration supporters seek to

gain a social advantage; this works by discouraging immigration and voting for parties that are more hostile to economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

The social effect of the contemporary economic context, in which an election or referendum takes place, can also determine the extent to which in-group favouritism influences discriminatory voting behaviour; the level of societal uncertainty, and the associated anxiety, can significantly influence voting choice. Investigating the influence of social status on social identification, Bertjan Doosje et al. (2002) concluded that high in-group identifiers were more committed to their in-group in times of change and uncertainty, whereas low identifiers only increased their commitment to their group in exchange for a 'more favourable status configuration' (Doosje et al, 2002, p.74). Again, recent migrants are often characterised as out-group members and, in times of uncertainty, can become the subject of populist discourse by political parties aimed at discouraging a multitude of forms of migration, in order to promote a perceived advantage for long-term or lifelong citizens of a country. On the other hand, ethnic and cultural differences within a multicultural society create an ethnocentric paradigm in which in-group favouritism can exert an influence over voting behaviour; low status among ethnic minority groups can increase in-group favouritist behaviour across a variety of international contexts.

The impact of interethnic conflict on the pervasiveness of in-group favouritism is perhaps just as salient within the context of Germany, where German, Turkish and ethnic-German resettlers continue to build a society in re-unified Germany. In-group favouritism and assimilation (*acquiring the psycho-social characteristics of the majority ethnic group*) both strengthened out-group rejection and decreased intergroup contact, however, among Turkish and resettler respondents there existed strong feelings of mistrust toward the social support and legal

system in Germany which was not echoed among the majority ethnic group (Brüß, 2005). In-group favouritist discourse becomes particularly salient in for low-status social groups, particularly groups who have experienced collective migration, because it provides the emotional and practical support for the process of assimilation into their new communities; these voters would, in principle, be supportive of parties and referendum options that are more supportive of the assimilation of new migrant communities.

Ultimately, Culture-specific and nation-specific in-group favouritism first manifests in childhood and can be influential throughout the life of the individual. Adam Rutland (1999) conducted a study with British children involving a photograph evaluation test in order to measure their national in-group favouritism. The study found that, while the ubiquity of national stereotyping was dependent on the perceived social appropriateness of such behaviour, in-group favouritism manifested only in respondents aged ten and above (Rutland, 1999, pp.63-66). Voting behaviour that is designed to promote in-group favouritism is related to, nevertheless distinct from, voting behaviour that is designed to derogate out-groups and their members within society, as the following section will not explore.

Voting Choice as Out-group Derogation Behaviour

In this section, the researcher analysed if, for voters, the choice of one 2016 referendum option over the other (*Leave over Remain, or vice versa*) might be defined as a behaviour driven by negative out-group regard or out-group derogation.

Within a highly multicultural society, the formation of a national in-group identity, that embraces that multiculturalism, can lead to voting and social behaviour, in some segments of society, that deliberately discriminates against ethnic and cultural minorities. Natasha Frederic and Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor (2018) investigated whether a heterogeneous national in-

group identity, which incorporates multiple ethnicities and cultures, led to increases in out-group derogation among those with more conservative values. They concluded that a combination of high in-group heterogeneity and high individual right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) predicted more prejudice toward immigrants, generally, and non-EU/EFTA migrants, specifically (Frederic and Falomir-Pichastor 2018). Voters can become drawn to parties and referendum options that promote some of the RWA principles, such as traditionalism, conservatism and authoritarianism, as well as a hostility toward real-world factors of liberal societies, such as large-scale migration, freedom of speech and globalised capitalism.

When some minority social groups display behaviour that is distinct from the norms and values of the dominant social group, this can influence a normalisation of extreme attitudes and derogatory behaviour toward the minority group. Afrodita Marcu and Xenia Chryssochoou (2005) looked beyond contemporary migration patterns in Europe, and they explored the phenomenon of historic out-group derogation against a persecuted minority group on the continent: the Romani travelling communities. Generally, respondents in both countries attributed more human traits, or ‘cultural characteristics’, to in-group members, and affixed more animalistic traits, or ‘natural characteristics’, to the Roma people; in this, the researchers observed the ‘exclusion’ of this out-group from the ‘realm of humanity’ by in-group identifiers (Marcu and Chryssochoou, 2005, pp.42-54). This extremitisation of discourse can impact voters beyond the sphere of the ballot box; the intergroup relationship between dominant in-group members and marginalised out-group member can be negatively influenced in general, leading to lower levels of intergroup contact, compassion and cohesion. Likewise, out-group derogation against minority social groups can be more subtly observed across several different national contexts and against an array of ethnic and cultural groups. In 1997, Thomas Pettigrew et al.,

conducted a comparative study of the derogation of African Americans, and, new, minority-ethnic, Europeans in their respective societies. The studies found that the predictors of such out-group derogation against ethnic minorities were lower levels of education, poverty, higher national pride *and* social and political conservatism (Pettigrew et al., 1997). Furthermore, national differences in Europe also had a mediating effect on out-group attitudes; white Britons devalued ‘West Indians’ (Caribbeans) most, whereas white French citizens had more negative attitudes toward ‘North Africans’ (Pettigrew et al, 1997, pp.265-267). Populist parties and referendum campaigns rely upon derogatory out-group stereotypes to build support among their dominant in-group which, in western societies, often consists solely of *white* citizens. In the UK, outside of the 2016 referendum, these ideals are exemplified by parties such as the BNP and UKIP, and by AfD (Germany), National Rally (France) and Vox (Spain) across other parts of Europe.

Lastly, Golec de Zavala’s theory of collective narcissism has been examined in relation to hostile behaviour against out-groups committed by members of a society's dominant in-group; the analysis centred on the influence of high and low levels of in-group regard. Exaggerated national pride will inevitably lead to forms of out-group derogation, and even hostility (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). Their research concluded that collective narcissism, and, positive in-group regard, had competing effects on out-group hostility; both low in-group regard, and high collective narcissism were predictors of out-group hostility. Whereas genuinely positive in-group regard, such as liberal forms of national exceptionalism, were related to tolerance and positive attitudes toward out-groups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). As much of the research into collective narcissism has shown, there is little positive correlation between high levels of collective narcissism and high commitment to in-group wellbeing; in fact, quite the reverse is

true, collective narcissism influences voting behaviour that seeks to diminish the status of out-groups regardless of the impact of the wellbeing of the voters' in-group.

Study Design

This element of the research explores how two separate voting groups, Leave and Remain voters in the 2016 European Union Membership referendum, differ in mean scores of, firstly, Social Identification and, secondly, Collective Narcissism when the selected ingroup for each of these psychometric scales is either the British in-group or the European in-group, respectively.

Following this first element of the investigation, differences in demographic grouping and voting behavior are tested in order to determine their influence on the scores for both sets of Social Identification and Collective Narcissism results.

These surveys were conducted using two separate self-report questionnaires which were distributed to participants throughout the year 2019. Respondents were recruited using the Birmingham City University Research Participation Scheme (BCU RPS) and by social media communications. BCU RPS allows eligible students to exchange their participation in another person's research study, for credits within the platform; the students were required to obtain a pre-determined number of credits before their own research studies could be uploaded onto BCU RPS for other eligible students to take part in. The second resource, used to recruit participants from outside of Birmingham City University's student population, was the social media platform, Twitter, in conjunction with email. For the purpose of anonymity, participants were not asked to disclose whether they were BCU RPS participants or external participants.

148 eligible survey responses were collected for the first survey which was entitled the "British Attitudes Survey". 157 eligible survey responses were collected for the second survey which was entitled the "European Attitudes Survey". Each survey was distributed in the months

leading up to each of the major elections in the UK during 2019; the British Attitudes Survey was conducted ahead of the European Parliament elections, whereas the European Attitudes Survey was conducted ahead of the General Election. These two periods in time were chosen in order for the research to benefit from a heightened political awareness among the British electorate; such periods in time were considered to be more potent data collection windows, in which the electorate would be more likely to engage with socio-political surveys relative to other times in the year when Brexit-related politics would be less salient in public discourse.

Participants

Each of the questionnaires for this investigation, comprising both the British Attitudes Survey and the European Attitudes Survey, required participants to provide information about their recent voting behaviour and opinions, as well as their personal demographics. The first survey attained 148 eligible respondents and the second survey was made up of 157 participants.

	British Attitudes		European Attitudes	
	Leave 2016	Remain 2016	Leave 2016	Remain 2016
Age	36.97	32.12	33.65	32.22
2016 Vote	32	116	51	106
Male	21	52	38	47
Female	11	64	13	59
White	25	80	43	79
BAME	7	36	8	27
Middle Class	13	66	31	48
Working Class	19	50	20	58

Leave Region	24	98	42	78
Remain Region	8	18	9	28
Same Region	21	58	38	62
New Region	11	58	13	44
2 nd Referendum Leave	20	3	47	7
2 nd Referendum Remain	12	113	4	99
Leave Party 2019	19	6	44	10
Remain Party 2019	13	110	7	96

Table 2 Participant Demographics for Surveys

British Attitudes Survey

The mean age for participants was $M=33.17$, $SD=13.72$. Leave voters were, on average, older than the mean at $M=36.97$, $SD=16.31$. Remain voters, conversely, had a lower mean age; this was $M=32.12$, $SD=12.80$.




Figure 1 British Attitudes Survey Mean Age

78.4% of participants (116) voted Remain in the 2016 EU referendum, whereas the other 21.6% (32) of participants voted to leave. This variable served as the grouping variable in both the Independent Samples T-tests and the Paired Samples T-tests.




Figure 2 British Attitudes Survey 2016 Vote

50.7% of participants were female (75), while 49.3% were male (73). 64 of the female participants voted Remain while the other 11 voted Leave. 52 of the male participants voted to remain and the remaining 21 voted to leave.




Figure 3 British Attitudes Survey Gender

70.9% of participants identified as white (105), and the other 43 identified as BAME (29.1%). The BAME consisted of those who identified as black British, British Asian, mixed ethnicity and as members of other minority ethnic groups in the UK. 80 of the white participants voted Remain and the other 25 voted Leave. 36 of the BAME participants voted to remain while the other 7 voted to leave.




Figure 4 British Attitudes Survey Ethnicity

53.4% of participants identified as middle-class (79) and the remainder (69) considered themselves to be working-class (46.6%). 66 of the middle-class participants voted Remain, and 13 voted Leave in 2016. 50 of the working-class participants voted to remain and the other 19 voted to leave the European Union.




Figure 5 British Attitudes Survey Social Class

82.4% of participants lived in a Leave-voting region or nation of the UK (122) and the other 26 participants lived in Remain-voting regions or nations (17.6%). Greater London, Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain, while Wales and the remaining eight regions of England voted Leave. 98 participants in Leave-voting areas regions or nations voted Remain, while 24 voted to Leave. 18 participants in Remain-voting regions or nations voted to remain, while 8 of them voted to leave the EU.




Figure 6 British Attitudes Survey Region

53.4% of participants (79) lived in the same region or nation of their birth, whereas 69 (46.6%) participants lived in a new region or nation to the one in which they were born; this latter group might include voters who were born outside of the UK. 58 participants living in the same region or nation voted Remain and 21 voted Leave. 58 of those living in a newer region or nation voted to remain, while 11 of these participants voted to leave.




Figure 7 British Attitudes Survey Regional Mobility

84.5% of participants (125) said they would vote Remain in the event of a second referendum; the other 23 stated that they would vote Leave in the event of a second referendum (15.5%). 113 of those who preferred Remain in 2019 also voted Remain in 2016, compared to the 12 who voted Leave in the referendum. 3 participants who preferred to vote Leave, in the event of a second referendum, voted Remain in 2016, while the other 20 voted Leave in the poll.




Figure 8 British Attitudes Survey 2019 Second Referendum Preference

83.1% of participants (123) voted for Remain-supporting political parties during the 2017 United Kingdom General Election, compared to the 25 who voted for Leave-supporting parties (16.9%). While Labour's 2017 position on Brexit was equivocal, it was coded as a Remain-supporting party due to a large majority of members of parliament being opposed to leaving the EU *and* its subsequent support for a second referendum with Remain as an option; other Remain-supporting parties included the SNP, Liberal Democrats, the Green Party of England *and* Wales, and Sinn Fein. Leave-supporting parties included the Conservatives and UKIP. 110 of those who supported Remain-supporting parties in 2017 also voted Remain in 2016, whereas 13 voted Leave. 6 participants who voted for Leave-supporting parties in 2017 also voted Remain in 2016; 19 of these voters opted for Leave in the referendum.




Figure 9 British Attitudes Survey 2017 General Election Vote

European Attitudes Survey

The mean age for participants was $M=32.68$, $SD=11.44$. Leave voters were, on average, older than the mean at $M=33.65$, $SD=9.18$. Remain voters, conversely, had a lower mean age; this was $M=32.22$, $SD=12.39$.




Figure 10 European Attitudes Survey Mean Age

67.5% of participants (106) voted Remain in the 2016 European Union Membership referendum, whereas the other 51 participants voted to leave (32.5%). This variable served as the grouping variable in both the Independent Samples T-tests and the Paired Samples T-tests.




Figure 11 European Attitudes Survey 2016 Vote

54.1% of participants were male (85), and the other 72 were female (45.9%). 47 of the male participants voted to remain, while 38 of them voted to leave the EU. 59 female participants voted Remain, whereas the other 13 voted Leave.




Figure 12 European Attitudes Survey Gender

77.7% of participants (122) identified as white, and the other 35 participants considered themselves to be BAME (22.3%). The BAME consisted of those who identified as black British, British Asian, mixed ethnicity and as members of other minority ethnic groups in the UK. 79 of the white participants voted Remain and the other 43 voted Leave. 27 BAME participants voted Remain and 8 voted to leave the EU.




Figure 13 European Attitudes Survey Ethnicity

50.3% of participants identified as middle-class (79) and 49.7% identified as working-class (78). 48 of the middle-class participants voted Remain and 31 of the group voted Leave. 58 of the working-class participants voted to remain, compared to the 20 who voted to leave the European Union in the 2016 poll.




Figure 14 European Attitudes Survey Social Class

76.4% of participants (120) lived in a Leave-voting region or nation of the UK; 37 participants lived in a Remain-voting region or nation (23.6%). Greater London, Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain, while Wales and the remaining eight regions of England voted Leave. 78 of those living in Leave-voting regions or nations voted Remain, while 42 voted Leave. 28 of those living in Remain-voting regions or nations voted Remain, while 9 voted to leave the EU in the referendum.




Figure 15 European Attitudes Survey Region

63.7% of participants (100) lived in the same UK region or nation of their birth, whereas 57 lived in a different region or nation to the one in which they were born (or were born outside

of the UK) (36.3%). 62 of those living in the same region or nation voted to remain, while 38 voted to leave. 44 of those living in a newer region or nation of the UK voted Remain, compared to the 13 who voted Leave in the referendum.




Figure 16 European Attitudes Survey Regional Mobility

65.6% of participants (103) stated that they would vote Remain in the event of a second referendum of EU membership, while 54 said they would vote Leave in such a circumstance (34.4%). 99 of those who preferred Remain in 2019 also voted Remain in the 2016 referendum, while 4 voted Leave. 47 of those who preferred Leave in a second referendum voted to leave the EU in 2016, compared to the 7 who voted Remain in the poll.




Figure 17 European Attitudes Survey 2019 Second Referendum Preference

65.6% of participants (103) stated their intention to vote for a Remain-supporting party (or party promoting a second referendum with Remain as an option) in the 2019 United Kingdom General Election, while 54 (34.4%) intended to vote for a Leave-supporting party. Remain-supporting parties included Labour, Liberal Democrats, the SNP and the Green Party. Leave-supporting parties included the Conservatives and the Brexit Party. 96 of those who intended to vote for Remain-supporting parties also voted Remain in 2016, while 7 voted to leave the EU. 44 of those who wished to vote for Leave-supporting parties, in the election vote, voted Leave in 2016, while 10 voted to remain a member state of the EU.




Figure 18 European Attitudes Survey 2019 General Election Preference

Psychometric and Demographic Materials

Copies of the coded responses and the legend for each survey are provided in Appendices 2 and 3. The results of the statistical tests, namely *Pearson's Correlation Coefficients and Binary Logistic Regressions*, are presented in the following sections of this chapter; results from *exploratory T-test analyses* are also presented in this chapter.

For each of the two surveys, each respondent was asked to respond to every item in the questionnaire. Each item can be grouped into one of the three following subject areas: voting behaviour, social demographics and psychometric indicators.

Voting Behaviour

There was a slight variation in the questions for the British Attitudes Survey and the European Attitudes Survey.

British Attitudes Survey

1. How did you vote in the 2016 European Union Referendum?
2. How did you vote in the 2017 General Election?
3. If there was another referendum on European Union membership, how would you vote?

European Attitudes Survey

1. How did you vote in the 2016 European Union Referendum?
2. How do you intend to vote in the 2019 General Election?
3. If there was another referendum on European Union membership, how would you vote?

Social Demographics

Each survey collected the same social demographic data.

1. How old are you?
2. What is your gender?
3. Which ethnicity best describes you?

4. Which social class best describes you?
5. Which region or nation do you currently live in?
6. Were you born in the same region or nation that you currently live in?

Psychometric Indicators

The in-group for both the Four-Item Social Identification scale and the Collective Narcissism scale differs between the two surveys. The first measure was the Four-Item-Social-Identification (FISI) scale created by Postmes, Haslem and Jans (2013); the in-groups were specified as “British” for the British Attitudes Survey, and “European” for the European Attitudes Survey. The second measure as the Collective Narcissism scale, which consists of 9 items, and was created by Golec de Zavala et al. (2009).

Indices for Social Identification

The Four-Item Social Identification scale is measured on a 7-point Likert scale and consists of four statements to which the participants respond with a number between 1 and 7. This scale is used to measure how salient an identity domain is for a participant; the given domain can be any that applies to the participant, but cannot be a non-applicable domain (e.g. the ‘white’ domain is not applicable to a non-white person). A mean score of 1, being the lowest score, indicates very low salience of an identity domain. In the case of this study, the two domains are ‘British’ and ‘European’. A mean score of 7, being the highest, indicates that either, or both, the ‘British’ or ‘European’ identity occupy a position of high salience and cognitive centrality for the participant.

High salience and cognitive centrality of an identity domain suggest that the domain is an important part of an individual’s self-construct, playing a significant part in how the participants

identifies their self within society. Conversely, low salience and low cognitive centrality of an identity domain indicates that the domain in question is an insignificant element of the participant's overall identity.

Indices for Collective Narcissism

The Collective Narcissism scale is measured on a 7-point Likert scale and consists of nine statements to which the participants respond with a number between 1 and 7. The scale is used to measure unrealistic appraisals of an in-group's features by the individual; the given domain can be any that applies to the participant, but cannot be a non-applicable domain (e.g. the 'North American' domain is not applicable to a non-North American person). A mean score of 1, being the lowest score, indicates very low levels of collective narcissism within a given identity domain. In the case of this study, the two domains are 'British' and 'European'. A mean score of 7, being the highest, indicates that a participant has a high level of narcissism in their appraisal of the in-group's features. These features can relate to various aspects of the group, such as subjective worth and perceived importance as shown in the exemplar scales below.

High collective narcissism within an identity domain suggest that the domain is an important part of an individual's self-construct, playing a significant part in how the participants identifies their self within society. However, it is crucial to note that high levels of collective narcissism in an identity domain is separate to high levels of trait narcissism in the individual domain, and the two must not be confused, as the Collective Narcissism scale measures group attitudes and cognition not individual traits. Conversely, low collective narcissism indicates that a participant has a less narcissistic attitude toward members of the given in-group. This low score, however, is not an indication of the salience of an identity domain, but merely an appraisal of the domain group's features.

British Attitudes Survey

British Social Identification

1. I identify with Britain.
2. I feel committed to Britain.
3. I am glad to be British.
4. Being British is an important part of how I see myself.

British Collective Narcissism

1. I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of British people.
2. British people deserve special treatment.
3. I will never be satisfied until British people get the recognition they deserve.
4. I insist upon British people getting the respect that is due to them.
5. It really makes me angry when others criticize British people.
6. If British people had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.
7. I get upset when people do not notice the achievements of British people.
8. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of British people.
9. The true worth of British people is often misunderstood.

European Attitudes Survey

European Social Identification

1. I identify with Europe.

2. I feel committed to Europe.
3. I am glad to be European.
4. Being European is an important part of how I see myself.

European Collective Narcissism

1. I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of European people.
2. European people deserve special treatment.
3. I will never be satisfied until European people get the recognition they deserve.
4. I insist upon European people getting the respect that is due to them.
5. It really makes me angry when others criticize European people.
6. If European people had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.
7. I get upset when people do not notice the achievements of European people.
8. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of European people.
9. The true worth of European people is often misunderstood.

Scale Reliability Analysis

Each of the two surveys incorporated the same two pre-existing scales; both scales were modified in alignment with the needs of the study. The first measure was the Four-Item-Social-Identification (FISI) scale created by Postmes, Haslem and Jans (2013); the in-groups were specified as “British” for the British Attitudes Survey, and “European” for the European Attitudes Survey. The second measure as the Collective Narcissism scale, which consists of 9 items, and was created by Golec de Zavala et al. (2009). The in-groups were specified as

“British” for the British Attitudes Survey, and “European” for the European Attitudes Survey, as was the case with the FISI scale.

British Social Identification

A reliability analysis was carried out on the British Social Identification scale which was comprised of 4 items. Cronbach's Alpha showed the scale to reach an acceptable reliability of $\alpha=0.93$. All four scale items appeared to be worthy of retention, with each resulting in a decrease in the alpha is removed.

British Collective Narcissism

A reliability analysis was carried out on the British Collective Narcissism scale which was comprised of 9 items. Cronbach's Alpha showed the scale to reach an acceptable reliability of $\alpha=0.94$. All nine scale items appeared to be worthy of retention, with each resulting in a decrease in the alpha is removed.

European Social Identification

A reliability analysis was carried out on the European Social Identification scale which was comprised of 4 items. Cronbach's Alpha showed the scale to reach an acceptable reliability of $\alpha=0.95$. All four scale items appeared to be worthy of retention, with each resulting in a decrease in the alpha is removed.

European Collective Narcissism

A reliability analysis was carried out on the European Collective Narcissism scale which was comprised of 9 items. Cronbach's Alpha showed the scale to reach an acceptable reliability of $\alpha=0.95$. Eight of the nine scale items appeared to be worthy of retention, with each resulting in a

decrease in the alpha is removed. Removing the second item, “*European people deserve special treatment*”, resulted in an increase in the alpha from $\alpha=0.946$ to $\alpha=0.947$ (when observed to three decimal points). The potential removal of this item was considered, but the option was ultimately disregarded because there was no difference in the alpha when counted to two decimal places; the alpha was $\alpha=0.95$ with or without the second scale item.

Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients

British Attitudes Survey

A Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient test was conducted to investigate the one-to-one relationships between the three continuous variables among the 148 participants who completed the online social survey; the three continuous variables were age, British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism. Age was not found to have a significant correlation with either British Social Identification or British Collective Narcissism. British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism were significantly correlated, $r(148) = .48, p < .001$. The researcher opted to disqualify age from use in the binary logistic regression analysis of the British Attitudes Survey; the two continuous variables that were selected for the binary logistic regression were the positively related British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism.

	Age	British Social Identification	British Collective Narcissism.
Age	1	.099	.054
British Social Identification	.099	1	.475**

British Collective Narcissism.	.054	.475**	1
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 3 Correlation Matrix for British Attitudes Survey Continuous Variables

European Attitudes Survey

A Pearson's Correlation Coefficient test was conducted to investigate the one-to-one relationships between the three continuous variables among the 157 participants who completed the online social survey; the three continuous variables were age, European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism. Age was not found to have a significant correlation with either European Social Identification or European Collective Narcissism. European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism were significantly correlated, $r(157) = .55$, $p < .001$. The researcher opted to disqualify age from use in the binary logistic regression analysis of the European Attitudes Survey; the two continuous variables that were selected for the binary logistic regression were the positively related European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism.

	Age	European Social Identification	European Collective Narcissism.
Age	1	.077	.043
European Social Identification	.077	1	.550**
European Collective Narcissism.	.043	.550**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 4 Correlation Matrix for European Attitudes Survey Continuous Variables

Exploratory T-test Analyses

The researcher conducted exploratory T-test analyses to determine whether there existed significant differences between participants' social identification *and* collective narcissism means scores (in both the British and European domains) and participants' choice in the 2016 EU membership referendum. These tests investigated mean score differences between groups (*Leave and Remain voters*) and within groups (*differences between social identification and collective narcissism within the same participants*). These exploratory T-test analyses uncovered the following trends within the data:

In the British Attitudes Survey, 2016 Leave voters had significantly higher British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism mean scores than Remain voters. Additionally, both Leave and Remain voters scored higher in British Social Identification than British Collective Narcissism. Conversely, in the European Attitudes Survey, 2016 Remain voters had significantly higher European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism mean scores than Leave voters. Moreover, both Remain and Leave voters scored higher in European Social Identification than European Collective Narcissism.

Measure	Mean	SD
Leave British Social Identification	5.45	1.46
Leave British Collective Narcissism	3.58	1.57
Leave European Social Identification	2.58	1.23
Leave European Collective Narcissism	2.05	.81
Remain British Social Identification	3.75	1.67
Remain British Collective Narcissism	2.05	1.07

Remain European Social Identification	5.18	1.61
Remain European Collective Narcissism	3.59	1.40

Table 5 for Exploratory T-test M and SD

These results provided support for the need for further analysis into the relationship between social identification, predominantly, and, collective narcissism, secondarily, and voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. The binary logistic regression analysis sought to explore the influence of these two continuous variables (*social identification and collective narcissism in either group domain*) and one categorical variable (*voting preference in a hypothetical second referendum on EU membership*) upon the binary dependent variable (*pro-Leave parties and pro-Second referendum parties in the 2017 and 2019 General Elections, respectively*). The full results for the exploratory T-test analyses can be found in appendix 1.

Findings

British Attitudes Survey

A binary logistic regression was conducted to ascertain whether British Social Identification, British Collective Narcissism and 2019 Second Referendum Preference were significantly associated with voting choice in the 2017 General Election. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(3) = 52.75, p < .001$. The model explained 41% of the variance in 2017 voting choice and correctly classified 90% of cases. A preference for Leave in a hypothetical second referendum on EU membership significantly increased the likelihood of support for a Leave-supporting party (*Conservatives; UKIP; DUP*) in the 2017 General Election and an increase in the score in British Collective Narcissism was associated with an increased likelihood of voting for a Leave-supporting party in that election.

Variable	B	SE	Wald	Sig.	OR
BSI	-.23	.19	1.50	.21	.80
BCN	-.51	.22	5.51	.02	.60
2019 Pref.	-.2.02	.60	11.40	.01	.13

Table 6 Binary Logistic Regression for British Attitudes Survey

European Attitudes Survey

A binary logistic regression was conducted to ascertain whether European Social Identification, European Collective Narcissism and 2019 Second Referendum Preference were significantly associated with voting choice in the 2019 General Election. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(3) = 14.72, p < .001$. The model explained 77% of the variance in 2019 voting choice and correctly classified 94% of cases. A preference for Leave in a hypothetical second referendum on EU membership significantly increased the likelihood of support for a Leave-supporting party (*Conservatives; UKIP; DUP*) in the 2019 General Election, however, neither European Social Identification nor European Collective Narcissism had a significant impact on voting choice.

Variable	B	SE	Wald	Sig.	OR
ESI	-.03	.27	.01	.92	.97
ECN	.15	.31	.23	.63	1.16
2019 Pref.	-5.10	.99	26.61	.01	.01

Table 7 Binary Logistic Regression for European Attitudes Survey

Discussion

This study examined the relationships between cognitive centrality of British and European identities, voter preference in a hypothetical second referendum on European Union membership and voting choice in two General Elections in the UK. This inferential statistical analysis was conducted over two waves of an online social survey, with the first cohort consisting of 148 participants and the second of 157 participants.

The study found that voters' cognitive centrality of their British identity was positively correlated to their level of British collective narcissism. Leave voters reported the highest mean scores of British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism, although their British Social Identification scores were higher than the latter; this indicates a distinction between the cognitive influences of social identification (*cognitive centrality*) and collective narcissism in the British domain. Likewise, voters' cognitive centrality of their European identity was positively correlated to their level of European collective narcissism. Remain voters reported the highest mean scores of European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism, although their European Social Identification scores were higher than the latter; this indicates a distinction between the cognitive influences of social identification (*cognitive centrality*) and collective narcissism in the European domain.

Moreover, voters who preferred Leave in a hypothetical second referendum on EU membership and reported higher levels of British Collective Narcissism were significantly more likely to vote for a Leave-supporting party in the 2017 General Election. Likewise, voters who preferred Leave in a hypothetical second referendum on EU membership were significantly more likely to vote for a Leave-supporting party in the 2019 General Election (according to the findings of the second study: the *European Attitudes Survey*). Also, the group differences,

between Leave party and Remain party voters, in both cognitive centrality of social identity and of collective narcissism exemplify Obst and White's (2005) theory that groups within the same society can possess different levels of salience in the same identity domain; in this instance, Leave party voters had higher levels of identity salience in the British domain where Remain voters had higher levels of identity salience in the European domain. Remain party voters provided evidence to justify the theories of contemporary multiplicitous identities (Deaux, 2001) and the continued importance of individual identity salience in the shaping individual behaviour that deviates from group norms (Brewer, 1999; Abrams and Hogg, 1990). Remain voters vehemently supported a minority political view (being to Remain a member of the EU) that was, in a certain regard, diametrically opposed to the group norm.

Moreover, in incorporating Hearne et al.'s (2019) and Dorling's (2016) statistical analyses of the demographic balance of the Leave and Remain vote, this study provides further evidence to aid one's understanding of the influence of pro-Leave discourse in shaping voting behaviour. Voting for Leave parties helps British in-group identifiers to mitigate the *black sheep effect* (Marques et al., 2001) in a manner consistent with national in-group norms, while the demographic differences between the two voting cohorts imply that those citizens who feel marginalised within the society (Dorling, 2016; Hearne et al., 2019) were less likely to vote against the norms of the British in-group, thus attempting to protect the perceived status of the national in-group (Ellemers, 1997; Kelly, 1993; Doosje et al., 2002). Finally, the higher levels of British Collective Narcissism in Leave party voters demonstrate the influence of trait collective narcissism on influencing the behaviour of high identifiers. Leave parties' rejection of freedom of movement of people can be explained as the influence of collective narcissism in rejecting, and acting with hostility toward, outgroup members (Schreijers, 2015; Golec de Zavala et al.,

2013) and by evidence of the cognitive trait's influence on shaping behaviour that protects the status and homogeneity of an in-group by rejecting outgroup members and discouraging in-group heterogeneity (Pettigrew et al., 1998; Voci, 2016).

In this study, both the Remain party voters and Leave party voters were influenced by higher levels of cognitive centrality of identity albeit in competing ways; higher cognitive centrality of British identity, coupled with the crucial factor of high British Collective Narcissism, was definitive in shaping voters' attitudes toward Britain and the European Union, although it remains to be discovered whether there exists any causality between cognitive centrality of national identity or collective narcissism in the national domain, and, voting behaviour in a General election.

Conclusion

The researcher conducted two online surveys to explore how measures of nationalism can affect both referenda and elections, as in the 2016 EU membership referendum and 2019 UK General Election. The researcher found that British nationalism, in the form a significantly higher social identification and a level of collective narcissism which significantly predicted a Leave vote, was highly influential and will continue to help shape our collective understanding of political attitudes in post-Brexit Britain.

One limitation of the study was an overly cautious approach which was adopted by the researcher. To reduce the chances of sample insufficiency, the researcher selected a small number of independent variables for the quantitative element of the research; this was to increase the chances of participants completing the whole study. In future, the researcher would work

with greater confidence in their ability to obtain a statistically valid sample size with a larger number of independent variables and a longer average completion time.

The researcher questioned how a generation of Britons would experience life outside of the EU. They queried if the intensification of social divisions, which were evident from the days after the referendum vote in 2016, would continue to or subside over time. However, the nature of this doctoral research meant that the researcher was constricted by time, access, and resource, and the online surveys were unable to attain this broader ambition. This wider goal of tracking experience over time would necessitate longitudinal research with a larger pool of participants to guard against sample attrition; this would enable the researcher to track social perceptions over a sustained period, at regular intervals to deepen the analysis.

This chapter has presented a timeline of the most significant political events that took place between the David Cameron's Bloomberg speech which promised an in/out referendum on EU membership and Theresa May's resignation as Prime Minister; the researcher used this information to demonstrate the long-term political influences that shaped voters' attitudes toward Brexit, Britain and the European Union.

This chapter also explored a history of psychological research into how voters form and adopt a variety of social identities and how these identities influence social relationships and interactions. Moreover, the research delved into work out the trait of collective narcissism, investigating both its nature and its potentially dangerous influence over intergroup relationships.

The researcher uncovered a positive correlative relationship between social identification (*cognitive centrality of an identity*) and collective narcissism when it was measured in both the British and European domains. Remain party voters reported higher levels of European Social

Identification and European Collective Narcissism than Leave voters, with the first cognitive trait being more salient than the latter. Leave party voters reported higher levels of British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism than Remain voters, with the first cognitive trait being more salient than the latter. Finally, the likelihood of a vote for a Leave-supporting party was moderated by a preference for Leave in a hypothetical second referendum on EU in membership in 2019, and by support for a hypothetical Leave vote *and* higher British Collective Narcissism in 2017; this indicates that there exists a relationship between the discourse of political parties and cognitive centrality of British identity when investigating future voting intention.

The next chapter will consider how Leave-supporting parties and Second referendum-supporting parties sought to influence how voters' constructed perceptions of the impact of Brexit during the 2019 General Election in the UK. The discourse of these parties will be explored through a textural analysis of nine party manifestos in three groups: the *pro-Leave*, *British unionist parties*, the *pro-second referendum*, *British unionist parties* and the *pro-second referendum*, *British separatist parties*.

Chapter 3: Wider Methodological Considerations

Introduction

This chapter explores the methodological questions, challenges and choices faced by the researcher in their attempt to understand voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit during the timeframe of this study. The researcher attempted to determine the validity of using a mixed methods research design as a means of gaining insight into the subject (Burke-Johnson and Onwegbuzie, 2004; Burke-Johnson et al., 2007; Walker, 2011; Golafshani, 2005). Furthermore, the researcher assessed the applicability of several available research methods. These assessed methods included focus groups (Morgan, 1996; Kitzinger, 1995), online social surveys (Evans and Mathur, 2005; Kelley et al., 2003) and textual analyses (Carley, 1994; Castleberry and Nolen, 2018). These three research methods were ultimately deployed in pursuit of resolving the four research questions: *To what extent did social identification and collective narcissism predict voting behaviour differences in the UK voters? How did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term social impact of Brexit? How did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit? How did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?*

The chapter continues with a presentation of the chosen samples for the focus groups, online social surveys and textual analyses of the electoral manifestos; these are presented alongside some theoretical justifications for the sampling choices (Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007; van Smeden, 2016; Guest et al., 2016). In addition to the sampling investigation, the research reconsidered the foundational studies upon which the present study was founded; the

foundational studies were conducted by Hearne et al. (2018), Golec de Zavala et al. (2009) and Ellemers et al. (2002).

Finally, the chapter concludes with a scrutinisation of the ethical challenges inherent in conducting research into voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit (Smith, 1995).

Research Design

Focus Groups

The researcher attempted to gain an understanding of voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit by engaging with participants in focus groups; this method was one of the research methods employed in this study. Focus groups are but one of several qualitative research methods available to social researchers, however, they possess significant strengths over qualitative alternatives; these strengths aided collection of quality data used to analyse voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. While focus groups resemble interviews in their ability to provide to provide insights into complex thoughts, it is the 'group effect' which distinguishes this method from other qualitative research techniques in the social sciences; this *group effect* occurs when participants, rather than moderators, query one another and shape the direction of the discussion to a greater extent (Morgan, 1996, pp.129-140). One of the benefits of the group effect is that it allows researchers to observe both conformity *and* diversity of opinion; that is to say, it allows participants to discuss, among themselves, ideas and themes about which they agree or disagree, respectively. This group effect does, however, present some weaknesses and threats to the overall research study. Firstly, the 'polarisation effect' can amplify conflicting opinions and somewhat distort the validity and sincerity of the attitudes and perceptions recorded in the study; and, secondly, the lack of interpersonal anonymity within the group can diminish the levels of 'self-disclosure' for fear of judgement by other group members (Morgan, 1996,

pp.140-152). The decision to obtain a combination of Leave and Remain supporters, from a number of different backgrounds, was taken in order to explore the variety of perceptions and attitudes among voters of diverse in-groups. Focus groups benefit from their ability to elicit comfortable, natural language that would be considered norm-deviant in an interview setting; that is to say, focus groups create an atmosphere of a free and open discussion, in contrast to the more formalised process of the one-to-one (or *one-to-two*) interview (Kitzinger, 1995, pp.299-302). The researcher considered the focus groups to be the most useful form of *live-participant* qualitative research method, for exploring voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit, because of this creation of an atmosphere in which participants felt free to share their views, concerns and beliefs in a non-judgmental, anonymised forum; this was considered to be crucial for generating rich data for the subsequent thematic analysis. However, the unusually heightened freedom of expression, inherent with the focus group method, coupled with the potential for a polarisation effect presented a need to balance this interpretivist data with generalisable research in the form of the social survey.

Online Social Surveys (Questionnaires)

The researcher selected online social surveys (*online questionnaires*) as the second live-participant research method, as well as the first and only quantitative research method deployed in the study. The online social surveys were used to gather data from a larger group of respondents, when compared to the focus groups, and in a more structured, inductive manner. Online social surveys were useful for the researchers because of their flexibility, ease of distribution and their question diversity; the latter element was exemplified by the combination of multiple-choice boxes and Likert rating scales (Evans and Mathur, 2005). With the Likert scales of the social surveys, participants are able to express their attitudes and

perceptions toward a given topic (related to Brexit) in a manner that is quantifiable and, thus generalisable with the aid of statistical analysis techniques.

This research method possesses certain flaws, as well. The online nature of the survey distribution can lead to participants considering the study to be ‘impersonal’ and the anonymous nature of responses can result in data that lacks both ‘representativeness’ and ‘trustworthiness’ (Evans and Mathur, 2005, pp.195-210). The prominent use of BCU RPS offset some of these concerns; anonymous identifiers were generated by the server to confirm the registration of the students among the samples. The ability to glean large amounts of information from a sizeable sample can create some unexpected challenges to researchers. Time constraints can often lead to rushed analyses that draw inaccurate conclusions from the findings (Kelley et al., 2003). Conversely, ‘data dredging’ is the processes, which Kelley et al. (2003) warned against, of conducting multitudinous statistical tests in order to *fish for* any significant results the researcher might find (Kelley et al., 2003, pp.261-266).

Avoiding data dredging has both practical and philosophical merits; the latter being that if the process of dredging produces many instances of non-significant findings, then these non-significant findings of equal importance to the significant ones and should therefore be presented and discussed with equal vigour. The chosen statistical test was the *Binary Logistic Regression*, and these tests were conducted using the SPSS statistical software platform.

Textual Analysis of Political Manifestos

The researcher complimented the two *live-participant* research methods (noted above) with a primary textual analysis; this also represented the second qualitative, interpretivist research methods used to understand voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. The textual analysis of the electoral manifestos, produced and distributed during the 2019 UK General

Election, allowed the researcher to understand and the impact of political language in that year of high significance in the development of the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. The researcher took the decision to include the manifestos for the 2019 General Election, but to exclude the manifestos for the 2019 European Parliament Elections in the UK because, two of the most significant pro-Brexit parties declined to produce manifestos for the Europe-wide election in May 2019. The Conservative Party did not actively campaign in the election, while the Brexit Party refused to produce a manifesto for a parliament it was attempting to leave (UK Parliament, 2020). Furthermore, the decision to disclude the electoral manifestos from the 2017 General Election was taken because one of the major pro-Second referendum parties (Labour) had not yet decided to support a second referendum on EU membership, while one of the pro-Leave parties, Brexit Party, had not yet been formed; the Brexit Party came into existence in Spring 2019, in order, firstly, to contest the 2019 European Parliament Elections in the UK, *albeit without a manifesto*. (UK Parliament, 2020).

As the textual analysis of party manifestos consists of manifestos produced by six pro-second referendum compared to only three pro-Leave parties, the researcher concluded that to include the 2019 European Parliament manifestos would substantially increase the size disparity in data sets, between pro-Leave and pro-second referendum parties; the data gleaned from the General Election manifestos was found to be more than adequate for the thematic analysis of the data (gathered and presented in manifesto findings chapter).

The textual analysis of the 2019 General Election manifestos gave the researcher insights into voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit because these documents provided the researcher with a political and social context within which their attitudes and perceptions were formed. The political parties, associated with these manifestos, each possess

a distinctive history within the British political system, and each regularly targets voters from disparate socio-cultural backgrounds; understanding the language and arguments of well-established (and newly established) political parties gives a degree of insight into how voters relate to, and make sense of, the social and political world around them. Language is viewed both as a window on the individual mind, and, as a method of examine cultural contexts. In this sense, a thematic of the documents which is ‘theoretically grounded’ in an understanding of social cognition, behaviour and action serves to enrich the analysis of the text (Carley, 1994, p.291). Furthermore, Kathleen Carley wrote that ‘through analysing texts, differences across cultures and changes within cultures can be located’ (Carley, 1994, p.295). In the context of the present thesis, *cultures* will refer explicitly to social demographic group, and political support, cultures within the United Kingdom, rather than comparatively between the UK and another nation. The theoretical framework, built from empirical psychological research and varied theoretical research within the fields of political science and sociology, informed the coding and thematic analytical approach of the overall study.




Figure 19 Theoretical Framework for Study

The 2019 General Election manifestos, selected for the thematic analysis of this study, reflected the chosen parties’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit, and those parties’ underlying social and political values. Political manifestos are designed to synthesise and

disseminate information about the political positions and prospective policies of each party standing in an election; however, these documents may provide insight into the underlying social attitudes and perceptions of, simultaneously, the producers and consumers of these forms of political communication. The parties who competed in the 2019 General Election presented their attitudes toward the Union of the United Kingdom; this incorporated British Unionists (Conservatives, 2019; Labour, 2019; Liberal Democrats, 2019; Green Party, 2019; UKIP, 2019; Brexit Party, 2019) and British Separatists (SNP, 2019; Plaid Cymru, 2019; Sinn Fein, 2019). Furthermore, the parties demonstrated their views on social, political and economic issues from a rightist perspective (Conservatives, 2019; UKIP, 2019; Brexit Party) or leftist perspective (Labour, 2019; Liberal Democrats, 2019; Green Party, 2019; SNP, 2019; Plaid Cymru, 2019; Sinn Fein, 2019). These perspectives shaped how these manifestos were constructed in a manner independent of the timely issue of the UK's exit from the European Union, although the parties' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit might have been influenced by longstanding values and positions of these political parties.

A thematic textual analysis is designed to ensure rigourousness and validity when conducting qualitative research. This is achieved by conducting a four-step method of analysis; these steps are '*compiling*' (gathering texts), '*disassembling*' (coding), '*reassembling*' (theming) and '*interpreting*' (generating findings and conclusions) (Castleberry and Nolen, 2018, p.810). The analysis of the manifestos incorporated a similar coding scheme to that of the focus group analysis. The coding aspects were the *perceived social impact of Brexit for the United Kingdom*. In obtaining knowledge about these prospective impacts of leaving the EU, the researcher was able to explore and contextualise voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit; this was achieved by examining and

uncovering the discursive source of codified opinions and references about how Brexit was to have impacted their lives, that is to say, the researcher explored how political parties attempted to influence these attitudes and perceptions.

Cohorts within a Repeated Cross-sectional Design

The researcher opted to investigate voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit using a repeated cross-sectional design. Participants were recruited at various points between April 2019 and December 2019 to provide the researcher with information, about their attitudes and perceptions, using one of the two *live-participant* data collection methods: focus groups and online social surveys (questionnaires). Each individual study, within the repeated cross-sectional approach, sought to gain insight into the medium-term effect of the European Union withdrawal negotiations upon voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit across what would become known as the Brexit Year (31st January 2019 to 31st January 2020).

This recruitment method sorted participants into *temporal cohorts*; data was collected from groups of participants within a specified block of time, within the context of a significant development in the *history of Brexit*. A central feature of cross-sectional research is that it is time-limited and that it notes differences between cohorts' attitudes and perceptions (Levin, 2006, pp.24-25). Although this might be considered a weakness when compared to longitudinal, panel-based research, this approach presents some benefits to social researchers. Taking snapshots of voters attitudes and perceptions, in non-related cohorts, reduces the potential for sample attrition (associated with panel studies) while allowing the researcher to retain the possibility of making 'causal inferences' based on differences and similarities *between groups* rather than *within groups*; these inferences are made *between groups* because the majority of participants only participated in one of the data collections (Levin, 2006,

pp.24-25). The unpredictable nature of trying to anticipate significant developments in the Brexit negotiations, coupled with participant samples made predominantly of second- and final-year undergraduates, increased the likelihood of sample attrition and access issues and provided further validation and necessitation of the repeated cross-sectional approach.

The groupings of participants, whom took part in this study, can be most specifically described as prospective cohorts; that is to say, the data collected from these participants was gathered for the study's purposes, rather than retrospectively; a prospective study differs from its retrospective counterpart because the data collected immediately for the purposes of resolving a current problem, rather than the data being collected previously, and examined retrospectively, to resolve a current problem (Setia, 2016). While prospective studies are often more costly and time-consuming than retrospective ones, they benefit from a 'uniformity of measurement'; the primary researcher of this study selected the measures and variables which were presented to participants, therefore no irrelevant or incomplete data needed to be excluded from the study (Setia, 2016, pp.21-25). The prospective cohort was sourced predominantly from BCU RPS with other social media and internal communication channels used to supplement this recruitment method.

Sampling

This section explores the sampling methods that were used for the two *live-participant* research methods deployed within this study to investigate voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit: the two research methods were focus groups and online social surveys. The final samples for the focus groups and surveys were selected using a purposive sampling method, which is a derivative of the non-probability sampling technique. Ideally, a probability sampling method would have provided more valid data which was representative of the

electorate of the United Kingdom, however, the decision to use purpose sampling was taken because of concerns about time, access and resource limitations (Etikan et al., 2016).

Purposive, or judgement, sampling is described as the ‘deliberate choice of the participant due to the qualities the participant possesses’ (Etikan, 2016, p.1). The focus groups and online social surveys needed to be conducted within a finite period of time, determined both by the fast-moving nature of the history of Brexit *from Leave vote to Brexit-Day (2016 to 2020)* and by the permissible timeframe for conducting doctoral research *(2018 to 2021)*; a representative sample would have been more time-consuming than the purposive sampling that was used to obtain participants. Furthermore, limited financial resources for recruiting participants and restricted access to the entirety of the British electorate lessened the possibility of collecting a genuinely representative sample of participants from the length and breadth of the UK; again, for these reasons, purposive sampling was deemed the most useful methods of selecting participants for the focus groups and online social surveys.

The sampling presented some problems concerning the validity and generalisability of this study in understanding voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit across the UK. The samples (presented in depth in the subsequent chapters), across both the focus groups and online social surveys, were younger than the average age in the UK and participants were more likely to be female and to live and work in the English Midlands relative to the entire population of the UK; this was a consequence of utilising Birmingham City University as a location for participant recruitment.

Notwithstanding the concerns about the non-representativeness of the samples for the focus groups and online social surveys, these studies were conducted under strict parameters to ensure that the data collected was as robust and valid as possible given the studies’

limitations. Within this thesis, the necessary qualities for participants were, firstly, citizenship or permanent residence in the UK, and, secondly, an interest in or knowledge about the process of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit).

The simplified designs of these studies, involving common demographic and voting behaviour variables, standardised psychometric indicators and open response questions, helped to reduce the probability of recruiting unsuitable or unknowledgeable participants; it was understood that most adult citizens of the UK possessed a layperson's knowledge of the Brexit, in terms of a basic understanding of what Brexit means as a political event and how Brexit was related to major political parties in the UK. This layperson's knowledge did not necessarily relate to more complex effects of Brexit such as the suspension of Northern Irish devolution, the Irish border, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and other considerations which intersected the Brexit negotiations. This laypersons approach was considered crucial in understanding voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit because it incorporated participant samples that did not necessarily have a strong working knowledge of the politics of the European Union and the UK's place therein.

Sample Sizes

The sample sizes for the focus groups and the online social surveys were determined in concert with different bodies of knowledge for gaining valid samples for each of these research methods.

The two online social surveys, the British Attitudes Survey, and the European Attitudes Survey, required 30 participants each in order to meet the recommended minimum sample sizes for binary logistic regression. The researcher referenced studies by Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007), and van Smeden et al. (2016) to ascertain best practice for sampling in

a quantitative study which employs logistic regression as its mode of data analysis. When performing logistic regression, the studies by these scholars found that 10 observations per independent variable was sufficient for obtaining an appropriate sample size. Each of the two survey studies used one dependent variable and three independent variables.

The first online survey, the British Attitudes Survey, attained 148 eligible respondents. This exceeded the minimum required sample of 30 based on its use of three independent variables (British Social Identification, British Collective Narcissism, and preference in a hypothetical second referendum of EU membership).

The second online survey, the European Attitudes Survey, was made up of 157 participants. This exceeded the minimum required sample of 30 based on its use of three independent variables (European Social Identification, European Collective Narcissism, and preference in a hypothetical second referendum of EU membership).

The focus groups required a far smaller number of participants to gain useful and generalisable knowledge. Research into the requisite sample size for focus group research concluded that a range of three to six focus groups was optimal for investigating voters' attitudes and perceptions toward a subject, such as Brexit in this instance (Guest et al., 2016). In 2016, Guest et al. (2016) conducted an evaluation of 40 focus groups used in a health research study; the research concluded that 80% of all themes were discovered within two to three randomly selected focus groups, and 90% of all themes were discovered within three to six (Guest et al., 2016). All of the 'most prevalent themes' were found within the two to three focus groups (Guest et al., 2016, pp.3-5).

Finally, the selection of 9 electoral manifestos for the textual analyses was necessary because this number gave the researcher access to parties which received 96.5% of all votes cast in the 2019 General Election, while the documents could be easily grouped based on the combination of their attitudes toward the union of the UK (*pro or anti*) and attitudes toward a second referendum on EU membership (*pro or anti*).

Eventually, 384 online survey responses, 5 focus groups comprising 30 people, and 9 electoral manifestos became the total sample for each element of the study into voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in 2019.

Measures and Questions

The focus groups, and the open survey portion of the online questionnaires, were conducted using an *interpretation* of the interview schedule which formed the qualitative basis for the 2018 study by Hearne, Semmens-Wheeler and Hill (2018) which was a retrospective exploration of the referendum voting in the years following the 2016 decision. The present study built upon research by these three scholars in the preceding year, while taking advantage of the changes in circumstances and discourse surrounding Brexit that occurred in the *Brexit Year* (31st Jan 2019 – 31st Jan 2020). The work of the 2018 study, which comprised a psychological exploration of the vote, two years earlier, also provided a foundational knowledge and rationale for the use social identity and intergroup theory, in the form of the online social surveys.

<i>What does British identity mean to you?</i>
--

<i>What does European identity mean to you?</i>

<i>How do you feel Brexit will impact your community/friends and family?</i>
--

Table 8 Focus Group Questions

The semi-structured nature of focus groups allowed for a limited amount of deviation from the interview schedule; the adaptation of these questions from an interview context to a focus group necessitated this flexibility.

The online social surveys consisted of two validated rating scales; these were created by Golec de Zavala et al. (2009) and Ellemers et al. (2002). Each was suitably adapted to fit the purposes of this research study. These scales were the Collective Narcissism Scale and the Four-Item Social Identification Scale, respectively.

<i>I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my group.</i>
<i>My group deserves special treatment.</i>
<i>I will never be satisfied until my group gets the recognition it deserves.</i>
<i>I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it.</i>
<i>It really makes me angry when others criticize my group.</i>
<i>If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.</i>
<i>I do not get upset when people do not notice the achievements of my group. [R]</i>
<i>Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group.</i>
<i>The true worth of my group is often misunderstood.</i>

Table 9 Collective Narcissism Questions (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009)

<i>I identify with my group.</i>
<i>I feel committed to my group.</i>
<i>I'm glad to be a member of my group.</i>
<i>Being a member of my group is an important part of how I see myself.</i>

Table 10 Social Identification Questions (Ellemers et al., 2002)

The in-groups for both the Collective Narcissism Scale and the Four-Item Social Identification Scale were changed to, variously, Britain and the British in the first study, and

Europe and Europeans, in the fourth study. Both the Collective Narcissism scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and Four-item Social Identification scale (Ellemers et al., 2002) were designed for use in psychological experiments in which the in-group is not defined beforehand. However, since 2009, numerous studies have used them to measure the strength of national social identification (Daniel et al., 2016; Platow et al., 2015) or national collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2019; Golec de Zavala and Lantos, 2020; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019) among a sample, and to explore the social consequences of these psychological processes.

In addition to these rating scales and open-ended questions, a series of demographic variables were obtained in order to generate an in-depth knowledge of the samples for both of the online social surveys.

The nominal variables were *2016 Voting Choice*, *Recent General Election Voting Choice*, *Gender*, *Region or Nation*, *Regional Mobility of Residency* (*whether they participant lives in the same region as the one in which they were born*), *Self-described Social Class and Ethnicity*. Conversely, the scale variable was age. All of these variables provided insights into the social make-up of the sample but were excluded from the ultimate binary logistic regression analysis; the regression analysis used two scale variables, *Collective Narcissism* and *Social Identification*, and used two nominal variables, *preference in a second referendum on EU membership and political party voting*. These data are expressed clearly in the findings chapters to come.

Procedure for Conducting Studies

This segment explores illustrates how the researcher conducted to three forms of research, with both live participants and static texts; presenting the different approaches needed for these studies to be replicated.

Considerations for Textual Analysis

The selection of nine political manifestos from the 2019 United Kingdom General Election enabled the researcher to gauge the width and breadth of party-political attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit while analysing a finite, standardised dataset in the form of the nine documents. The parties, who produced the nine manifestos, earned 96.5% of the vote share in the general election. The procedure of grouping together the manifestos, in sets of three, for the thematic analysis aids the researchers' attempt to find common patterns in attempts to shape attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit among parties who appeal to disparate voters; these distinctions within groups range from nationalists in different nations (Wales; Scotland; Northern Ireland) to parties which operate within the mainstream and on the political margins (Conservatives; UKIP and Brexit Party).

The manifestos were gathered in electronic, PDF form, then printed for the benefit of the researcher; these printed versions of the e-versions of the manifestos enabled the researcher to annotate the documents by hand. The text of each manifesto was coded, and those codes were used to generate themes for each of the three groupings (the *pro-Leave*, *British unionist parties*; the *pro-second referendum*, *British unionist parties*; the *pro-second referendum*, *British separatist parties*); the method used was the Braun and Clarke (2006) technique of thematic analysis.

Procedure for Online Social Surveys

The two questionnaires enabled the researcher to record several demographic and voting behaviour variables, in addition to the two, 7-point Likert scales which were embedded within each of the British Attitudes Survey and European Attitudes Survey, respectively.

All participants, whether they were recruited by BCU RPS or by social media communication, gained access to the online questionnaire by clicking on a link that connected them to the Qualtrics platform which hosted and collected the raw data from the questionnaires.

The names of participants were not recorded for this study. Instead, each participant was given the opportunity to create a code (devised by the participant) that was attached to their set of responses to either of the questionnaire; should any of the participants have requested that their data be removed from the overall study, this would have been achieved by searching for the participant code and deleting all associated data. The code consisted of the two-digit version of their birth month, part of the name of their hometown, and the two-digit version of their birth year. For example, someone born in Stoke-on-Trent in December 1980 might create the code *12Sto80*.

Procedure for Focus Groups

The five focus groups enabled the researcher to investigate the attitudes of both Leave and Remain voters toward a variety of topics. These topics were British identity, European identity, the social impact of leaving the European Union, and their attitudes toward voters on the opposing side of the Brexit debate. Participants were recruited in advance, using BCU RPS and social media communication, and the data collection took place on five separate days in November 2019.

The focus groups varied in size. Focus Group 1 and Focus Group 5 each had eight participants, where Focus Group 2 and Focus Group 3 had five participants each, and Focus Group 4 had four participants.

The names of the participants were not recorded for the study. Instead, each was given a participant's number and code. For example, the first participant in the first focus group was *Focus Group 1 Participant 1* or *F1P1*. This code was later transformed into a pseudonym; the form of the pseudonym was a simple given name. Each participant also indicated their gender, age range and was afforded a blank space to express their racial or ethnic identity.

Mixed-Methods Research

This section examined how a mixed methods approach to primary research aided the researcher's attempt to understand voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. A mixed methods paradigm incorporates both quantitative and qualitative methods, however, it is common for one of the two to be the dominant method, and for the other, subordinate method, to enrich the findings of the dominant. Burke-Johnson et al. (2007) cited classical pragmatists *Dewey, James* and *Pierce* in their assessment of the most useful combinations, between qualitative-dominant and quantitative-dominant research, respectively; the most important condition underpinning a researcher's choice should be 'comprehensivity' (Burke-Johnson et al., 2007, p.131). In light of this conclusion, this present study took a qualitative-dominant approach to its enquiry, using the less dominant form, being quantitative data, to build upon these interpretive, qualitative findings. The two methods of qualitative research adopted in this overall study were focus groups and textual analysis on pre-existing texts (electoral manifestos); these two forms of research provided the dominant datasets, and these were

complimented by the use of quantitative social survey questionnaires to expand, and generalise upon, the specific findings of the two qualitative methods.

The decision to conduct pragmatic research coincided with the selection of both qualitative focus groups and quantitative surveys. The mixing of these methods allowed the researcher to induce new findings based on pre-existing *Likert scale* surveys and to compliment those with a more deductive thematic analysis of the focus group and textual analysis of political manifesto data. Investigations into the validity of using a mixed methods paradigm for social research has been conducted by researchers including de Lisle (2011). De Lisle (2011) conducted research into school choice among families and social policy concerning underperforming schools in Trinidad and Tobago, but the conclusions drawn from his study have been applied in a variety of contexts in social research. The Caribbean researcher found that certain elements of qualitative research, such as its ability to allow participants to freely express thoughts, feelings, memories and opinions, made this form of data collection was more useful for providing context and understanding external influences upon participants; however, although ‘large-scale empirical data’ is more limited in its ability to explore subjective elements, it allows for greater generalisability if conducted properly (de Lisle, 2011, pp.87-115). The focus groups used in this study of voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit, helped to illuminate differences in attitude, perception and experience between participants to a greater extent than did the questionnaires; while the questionnaires generated empirical findings, which might be replicated with a non-identical sample of participants.

The aim of writing this thesis is to create knowledge about voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit, while limiting the fallibility and swelling the empirical certainty of

that knowledge. While both quantitative and qualitative research methods possess their own inherent strengths and weakness, the interplay between the two, within a mixed methods paradigm, creates new opportunities and threats to the researcher. On one hand, work involving both qualitative and quantitative data ‘increases the generalisability of the study’ (Burke-Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp.15-16). Although, this leaves open the possibility of the quantitative results directly contradicting the findings and conclusions of the qualitative research, and vice versa (Burke-Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp.16-24). This negative potentiality was considered, at great length, by the researcher, however, it was ultimately concluded that the ability to gather both positivist and interpretivist data made a mixed methods paradigm the most worthwhile option for understanding the complexity and scale of differing attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit.

The researcher attempted to create new knowledge about this thesis’ subject, although the pursuit of this goal was aided by the incorporation of existing research tools that have been used in previous studies in the social sciences discipline. Quantitative research methods, such as the Likert scale-based surveys which formed the statistical data for the primary research of this thesis, possess unique advantages over qualitative methods, but they also present their own specific challenges. For ratings scales to be considered valid forms of empirical research, they must pass tests of ‘content validity’, ensuring that the scale covers ‘the entire domain related to the variable’, and ‘construct validity’ which determines whether valid ‘inferences’ can be drawn from the measures within the scale (Heale and Twycross, 2015, pp.66-67). A scale validity assessment was conducted for each of the two versions of the questionnaire. The selected scales (Four-Item Social Identification Scale, Collective Narcissism Scale, and Collective Self-Esteem Scale) had been thoroughly tested for both content and construct

validity and were deemed suitable for this study; the online social survey questions presented in this methodology are the original scale measures, as the modified versions are presented in the findings chapter. Given this development, however, as the construction of these two scales predated this study, and indeed, the Brexit vote itself, each lacked direct applicability to voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit; the requirement for a pragmatic, partially interpretist approach to analysis became evident early in the history of this study.

Mixed Methods and Sampling Considerations

As with all academic research, certain practical, temporal and financial constraints limited the expansiveness and comprehensiveness of the research carried; every effort was undertaken to ensure that this study into voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit was wide-ranging as was possible, as a means of producing certain knowledge of the social world. Research into methodologies, carried out by Wendy Walker (2011), warned that studies may be less reliable if they suffered from a 'failure to achieve randomisation', a lack of 'conditional control' and had the presence of high levels of participant self-awareness, which is commonly known as the 'Hawthorne Effect' (Walker, 2011, pp.572-580); where possible, the research that was conducted with *live* participants was designed to reduce the risks of non-randomisation and poor conditional control.

The primary, *live* participant elements of this research study were predominantly drawn from a sample of undergraduate students from the Birmingham City University Research Participation Scheme (BCU RPS), with some random, external recruitment carried out via social media; this latter sampling method benefitted from the impression and engagement-measuring tools on Twitter and other platforms.

Unfortunately, while the online social surveys were completed in non-controlled conditions, participants who were recruited using RPS (and internal communications) represented a non-random, potentially highly self-aware sample of university students and casual staff. This was a weakness of the research study; however, it did contribute to one of the core strengths of the thesis: this recruitment methods allowed the researcher to mobilise a potential sample pool of 24,000 participants, among whom a large proportion were eligible to participate in the study. The two main recruiting periods were April/May 2019 and November/December 2019. These two bimestrial (2 month) data collection periods were chosen because they coincided with the build-up to, and holding of, two major elections in the United Kingdom: the 2019 European Parliament Elections in the UK and the 2019 United Kingdom General Election, respectively. The rationale for conducting primary data collection was centred upon the presumption that voters would be actively considering their attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit during two UK-wide elections that sought to gauge the electorates' thoughts and feelings concerning the UK's relationship with the European Union.

Furthermore, the selection of an appropriate sample for the qualitative portion of the mixed methods study presented some challenges to the researcher. The adoption of focus groups, as one of the primary data collections, comes with the assumption that the researcher has constructed a valid paradigm within which to place this qualitative method; that is to say that although qualitative research eschews positivist or statistical data, it must be situated within a reliable model or framework of conducting the research. Golafshani's (2005) analysis of the reliability and validity of qualitative research posited that the lack of 'generalisability' of qualitative findings does not diminish the 'trustworthiness' or 'transferability' of the

research into other contexts; each subjective paradigm is be judged on ‘its own paradigms terms’ within qualitative research (Golafshani, 2005, pp.597-605).

The researcher attempted to create a qualitative study of voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit that was context specific and quite different from more common analyses of voters’ views toward a given General Election in the UK or a political party abstractly. While efforts were made to distinguish between the party politics and the result of the 2016 EU referendum, this distinction might illuminate similarities between attitudes toward politics and voting independently of their context.

A mixed methods approach, incorporating both interpretivist and positivist research, opens up intriguing possibilities for understanding voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit, when compared with an approach that rejected one of these two types of research. This benefit is explored in the research of Rylee Dionigi. Dionigi’s (2006) research was centred on the links between aging and exercise, rather than on psychological traits and voting behaviour, although the scholar defends the use of qualitative research in all types of sociological research. Voters’ attitudes toward Brexit can be researched using only positivist research, such as mass social surveys; this approach would ideally generate replicable data that could be used to make assumptions about the attitudes and perceptions of voters across the electorate. However, the weakness of this positivist-only approach is that it favours generalisable knowledge over a more particularised knowledge of a unique set of participants. The researcher considered one of the benefits of social scientific research to be its ability to see beyond the mainstream experience and to illuminate the marginalised and under-reported views of citizens in a given society. This research study was undertaken to garner an

understanding of voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit that was as comprehensive and wide-ranging as the study's limitations allowed.

Ethical Considerations

Both the focus groups and the online social surveys were conducted using ethical methods of data collection and analysis. McInroy (2016) cited a commitment to gaining *informed consent*, maintaining *privacy and anonymity*, and minimising the possibility of causing *emotional distress* to participants as the most salient ethical considerations when conducting online questionnaires. Smith (1995) reinforced the importance of those three considerations while positing a fourth which was specific to focus groups; protecting the 'safety and physical wellbeing' of participants is of paramount importance for the researcher who often performs the role of moderator (Smith, 1995, p.480). The researcher valued the need to conduct ethical research as highly as the desire to collect valid and generalisable data about voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit; in this regard, social research is designed to both understand and to protect citizens within the society that is being researched, and ethical research helps to maintain both of these standards while working.

To ensure the anonymity of all participants across the surveys and focus groups, no identifiers were obtained from them; user-generated *participant codes* for the former, and pre-selected *pseudonyms* for the latter, protected the true identities of all participants. The privacy of all primary data is ensured by storing all responses on an encrypted hard drive which was kept for five years, for auditing purposes, before being securely destroyed. After these five years elapsed, the only record of the data is the interpretation and presentation of such which was recorded within this thesis. The privacy protocol was operated in accordance with the

ethical guidelines of the Business, Law and Social Sciences (BLSS) Doctoral Research College, and of the wider Birmingham City University.

The focus groups presented divergent ethical and practical challenges from the online social surveys; the most obvious of these was the presence of interpersonal contact between participants. The researcher, acting in the role of moderator, took measures to ensure the mental and physical wellbeing while allowing participants to engage in open, honest and *frank* discussions about their attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. Smith (1995) wrote that the ‘synergistic effect’ of the focus group can often generate an ‘over-exposure’ of personal information, viewpoints and anger which might endanger participant wellbeing, whereas the presence of ‘too many observers’ can, conversely, reduce the ‘willingness’ to discuss attitudes and perceptions, which may, as a result, reduce the validity and usefulness of the data (Smith, 1995, pp.478-486).

The task of balancing openness and wellbeing was relished and undertaken by the researcher with the support of the doctoral supervisory team at the university.

Chapter 4: Textual Analyses of Electoral Manifestos

Introduction

This chapter explores the findings that were generated in an attempt to resolve the second research question for this study: *How did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term social impact of Brexit?* In resolving this research question, the researcher will be better able to resolve the overall question of how voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit have changed since 2016. This will be achieved by gaining an understanding of the ways that political parties shape public discourse about Brexit and the differing ways in which Leave and Remain voters perceived and processed this discourse when voting in elections that determined the political course Brexit. The textual analysis of the electoral manifestos is conducted using a thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clark, 2006) to discover common patterns and differences across the political communication of parties in the four nations of the United Kingdom.

The study consists of thematic textual analyses of nine electoral manifestos from the 2019 General Election in the UK, with the analyses centring on perceived the social impacts of Brexit from parties with divergent attitudes toward membership of the European Union and of the UK's continued union as a state.

The study categorises the manifestos into three groups which were determined by the given party's positions on both the European Union and the union of the United Kingdom. These groups are the *pro-Leave, British unionist parties* (Conservatives, 2019; UKIP or *United Kingdom Independence Party*, 2019; Brexit Party, 2019); the *pro-second referendum, British unionist parties* (Labour, 2019; Liberal Democrats, 2019; Green Party of England and Wales,

2019); *the pro-second referendum, British separatist parties* (SNP or Scottish National Party, 2019; Plaid Cymru, 2019; Sinn Fein, 2019). These grouping, based on party attitudes toward Brexit and to the union of the United Kingdom, help to investigate the relationship between a unified British identity and nationalism, as well as a larger European identity and its association with support for membership of the European Union; this study serves as an attempt to understand voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit through the prism of party voting behaviour.

The thematic textual analysis is supported by secondary research, both empirical and theoretical, about the potential impact of Brexit on social, political and culture life in the UK. Firstly, claims of a perceived increase in nationalist (Stephens, 2016; Brown, 2017) and xenophobic (Merali, 2016; Büttner, 2018) discourse within the post-Brexit media landscape is investigated to understand how these potential changes in discourse could impact voters' attitudes and perceptions toward the UK and Europe.

The likelihood of Brexits negative social impact falling hardest on those with less resources in UK society is explored (Hearne et al., 2017; Frost 2017). Moreover, the researcher explored the extent to which pre-existing social inequalities, within British life, both influenced the UK's decision to vote Leave and 2016, and would, consequently, be exacerbated because of the economic cost of leaving the EU (Farrell, 2016; Rickard 2016). The researcher investigated the arguments that the UK's exit from the European Union would contribute to a decline in national sovereignty rather than an increase in it (Gordon, 2016; Ackerman 2016). To that point, the argument that the loss of *four nations* sovereignty was probed to understand how British separatist discourses influence attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit (Henderson et al., 2016). Whereas the researcher also analyses the merits contained within the argument that the UK's

desire to avoid *ever closer union* with the remainder of the EU was responsible for fueling debates about a perceived loss of British sovereignty (Wind, 2017).

Research into the potential social impact of the economic consequences of Brexit was also conducted. The researcher investigated the possible social consequences for economic downturns in the manufacturing sector (Li et al., 2019; Pryce et al., 2019), in the city (*or financial services*) (Boleat, 2019), on household income (Breinlich et al., 2017), and on UK-EU trade (Macdonald, 2017). Furthermore, the social impact of the potential economic consequences of Brexit on regional inequality in the UK (O'Reilly et al., 2016), on long-term Foreign direct investment (van Reenan, 2016), and on skills and labour migration (Wadsworth et al., 2016) were also studied.

The researcher explored how the future of the union of the United Kingdom was influenced by discourse and political action regarding Brexit. An analysis and presentation of contemporary polling data illuminated the levels of support for independence movements in three of the four home nations of the United Kingdom (BBC Wales, 2020; DRG Global, 2020; Lucid Talk, 2020), and the researcher contemplates the how the political parties of the United Kingdom parliament communicate their position on the continuation of the union of the UK (Alexandre-Collier, 2015; Berberi, 2017; Dye, 2015; Ewen, 2016; Schnapper, 2015; Wyn Jones, 2009)

Research into the psychological effect of political communication was analysed in order to improve the researchers understanding of the effect of political manifestos in influencing voters' perceptions and attitudes toward Brexit. The concept of traditional parties, that communicate a consistent ideology and positionality, over years and decades, gave insight into how voters' attitudes can both remain static, if they feel committed to the traditional party, and

can change if they reject the traditional ideology (Greene, 1999). The researcher then explored how political parties, and the media, in tandem, set the agenda or determine the most salient subjects within popular public discourse (Kalla and Broockman, 2017; Lau, 1989). Moreover, the construction and popularisation of electoral manifestos is inspected to understand the levels of awareness that voters have about the conventional, artificial nature of political communication (McNair, 2011)

The analytical journey concluded with an investigation into the ways fringe, non-mainstream ideologies can come to assume prominent positions in the public discourse (Matthes and Schmuck, 2015; Moore and Ramsay, 2017; Pencheva and Maronitis, 2018) and how individual actors, within the political structure of the UK can have a disproportionate impact of shaping voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit (Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019).

Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 23rd July 2019 to 29th October 2019

The following table presents a series of significant events related to the historic course of Brexit and analyses the relevance of these events to shaping voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This table spans from the election of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister in 2019 until Parliament's granting of a General Election later on in the autumn of 2019.

Date	Event	Impact on Brexit
23rd July 2019	<i>Boris Johnson Elected Conservative Party Leader and UK Prime Minister</i>	Boris Johnson, who was a central figure in the Vote Leave campaign, becomes Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister. His victory over Jeremy Hunt signals a premiership more committed to a hard-er form of Brexit than that of outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May.

August 28th 2019	<i>Boris Johnson Prorogues Parliament for Five Weeks</i>	The Prime Minister's unconventional and unprecedented shutdown of Parliament is viewed, within and without the Commons, as an attempt to minimise parliamentary debate regarding the Withdrawal Bill and to increase the likelihood of a No-Deal Brexit.
September 9th 2019	<i>'Benn Act' Becomes Law: Preventing a No-Deal Brexit without a Parliamentary Majority</i>	Hilary Benn, of Labour, introduces this bill which becomes an Act of Parliament when it is passed by 327 votes to 299; Royal Assent and Commencement occur on September 9 th . This Act momentarily negates the threat of No-Deal and obliges Boris Johnson to request an extension to Brexit Day; the new date becomes 31 st January 2020.
September 24th 2019	<i>UK Supreme Court Rules Five-Week Prorogation Unlawful: Parliament is Reopened</i>	The UK Supreme Court, led by President Baroness Hale, rules that the five-week prorogation is unlawful, and that Parliament is still sitting; this prompts MPs to return to the Commons to debate the Withdrawal Bill.
October 17th 2019	<i>EU and UK Agree 'Divorce' Deal to Replace Irish Backstop</i>	EU's negotiators, Donald Tusk, Jean-Claude Juncker and Michel Barnier (<i>chief</i>) and UK's negotiators Boris Johnson, Stephen Barclay and David Frost (<i>chief</i>) agree Brexit withdrawal agreement. This must be passed in UK parliament as was decided by the UK Supreme Court on January 24 th , 2017 in <i>R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union</i> .
October 28th 2019	<i>EU Agrees 31st January Extension to Brexit Day: Gives</i>	As several <i>meaningful</i> votes and <i>indicative</i> votes fail to either pass

	<i>UK Parliament Time to Pass Legislation</i>	the Withdrawal Agreement, or build a consensus around a new direction, by 31 st October, Boris is obliged by law to request an extension to Brexit Day. The EU agrees and the new date is 31 st January 2020.
October 29th 2019	<i>House of Commons Approves Boris Johnson's Request for General Election</i>	After being granted the extension by the EU, Boris Johnson calls for a General Election in an attempt to gain an overall majority that would be able to pass the Withdrawal Agreement without cross-party consensus. The Commons overwhelmingly approves the General Election.

Table 11 Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 23rd July 2019 29th October 2019 (UK Parliament, 2020; Europa, 2020)

How Party Manifestos Influenced the Debate around Brexit

The following sections explores the importance of party manifestos in shaping political attitudes and perceptions, and these theories are further investigated in relation to the context of the post-2016 referendum period of British politics.

Electoral Manifestos as Consented Propaganda

In this section, the researcher investigated the practice of producing political manifestos to shape voters' opinions prior to an election or referendum, critically assessing how this traditional campaigning technique was used to shape voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit.

Political parties in the two general elections that followed the 2016 EU membership referendum, used their electoral manifestos to influence attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit during a four-year period of time when the UK's exit from the EU was far from a certain prospect; this period of time was the autumn of 2019, in which there was no parliamentary majority for either successful passage of the Withdrawal Act 2019 or for a second referendum on

EU membership or any other potential resolution to the impasse (UK Parliament, 2020). To generalise, however, every election or referendum campaign is conducted using a variety of media made available to the parties' campaign organisers. The political manifesto is a conventional media used in elections and referenda; these documents are referred to as 'consented propaganda' (McNair, 2017, p.29); that is to say these manifestos spread the doctrines, ideas and ideological positions of political parties with the implied consent of the electorate. The contents of electoral manifestos are frequently discussed in popular, televised election debates involving party leader or other senior cabinet figures; these televised debates are customary rather than constitutional (Hughes, 2019).

Issues arose during the Brexit referendum campaign, however, with regard to McNair's assessment of consented propaganda. Much of the information that was used shape voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit consisted of incomplete, incorrect and often deliberately misleading information based on projections about the costs or benefits of leaving, or remaining in, the European Union; respectively; the most prominent of these misleading figures was a widely seen figure was the suggesting of a *£350 million* per week saving as a result of voting Leave.

The information contained within political manifestos, whether fraudulent or equitable, is communicated via multiple forms of media; this relating of political messages through the media helps to inform large amounts of voters' attitudes and perceptions before voting. Political parties worked in tandem with the news media to set the political agenda during the general elections and referendum; the ultimate *political agenda* comes about by a selection of the important topics and the concurrent relegation of unimportant topics to the fringes of debate (Kalla and Broockman, 2017). During the 2019 General Election campaign, the UK's potential exit from the

EU, and the prospective consequences associated with the proposition, was placed as the most important topic on the agenda; this was thus discussed prominently across the breadth of the manifestos for the major parties. Thusly, the likely social impacts of Brexit were prominently featured in the electoral manifestos, and it remains to be seen whether these documents informed voters' decision-making processes to any observable effect.

The Pre-existing Political Objectives of the Parties in the 2019 General Election

The researcher investigated the relationship between the temporal context of the 2019 General Election manifestos, and the pre-existing policies and positions of the parties, to understand how the producers of the manifestos sought to influence voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit.

The information, which is communicated in these party manifestos, and subsequently in other forms of political communication, was designed to address the most salient social, economic and political concerns of probable party voters; even the larger catch-all parties such as Labour and the Conservatives, primarily target voters in seats that they have a chance of winning in an election, whereas areas of lower electoral opportunity are canvassed less vigorously. Within the British context, large catch-all parties a greater chance of forming a parliamentary majority than smaller, issues-driven parties partly because of the nature of the first-past-the-post voting system; a governing majority is slightly more dependent on the parties geographical spread to gain 326 of the 650 available seats, rather than on the popular vote, in gaining one vote more than 50% of the overall vote, as the last Prime Minister to govern after their party received a majority of the popular vote was Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in 1935 (UK Parliament, 2020).

As noted, Brexit was the most salient subject during the campaign, but the subject adopted different meaning for different voters; for *British separatist* parties, the prospect of Brexit was

used to increase support for ending their own nation's union with the rest of the United Kingdom (SNP, 2019; Plaid Cymru, 2019; Sinn Féin, 2019); likewise, *British unionist* parties, who also were opposed to Brexit, presented the proposition of leaving the European Union as a threat to the core values of their likely voters such as *a protection of civil liberties such as a migratory rights* (Liberal Democrats, 2019), *economic regulation and welfare protection* (Labour, 2019), or *a commitment to environmentalism* (Green Party, 2019). The *pro-Leave, British unionists* (Conservatives, 2019; UKIP, 2019; Conservatives, 2019) sought to use the referendum to reinforce an implicitly (Conservatives) or explicitly (UKIP and Brexit Party) Eurosceptic viewpoint in British politics. Each party that took part in the election attempted to balance their message in three ways: shaping a position on Brexit (Leave or Second Referendum), shaping a view on the union of the UK (Unionist or Separatist) and shaping an overall view of the best political philosophy (which was unique to each party in the running).

Furthermore, the researcher found that there existed a significant link between voters' identity self-constructs and their choice of political parties; this interplay between the salience of Brexit in the election, and long-standing social identities derived from political affiliation, added a further layer of complexity to the attempted understanding of how these manifestos shaped attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. To that point, research by Lau (1989) found a significant relationship between social identification and mainstream political parties; being members of, and/or voting for, a party that reinforces their mainstream values is a highly salient part of the social identity of those voters (Lau, 1989, p.228). Political parties build loyalty among voters by reinforcing the norms and values of voters with high mainstream party identifiers.

To take an example from contemporary history, when political leaders of yesteryear deviated from the long-standing norms and values of their party, this alienated high-identifiers and

reduced their loyalty to the given party. This was exemplified by Tony Blair's diminishment of trade unions and Nick Clegg's coalition-era policies and tuition fee reforms which occurred during their periods in government. The loss of significant numbers of votes and parliamentary seats can be observed in the history of British General Election from 1997 to 2015, which is the period of time in which one or both of these politicians lead their respective parties (UK Parliament, 2020). While other factors might have contributed to the decline of those parties, it remains worth keeping in mind the delicacy of long-term relationships between voters and parties, and the need for parties to consistently fortify their bases.

Furthermore, Labour and the Conservatives, specifically, function as that which Greene (2009) coined 'Traditional Parties'; these parties have a noticeably potent influence on voters regardless of the present-day political agenda (Greene, 2009, p.396). For longstanding traditional party voters, the discourse surrounding the potential impact of a proposed Brexit was unlikely to undermine their long-term support for their chosen party; this is because the party and its traditions form a salient part of the social identity of these voters, and it is likely that this effect was multi-generational.

In the 2019 General Election campaign, parties, especially the bulk of the pro-second referendum group (*Labour, 2019; Liberal Democrats; 2019; Green Party; 2019*), used the manifestos to reaffirm their party's longstanding commitment to the EU, and to encourage voters to build support for a second referendum on European Union membership with Remain as an option.

Political Communication in a Brexit-era British Context

This section surveys how party manifestos influenced voter attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in a uniquely British context; the researcher delves into the relationship between the British political actors of the Brexit era and the outcome of the General Election 2019.

Several of the key figures in the Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 EU referendum shaped the manifestos and political positions of two of the pro-Leave parties; these were special adviser Dominic Cummings, and politicians Michael Gove and Boris Johnson of the Conservatives, and Nigel Farage of the Brexit Party. Moreover, Jeremy Corbyn arguably played a significant role in the outcome of both the 2016 referendum and the 2019 General Election, by failing to convince voters of the merits of voting Remain or for a Labour Party that supported a second referendum on EU membership, respectively (Whittle, 2020).

The victory of the Conservatives, with an 80-seat majority, exemplified the concept of a Brexit as a ‘critical juncture’ in UK politics whereby a small group of political actors took the UK in a direction, i.e., leaving the European Union, that it would not have done otherwise (Zappettini and Krzyanowski, 2019, p.382). It was one of the goals of this study to explore how the leadership of the Conservative Party were able to create positive perceptions and attitudes toward Brexit within a sufficient number of voters so as to win the 2019 General Election, and to take the UK out of the European Union on 31st January 2020.

An analysis of the campaign literature that was used during the Leave and Remain campaigns of the 2016 EU membership referendum concluded that the issue of national and parliamentary sovereignty was elevated to a position of high salience in the public discourse by both sides of the argument, *Leave* and *Remain*. (Pencheva and Maronitis, 2018). The salience of the concept of

sovereignty, particularly national sovereignty (*the full right and power of the nation to self-govern*) and parliamentary sovereignty (*the full right and power of Parliament to govern the nation*) were popularised by the Dominic Cummings-helmed Vote Leave campaign (Pencheva and Maronitis, 2018). Pencheva and Maronitis appeared to indicate that the Remain campaign, and subsequent pro-Second referendum parties, used the concept of sovereignty very prominently in their rhetoric as a means of counter-attacking the Leave campaign; that is to say that the Remain campaign suggested that leaving the EU posed the greater threat to the position of the British Parliament as the supreme authority in the United Kingdom, compared to remaining in the EU, with the reason being that it would make the British state less commanding on the global stage, and, therefore, less able to emphasise its sovereignty when faced with external threats and enemy advances.

British Culture and Political Discourse

The researcher found that a vision of a United Kingdom, and especially an England, that grows more ethnically and culturally diverse, was used shape negative attitudes and perceptions toward remaining in the EU amongst those inclined to vote for a pro-Leave party. Pro-Leave politicians attempted to exploit social division based on ethnicity and race to construct inflexible attitudes toward EU membership in the minds of voters; the language and campaign of the Leave campaign was one of the most effective means of constructing these attitudes (Reid, 2019). The Leave campaign was often criticised for use of imagery and rhetoric that increased social tension, during the campaign and thenceforth, around the subjects of socio-cultural and immigration. Matthes and Schmuck (2015) noted a prevalence of *white nationalism* (particularised as predominantly a form of white English nationalism fueled by parties of the far right in the nine regions of England) within public discourse during the years leading up to the referendum, and these themes have arguably been intensified and concentrated within debate,

specifically among advocates of ending Freedom of Movement of People (a central tenet of EU membership). Voters who felt an affinity with the social attitudes and worldviews, noted above, might have been more inclined to vote for pro-Second referendum parties as a means of achieving a desired social outcome in a post-Brexit Britain.

What's more, the pro-second referendum parties used their own rhetoric and imagery to construct perceptions, among Remain voters and pro-second referendum supporters, that Leave voters possessed a myriad of undesirable character traits; these included the traits of anti-intellectualism, racism and general xenophobia (Moore and Ramsay, 2017). These traits were often attributed to Leave supporters of the provinces (outside of London) and of working (and under-) class social status within British society.

The Remain campaign was characterised, both from within and without, as being susceptible to allegations of elitism. In the eyes of its critics, the Remain campaign's use of celebrities, business leaders and global politicians fueled the narrative that the campaign, and support for remaining in the EU, was the domain of 'self-interested elites' (Moore and Ramsay, 2017, p.7). One of the central reasons for this perception of elitism within the Remain campaign was its direct juxtaposition against the Leave campaign; while Leave discourse could be considered a social movement, driven by promotion of (predominantly) white nationalism, and working class revolt, constructed for non-elite voters, Remain's campaign consisted primarily of macroeconomic discourse, concerns about trade, and worries about the diminished reputation of the United Kingdom on the international stage (Iakhnis et al., 2018).

Social divisions in the UK that are based on social class might be as deeply ingrained as those derived from ethnicity and cultural differences; the prominence of pro-prejudicial rhetoric

from both campaigns could ultimately lead to further social conflict as a result of the referendum and its Brexit-era elections.

Pro-Leave Parties' Attitudes toward Europe

In this section, the researcher attempted to illustrate how attitudes toward membership of the European Union informed the political positions of the major pro-Leave, British unionist parties that took part in the 2019 General election.

The Conservative Party has longly held, what has often been described as, an ambivalent attitude toward the UK's membership within the European Union; a large proportion of the party membership would traditionally have been described as Eurosceptic while there was another bloc within the Tory party that strongly supported remaining in the European Union indefinitely. During the EU membership referendum of 2016, the Conservative Party had the greatest split amongst its MPs with regard to supporting Leave and Remain, respectively; 185 Tory MPs declared support for Remain and 138 supported Leave (UK Parliament, 2020). When compared the next most-divided party at the referendum, being Labour with 218 Remain and 10 Leave MPs (UK Parliament, 2020); this indicates the extent to which the ruling Conservatives were fractured on the issue. Indeed, several frontbench (government positioned) MPs from the Conservative Party, at the time of the referendum, opposed Prime Minister David Cameron and were themselves members of the Vote Leave Campaign Committee; these included Justice Secretary Michael Gove, Commons Leader Chris Grayling, Culture Secretary John Whittingdale, Northern Ireland Secretary Theresa Villiers, Minister of State for Energy and Climate Change Andrea Leadsom, and Minister of State for Employment Priti Patel (Vote Leave, 2021).

The Conservative Party, one of three *pro-Leave, British unionist parties in this study*, was long torn on the *European question*, despite being in power for 29 years of the UK's 47-year

membership of the European Union (and its precursors) and leading the UK through a series of developments in the organisation, including the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). Alexandre-Collier (2015) recognised a pattern in behaviour of some members of the Conservative Party which he coined the ‘Maastricht Pattern’; until 2016, as the party leadership integrated the country more deeply into European Union, swathes of the Conservative support base, or *grassroots*, rejected each new element of European integration in much the same way as party members rejected the Maastricht Treaty; up until the referendum, these grassroots activists represented a highly vocal minority view within the party rather than the mainstream (Alexandre-Collier, 2015, p.17). One would argue that since the referendum, Euroscepticism upon the Conservative frontbenches has grown to hitherto unseen levels and has thus negatively affected public attitudes and perceptions toward the EU. On the other hand, the Conservatives ultimately passed the act which would ratify the Maastricht Treaty in parliament, cementing the division between pro-integration Conservatives like the then-serving Prime Minister John Major, and those figures less keen on integration such as his predecessor Margaret Thatcher who actively opposed the treaty from her position in the House of Lords (Baker et al., 1994).

The other two pro-Leave, British unionist parties were much less divided about whether to support and advocate for Brexit. These two parties were UKIP and the Brexit Party; the former existed long before the 2016 referendum and the latter were founded in spring 2019, approximately six months before the General Election 2019. The electoral success of UKIP in the 2014 European Parliament Elections was a major catalyst for Prime Minister Cameron’s decision to hold the referendum on EU membership; UKIP, as well as its competitor the Brexit Party (led by former UKIP leader Nigel Farage), advocated a form of hard Euroscepticism which is also known as *Euro-rejectionism*; this form of Euroscepticism is distinct from the latent

forms that exist in other mainstream UK parties, and is expressed as a consistent rejection of all forms of European integration and embrace of British nationalism (Dye, 2015). These factors made the two smaller pro-Leave, British unionist parties quite distinct from the Conservative Party, but all three were allied in their total support for leaving the EU in the months after the 2019 General election.

All three of the parties in question drew the majority of its support from the nine regions of England, rather than three other nations that constitute the UK. Leave voters across the UK may have been influenced by the presence of British nationalism in the campaign, but a unique form of English nationalism appears to have been the most influential and persuasive form of nationalism at play in the 2016 poll. The regions and nations of the UK that voted to Leave the European Union were Wales and eight of the nine English regions (excluding London); even without London, England had a higher Leave vote share than Wales at 53.4% compared to 52.2% (UK Parliament, 2020). Henderson et al. (2016) felt that the reason for the higher Leave vote in England lies in the idea that England is the most culturally Eurosceptic of the four nations; the cultural case for Brexit was founded in the widespread belief that English identity is 'incompatible with EU membership' (Henderson et al., 2016, p.190). This disparity between English and non-English voters in the UK might also continue to influence support from British separatism among pro-EU voters in the devolved nations; this conflict has often been borne out in popular discourse about Brexit, devolution and the prospect of separatist independence referenda (UK Parliament, 2020).

Pro-Second Referendum Parties' Attitudes toward Europe

In this section, the researcher attempted to illustrate how attitudes toward membership of the European Union informed the political positions of the major pro-second referendum parties that

took part in the 2019 General election. A key distinction is made between the six parties based on their support for the continued union of the United Kingdom; the two groups are divided between British unionists (*pro*) and British separatists (*anti*).

The largest of the pro-second referendum parties, Labour, also differed from the Conservatives during the 2016 EU membership referendum because its parliamentary party was far less divided on the issue of Brexit; the majority of Labour parliamentarians supported Remain, with only a few notable Leave-supporters taking the opposite view, such as Gisela Stuart and Kate Hoey (UK Parliament, 2020). Labour had, however, been described as having a mixed record on support for further European integration during its 18-year period of power during the UK's 47-year membership of the EU. The party's discourse on the European Union has been conducted with a 'defensive tone', while across a variety of Labour leaders, the salience of Europe has been diminished and relegated to the fringes of debate by, and within, the party (Schnapper, 2015, p.50). While Labour had never, before 2019, taken the position that the UK should leave the European Union without a second referendum on EU membership, they could not have been described as an explicitly pro-European parties UK political system in the context of the post-referendum period (2016-2020), at least when compared to the following parties. The New Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (1997 to 2010) exemplify the complicated nature of Labour's attitudes toward European integration; the party supported the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and the Accession Treaties of 2003 and 2005 (which enlarged the geography of the EU) while, on the other hand, seeking and securing opt-outs from the monetary union and social charter of the earlier Maastricht Treaty and opposing the *never-ratified* Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (which preceded the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty)

(Bulmer, 2008). New Labour could be considered a pro-EU governing party, but also one that was not fully committed to ever closer union.

The Liberal Democrats, by contrast, represented one of the few explicitly pro-European party that sought election in all three of the nations of Great Britain (England, Scotland, Wales but not Northern Ireland), however, between the date that the UK joined the EEC (predecessor of the EU) until Brexit Day, the Liberal Democrats were in power, as the junior member of a coalition, for only 5 of 47 years, or 10.6% of the years of the UK's membership; this meant that the government of the UK has been largely devoid of an unequivocally pro-EU voice, in contrast to Labour's more measured approach to pro-EU rhetoric (Schnapper, 2015). The Green Party, furthermore, which is also regarded as pro-European, had not, as of 2019, held more than a single seat in the House of Commons. In summary, the Labour Party can be critiqued for being the least pro-EU of the three despite holding the largest membership, vote share and parliamentary seats during the period of the UK's membership of the EU.

In the UK context, there are two types of political parties whom opposed leaving the EU without a second referendum on membership with Remain as an option; the first group of parties were the British unionists detailed in the above paragraphs; the second group did not advocate Brexit, but also did not advocate the continuation of the Union of the United Kingdom without further referenda, and these parties are referred to as the British separatists; these parties are the SNP, Plaid Cymru and Sinn Fein and all three were strongly in favour of continued membership of the European Union for their nation at least, if not for the UK as a whole.

British Separatist Parties' Attitudes toward the UK

The researcher explored, in this section, how the three major British separatist parties in this study perceive their self-identifying nation's (Scotland; Wales; Northern Ireland) place within

the United Kingdom; the researcher used this data to examine its impact on shaping attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in the devolved nations.

The British separatist parties (SNP; Plaid Cymru; Sinn Féin) all promoted membership of the European Union, but also advocated independence for their own nation from the rest of the UK; support for these British separatist parties continued to differ from nation to nation. A number of surveys (DRG Global, 2020; Lucid Talk, 2020; BBC Wales, 2020) have been conducted over the past decade to gauge support for the three major forms of independence from the United Kingdom that exist the three smaller nations of the UK, excluding England. Anti-unionism in Scotland is generally higher than in either Northern Ireland or Wales; support for Scottish independence rose from 47% in 2016 to 50% in 2020 (DRG Global, 2020). Support for Irish unification has also risen sharply since the 2016 referendum, arguably as a result of fears for the Good Friday Agreement, which ended the majority of the violence in the Troubles (*near civil war in Northern Ireland*) being undermined as a consequence of the Brexit negotiations. One potential outcome of the Brexit negotiations was the construction of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which have been in direct contravention of the Good Friday Agreement; the international treaty required ‘the removal of security installations’ between North and South on the island of Ireland, and this was interpreted as meaning that new security installations, such as border checkpoints, must not have been erected after the signing of the agreement (British-Irish Council, 1998, p.25). Potentially as a result of this uncertainty, support for a United Ireland rose from 28% in 2016 to 45% in 2020 (Lucid Talk, 2020).

In Wales, however, support for Welsh independence has been consistently far lower than comparable British separatist movements in Scotland and Northern Ireland; support for Welsh independence rose only slightly from 6% in 2016 to 11% in 2020 (BBC Wales, 2020).




Figure 20 Anti-Unionism in Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland (BBC Wales, 2020; Lucid Talk, 2020; DRG Global, 2020)

Voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit are perhaps influenced by the complexity of their national identity; the campaign was linked to a rise in British nationalism (Rickard, 2016; Stephens, 2016), however, the four-nation make-up of the United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland) complicates how nationalism works for different voters. YouGov conducted a survey to understand the relationship that British people have with both their nation's identity (England, Wales, Scotland) in Great Britain, and their wider British national identity. The study found that Scottish people were more likely to identify as being '*more Scottish than British*' and '*Scottish not British*' than Welsh people were (with regard to the Welsh identity rather than Scottish); furthermore, Welsh participants were more like to say they felt '*more British than Welsh*' and '*British not Welsh*' than Scottish people were (with regard to the Scottish identity rather than Welsh) (YouGov, 2020).

Although there is little empirical evidence that this difference in national identity association is directly correlated with support for Brexit, it is worth noting the difference between Wales and Scotland. For Scots, their nation-based identity is more salient than it is for the Welsh, according

to this study, and Scotland as a nation voted to remain within the EU while Wales voted Leave. With little evidence of support for English separatist movements (that is a desire for England to be a nation independent from the other three nations of the United Kingdom), and with the largest English separatist party, the English Democrats, having received 0.25% of the vote in its most successful General Election in 2010 (UK Parliament, 2020), this nation has been excluded from the analysis of separatist sentiment.




Table 12 National Identity in Great Britain (YouGov, 2020).

The SNP, Scotland's largest Westminster party and the governing party at Holyrood, positioned itself as an opposition to pro-Leave sentiment in the 2019 General Election, and also sought to use the poll as a platform to increase support for a second referendum of Scottish independence in light of the potential economic, social and political detriment to Scotland that would arise out of the implementation of Brexit. The nationalism that is prominent in the organisation and rhetoric of the Scottish national party does not resemble the kind of right-wing populism than occurs in large nations in Western Europe and North America; Dye (2015) characterises the SNP as an 'ethnoregionalist party' similar to those found in the Basque

Country, Catalonia and Quebec, than eschews ethnocentrism and instead seeks to gain support by offering nationalists in Scotland a pragmatic, unromantic form path toward independence through a steady building of parliamentary representation, maximising devolution opportunities and by constructing a democratic mandate for full self-governance (Dye, 2015, p.2). As figure 20 suggests, support for British separatism in Scotland has been consistently higher than it has been in the other devolved nations, and the SNP's influence on shaping negative attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit, in the public discourse, far outweighs that of the two parties below.

Northern Ireland's perception of Brexit, for its own nation, differs from that of any other region or nation of the UK. Freedom of Movement of People between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is not merely a feature of EU membership, but it is an important part of the social identity of the people of Northern Ireland that was placed at risk as a result of Brexit through its contravention of the Good Friday agreement. For this reason, Irish nationalists (British separatists) vehemently opposed the UK's exit from the European Union on the grounds that it would undermine the ongoing Peace Process in the region, which was a violent conflict between British unionists and Irish nationalists. The social division between British unionist and nationalist (British separatist) voters in Northern Ireland was epitomised by the referendum outcome in British unionist and Irish nationalist constituencies in the 2016 EU membership referendum. 7 out of 10 unionist constituencies voted to leave the EU, mirroring the outcome in 8 of 9 English regions and in Wales, while all 8 nationalist constituencies voted Remain in 2016; Northern Ireland as a nation voted for the UK to remain a member state of the European Union (Berberi, 2017). As Brexit developed and became a more and more real proposition, support for a United Ireland also increased; it remains to be seen whether this increase was as a direct result

of negative attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit amongst a nation-based electorate that voted Remain.

Welsh nationalist parties sought to construct perceptions of Brexit as being in contravention with Welsh sovereignty in the UK, however, as stateless-nationalists ruled by Labour at the devolved level and the Conservatives in the national domain, those arguments gained less traction in Wales than in Scotland (where many voters favour full independence as a nation state) and Northern Ireland (where many prefer independence from the UK but unity and shared sovereignty with the Republic of Ireland). Although Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) was the most visible British separatist, pro-EU party in Wales, the party was far less successful electorally than British separatists in Scotland (SNP) and Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin; SDLP) (Wyn Jones, 2012). In the 2015 General Election, Plaid Cymru won the 3rd most seats and the 4th most votes, and in the 2016 Assembly Elections received fewer votes than the Conservative and Unionists; both won 6 seats and the other large British unionist party in Wales, Labour, won 27 seats (UK Parliament, 2020). Wales clearly differed from the other two other devolved nations in two significant ways; Wales as a nation voted Leave in the 2016 referendum, and Welsh separatist supporters were less plentiful than separatists in Scotland and Northern Ireland, respectively. These two factors limited Plaid Cymru's ability to leverage anti-Brexit sentiment to gain support for its ultimate aim, being Welsh independence from the UK.

[The Prospective Impact of Brexit on Voters](#)

The following sections explores how the academic community perceived Brexit would impact the United Kingdom, in the event that the UK did secede from the European Union. These analyses were conducted in relation to a variety of sources of impact, being macro- and micro-economic, social, political or otherwise, and in relation to varying forms of Brexit, being a

settlement that was either closely aligned or largely divergent from the existing relationship between the EU and the UK.

Social Impact of Brexit's Economic Decline

In this section, the researcher explored how predictive economic models foretold the social impact of Brexit based upon its effect on trade and the UK economy in general. This review takes on board research that was conducted on a variety of industries and fields; this provided a basis of knowledge for assessing the impact of Brexit on voters from differing social and economic backgrounds.

The 2019 General Election represented an opportunity to influence attitudes and perceptions about Brexit for pro-Leave and pro-second referendum parties; during the intervening years between the 2016 referendum and the 2019 election, the economic consequences of Brexit have played a major role in the public discourse. Among the more significant economic impacts of leaving the European Union are the effects that it will likely have on supply chains and movement of goods and services between the UK and the EU27. Trading costs and delays in supply chains, as a result of Brexit, were projected to reduce efficiency and competitiveness in the UK economy, and to make the UK as less attractive venue for foreign direct investment (van Reenan, 2016; Breinlich et al., 2017; MacDonald, 2017). Furthermore, Brexit was forecasted to increase product waste and overall cost of production, as well as reducing worker productivity in the short to medium term (Li et al., 2019). Li's analysis suggested that economic decline as a result of low productivity would have a negative impact on the British economy; the likely outcome of the scenario being low economic growth, higher unemployment for citizens and a less competitive economy within the global economy.

In addition, less access to EU markets was predicted to have a particularly negative impact on the UK's important financial services sector (Boleat, 2019). These potential economic impacts were also explored from a theoretical perspective; economists sought to understand how worse off the UK had become, economically, as a result of the uncertainty that existed between 2016 and 2019. Economists Pryce et al. (2019) found that economic growth in the UK between 2016 and 2019 was between 2% and 2.5% below projections as a result of the economic uncertainty surrounding Britain's exit from the European Union (Pryce et al., 2019, p.168). A negative economic impact of Brexit in the financial services sector would diminish the job prospects and financial security of a different subset of British workers, adding further damage to the more severe sectoral declines predicted for voters who work in the manufacturing and logistics sectors.

Social Impact of Brexit's Socio-Cultural Conflict

In this section, the researcher explored how an observed rise in social tensions, following the 2016 vote to leave the European Union, would continue to intensify regardless of the final settlement of Brexit between the governing authorities in the UK and the EU27. This portion identified pre-existing social class and ethnic tensions as important factors in the escalation of these Brexit-era social problems.

The impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom goes far beyond balance sheets and economic forecasts. One of the most notable prospective and unquantifiable socio-cultural impacts was of the effect that the public debate and political outcomes would have upon the social cohesiveness of the UK. While racism and xenophobia were present in the United Kingdom long before the outcome of the 2016 EU referendum, the success of the Leave campaign exacerbated and cemented certain forms of racial and ethnic prejudice in the contemporary discourse (Merali,

2016). Immigration was used to dissuade voters from opting for Remain; this was achieved by elevating negative attitudes toward freedom of movement in the EU to a highly salient position within the public discourse (Merali, 2016). Considering contemporary predictions of greater migration into the UK, irrespective of the Leave vote, these ethnic and racial tensions are likely to remain salient issues for Britons going forward, influencing negative social relations within communities and creating an unharmonious Britain for the foreseeable future.

The regional inequalities, both economic inequalities and decision-making power inequalities that existed between London and the rest of the United Kingdom can be observed in the broad bases of support for Leave in 2016 and beyond. Support for leaving the European Union was most prominent among older voters, those living in deindustrialising, or *left-behind*, towns and those with lower levels of education; the prospective downturn in the British economy, as a result of Brexit, would negatively impact the lives of these, more marginalised, voters than it would for their counterparts who are younger, those with higher levels of education and those living in wealthy or economically-improving towns and cities (Hearne et al., 2018). Voters in these marginalised locales and groupings of the UK felt a sense of *social abandonment* by the political and business elites of society; general feelings of there being a dearth of opportunities for individual and collective prosperity among these voters fueled a desire for radical change (Farrell, 2016, p.492). With Brexit forecasted to have a more severe detriment in locations that rely more heavily in areas that rely more heavily upon manufacturing than on the service economy, voters in these areas are likely to be harmed further and for longer by the UK's decision to leave the European Union.

Finally, inter-regional tensions began to increase within the UK before and during the Brexit era. This resulted in anti-London sentiment across the other eight English regions and renewed

anti-Westminster sentiment in the three devolved nations; the latter being crystalized in British separatist movements across Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (YouGov, 2020). The possibility of referenda on independence, in both Northern Ireland and Scotland, in the short-to-medium term, is likely to continue to create a socio-cultural tension between British unionists and British separatists until these referenda take place.

Study Design

This element of the thesis explores how the researcher designed the study to go about answering the following research question; *how did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term economic, political and social impact of Brexit for voters?*

Case Studies Selected

This section demonstrates which case studies were selected and also illuminates their grouping within this study (*pro-Leave, British unionist parties; pro-second referendum, British unionist parties; pro-second referendum, British separatist parties*). Within the groups, each party grouping is united by, firstly, their attitude toward the European Union (*pro-Leave or pro-Second Referendum*) and, secondly, toward the union of the United Kingdom (*British unionist or British separatist*).

These party manifestos were selected because they represented 8 of the 9 most popular parties in the preceding 2017 General Election (Conservatives; Labour; Liberal Democrats; SNP; UKIP; Sinn Fein; Green Party of England and Wales; Plaid Cymru). The Brexit Party's manifesto replaced that of the Democratic Unionist Party in this study because, while the Brexit Party was not in existence in 2017, it was the largest party at the 2019 European Parliament

Elections in the UK; the decision to replace the DUP with the Brexit Party was justified by the fact that both parties were in favour of Brexit and that the party gained a higher vote share in the election and fielded candidates in three of the four nations (England; Wales; Scotland) compared to a single nation for the DUP (Northern Ireland).

The thematic textual analysis of these manifestos was the most representative study within the overall project for gauging the breadth of attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit among voters; the nine parties combined to represent 96.5% of all votes cast in the election, and takes in views of both British unionists, and British separatists from the three devolved nations (British separatists) in addition to the views of both Eurosceptics and pro- Europeans (UK Parliament, 2020).

References for the electronic copies of each of the nine party manifestos are provided in the list of references for this chapter. These manifestos are Conservatives, 2019; UKIP or United Kingdom Independence Party, 2019; Brexit Party, 2019; Labour, 2019; Liberal Democrats, 2019; Green Party of England and Wales, 2019; SNP or Scottish National Party, 2019; Plaid Cymru, 2019; Sinn Fein, 2019. Each manifesto was thoroughly read and then coded in relation to its discourse on the social impact of a (*then-potential*) Brexit.

Political Party	Electoral Location	Brexit Grouping	2019 General Election Seats Won (<i>with %</i>)	2017 General Election Seats Won (<i>with %</i>)
Conservative Party	United Kingdom	Pro-Leave, British unionist parties	365 (43.6)	317 (42.3)
Brexit Party	Great Britain	Pro-Leave, British unionist parties	0 (2.0)	<i>New Party - 2019</i>
UKIP	United Kingdom	Pro-Leave, British unionist parties	0 (0.1)	0 (1.8)
Labour	Great Britain	Pro-second referendum, British unionist parties	202 (32.1)	262 (40.0)

Liberal Democrats	Great Britain	Pro-second referendum, British unionist parties	11 (11.5)	12 (7.4)
Green Party	England and Wales	Pro-second referendum, British unionist parties	1 (2.7)	1 (1.6)
SNP	Scotland	Pro-second referendum, British separatist parties	48 (3.9)	35 (3.0)
Sinn Fein	Northern Ireland	Pro-second referendum, British separatist parties	7 (0.6)	7 (0.7)
Plaid Cymru	Wales	Pro-second referendum, British separatist parties	4 (0.5)	4 (0.5)

Table 13 Case Study Manifestos for Thematic Analysis (UK Parliament, 2020)

Notes on Data Selection, Grouping and Coding

Each manifesto was coded individually to investigate how the associated party communicated the economic, political and social impact of a potential Brexit. 9 manifestos were selected for thematic analysis. In contemporary elections, political parties use a multitude of available media to communicate with voters; these include television, radio, social media, online advertising, direct marketing and, of course, the production of a manifesto.

The multimedia landscape of general elections provides rich but oft-incoherent datasets for thematic analyses of this sort. Electoral manifestos were selected as they are single, formal documents, which becomes a single unit of analysis, produced by a consensus among all prospective parliamentary candidates who stand on their party's manifesto (UK Parliament, 2020). This study also focuses solely on the 2019 General Election at the exclusion of the 2019 European Parliament elections for an important reason: the two largest pro-Leave parties in the UK, in 2019, did not produce manifestos for the 2019 European Parliament Election; the Conservatives, led by an out-going Theresa May did not contest the election, and the Brexit

Party refused to construct a set of policies for the next European Parliament, as it was their ambition to leave the EU within the session (UK Parliament, 2020).

Each party was then grouped into one of three categories, for the thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) based on their attitude toward Brexit, and their attitude toward the union of the UK. The pro-Leave, British unionist parties were in favour of leaving the European Union without a further referendum, and they were strongly in favour of retaining the union of the United Kingdom. These three parties were the Conservatives, the Brexit Party and UKIP. The pro-second referendum, British unionist parties were broadly in favour of holding a second referendum of European Union membership with an option to Remain, and they were strongly in favour of retaining the union of the United Kingdom. These three parties were Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party of England and Wales. The pro-second referendum, British separatist parties were strongly in favour of holding a second referendum of European Union membership with an option to Remain, and they were strongly opposed to the union of the United Kingdom; favouring Scottish independence, Welsh independence and a United Ireland external from the rest of the UK, respectively. These three parties were the SNP, Plaid Cymru and Sinn Féin.

Procedure for Thematic Analysis

The research gathered PDF copies of the electoral manifestos for each of the nine parties involved in the study; these texts were saved in non-encrypted folders as they were not confidential in nature. To gain familiarity with the information, the researcher re-read each of the manifestos twice and then, on a third pass, used the ‘notes’ function on their word processor to ‘code’ sentences and paragraphs which they felt would be relevant to the question: *‘how did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the*

long-term social impact of Brexit?’ These codes were later grouped together into ‘themes’ which consist of codes that are most highly related. Each set of themes corresponded to one of the three groups: the pro-Leave, British unionist parties; the pro-second referendum, British unionist parties; the pro-second referendum, British separatist parties. The themes are reported below, connected to their relevant group, and expressed in continuous prose.

One important consideration when selecting the group names for the thematic analysis of electoral manifestos was the use of the term ‘British separatist’. After considerable mind-mapping of names, this was deemed to be the most appropriate. The term anti-unionist was also considered for parties that support independence movements in one of three nations (Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales), however, the term ‘unionist’ has colloquial meaning for the political discourse in Northern Ireland and is linked with specific parties in that country that are not applicable in Wales or Scotland. The term ‘separatist’ has connotations with other countries, notably the Basque separatist movement, but it is used in a distinct context within this study. British separatist simply means a desire to separate the United Kingdom into multiple sovereign states, and has no additional denotation, regardless of the wider use of the term ‘separatist’.

Findings

Pro-Leave, British Unionist Parties

In this section, the researcher conducts a descriptive analysis of the manifestos which were produced by the *pro-Leave, British unionist parties* (Conservatives; UKIP; Brexit Party) to assess how they used manifesto discourse to shape voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This section considers how the parties use the concepts of constitutional self-governance and the protection of national self-interest to convince their targeted voters of the merits of the

UK leaving the EU. The descriptive findings will be critically analysed and evaluated, aided by the secondary research presented earlier in the chapter, during the discussion.

Brexit Gives the UK Greater Self-Governance

It was evident that the concept of self-governance, or national sovereignty, with regard to policy and law, was used across the pro-Leave, British unionist parties to build positive perceptions about the UK leaving the European Union. The ruling Conservative Party sought to use Brexit as an opportunity for constitutional reform as a means to ‘restore trust in our institutions and in how our democracy operates’ (Conservatives, 2019, p.51). UKIP sought to invoke a history before the UK’s membership of the EEC to support a general replenishment of self-governance and a move away from a more pooled sovereignty as a member state of the EU; the party vowed to ‘fully restore the UK’s former status as an independent, self-governing, sovereign state’ (UKIP, 2019, p.1).

The Conservatives branded the European Union as a bureaucracy that was detrimental to the UK’s best interests; the party vowed to use ‘our new freedom after Brexit to ensure that British rules work for British companies’ (Conservatives, 2019, p.33). Another of the *pro-Leave, British unionist parties*, the Brexit Party also argued that, post-Brexit, the UK would benefit from great self-governance of tax laws; ‘a clean-break Brexit is a chance to reduce the cost of living for working families... EU rules stop us reducing our VAT rates’ (Brexit Party, 2019, p.13). Similarly, UKIP positioned the post-Brexit ability of the UK Parliament to set energy policy as among the more salient reasons to support leaving the European Union; ‘Brexit will allow the UK to set its own future energy policy, with lower prices and more secure supplies’ (UKIP, 2019, p.10).

UKIP categorised the UK's mandatory contribution to the annual EU budget, as a member state, as being an important hurdle, which was to be overcome in their desire for greater self-governance. The party argued that their plans to invest funds into UK infrastructure would benefit from the 'absolute minimum saving of £9.4 billion per annum' gleaned from leaving the European Union (UKIP, 2019, p.16). UKIP counterbalanced the trade loss from the UK-EU relationship with potential trade deals that could be obtained through membership of the World Trade Organisation; the party attempted to convince voters of the merits of leaving the European Union by arguing that 'we will be free to decide our own trade policy and negotiate trade agreements' (UKIP, 2019, p.9). Regarding trade and competition, the Brexit Party critiqued the EU's state aid rules, arguing that the rules were hindering Parliament's ability to invest strategically in certain industries that would be beneficial to the UK; Farage's party argued that 'freed from EU rules on state aid, we can invest in strategic industries such as steel, railways and defence to create thousands of jobs' (Brexit Party, 2019, p.11).

One of the themes that united the Leave campaign and the *pro-Leave, British unionists* was rhetoric based upon an antagonism toward immigration. The Conservatives attempted to describe ending the commitment to Freedom of Movement of People as being a benefit of leaving the European Union. The ruling party critiqued the levels of 'low-skilled migrants' (p.20) while advocating an Australian-style points-based immigration system; they wrote that 'only by establishing immigration controls and ending freedom of movement will we be able to attract the high-skilled workers we need to contribute to our economy, our communities and our public services' (Conservatives, 2019, p.20). In addition to rejecting certain types of economic migrants, the Conservative Party argued that Brexit would give Parliament greater authority to block EU citizens with pre-existing criminal records from entering the

UK; Boris Johnson promised to ‘use our new freedoms after Brexit to prevent more foreign national offenders entering our country’ (Conservatives, 2019, p.18). The Brexit Party agreed with the introduction of a point-based immigration system, claiming it would ‘reduce annual immigration and address wage stagnation and the skills gap’ (Brexit Party, 2019, p.16).

Brexit Puts Britons’ Interests First

The *pro-Leave, British unionist parties* constructed the perception that leaving the European Union would be beneficial for the regions and nations of the UK which are outside of (Greater) London. Both the Conservatives and the Brexit Party targeted voters in the UK’s *coastal and fishing communities*, while promising significant regeneration of the areas as a result of a proposed Brexit. The Brexit Party argued that leaving the EU gave the UK the opportunity to ‘recover control of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (or the median line), creating... new investment, jobs and tourism’ (Brexit Party, 2019, p.10). Similarly, the ruling Conservatives called on voters to support Leaving the EU because it would make allow the UK to become ‘an independent coastal state and taking back control of our waters’ (Conservatives, 2019, p.42).

This grouping of political parties also attempted to construct a desirable perception of Brexit by suggesting that leaving the European Union would help spread economic prosperity around the eight non-London regions of England, and across the three devolved nations (Scotland; Wales; Northern Ireland). The Conservatives pitched the idea that ‘by getting Brexit done, we will deliver certainty so that all four nations of the UK can move on together. This will allow us to strengthen the Union’ (Conservatives, 2019, p.45). Similarly, the Brexit Party supported ‘policies aimed at regional regeneration’ in attempt to appeal to voters across the length and breadth of the UK (Brexit Party, 2019, p.8).

The *pro-Leave, British unionist parties* attempted to create positive attitudes and perceptions about Brexit by arguing that the UK's social and environmental wellbeing would be improved as a result of leaving the European Union. UKIP sought to create an *us vs them* dichotomy between UK citizens and citizens of the EU27, exploiting anxieties about the National Health Service (NHS), immigration and an increased population to create a fearful perception of the UK remaining a member state of the European Union. The party wrote that 'EU open borders have created a major drain on resources by bringing in around 3.8 million additional people. Many of these people will have no history of contributing significant tax revenue to help pay for the NHS' (UKIP, 2019, p.1). Similarly, UKIP exploited voter concerns about the Freedom of Movement of People; the party claimed that 'mass uncontrolled immigration has been extremely damaging to Britain. We have imported cheap labour by the million. This... depresses the wages and living standards of those at the bottom end of the economic scale' (UKIP, 2019, p.3). With regard to the UK's environmental wellbeing, UKIP also wrote that Britain's best agricultural and environmental interests would be better served by leaving the European Union's CAP; they argued that leaving the CAP enabled the UK to move 'move from a system which subsidises large landowners to one that supports food producers and environmental protection' (UKIP, 2019, p.1).

Pro-Second Referendum, British Unionist Parties

The researcher conducts, in this section, a descriptive analysis of the manifestos which were produced by the *pro-second referendum, British unionist parties* (Labour; Liberal Democrats; Green Party) to assess how they used manifesto discourse to influence voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This section considers how the parties identify Brexit's potential harm to the health and wellbeing of voters, and its potentially negative impact on the UK's

international reputation, to persuade their targeted voters of the benefits of the UK conducting a second referendum with the option of remaining in the EU. These descriptive findings will be critically analysed and deliberated, assisted by the secondary research presented earlier in the chapter, within the discussion.

Brexit Harms the Health and Wellbeing of Britons

The pro-second referendum, British unionist parties differed from the *pro-Leave, British unionist parties* on their attitudes toward Brexit; the former group used their party manifestos to express their support for a second referendum on EU membership, with the option to *remain* being placed on the ballot. The two groups, however, were united in their support for the continuation of the union of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK).

Labour called upon voters to allow the party to renegotiate the EU withdrawal deal, and then for that deal to be the subject of a second referendum, with Remain as the alternative; this approach was necessitated by the threat posed by the withdrawal deal to the peace process in Northern Ireland that emerged in the wake of *The Troubles*. The Labour Party created the perception that the Conservatives' attempt to negotiate a withdrawal deal failed to avoid 'hard border in Northern Ireland' and protect 'the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process' in the country, threatening the lives and wellbeing of those Britons living in Northern Ireland (Labour, 2019, p.83). As Northern Ireland's peace process has real implications for the future of the union, the Liberal Democrats also perceived Brexit as a threat the union because it could be used to fuel anti-unionism in all three of the devolved nations of the UK; the party stated that they 'will not allow Brexit to reverse devolution and will oppose attempts to use Brexit to go back to the past when powers were hoarded at Westminster' (Liberal Democrats, 2019, p.83).

Aside from the threat to the union, *pro-second referendum*, *British unionist* sought to convince voters that Brexit posed a significant threat to the social wellbeing of the British people. The Green Party talked about the threat of increasing populism and social division and of the destabilising effect that it would continue to have if Brexit was to be implemented; The Greens claimed that ‘the real agenda of those pulling the populist strings is widespread chaos in which discord will thrive’ (Green Party, 2019, p.29). Furthermore, the Liberal Democrats argued that, in addition to a rise in populism, the social welfare of Britons would be damaged by a loss of infrastructure investment in the UK. The Liberal Democrats singled out arts and culture; ‘arts... are essential for personal fulfilment and quality of life – they enlarge people’s experience and are part of what turns a group of people into a community. Funding for these organisations is put at risk with Brexit’ (Liberal Democrats, 2019, p.37). The Liberal Democrats also constructed the perception that Brexit would reduce international investment and cooperation in research and innovation; they argued that ‘pursuing a Brexit that will hit research and innovation, which is so dependent on European and other international collaboration’ which would have a detrimental impact on jobs and workers (Liberal Democrats, 2019, p.18).

A key theme that runs across the referendum and most elections in the UK, is the ongoing success and wellbeing of the NHS and its ability to meet the health and social care needs of the British population. Labour perceived Brexit as a threat to Britain because it could be succeeded by partial deregulation and marketisation of the NHS; Labour wrote, ‘it would leave our NHS at the mercy of a trade deal with Donald Trump. This sell-out deal is unacceptable to Labour’ (Labour, 2019, p.90).

Brexit Weakens the UK's International Reputation

The perception that Brexit would damage the international reputation of the UK, both within the EU and globally, united the *pro-second referendum*, *British unionist parties*, and their collective party manifestos subsequently expressed the attitude that an alternative to the Conservatives' Brexit proposal would better serve the interests of the UK. The parties singled out the potential loss of access to several institutions and practices of the European Union that not only keep Britons safe, but also serve to present the UK as a prosperous and progressive country. Labour argued the loss of access to the European Arrest Warrant was a negative aspect of Brexit; they wrote of their commitment to maintaining 'access to the European Arrest Warrant and shared databases... (To make) people safer at home and abroad' (Labour, 2019, p.90). The Liberal Democrats worried that Brexit would entail a decline in liberalisation of citizens' rights in the UK; the party attempted to 'ensure there is no rolling back of the rights and protections enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' (Liberal Democrats, 2019, p.29) Additionally, the Green Party attempted to construct the perception that Brexit would diminish the UK's environmental influence in the European Parliament; they argued that losing a place in the EP represented a loss of opportunity to 'champion reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, so that it promotes more sustainable farming methods' (Green Party, 2019, p.31).

Although Brexit was a negotiation and conflict between the UK and the EU27, the *pro-second referendum*, *British unionist* regarded a potentially negative impact on the UK's international reputation further afield than the EU. The Liberal Democrats considered the UK as a country looked upon by others as a role model for peace advocacy, and that such a reputation was under threat as a result of Brexit. The party argued that 'working together through the EU, the countries of Europe have achieved peace and prosperity on a continent historically wracked by war and division' (Liberal Democrats, 2019, p.11). The Liberal Democrats continued by

adding that the UK's reputation as an advocate and practitioner of liberal democracy was diminished as a result of the prospect of leaving the European Union; they argued 'the UK should be playing a leading role as part of a coalition of liberal democracies to respond to... the great challenges of the 21st century are global: climate change, human trafficking, the arms trade, the power of multinationals, global poverty and inequality' (Liberal Democrats, 2019, p.11). Ultimately, the Green Party argued that, possibly, the most symbolically detrimental impact to the UK's international reputation would occur if voters were denied a second referendum of EU membership, with Remain as an option. The party argued that the UK's ability to advocate democracy in undemocratic countries would be undermined because 'nobody voted for less democracy during the 2016 referendum... we continue to believe that more democracy is the way to... unite our country again' (Green Party, 2019, p.29).

Pro-Second Referendum, British Separatist Parties

In this section, the research conducts a final descriptive analysis of the manifestos which were produced by the *pro-second referendum, British separatist parties* (SNP; Plaid Cymru; Sinn Féin) to assess how they used manifesto discourse to influence voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This section considers how the parties argue that Brexit would force the devolved administrations to cede power to the (Westminster dominated) UK Parliament, and, in addition, that Brexit would disproportionately disadvantage the three devolved nations, in order to encourage their targeted voters of the benefits of the UK conducting a second referendum with the option of remaining in the EU, in advance of an attempt to gain independence from the UK. These descriptive findings will be critically analysed and critiqued, supported by the secondary research presented earlier in the chapter, within the discussion.

Brexit Makes the Devolved Nations Worse-off than England

The pro-second referendum, British separatist parties differed from the *pro-Leave, British unionist parties* on their attitudes toward Brexit; the former group used their party manifestos to express their support for a second referendum on EU membership, with the option to Remain being placed on the ballot. However, these three parties of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, respectively, also differed from the *pro-second referendum, British unionist parties* because they opposed the continuation of the union of the UK in favour of Scottish independence, Welsh independence and a United Ireland (Irish nationalism), respectively; in this sense, all three parties are British separatist parties.

These *pro-second referendum, British separatist parties* attempted to create the perception that Brexit was a political project that would have a more detrimental impact upon their nation than it would for the nation of England. The Scottish National Party (SNP) argued that the uncertainty regarding Brexit, to that point and beyond, had already reversed Scottish economic growth under the SNP's leadership of the Scottish Parliament; they wrote that 'The Tories have placed uncertainty upon Scottish businesses resulting in the Scottish economy already being £3 billion smaller than it would have been without the Brexit vote' (SNP, 2019, p.23). Specifically, the SNP tried to construct the perception that one of Scotland's most unique and valuable sectors, that of tourism and heritage, would be disproportionately damaged by the loss of Freedom of Movement of People. The SNP argued that as the 'EU currently accounts for six out of Scotland's ten key visitor markets... Adding barriers to travelling freely will put recent industry success at risk' (SNP, 2019, p.25). The potential loss of EU labour in the fisheries industry was also cited as a prospective problem associated with Brexit; the party wrote, 'with around 4,500 EU nationals working in fish processing, we need to ensure that they remain in their Scottish communities' (SNP, 2019, p.40).

Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) found that the loss of foreign direct investment, since the 2016 referendum result, was felt more acutely in Wales than in other parts of the UK. This loss of investment was perceived to be damaging to infrastructure investment and job creation in Wales, especially relative to English investment levels; their studies found that ‘the average fall-off in incoming new projects across the UK was 16.5%, but for Wales it was 46%’ (Plaid Cymru, 2019, p.10). Plaid Cymru communicated, through its manifesto, that specific industries, upon which the Welsh economy is dependent, were at serious risk because of the prospect of the UK leaving the European Union; these detrimental impacts would be seen in the agricultural sector, through loss of access to the CAP, and in the automotive sector through lost investment. The party wrote that ‘Brexit has serious implications for Welsh farmers... more than half of a farmer’s income comes from the direct payments received through the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy’ (Plaid Cymru, 2019, p.9). With regard to the automotive sector, the party sought to influence perceptions of Brexit’s impact using the following examples: ‘from just one sector, more than 1,700 job losses have been announced at Ford in Bridgend and another 220 at Schaeffler and 95 at Calsonic Kansei car components plants in Llanelli’ (Plaid Cymru, 2019, p.10).

In Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin (*Ourselves*) attempted to dissuade voters from supporting Brexit by arguing that the implementation of Brexit legislation threatened the pre-existing agreement regarding no border between the nations on the island of Ireland, in accordance with the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The party decried the perception that ‘Brexit at any cost has led us to the verge of crashing out of the EU without a deal and a reintroduction of a hard border on our Ireland’ (Sinn Féin, 2019, p.6).

Brexit Fortifies the Mandate for Independence from the UK

The *pro-second referendum, British separatists* wished to create the perception that Brexit gave their nation a renewed mandate to seek independence from the UK. The SNP, who were predominantly successful for the unsuccessful *Yes* campaign during the Scottish Independence referendum of 2014, considered the fact that Scotland, as a nation, voted to Remain in the EU while the UK, as a whole, voted Leave, constituted a renewed mandate for independence. The party argued that ‘We have a clear mandate to deliver a new referendum on becoming an independent country... Next year we intend to offer the people of Scotland a choice over their future’ (SNP, 2019, p.4). The SNP attempted to convince voters that part of the justification for a renewed campaign for independence was the loss of sovereignty of the Scottish Parliament (Holyrood) in determining the outcome of Brexit. The SNP argued ‘Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU but has been completely ignored by Westminster... Brexit has destroyed the idea of the United Kingdom as a partnership of equals... Scotland – the nation of the UK with the highest remain vote – is to get nothing. The Tory Brexit deal will take Scotland out of the EU, out of the Single Market and Customs Union, all against our will’ (SNP, 2019, p.4).

Plaid Cymru, correspondingly, deemed the process of negotiating and implementing Brexit as a denial of the sovereignty of the Welsh Assembly (Senedd Cymru). The Welsh Assembly had differed from the UK Parliament in its overwhelming support for a second referendum on EU membership, with Remain being selected as one of the options. Plaid Cymru stated, ‘it denies a say for our Senedd. Despite having consistently voted in favour of remaining in the Single Market and Customs Union, and supporting a People’s Vote, our parliament has been ignored throughout’ (Plaid Cymru, 2019, p.7). The Welsh nationalist party sought to construct the perception, among its voters, that Wales was better off a member of the European

Union but not a member of the United Kingdom; Plaid Cymru stated ‘Wales should become an independent member of the European Union... to forge a new relationship with the other countries of these islands based on equality’ (Plaid Cymru, 2019, p.24).

Finally, Sinn Fein tried to create the perception, among voters, that Brexit would inevitably destabilise the Northern Ireland peace process, and that a United Ireland was the best, most democratic means of averting such an outcome. The Irish nationalist party wrote ‘there is a solution that allows us to ensure that we do not have a hard border... That solution is contained within the Good Friday Agreement – the creation of a new, agreed and united Ireland – an inclusive society’ (Sinn Fein, 2019, p.6). With regard to the inevitability of certain political outcomes, Sinn Fein did consider a referendum on Irish unification as a certainty, or at least this was presented as so within its manifesto. The party wrote that while ‘Irish unity is not inevitable – we have to work to make it happen... A referendum on Irish unity is coming’ (Sinn Fein, 2019, p.8).

Discussion

This study examined how the political parties of the United Kingdom used their party manifestos to construct attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit during the 2019 General Election. Moreover, the thematic analyses of these manifestos were aided by the grouping of the political parties based on two distinct political attitudes; these were, firstly, the parties’ attitudes toward Brexit, and, secondly, their attitudes toward the continued union of the United Kingdom.

The study found that the pro-Leave, British unionist parties (Conservatives; UKIP; Brexit Party) used their party manifestos to convince voters that Brexit would give the UK greater self-governing powers and would, in addition, place the interests of British people above the interests of those living in the EU27. These parties largely ignored any of the social concerns, brought about by the UK’s exit from the European Union, that were presented within the manifestos of

their pro-Second referendum competitors. This had the effect of shaping and solidifying positive perceptions of Brexit in the minds of pro-Leave voters. Namely, this approach functioned by celebrating the ideological, if not practical, concepts of reducing pooled (or shared) sovereignty and increasing national and Parliamentary sovereignty as a result of the UK being far less bound by EU rules, laws and expectations as an allied nation rather than as a member state.

Conversely, the pro-second referendum, British unionist parties (Labour; Liberal Democrats; Green Party of England and Wales) used their manifestos to construct the perception that Brexit posed a risk to the health, rights and wellbeing of the British people, and, on a larger scale, would damage the UK's international reputation in the eyes of the EU27 and the wider world. This approach created the perception that Brexit would inevitably lead to worse health, lower levels of prosperity and diminished protection for workers and citizens, when compared to the period of time that the UK spent as a member state of the European Union. The eventual occurrence of Brexit, on January 31st, 2020, coupled with these strongly negative perceptions of such an outcome, would likely lead to feelings of greater uncertainty and anxiety about the future for any voters who were recipients of this political discourse.

On the other hand, the pro-second referendum, British separatist parties (SNP; Plaid Cymru; Sinn Féin) sought to construct the perception that Brexit would have a disproportionately detrimental effect on each party's devolved nation (within the UK), and the manifestos were used to solidify the attitude that Brexit was an Anglocentric (English) proposal that fortified each party's mandate to seek independence from an English-dominated United Kingdom. Voters who lived in the three devolved nations (Scotland; Wales; Northern Ireland) and who were also receptive to this discourse from the separatist parties, would be more inclined to support independence from the United Kingdom regardless of the outcome of the Brexit-era battles in

Parliament, but the success of the pro-Leave majority in early 2020 would logically make these voters more determined to seek separation from the UK, holding onto the potential of an accession to the EU as an independent, sovereign nation.

The manifesto discourse and the English electoral success of the pro-Leave, British unionists in the 2019 General Election is consistent with Henderson et al.'s (2016) assessment that pro-Brexit parties sought to represent the UK's membership of the European Union as being inconsistent with a distinctly English national identity; if Brexit can be seen as a predominantly English form of national political action, it would be detrimental to the goal of strengthening British unionism, in favour of implementing a mainly-English desired political outcome against the wishes of the majority of the electorate from Scotland and Northern Ireland, respectively.

Furthermore, each of the pro-Leave, British unionist manifestos maintained a constant link with the underlying ethos of these parties; each party demonstrated a commitment to Euroscepticism that had run through their parties in differing degrees through the UK's membership of the EU (Dye, 2015; Alexandre-Collier, 2015). As these parties sought to construct a wholly positive perception of the UK's exit from the EU, they eschewed any discourse about the prospective economic or social detriment that would be brought about by Brexit. This consistency of varying degrees of Eurosceptic discourse, within the three parties' manifestos, helped the researcher to determine that solidifying their respective voting bases was the paramount concern for each of the pro-Leave parties.

The manifestos of the pro-second referendum, British unionists continued the history of those parties constructing a positive perception of EU membership; these perceptions were made either explicitly, by the Liberal Democrats and Greens, or implicitly by Labour, as was congruous with the past behaviour of these parties (Schnapper, 2015). Furthermore, the discourse

within these manifestos drew upon some of the predicted socio-economic (Li et al., 2015; Pryce et al., 2019; Wadsworth, 2016; O'Reilly, 2016; Boleat, 2019; van Reenan, 2016; Breinlich et al., 2017; MacDonald, 2017) and socio-cultural (Hearne et al., 2018; Rickard, 2016) costs of leaving the European Union; these negative perceptions of an attempt to leave the EU were used to construct the attitude that an alternative, in the form of a second referendum on membership with Remain as an option, was necessary to avert the economic and social ills of Brexit. These parties were unable to convince a significant enough proportion of pro-Leave voters, within the UK electorate, to take seriously the predicted social impact of leaving the EU.

Finally, the party manifestos of the pro-second referendum, British separatists demonstrated the heightened levels of support for independence from the UK in Scotland (Dye, 2015), Northern Ireland (Berberi, 2017) and, to a lesser extent, Wales (Wyn Jones, 2012). These parties constructed the perceptions that would bring about some of the same economic misfortune as was demonstrated in the manifestos of the pro-second referendum, British unionists, but the perceived impact was centered solely upon each of the devolved nations of the three parties (Li et al., 2015; Pryce et al., 2019; Wadsworth, 2016; O'Reilly, 2016; Boleat, 2019; van Reenan, 2016; Breinlich et al., 2017; MacDonald, 2017) and social (Hearne et al., 2018; Rickard, 2016). British separatist voters are likely to feel greater levels of anxiety regarding Brexit if they are unable to secure a successful secessionist vote in an independence referendum. At the time of writing, the UK government has shown little indication of a willingness to hold any such referendum in any of the three devolved nations; regarding this conflict, Brexit will continue to be a source of social tension within the four, culturally distinct nations that constitute the United Kingdom.

To a large extent, each of the nine parties involved in this study attempted to construct perceptions and attitudes toward Brexit in a manner consistent with their ideological position toward (what was a prospective) Brexit and toward the continuation of the union of the United Kingdom; the electoral victory of the pro-second referendum, British unionists, led by the Conservatives, brought about the UK's exit from the European Union, and the long-term consequences thereof remain to be realised as of yet.

Conclusion

The thematic analysis of the 2019 electoral manifestos was intended to understand the influence of political parties on shaping voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. The researcher considered the influence of carefully crafted political rhetoric on shaping social and political behaviour among voters.

A limitation of the study was the small number of primary texts analysed for the overall study. Time constraints meant that the researcher needed to focus on a single item from each of the nine parties which were used at a single political event: the 2019 General Election. Ideally, the researcher wanted to analyse a large corpus of texts based on speeches and social media discourse from both the given election and previous elections and referenda in the UK. However, the limited time to gain skills and access to equipment for sociolinguistic collocation analysis precluded this analysis. This option, however, remains open to the researcher for future academic studies.

This chapter has presented a timeline of the most significant political events that took place between the Boris Johnson's election as Prime Minister and the UK parliament's decision to hold the 2019 General Election; the researcher used this information to critically assess the

data's relevance to how parties created manifestos that influenced the formation of voters' attitudes and perceptions toward the social impact of Brexit.

This chapter also explored media theories on how electoral manifestos work to influence perceptions and attitudes within recipients of the encapsulated political discourse. Further secondary research was conducted to investigate how parties reacted to voters' attitudes and perceptions toward British unionism and EU membership as a means of increasing their electoral voting bases. The final element of this chapter's literature review examined socio-economic analyses of the prospective impact of the UK leaving the European Union; this information was used as a tool for the critical analysis of the impact assessment discourse contained within the manifestos.

The researcher uncovered a thematic pattern of related discourse within the three sets of parties (*pro-Leave, British unionist parties; pro-second referendum, British unionist parties; pro-second referendum, British separatist parties*). The pro-Leave, British unionists collectively sought to create the impression, in voters, that Brexit would give the UK greater levels of sovereignty and a stronger ability to create policy that is in the UK's self-interest above external interests. The pro-second referendum, British unionists, however, wanted to give voters' the perception that Brexit would both diminish the UK's reputation amongst its internal allies, and make life more dangerous for vulnerable Britons living in the UK. Furthermore, the pro-second referendum, British separatists instilled, in voters, the perception that Brexit would both undermine the sovereignty of the devolved parliaments/assemblies and would, ultimately, strengthen the mandate for separatism in each of the three devolved nations.

The next chapter will consider how Leave and Remain constructed their attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in two distinct ways. The first domain was concerned with these

voters' perceptions of the social impact of Brexit, and the second centred on their constructions of British and European identities over the course of the Brexit era.

Chapter 5: Focus Groups on Aspects of Brexit and Identity

Introduction

This chapter explores the findings that were generated in pursuit of answering the first and second research questions: firstly, *how did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?* And secondly, *how did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?* The resolution of these research questions will enable the researcher to resolve the overall question of how voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit have changed since 2016. This will be achieved by gaining insights into how voters on either side of the Leave-Remain divide understand how the social implications of Brexit have changed, in the light of new information, and how their attitudes toward the United Kingdom and Europe have diverged from historic norms that existed before the 2016 EU Membership Referendum. The analysis of primary focus group data is conducted using a thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clark, 2006) to discover patterns and differences in social attitudes across voters from various ethnic groups, gender, age ranges and locations of the United Kingdom.

The researcher recruited 30 participants across 5 focus groups in November 2019 for this element of the research. Of the 30 participants in the sample, 20 voted Remain and 10 voted Leave in the 2016 EU Membership Referendum; 21 were female and 10 were male; 15 identified as white and 15 identified as BAME; the participants ranged from 18-24 years old to over 55. In 2019, debates regarding Brexit featured prominently throughout the electoral campaign for the General Election; the result of the election saw a minority Conservative government increase its share of seats to become a majority government with the requisite number of parliamentarians to

vote through the act which brought about the UK's exit from the European Union on the 31st of January 2020. The researcher's choice of November 2019, for the data collection period, was borne of the desire to gauge the social attitudes of voters at a time when the UK's potential exit from the European Union was a highly salient subject within the public's popular discourse.

The thematic analysis is supported by research, both empirical and theoretical, about the influence of numerous demographic differences, perspectives and values on the formation of British and European identities.

The researcher investigated competing perspectives on the success (or failure) of multicultural policies in fostering collective, cross-cultural identities in Britain and western Europe (Nye, 2017; Joppke, 2004). Furthermore, the constructions of dual, interrelated and competing identities among Europeans are studied to understand how citizens' perceptions toward contemporary Britain and Europe are formed (Nandi and Platt, 2013). The phenomena of structural racism in western Europe (Bobo and Fox, 2003) and white-ethnicity rejection of non-white migration (Modood, 2011) are observed to contextualise social attitudes that were prominent during the 2016 EU Membership Referendum campaign and beyond.

The researcher explores how the experience of industrial loss and regional decline, in parts of the UK, influence contemporary attitudes toward the United Kingdom and the European Union (Martin et al., 2016). Likewise, the social behaviour of citizens, based on the experience of localised or regionalised inequalities is investigated; this behaviour is centred on psychological differences between those who frequently move to attain financial prosperity and those who are less inclined to do so (Goodhart, 2016).

The researcher investigates how the history, traditions and cultural influence of the monarchy help to construct British identities, and how voters differ about the monarchy based on their view of the monarch and of the Royal Family (Foss, 2012; McGuigan, 2000). Moreover, the lifelong influence of the monarchy within individualised constructions of British identities is critically assessed in order to gauge how nationalism and national pride alter across time (Winstone and Witherspoon, 2015). Conversely, the researcher considers how negative appraisals of the monarchy can both present a conflict within British society, and also alter the constructions of contemporary British identities (Younge, 2019).

An investigation into how negative attitudes toward the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 fuelled a rise in Euroscepticism is conducted to understand how the lasting political effects of the debate around the treaty influence today's attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit (Usherwood, 2013). The researcher also examines how anti-normative (Glencross, 2014) and anti-federalist (Fabbrini, 2013; Schmidt, 1999) forms of Euroscepticism shape nationalist attitudes toward the European Union. Additionally, this study considers how perceptions of the economic cost of EU membership fuel Euroscepticism and increased anti-EU nationalism (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). There exist a body evidence that there is a generational divide between pro-Europeans and those who exhibit both British nationalism and Euroscepticism in the UK (Fox and Pearce, 2018; Down and Wilson, 2013) Finally, the researcher examines how Euroscepticism manifests among those of the left of politics (being the group in British life which is considered to be less Eurosceptics of than the those of the right) and how this influences attitudes toward both the UK and Europe (West and Brown, 1993)

The researcher examines how differing social attitudes toward globalised migration influenced British nationalistic attitudes and anti-European perceptions in the UK (Gelfand et al.,

2011; Chiu et al., 2011). Ultimately, the researcher questions whether the historic relationship between the UK and the USA, known as the *special* relationship, hinders or helps the formation of European identities (Wilson, 2017).

Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 1st December 2019 to 1st January 2021

The following table presents a series of significant events related to the historic course of Brexit and analyses the relevance of these events to shaping voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This table spans from the arrival of Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel to the leadership positions in the European Commission and European Council, respectively, in 2019 until the UK's exit from the post-Brexit transition period of in 2021.

Date	Event	Impact on Brexit
December 1st 2019	<i>Juncker and Tusk Replaced by von der Leyen and Michel in European Commission and European Council</i>	The new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and new President of the European Council Charles Michel replace outgoing Juncker and Tusk. Although the new presidents are not radical departures from their predecessors, this introduces two new negotiators for any future changes to the UK's relationship with the EU27.
December 12th 2019	<i>Johnson's Conservatives Win an 80-Seat Majority with 365 Seats</i>	Boris Johnson's Conservative and Unionist Party, with the electoral slogan 'Get Brexit Done' wins an 80-seat majority at the election. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn resigns, and Johnson seeks to pass the Withdrawal Bill before the deadline.
January 23rd 2020	<i>Brexit Withdrawal Bill becomes Law after Approval by UK Parliament</i>	The Withdrawal Agreement gains Royal Assent after the Commons passed the

		bill by 330 votes to 231 on 9th January 2020.
January 29th 2020	<i>European Parliament Approves Withdrawal Bill</i>	The Withdrawal Agreement is ratified by the European Parliament and is signed by Boris Johnson, Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel.
January 31st 2020	<i>UK Leaves European Union</i>	The UK leaves the European Union at midnight and enters into the 11-month transition period; during this period of further negotiation, the UK remains in the Customs Union and Single Market.
17th December 2020	<i>Internal Market Bill Becomes Law</i>	The UK Parliament passes a bill that contravenes international law by overriding the Withdrawal Agreement. The bill, which would be effective if the UK failed to reach a Free Trade Agreement with the EU, gave UK ministers the right to overrule parts of EU Customs Law in Northern Ireland; in the case of no FTA, Northern Ireland would be subject to EU customs laws.
24th December 2020	<i>The UK and EU Agree the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement</i>	This agreement ensures that the UK will not exit the transition period without a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union.
1st January 2021	<i>The Transition Period Ends</i>	Brexit has been implemented with a Free Trade Deal and new rules regarding the UK's relationship with the European Union.

Table 14 Timeline of Key Political Events regarding Brexit: 1st December 2019 to 1st January 2021 (UK Parliament, 2020; Europa, 2020)

British and European Social Identities

The following sections explore how people living in the UK constructed their British and European identities across time. This exploration is aided by the use of existing theory on the

elements with which these social identities are constructed; this literature will inform the researchers attempt to understand how voters constructed these identities before Brexit.

How the British Institutions and Wartime History Influences British and European Identities

In this first section, the researcher examines how the unique wartime history of the United Kingdom, and its state institutions help to construct a distinct British identity and, potentially, a unified European identity which it might share with other European countries.

The study of discriminatory nationalism is often, mistakenly, focused solely on those forms which are associated with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and ethnocentric xenophobia. Another form of nationalism that transcends the left-right spectrum of political positions is *institutional nationalism*; with this system, citizens construct a highly salient national identity around the political and cultural institutions of their society, rather than upon common, homogenous demographic characteristics of in-group members, such as racial, religious denomination, culture or migration history. Nationalism that is derived from socially liberal and pro-welfare values is referred to as ‘instrumental nationalism’ (Sandelind, 2016, p.197). A comparative analysis of social attitudes toward the welfare state in Sweden and the United Kingdom concluded that, in both cases, national identities tied closely to welfare states can lead to protectivist, often exclusionary ‘institutional patriotism’ (Sandelind, 2016, pp.210-216). However, if people construct highly salient British identities that are centred on the provision of their welfare state, this can lead to the desire to exclude national out-group members from accessing and benefitting from the national welfare state; these exclusionary British attitudes can be used to derogate against non-British Europeans, as well as non-Europeans, who require support from the welfare state.

Obscuringly, the attempt to foster the construction of a unified British identity sees institutional nationalism acting as both an exclusionary factor which diminishes the likelihood of forming such an identity, and an inclusionary factor which increases it, respectively. The National Health Service (NHS) was founded in 1948, in the post-war period, and served as an important avenue for labour migration in the period. Thus, the NHS operated to encourage and indeed mandate encounters between people of different ethnic, religious and cultural groups. It was regularly portrayed, in media discourse, as ‘the archetypal space where Middle England met migrant England. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the NHS played a very specific role in the visual culture of human difference in Britain in this period’ (Bivins, 2017, p.105). Institutional nationalism, with regard to the NHS, allows some Britons to construct an inclusive national identity that embraces national identity, while encouraging other Britons to reject new communities, from the rest of Europe and elsewhere, from accessing a significant institution that is tied to both the British welfare state and British public health.

A British identity is constructed both independently, and in relation to the states and people(s) other nations in Europe and beyond. The complex history between the United Kingdom and its wartime and post-war foes and allies complicates the ability of all Britons to construct a European identity for themselves. The practice of *remembering* World War Two, in particular, is commemorated both through narratives in the oral tradition and, as Elay (2001) observed, through the recorded media of literature, motion picture and radio. In the early post-war period, ‘official and popular cultures were pervaded by the war’s presence’, with the scholar singling out the 1950’s as a ‘rich arena of such memory production’ (Elay, 2001, pp.819-825). Indeed, Penny Summerfield (2010) also examined the findings from the Mass-Observation series of studies to investigate gender-based distinctions between the post-war experiences. The study

found that one of the most common methods which female Britons used to *remember* World War II was their participation in the ‘pleasure culture of war’; this refers to aspects of cultural consumption that evokes poignant but non-violent images of the war, such as the collection memorabilia, public commemorations, visiting museums and reading narratives of non-combatants (such as Nella Last) during the period (Summerfield, 2010, pp.2-8). The Second World War and its antecedent conflicts across the continent of Europe create a clear divide among the self-constructs of two large cohorts of the British population; the first group can construct meaning in the post-war peace as an invitation embrace one’s European identity; the second group constructs meaning in Europe’s wartime history as a reminder to distinguish and to not conflate the British identity with the European identity lest armed conflict return to the continent on a similar scale.

How Race and Social Class Influence British and European Identities

In this section, the research examined how differences in racial group and social class group influenced the construction of British and European identities among citizens of the United Kingdom; the researcher observed trends of migration, inter-ethnic social relations and social class differences in lifestyle to inform the analysis.

High populous waves of inward economic migration often reshape the ethnic make-up of the receptive country, and the reaction of the existing population to these waves of migration often results in ethnic, cultural and social class-based conflicts within the society. Malory Nye (2017) considered the social rejection of Commonwealth migrant workers and their families, during the twentieth century, as a having a strong influence of Briton’s contemporary attitudes toward British and European identities. The groups and patterns of post-World War II migration, particularly from South Asia and the Caribbean, shaped the experience of multiculturalism in

Britain differently to that in any other country in Europe; this in turn led the UK to develop divergent attitudes toward more contemporary patterns of migration from Eastern and Central Europe (Nye, 2017, pp.110-122). For some Britons, anti-migrant sentiment toward A8 EU member states was seen to stem from a legacy of anti-migrant sentiment and tangible social conflicts that were visited upon Caribbean and Asian migrants in the post-war period; a European identity that consists of an advocacy for free movement between European borders would become antithetical to a British identity that is built around the rejection of out-group (*non-British*) migration.

Complimentarily, the experience of inter-country migration can have a defining influence on the construction of British and European identities for the new communities of both the UK and Europe as a whole. As ethnic minority citizens move further away from first-hand experience of the lived culture on their ancestral homes, they are likely to maintain a strong ethnic identity and a burgeoning British identity that first and second generations did not possess; this was labelled the process of developing *multiple identities* (Nandi and Platt, 2013). People who migrate from European or non-European countries into the UK often retain a national identity for the country to which they were previously native, regardless of their intention to settle in the UK or to eventually migrate to a country of previous residence. For people who have arrived from EU27 member states, they are more likely to have a pre-existing European identity than those migrating from non-European countries. However, a study by Bobo and Fox (2003), which observed a contemporary workplace, originated their concept of ‘segmented assimilation’ among non-native ethnic minorities; *segmented assimilation* is understood as the different spatial, industrial and social class assimilation of different groupings of migrant workers (Bobo and Fox, 2003, pp.319-332). For non-European migrants who quickly assimilate, they are able to

adapt more easily to the languages, culture, social mores and expectations of western societies; those who are less able to assimilate, however, can experience social ills such as alienation, cultural misunderstandings and conflict, as these factors would make it difficult to construct a positive British or European identity.

Several analyses have been conducted to investigate the role of states and lawmakers in the help assimilate new communities in Europe, and to, ultimately, enable these people to adopt British and European identities. Tariq Modood's (2011) study concluded that liberal, multicultural policies of the day were not widely mirrored in contemporary civil society; the most notable example was the prevalence of white-only, mono-cultural ghettos which developed as a consequence of '*white flight*', the rapid departure of white citizens as a result of increased non-white migration into their neighbourhoods (Modood, 2011, pp.2-5). For new migrant communities to experience the twin problems of failed social integration policy and white flight, they are likely to feel excluded from the predominantly white European society in which they live; this socially constructed division between white British Europeans and non-white British Europeans further reduces the likelihood of constructing a British or European identity that is uniformly adopted among all citizens of the society. Additionally, a lack of assimilation and cohesion, derived from differences in both social class and ethnicity between non-European migrants and people already living in the receiving communities, can make it difficult for newly first-generation migrants to construct British and European identities. German-born sociologist Christian Joppke (2004) categorised the Twenty-first Century's shift away from a trend of enforcing social integration as being detrimental to migrant communities; citing contemporary Dutch society, he argued that the unwillingness of state actors to take an active role in community integration led to the natural formation of an 'ethnic underclass' of

those migrants whom were unable to assimilate into the culture and society of the Netherlands (Joppke, 2004, pp.240-249). Joppke's work suggests that non-European migrants, moving to western European societies, can feel excluded from the kinds of socio-participatory activities that enable residents in European societies to develop salient national and European identities. In addition to this higher likelihood of social exclusion, the formation of such *underclasses* can create additional social problems resultant from social, cultural and economic deprivation; these problems might range from attainment inequalities in children to severe levels of anomie in adults and the elderly.

While social inequalities based on social class and ethnicity are intrinsically linked in western societies, examining social class independently gave the researcher insight into the ways in which one's experience of social deprivation can lead to the construction of a positive or else negative national social identity. Ron Martin et al. (2016) wrote that de-industrialisation had not produced a 'uniform decline' in large urban spaces; rather, locales which were unable to adapt became declining 'shrinking cities', and those which adapted well to service economies and new technology industries grew into 're-invented cities' with stronger innovation ecosystems than their *shrinking* counterparts (Martin et al., 269-289, 2016). Citizens construct positive and desirable national social identities partly by appraising the quality of life in their hometown or city of employ. An overwhelmingly negative locally based experience, consisting of an experience of economic stagnation or decline, increases in crime and deviance, homelessness and redundancy, would lead citizens to construct a national identity that is consistent with the negative appraisal of their lived experience; the British social identity would likely be more positively constructed if these qualities of the lived experience were reversed. On the other hand, for some British citizens, the quality of life and local mores and culture, in the given city, town

or village of the UK in which they live and work, has scant influence on their construction of a social identity. While analyzing demographic and ideological data concerning the Brexit vote of 2016, Goodhart's (2016) analysis juxtaposed localist (*somewhere*) voters, who were more likely to vote Leave, and cosmopolitan (*anywhere*) voters who were drawn more toward voting Remain in 2016; with the latter being those voters who are comfortable moving large distances for work and who were unlikely to develop local place-based and industry-based identities (Goodhart, 2016). Citizens who do not develop strong place-based social identities, within the United Kingdom, are likely to construct a British identity from other sources of information, such as media and news discourse, interpersonal dialogue and popular culture. Again, this distinction between localist-based and cosmopolitan-based identity constructs makes it difficult to suggest a uniformity in how and to what extent Britons construct salient social identities in the British and European domains.

How the British Monarchy Influences British Identities

In this section, the researcher investigated the role played by the British monarchy in the construction of British identity among citizens of the United Kingdom. This entailed a critical analysis of the role of the monarchy in public life, and the position of individual members of the royal Family, across time, in the formation of a salient British social identity.

The British monarch, being the Queen, takes a crucial role in the (unwritten) constitution of the United Kingdom, allowing Britons to relate to a Head of State that is both unelected and, crucially, apolitical. Foss (2012) found that, despite it being chiefly 'symbolic institution, devoid of any real political power', the monarch can be a highly influential figure during times of crisis; the author cited the role of George VI in communicating with the UK at the outset of the Second World War, and also commended Elizabeth II's stabilising influence during the decolonization

period (Foss, 2012, pp.55-68). Many Britons regarded the monarch as the most significant elite representative of the United Kingdom in times of crisis; monarchs have often given nationally televised and radioed broadcasts in periods of great uncertainty including the onset of the two World Wars and the outbreak of Covid-19. Similarly, in addition to the Queen herself, other members of the Royal Family have adopted the role of representatives of the British identity at different periods of time; one of the most notable examples of this can be seen in the late Diana, Princess of Wales. For Jim McGuigan (2000), Diana represented the British identity by ‘combining star quality with the magic of royalty, suitably representative of a modernising and caring regime’ (McGuigan, 2000, p.5). For Britons with a highly salient British social identity, the combination of a long tradition of the monarchy and the modernising influence of some its more progressive members allows the monarchy to remain a relevant institution in British life, and an importance means of fostering a British identity among citizens.

The symbolism of the monarchy features prominently in many elements of the British state, most notably, perhaps, in the lyrics of the British national anthem. In a recent study, the most common associations with the national anthem, among children, were, firstly, the *Royal Family*, followed by *the military* and *national sports teams*; nearly half of the 8 to 10-year-old participants reported ‘feelings of pride’ when listening to the piece (Winstone and Witherspoon, 2015, pp.272-276). The singing of this national anthem, which places the wellbeing of the monarch as its central theme, allows Britons to verbally express their national social identity while also asserting the importance of the monarchy within the construction of that social identity.

Conversely, many Britons construct a British social identity that deliberately excludes the monarch from their conception for of what it means to be British. Support for British

republicanism can be observed in Gary Younge's (2019) assessment of the media attention paid to the wedding of Prince (Henry) Harry and Megan Markle. In a public lecture on the subject of identity politics in Britain, Younge argued that, rather than symbolising societal progress, popular coverage of the monarchy further solidified the 'inherited privilege' and 'patronage' which governed the country (Younge, 2019, pp.5-7). This cleavage between British republicans and British monarchists represents a potentially unresolvable conflict within the societal consensus of how one might construct a British social identity for their self; this division indicates that a unified British identity will continue to remain elusive because of the socially divisive factors with which it would be constructed.

How EU-based Euroscepticism Influences British and European Identities

The researcher used this section to discover how Eurosceptic attitudes and perceptions became synonymous with some voters' British identity constructions throughout the UK's membership of the European Union, illuminating why EU membership led many Britons to quickly, vehemently and (apparently) permanently reject their European identity despite the UK's geographical location within the EU.

The European Union was formally established by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, with the organisation having existed in several iterations after the creation of the 6-member European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This latter treaty, however, drastically changed the attitudes toward Europe and European integration for many Britons; EU-based Euroscepticism became a principal element of the construction of a British identity for many opponents of the Maastricht Treaty. Simon Usherwood (2013) wrote that the British and French crises surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 gave greater prominence to Eurosceptic parties of the far-right including the UK's Referendum Party (*now*

UKIP), and RPF (Rassemblement pour la France) and Front National (*now* Rassemblement National) (Usherwood, 2013). The growth of EU-based Euroscepticism, in the United Kingdom particularly, created a trenchant division between two bodies of the British population: these two camps consisted of those supportive of the Maastricht-era's further intergovernmental integration, and those fiercely opposed to it. This cultural division was, perhaps, most obviously exemplified by the 2016 European Union membership referendum. Additionally, prior to the Maastricht negotiations and ratification, EU-based Euroscepticism had already begun to shape negative attitudes toward the European project among some Britons; political implications for the development of the three European Economic Communities (EEC), particularly after the ratification of the Single European Act (1957), led to an increase in EU-based Euroscepticism among the British electorate. A study of diplomatic history by Andrew Glencross (2014), argued that underlying Euroscepticism in Britain increased the likelihood of secession from the European Union within the relative to the other EU27 countries. Glencross considered the entirety of the UK's EU membership, to that point, as representing a 'neverendum', being a portmanteau of never-ending referendum, on the country's relationship with the European Union and its precursors (Glencross, 2014, p.6). Since, the former Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan's categorisation of the UK's relationship with the European Community (EC) as a 'business arrangement', Glencross identified a widespread desire, in the UK, for European integration to be 'stripped of a normative commitment to a European ideal of ever-closer-union' (Glencross, 2014, p.10). By associating a European identity with membership of the EEC (later EU), and embracing ever closer union, voters drawn to EU-based Euroscepticism rejected European identities and embraced a form of British nationalism that was borne out of a desire to cease or to reverse the process of European integration.

A good deal of the EU-based Euroscepticism, that escalates British nationalism and deescalates European social identification, emerges from popular perceptions of the political structure of the European Union, especially with regard to the European Commission. Vivien Schmidt (1999) argued that the EU's proposed shift from a confederacy of *sovereign* states toward a singular federal state contributed to a 'dynamic confusion of powers' between national governments and the EU; voters become unable to hold political elites to account for decisions made because the electorate has become unaware of which polity is responsible for which policies (Schmidt, 1999, p.23-24). The competing perceptions of the difference between the election of the British government and the election of the European Commission can help to illuminate how and why EU-based Euroscepticism suppresses the desire, among some Britons, to adopt an EU-centric European identity. The British government are (predominantly) British MP's elected by voters, and the party with the largest share of Parliamentary seats forms the government, with its leader as Prime Minister; in contrast the 27 (previously 28) European Commissioners are selected by the Council of the European Union (which has no fixed members, but consists of a configuration of ministers in EU27 countries) and the Commission President-elect (chosen by 27 Commissioners), and this decision is voted approved by the European parliament (who are elected by voters). The contrast between the direct elections of the British government, by voters, contrasted with the elections of the European Commission by a combination of elected and appointed officials, led to complaints among Eurosceptic parties and voters about a perceived lack of accountability for the Commission.

Relatedly, much of the British nationalism that emanated from EU-based Euroscepticism was driven by perceptions of the political cost of the United Kingdom's European Union membership; secession from the EU was thus perceived as a means of increasing the economic

prosperity of the UK. Federico Fabbrini (2013) analysed the UK's opt-out of the 2012 Treaty of the Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (also known as the Fiscal Compact). The Fiscal Compact was an attempt to introduce a firmer set of rules on member states' general budget deficits, structural deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios; the Fabbrini categorised this, and other proposed moves toward greater central authority in the EU, as 'incompatible with the preservation of sovereignty' across the EU, not merely in the UK (Fabbrini, 2013, p.34). These political anxieties, often referred to as issues of sovereignty, function to dissuade Briton's from constructing any European identity that is synonymous with membership of the European Union and its institutions.

Ultimately, the discourse of economic anxiety was used, to great effect, to shape attitudes toward Britain and Europe during the 2016 EU Membership referendum. Goodwin and Milazzo (2015) found that a strong desire to 'fundamentally reform the terms of its (EU) membership' was pervasive in the country, stemming concurrently from the 'perceived economic costs' of membership and from a distaste for the 'seemingly distant EU institutions' (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015, pp.2-9). These perceptions were fueled by, and continued to charge, a form of British nationalism driven by economic anxiety among large swathes of the population. For voters without a strong foundational understanding of the British economy, the economic views of these Leave and Remain voters is shaped by popular discourse; if economic anxieties were the decisive factor in the success of the Leave campaign, it suggests that political and media organisations that promoted EU-based Euroscepticism were able to better convince the electorate of the validity of their message when compared to those organisations that utilised economic anxiety to endorse continued EU membership.

How Cultural Euroscepticism Influences British and European Identities

In this section, the researcher investigated how deeply engrained Euroscepticism, amongst the British populous, influences the constructions of critical and discriminatory British identities, and non-salient European identities; the analysis shows that Eurosceptic attitudes exist across the political spectrum, albeit they feature most prominently among those of the right of British politics. This cultural Euroscepticism is also be named Europhobia in some resources.

The cultural Euroscepticism that was evident in the discourse of the Leave campaign and its acolytes was evident across all social classes, ethnic groups, and genders within the United Kingdom, however, younger voters were, in general, much more receptive to the idea of constructing European identities for themselves, relative to older voters. Fox and Pearce (2018) found significant generational divides between voters' attitudes toward the European Union; first-hand experience and knowledge of wider and deeper European integration post-Maastricht, among younger voters, was identified as a causal factor in greater support for European Union membership. Two of the most salient factors the researchers identified were: 'rising levels of economic security' and improvements in 'access to education' for those growing up in the nineties and noughties compared to the two decades prior; this theory is known as the generational life cycle of Eurosceptic attitudes (Fox and Pearce, 2018, p.28). For these younger voters, their European identities were constructed around an experience of the benefits of EU membership since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; the UK's later exit from the European Union is likely to diminish this association, and membership of the European Union, in that case, would cease to be a factor in the construction of a European identities for Britons. Similarly, instances of out-group rejection of Europeans, particularly against Eastern European migrants within the UK, was also considered to be a legacy of pre-Maastricht constructions of British and

European identities. Down and Wilson (2013) drew comparisons between the experiences of, firstly, the Cold War, and, secondly, the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, to identify causes of said generational divide in attitudes. For those who came of age in the Thatcherite 1980's, those voters are likely to maintain a level of Euroscepticism and anti-Eastern European sentiment that millennials who experienced the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU were not exposed to (Down and Wilson, 2013). These generation divides in cultural Euroscepticism within the constructions of British and European identities make it difficult to apply any all-embracing definition of a social identity in either of these two domains.

The cultural Euroscepticism, outlined above, helped the researcher to explore its impact on the ways in which voters from the *right* of British politics construct their British and European identities, but rejection of European identity can also be observed in those of left-wing political traditions. Cornel West and Bill Brown (1993) rejected a 'monumentalist conception of culture', favouring a more complex understanding of European history which replaced a perceived 'superiority of European culture' with a systematic suppression of non-European culture, and oppression of non-Europeans and poor citizens of Europe; this was partially achieved by constructing a 'wealth positive' narrative about European history; whereby the ends of European advancement negate the importance of the means (West and Brown, 1993, pp.150-158). These citizens decline to embrace European identities because of a rejection of the historical mistreatment of non-European peoples by the state forces of European countries; for these voters, the basis for adopting a salient European identity must be underpinned by an embracement and favourable appraisal of the continent's colonial histories.

How Attitudes toward Globalisation Influence British and European Identities

In this final section, the research explored how Britons' attitude toward globalisation, in the contemporary world, influence the construction of their historic British and European social identities; the researcher queries the validity of such salient identities existing and occupying an important space within popular discourse in an increasingly globalised world.

The social impact of globalisation, especially in light of the shift in production and consumption of a country's goods and services from the national to the international domain, influences British citizens' construction of their British and European identities. Both Gelfand et al. (2011) and Chiu et al. (2011) attempted to develop social psychological theories of globalisation. The greater focus upon economic growth leads toward societies in which the least prosperous citizens 'become sensitive to the cultural implications of the inflow of foreign cultures'; the responsibility of creating tolerant, culturally liberal societies is often abdicated, causing group conflicts within society (Chiu et al., 663-670, 2011). As anti-globalisation often sentiment morphs into out-group discrimination against migrant workers, an abstract antipathy toward other countries, and an increase in nationalistic social attitudes, many voters reject the opportunity to adopt a salient European identity, as such a social identity would be shared with extra-national citizens across the remainder of the European continent.

Globalisation can minimise the salience of a European identity, among British citizens, because of the cultural, social and political influence of the United States of America; for many Britons, the U.S. elicits greater level of out-group interest, contact and empathy than do countries in the EU27 and also when compared to other non-EU European nations. Graham Wilson (2017) tracked several periods throughout history when Anglo-American governments moved their countries in similar directions. In the 1950's, both Eisenhower and Macmillan were Conservative

modernisers whom were later succeeded by civil rights pioneers of the left in Kennedy and Wilson; the conservative Reaganite and Thatcherite renewal of the special relationship gave way to the *third way*, centrist alliance of Clinton and Blair; the 2019 anointment of Boris Johnson (elected by his party after the publication of Wilson's 2017 study) shows further symmetry with American governing personnel, as Trump and Johnson simultaneously rose to greater prominence through right-wing populist campaigns of 2016 (Wilson, 2017, pp.545-555). For Britons who feel they share more social, cultural and commonalities with Americans, when compared to fellow European citizens, the importance of constructing a European identity is diminished. A Briton's awareness of the historic, albeit unofficial, *Special Relationship* between the United Kingdom and United States can diminish the importance of continental Europe in a relational context and relegate their European identity to a place of low salience, or non-salience, within the Briton's self-construct.

Study Design

This element of the thesis explores how the researcher designed the study to go about answering the following research questions: firstly, *how did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?* And secondly, *how did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?*

Eligible Participant Characteristics

The researcher asked participants to complete a short questionnaire, giving the researcher a small amount of information about themselves, while maintaining a degree of interpersonal anonymity for the remainder of the study. The questionnaires collected data about participants' voting choice in the 2016 EU membership referendum, to confirm their eligibility to take part in the study, as well as some demographic information.

Two thirds of the participants, 20 in all, voted Remain in the 2016 poll, whereas the other third, 10 participants, voted Leave.




Figure 21 Focus Group Participants' 2016 Vote

Of the 30 participants, 21 (70%) were female and 9 (30%) were male. 4 of the female participants voted Leave while the other 17 voted Remain. 6 male participants voted Leave and the other 3 voted Remain.




Figure 22 Focus Group Participants' Gender

50% of participants (15) identified as white and 15 identified as BAME (black, Asian or minority ethnic) (50%). Among the 15 participants who identified as BAME, there included one dual citizen of the UK and France, of Senegalese heritage, and a dual citizen of the UK and India who was of Indian heritage. 8 of the white participants voted Leave and 7 voted Remain. 2 of the BAME participants voted Leave while the other 13 voted Remain.




Figure 23 Focus Group Participants' 2016 Race or Ethnicity

In order to further protect participants' anonymity, in addition to the assigning of pseudonyms, participants were required to select the age range within which their age belonged, rather than being asked to state their age. 1 Leave voter and 11 Remain voters were aged 18-24 (40% in total). 1 Leave voter and 5 Remain voters were aged 25-34 (20% in total). 2 Leave voters and 3 Remain voters were aged 35-44 (16.7% in total). 2 Leave voters and no Remain voters were aged 45-54 (6.7% in total). 4 Leave voters and 1 Remain voter were over-55 (16.7% in total).




Figure 24 Focus Group Participants' Age Ranges

Polling research from, Skinner and Gottfried (2016) and Swales (2016), among others, indicated that Leave voters in 2016 were more likely to be male, white and on-average older when compared to Remain voters in the same year. This sample reflects those trends to an extent; however, this was a purposive sample which sought to recruit participants based solely on their voting history. Women, BAME voters and younger people were unintentionally overrepresented, relative to the overall population. It may not be possible to measure the extent to which these overrepresentations influenced the findings of this study.

Participants' Pseudonyms, Codes and Demographics

The following details were recorded for each participant within the study; the given name of each participant is a pseudonym.

Participant Pseudonym	Vote	Age Range	Ethnicity	Gender
Olivia (F1P1)	Leave voter	Over 55	White British	Female
Harry (F1P2)	Leave voter	Over 55	White British	Male

Charles (F1P3)	Leave voter	45-54	White British	Male
George (F1P4)	Leave voter	25-34	White British	Male
Jack (F1P5)	Leave voter	35-44	White British	Male
Amelia (F1P6)	Leave voter	45-54	White British	Female
Alfie (F1P7)	Leave voter	Over 55	White British	Male
Isla (F1P8)	Leave voter	Over 55	White British	Female
Yadid (F2P1)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	British Asian (Pakistani)	Male
Nadira (F2P2)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	British Mixed Race (White and Indian)	Female
Asha (F2P3)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	Black (Somali) British	Female
Leo (F2P4)	Leave voter	Age 35-44	Black (African) British	Male
Jacob (F2P5)	Remain voter	Age 35-44	White (American Dual Citizen)	Male
Ava (F3P1)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	White British	Female
Riya (F3P2)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	British Asian	Female
Kamya (F3P3)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	British Asian	Female
Sophia (F3P4)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	White British	Female
Grace (F3P5)	Remain voter	Age 25-34	White British	Female
Mia (F4P1)	Remain voter	Age 35-44	White British	Female
Chayana (F4P2)	Leave voter	Age 18-24	British (Indian) Asian	Female
Farzeen (F4P3)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	British Asian	Female
Isha (F4P4)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	British (Indian) Asian	Female
Pavani (F5P1)	Remain voter	Age 35-44	British Asian (Indian)	Female
Ella (F5P2)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	Black British	Female
Wakeeta (F5P3)	Remain voter	Age 25-34	Indian Dual Citizen	Female

Freddie (F5P4)	Remain voter	Age 25-34	Mixed (Black and Asian)	Male
Poppy (F5P5)	Remain voter	Age Over-55	White British	Female
Lily (F5P6)	Remain voter	Age 18-24	Mixed (Black and White)	Female
Evie (F5P7)	Remain voter	Age 25-34	Black (French Dual Citizen)	Female
Camila (F5P8)	Remain voter	Age 25-34	Catalan (Spanish Dual Citizen)	Female

Table 15 Participant pseudonyms and demographics

Focus Group Questions

The researcher asked participants to respond to the following questions individually. After that point, they were encouraged to engage with one another to discuss the focus group questions in greater depth with each of their fellow participants.

The questions were grouped into three subject areas; this was undertaken in order to address both research question within its three distinct elements. The subject areas and their related questions were as follows:

1. **British Identity:** *What does British identity mean to you? Do you feel you have a strong British identity?*
2. **European Identity:** *What does European identity mean to you? Do you feel you have a strong European identity?*
3. **Perceived Impact of Brexit:** *How do you feel Brexit will impact your friends and family? How do you feel Brexit will impact the United Kingdom?*

The participants responses were recorded, coded and themed in the months after data collection. Copies of the full transcripts are provided in Appendix 4. The responses that fell within the

recurring themes for Leave or Remain voters are presented below in the following section of this chapter.

Procedure for Thematic Analysis

The research recorded each of the five focus groups with a digital recording device. These recordings were transcribed, first-hand by the researcher, onto a word processor and saved in an encrypted folder which was accessible only by said researcher. To gain familiarity with the information, the researcher re-read each of the transcripts twice and then, on a third pass, used the ‘notes’ function on their word processor to ‘code’ sentences and paragraphs which they felt would be relevant to the questions: *‘how did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?’* and *‘how did voters’ British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?’*. These codes were later grouped together into ‘themes’ which consist of codes that are most highly related. Each set of themes corresponded to one of the two groups: Leave voters and Remain voters. The themes are reported below, connected to their relevant group, and expressed in continuous prose.

Findings

How did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?

British Identities

In this section, the research conducts a descriptive analysis of the focus group responses from the Leave and Remain voters to assess how these voters constructed their British identities. This data is necessary for understanding how differing British identity constructions can influence different voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This section considers how the Leave voters constructed their British identities by preserving traditions and embracing the history of

the UK, and also by bemoaning contemporary British life. In addition, the researcher reflects on how Remain voters constructed their British identities by celebrating contemporary multiculturalism and by critiquing the history of British imperialism and colonialism. These descriptive findings will be critically analysed and scrutinised, supported by the secondary research presented earlier in the chapter, within the discussion in order to better consider their effect upon changing attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit.

Leave Voters

I Construct my British Identity by Preserving British History and Traditions

Leave voters constructed their British identities by attempting to preserve British history, values and traditions. Leave voters construct a national identity by revering historic institutions and celebrating previous achievements by Britons.

These voters constructed their British identity by embracing the institution of the constitutional monarchy in the UK. Olivia took great pride in spectating at Royal celebrations and events. She said, ‘I can’t describe the feeling when I go to London and see all the pomp and the ceremony. My Queen; give me her any day than a President’ (Olivia, Line 94). Indeed, for George, being a subject of the monarchy was essential to being British; he said that being British ‘means we have a Queen’ (George, Line 181). The institution of the Church of England, of which the monarch is head, was also instrumental to formation of a British identity for Olivia. She said, ‘I was brought up, every day at school, saying the Lord’s Prayer. Because we were a Christian country, we still are, and we stood up and sang God Save the Queen’ (Olivia, Line 88).

Olivia felt that the continued presence of the British armed forces in public life gave her a strong connection to her national identity. She said, ‘I love the fact that we’ve got the best soldiers in the world. They go all over the world; defend us, teach other countries... how to

defend themselves' (Olivia, Line 99). Likewise, Jack argued that the British armed forces distinguished Britons from other national identity groups. He added, 'Military, as an ex-military person... is probably how I identify as being British. We are, as a country, a separate entity. As such, I'm British, I'm not European' (Jack, Line 150). It is also important to not understate the importance of the legacy of the two World Wars upon the construction of British identity for Leave voters. Amelia felt that knowledge of the World Wars, especially the Second, should be an essential component of constructing a British identity. Amelia asked rhetorically, 'where's their sense of history? I mean, maybe the First World War might be a bit... but that (WW2) shouldn't be hazy' (Amelia, Line 159).

My British Identity is Constructed Based on a Fading Ideal of Britain

Leave voters constructed their British identity partly by lamenting a fading ideal of what it meant to be British in the contemporary world. These voters felt that modern Britain fell well short a romanticised, historic version of the UK.

Despite having a highly salient British identity, George felt that contemporary Britain had experienced a sharp social and cultural decline that was driven by the public discourse; as a *conservative*, he considered a tendency toward more *progressive* politics contributed to a decline in his ideal version of Britain. He said, 'You almost feel robbed. It's like you can't be a patriot if you're English... In this country, you see someone doing well, they've got a nice car, good-looking partner, you go and key their car. We've turned into a bitter, twisted, envious country... We've turned into a complete blame culture. And, I do blame this on the "left," on socialism, everyone's owed a living, and that's not what being British is about (George, Line 143).

Furthermore, Amelia felt that nation pride, among Britons, had diminished; it was her opinion that those who constructed a highly salient British identity were made to feel a sense of shame

about being overtly patriotic. She said, ‘we must get that Britishness back, and it’s not about colonialism. We’re almost made to feel ashamed of our history’ (Amelia, Line 812).

Amelia bewailed the contemporaneous practice among political activists of calling for the removal of, or actively removing, statues of historical figures in public fora. She defended the continued public presence of the statues saying, ‘we’re almost made to feel ashamed of our history. Every country in the world... some appalling things, but they will all have done, in their march to freedom, some wonderful things. This thing of taking statues down at Oxford University... it’s got to stop’ (Amelia, Line 176). Alfie concurred with Amelia, arguing there existed a social benefit in keeping such statues in public places. He said, ‘(Statues) should be there for people to look at and learn from, not white-washed out of it and airbrushed’ (Alfie, Line 178).

Remain Voters

I Construct my British Identity by Embracing Contemporary British Multiculturalism

Remain voters constructed their British identities by embracing contemporary trends in British society and culture, while consigning historic traditions to a less significant place in the formation of their self-construct. For these voters, being British meant to be welcoming and accepting of changing definitions of Britishness. For example, ethnic minority Britons, like Nadira who was of both white British and Indian descent, felt that constructing a British identity was possible because it allowed to them to embrace both elements of her ethnic identity. She said, ‘I’m also from a mixed background. I have strong identities to my parent’s culture. My dad and my grandparents are from India’ (Nadira, Line 299). Also, Asha felt that a combination of generations of migration and the history of British colonialism meant that many people outside of the UK, such as her family, constructed British identities even before attaining citizenship;

that is to say she thought that the British cultural influence still existed in the Commonwealth nations and other former colonies such as Somaliland from whence her family came to the UK. She explained, ‘if you look throughout history, the British culture has gone to other countries... people from other countries have come to Britain, so the cultures have intertwined. So, people and their backgrounds from India and China will bring it over here, and they’re going to have strong identities to Britain, because it’s also been brought over there’ (Asha, Line 303).

Moreover, Poppy, who was of white British heritage, welcomed the multicultural dimension of contemporary British culture, feeling that openness and tolerance were essential to a positive construction of a British identity. She said, ‘I grew up proud of the fact we are a multi-cultural nation and that we can be quite tolerant, and we can be quite respectful of different faiths and beliefs’ (Poppy, Line 802).

Indeed, cultural tolerance united Remain voters across the categories of race and ethnicity. Popular culture and symbols helped these voters to construct a British identity by embracing the contemporary signifiers of the age. The signifiers ranged from more traditional British emblems, ‘Cup of tea, crumpets, the Union Jack flag, Buckingham palace, the Queen (Grace, Line 552) to more recent popular television, ‘I do sometimes fall under British stereotypes, like Great British Bake Off’ (Asha, Line 318) *and* music, “‘I came here totally, “oh my gosh, it’s going to be so good, I’m so into indie stuff”’ (Evie, Line 826).

However, Yadid felt that, as a first-generation Briton, future generations in his family would embrace contemporary British culture more fervently than did he; for him, some aspects of being British still felt alien or incongruent to his cultural identity. He said, ‘I’m British in the sense that I was born and raised here, and English is my first language... I think my children in future would be more British than me’ (Yadid, Line 292).

My British Identity is Constructed in the Shadow of the British Empire

Remain voters also constructed their British identities by remembering the less savoury elements of British history, such as widespread discrimination and especially the history of British colonialism. The prevalence of Brexit in the public consciousness appeared to influence how Remain voters processed Britain's colonial legacy and their construction of a British identity. Wakeeta felt that media organisations had contributed to an overly narcissistic and romanticised version of Britishness. She said, 'The way I was thinking about Britain... it seems to be some fantasy idea of a second colonial wave, like the great colonial empire coming back. That's the kind of idea that seemed to be sold to a lot of people in Britain... through media and social media discourse' (Wakeeta, Line 786). Similarly, Lily felt less able to construct a healthy, positive British identity because of a negative public discourse surrounding Brexit. She explained, 'After Brexit, it's made me want to turn against that more. I don't want to be associated with this thing that's become poisonous. It's patriotic, but it's like a poisonous version of that. They've twisted and gone back to this colonialist idea. Maybe I won't say, "I'm British," depending on how this all works out' (Lily, Line 812).

Jacob's British identity was constructed by reflecting on the formation of the British Empire and the particularly corrosive influence that the empire had on former colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He said, 'Britain still has a tie to the negative aspects of World War One and World War Two. This new generation is a little more tied to recognizing the poor choices that were made during the formation of the British Empire and how they treated colonies' (Jacob, Line 353). Moreover, Mia increasingly associated a British identity with forms of militaristic jingoism that she felt were odious and dangerous for vulnerable Britons. She said, 'it is part of that whole, stand with your country, poor lads have got to go off and fight. What are

they fighting for... it is put under that guise of, “you’re British, fight for your country”” (Mia, Line 655).

European Identities

In the current section, the research conducts descriptive analysis of the focus group responses from the Leave and Remain voters to assess how these voters constructed their European identities. This data is necessary for understanding how differing European identity constructions can influence different voters’ attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This section explores the reasons that Leave voters, in the study, gave for why they failed to construct European identities for themselves. Conversely, the researcher observes how Remain voters constructed their European identities by asserting the importance of European Union membership, while also admitting that their European identities are not central to their constructions of the self. These descriptive findings will be critically analysed and assessed, supported by the secondary research presented earlier in the chapter, within the discussion in order to better gauge their influence upon changing attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit.

Leave Voters

I Do Not Construct a European Identity for Myself

Leave voters did not construct European identities for a variety of reasons. Among the explanations for this lack of a European identity, among the cohort, was a belief that being British and being European was impossible because the two were inherently contradictory identities; voters felt that their construction of a British identity necessarily excluded a European identity.

Olivia felt that Europe existed outside of the United Kingdom, and that one needed to leave Britain to visit Europe. She said, ‘I don’t identify as a European ... I don’t identify with it

(Europe) at all, apart from going on holiday' (Olivia, Line 188). For some participants, a European identity was not only incompatible with constructions of a British identity but was also discordant with the national identities of those living in the EU27. Alfie distinguished between citizens of European countries and refused to label those people as *Europeans*. He said, 'I don't think I've ever met a European. I've never addressed anyone or thought of anyone as a European. He's Belgian, he's French, he's German, he's Italian... To me, there's no such thing as a European' (Alfie, Line 210).

Similarly, Harry felt that attempts to popularise and uniformalise a European identity were synonymous with the expansion of the European Union and an attempt at *ever closer union* (which as a Leave supporter, he opposed). Harry said, 'it's all a case of let's keep diluting your national identity because then we can just assimilate you. We can just bring you all in under one banner and call you all European. I'm not European. I've never been European' (Harry, Line 107). Charles, correspondingly, felt that a European identity was created to bring about federalisation in the EU, and he opted not to construct a European identity for this reason. He said, 'The European Union came up with identity because they want to be a sovereign European state... Don't try to convert me because I don't feel European' (Charles, Line 202).

Furthermore, George was even more severely critical of the European Union when explaining why he rejected the notion of a European identity. He said, 'I don't like being ruled by a parasite, which is what the European Union has become... It's undemocratic, it's wasteful. Apart from location, I don't feel we've got that much in common with the other 27 countries... we should trade with them like we do with the rest of the world. But, being ruled by them? Absolutely not. No' (George, Line 904).

Ultimately, constructing a European identity was impossible for some voters because of the legacy of the two World Wars. Harry conveyed anti-French and anti-German sentiment with regard to his lack of a unified European identity. He said, ‘my grandmother lost two of her brothers in the First World War in France. So, I grew up, from an early age, with a really healthy disregard for the French. And, pretty much the same for the Germans (Harry, Line 191).

Remain Voters

Being a Member of the EU Allowed Me to Construct a European Identity

Remain voters constructed their European identities by celebrating their membership of the European Union. The EU adopted the role of a unified social group, in addition to its legal, political and economic union of countries. For these voters, a European identity was a significant and salient identity that was forged in the post-World War Two peace across the continent.

On the point, Jacob constructed his European identity in recognition of the horrors of the Second World War; a European identity was forged, with the inception of the European Steel and Coal Community, to protect Europeans from the potential of another war of such great magnitude. He said, ‘there’s a recognition of a self-struggle, self-loss... we look at World War 2 and say the Nazis did this, and it’s awful. But, the bombing of Dresden, when you have that more European reflection you realise how terrible certain things are’ (Jacob, Line 456). Furthermore, Riya felt that a European identity was constructed by herself and citizens of the collected countries of the EU28 (later EU27), and that such a collective identity provided wellbeing and comfort to European citizens. She explained, ‘European identity is being part of a community. You’ve got support from all of these different countries, so it’s more of being a community. Everyone coming together’ (Riya, Line 570). Nadira, who’s family was of white British and Indian descent, disclosed that her European identity embraces newer communities of non-

European ancestry. She said, ‘you don’t have to have a specific skin colour or specific language, you’re just from the continent itself (if you’re European)’ (Nadira, Line 388).

Additionally, Wakeeta, who had recently attained British citizenship, celebrated freedom of movement, and lamented that a loss of EU Freedom of Movement would make her feel a sense of loss of her previous European identity. She said, ‘I lived in Berlin too. Being able to go to other countries with having a long-term German visa and being here (UK) feeling so absolutely claustrophobic and stuck. For a 45-minute trip to Amsterdam, I (will) need to apply two weeks in advance, show documentation, proof of finance, about 20 different documents’ (Wakeeta, Line 869). Similarly, Evie, who was of West African descent and was a dual British-French citizen, felt that the right to Freedom of Movement across Europe was an essential factor in the construction of a European identity; she also felt that this freedom gave Europeans an unfair social advantage over non-European migrants across the continent. She said, ‘look at the migration crisis and what’s going on at the moment within Europe and how we’ve been looking up at that situation and dealing with it is actually shameful. The freedom of movement, I’m very divided about it. I feel very free myself. Being born in France, I feel absolutely privileged about that’ (Evie, Line 896).

My European Identity is Less Significant than Other Identities in my Self-construct

Remain voters revealed that, although they did construct a European identity for themselves, this was far from the most significant and salient identity in their self-construct. A variety of other identities took precedence over their European identity. For some of these voters, their British identity was considerably more significant and salient for them than was their European identity. Riya felt that being a citizen of the EU made her a European in an official capacity, but she did not choose to label herself as a European when in conversation with others. She said, ‘if

somebody said, “what are you?” I wouldn’t say, “I’m European.” The first thing I would say, knowing that is... that I’m British. But, I wouldn’t recognise myself as European. Not until you realise that if you’re in the EU, you are technically European’ (Riya, Line 578). Moreover, when she was speaking with non-Europeans whilst on holiday, Grace expressed dismay at being labelled as a European over being called *English*. She said, ‘I never felt like I was a European. I never counted myself as a European. When I was in the States, they would be like, “ooh, you’re from Europe.” “No, I’m from England.” I feel like it’s a completely separate country’ (Grace, Line 601).

As well as an overall national identity being more salient and significant in self-constructs for Remain voters, local identities could also be more central to the overall identity of these voters. Local identity was much more significant for Ava than her European identity. She said, ‘I would much rather have that closer to home label of, “I am from Yorkshire.” I’m much quicker to give myself a Yorkshire identity than any other. That’s where I’m from, more close to home for me than saying I’m from Europe’ (Ava, Line 566).

For Remain voters with predominantly non-European ancestry, a (relatively) newly acquired European identity was much less salient and significant to them than their ancestral identities, being those national identities of their parents, grandparents or above. Asha explained, ‘I don’t call myself European. Maybe because I identify myself more with my ethnicity than my nationality. Obviously, I’m Somali so identify as being Somali over being just European’ (Asha, Line 406). Furthermore, Pavani was still in the process of constructing a British identity, as a Briton of Indian descent, and thus a European identity did not feature heavily in her self-construct. She said, ‘I have enough of a life journey going around wrestling with being British,

Indian, all the rest of it to think about being European. So, I'm in a state of confusion about it all right now' (Pavani, Line 847).

How Did Voters Perceive the Potential Social Impact of Brexit?

In this section, the research conducts a descriptive analysis of the focus group data, from the Leave and Remain voters, to evaluate how these voters perceived the potential social impact of the UK's exit from the European Union. This information is necessary for comprehending how Leave and Remain voters perceive Brexit differently and how these differing perspectives can influence voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. This section considers how Leave voters perceived the greatest social impact, of Brexit, to be the loss of social relationships with Remain supporters, and the formation of new bonds with Leave supporters. Conversely, the researcher contemplates how Remain voters perceived the most profound potential social impacts to be the loss of the benefits of freedom of movement across the continent, and the increased vulnerability of marginalised groups in British life. These descriptive findings will be critically analysed and reviewed, aided by the secondary research presented earlier in the chapter, within the discussion in order to better consider their impression on the changing attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in the UK.

Leave Voters

I Will Lose Relationships Because of Brexit

Leave voters expressed a concern that their decision to vote Leave, and their continued support for the position would place strain on their existing familial and friendly relationships. Amelia revealed that her personal relationships had been damaged because of her support for leaving the EU. Amelia said that, 'whether it's your friends or your family, everyone has their right to a

view. This discourse has been about how it's going to divide you. Friends and family, it's going to divide' (Amelia, Line 65). Similarly, Charles lost one of his most enduring friendships because of discord over their attitudes toward Brexit. Charles said, 'I've lost quite a good friend because of it. I tried really hard not to talk about Brexit, but he always wanted to talk about Brexit. He's a big Remainer' (Charles, Line 55).

Some of the personal relationships, which Leave voters felt would be diminished because of Brexit, would be lost because of the legal consequences of the UK's exit from the EU, rather than because of personal opinions. Alfie, who had extended family members from the EU27, felt that his relationship with his daughter would come under strain because of the loss of Freedom of Movement of People. Alfie said, 'Our grandchild has got a Belgian father. There are issues there that will put a strain on the relationship because they're looking at me and saying, "You're causing us problems here"' (Alfie, Line 77). Leo, who was born in Uganda and obtained British citizenship, echoed concerns about the social effect of losing Freedom of Movement of People; he felt that his children's future might be negatively impacted by travel restrictions, which were, in turn, an unexpected consequence of his decision to vote Leave. He said, 'even though I'm British right now, my children were born here, and I do take on board the value of a British passport might be deleted by not being part of the EU' (Leo, Line 244). Conversely, while some of the Leave voters displayed anxieties about the loss of personal relationships because of differences over Brexit, Olivia claimed that such social disconnections were necessary and welcome. In discussing personal relationships, she said, 'if you're going to chastise me because I think differently to you, then you're not my friend, full stop' (Olivia, Line 14).

Ultimately, psychology student Chayana expressed sympathy for fellow students in the UK who, because of potential travel restrictions and impositions, would not get the chance to

study and to form positive relationships with others in the EU27. She expressed this regret thusly, ‘No-one is ever going to get educated through that kind of system. They won’t have the opportunity to travel and do what they want to do. They have to follow these rules and have their aims and goals in life restricted’ (Chayana, Line 628).

Brexit Will Make Me Feel More Connected to Fellow Leave Supporters

Leave voters conveyed a sense of social connection toward fellow Leave voters, creating a conscious social group that would not have existed without the 2016 referendum on EU membership. Brexit would form a new social group gave Leave voters positive social relationships and a sense of in-group security in relation to opponents of Brexit. Charles found an unexpected social relationship through Brexit. He said, ‘people have gotten together and formed alliances which they wouldn’t have done otherwise’ (Charles, Line 56). Similarly, Amelia decried a lack of media coverage of long-lasting social relationships brought about by Brexit. She said, ‘no-one has looked into how it unites friends and family. Or, brings people together ... we (*my partner and I*) met through Brexit, and you don’t hear these good news stories’ (Amelia, Line 69).

In addition to creating meaningful, long-term social relationships, Leave voters also felt that belonging to this social group would give them a feeling of in-group security; this was especially related to the feeling, among Leave voters, that they were discriminated against within society and the media. Harry expressed dismay at the public discourse around Brexit, in particular that which was aimed toward Leave voters. He said, ‘I think the vitriol that’s come about with regard to Brexit has become a greater, stronger and wider divide. It’s become particularly nasty’ (Harry, Line 44). Furthermore, Olivia felt that class-based discrimination would continue to be directed toward Leave voters to an extent that would make her feel

increasingly uncomfortable as a Briton. She explained, ‘Remainers have been saying terrible things about uneducated people. “People didn’t know what they were voting for.” I think that has triggered something in the people, that they’re not being respected (Olivia, Line 22).

Remain Voters

Losing Freedom of Movement Will Make Life Worse for Me and My Family

Remain voters were concerned about the social impact of leaving the European Union, and the most prevalent concern was for the prospect of losing the rights and protection afforded to all citizens of EU member states. The loss of Freedom of Movement of People was chief among these voters’ concerns. Yadid’s felt that his extended family would be kept apart because of travel restrictions, in the event of (an ultimately occurrent) Brexit. He said, ‘if the UK was to go ahead and leave, the chances of my brother-in-law coming to the UK would be very slim’ (Yadid, Line 224). Ava was also concerned about an extended family members’ ability to settle in the UK as a citizen of the EU27. She said, ‘I know documentation is difficult at the moment because my partner’s uncle was trying to get his fiancée over from Cyprus, they made one spelling mistake and they had to re-do the entire thing, it pushed the process back months’ (Ava, Line 492).

In a similar vein, felt that she and her fellow students would have diminished opportunities to travel in the EU27 countries if Brexit occurred. She said, ‘I understand it will impact travel and seeing your family, especially if your family are not all based just here’ (Asha, Line 236). Likewise, Nadira expressed her concern for friends, who were citizens of the EU27, and their ability to see their families over Christmas and other out-of-term periods. She said, ‘I have friends from Latvia, Russia and Holland. They often go back around Christmas time, to see

grandparents and stuff. I know it's a lot easier for them to go back, than for their grandparents to come over. So, it will be harder for them to go back and see family' (Nadira, Line 231).

Brexit Will Make Society Unsafe for Vulnerable People

Remain voters felt that Brexit would contribute to the formation of a society that would become less safe and less protective of the most vulnerable in society. Several voters felt that the predicted rise in social tension, violence and prejudice, in the UK, would become even more prominent in the event of Brexit. Pavani, who was of Indian descent, felt an increase in race-centred hate crime and discrimination would endanger the lives of her and her family. She said, 'there has been a rise in hate crime and racist incidents since the EU referendum... my worry is that it will increase, and my friends and my family, who are potential victims of hate crime, are not safe' (Pavani, Line 731). Freddie felt that, as a Briton of mixed ethnicity, race-based discrimination was an ever-present in British society that would merely continue to be amplified by the public discourse about Brexit. He said, 'it's funny that, before that, with British sensibility, everything kind of runs under the surface, doesn't it? This (Hate crime) is probably the first instance of it... it was horrible to feel alien in your own space' (Freddie, Line 746).

Mia felt that the probability of rioting related to Brexit rose as the uncertainty about whether the UK would leave the EU increased in the build-up to the General Election in 2019. She asked, 'are there going to be riots? That's where people are standing back now, saying, "if it's taking this long, it's going to be massive, something bad is going to happen"' (Mia, Line 934).

In addition to social pressures, voters felt that Brexit would bring about a wide-scale privatisation of the NHS which would inhibit its ability to care for the vulnerable in society. Farzeen, especially, was concerned about the prospect of a privatised healthcare service

replacing the NHS in the event of Brexit. She queried, ‘if we do leave the EU, how can we be promised that we won’t be paying for healthcare? What if they go, “sorry, we’re out of money, we can’t do this, you’re going to have to start paying for stuff”’ (Farzeen, Line 677).

Grace felt that the loss of Freedom of Movement of Goods and Services would have a detrimental effect on her ability to obtain sexual health medication. She said, ‘for me, it’s a lot about the medications. There are people who use a lot of contraceptives that are made in the European Union. It’s very hard to get them over’ (Grace, Line 513). Likewise, Ava was concerned about her ability to access medications and services, including for mental health issues, in the event of a privatisation of the NHS resulting from the UK’s exit from the EU. She said, ‘I have a lot of medical issues... I’m struggling to get my medication and get my antidepressants and get the treatment that I need for my joints. If we were to leave the EU properly, the amount of that funding would plummet. And, if it were privatized, I’d be screwed’ (Ava, Line 482).

Discussion

This study examined the attitudes and perceptions of Leave and Remain voters toward the prospective social impact of Brexit, and toward their own British and European identities. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data from five focus groups with 30 participants in the autumn of 2019.

The study found that Leave voters constructed their British identities by celebrating and preserving the social and cultural history of the United Kingdom. These voters primed cultural institutions such as the monarchy and the armed forces as positive symbolic representations of the United Kingdom. Moreover, Leave voters also constructed a partly negative British social

identity because of their lived experience of contemporary Britain; these voters felt that their British identity had been debilitated by that they considered to be an *anti-meritocratic culture* and by negative political campaigns against the social and cultural history of Britain and the British Empire. The latter was best exemplified by Leave voters' antipathy toward the toppling and removing of public statues of historical figures such as Cecil Rhodes and Horatio Nelson. The Leave voters' celebration of, and desire to preserve, British cultural institutions, norms and values is consistent with Winstone and Wetherspoon's (2015) concept of the lifelong process of retaining national pride derived from the early process of national socialisation. Voters retain a positive appreciation of the historic culture of their nation in resistance to more critical appraisals of British culture and history. Furthermore, where Leave voters constructed a negative British in-group identity through contemporary lived experience, the desire to return to an idealised norm is best understood by engaging with Goodhart's (2016) binary of *somewhere* and *anywhere* citizens; Leave voters are the archetypal *somewhere* voters who consider social change, whether positive or negative, as an undermining influence in their place-based identity construction.

Leave voters, in the study, however, did not construct salient European identities for themselves. These attitudes were informed by a lack of cognitive centrality of European identity within their self-construct, and by Euroscepticism that is fuelled by anti-cultural and anti-EU rejection of a European identity. These findings sharply contrasted with the prior findings about the high salience and multifaceted construct of British identities within these voters. These voters typify the inherently Eurosceptic proportion of society who reject the very concept of a European identity based on antipathy toward the social, cultural and political influence of Europe and the European Union (Glencross, 2014; Usherwood, 2013; Schmidt, 1999).

Ultimately, Leave voters perceived the most salient social impacts of Brexit as being the loss of relationships with those who voted Remain, and being the new and strengthened relationships that were to be formed with those who voted Leave. These voters were unperturbed by the predicted social impact of Brexit based on the political changes to the UK's relationship with EU and by its potential economic consequences. These voters demonstrate the social and generational divide (Dorling et al., 2016; Fox and Pearce, 2018) that separates Leave and Remain voters; the influence of Brexit in British and British-European life has led to the formation of two new persistent in-group identities, Leavers and Remainers, that differ greatly in modal demographics and attitudes toward the costs and benefits of membership of the European Union.

Remain voters, conversely, constructed the positive aspects of their British identities by celebrating multiculturalism and diversity in contemporary British society. For these voters, the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-faith construct of modern Britain is a strength and a desirable quality of their country. However, their British identities were also constructed in relation to a negative appraisal of the history of the British Empire. For these voters, the history of British imperialism and colonialism was a source of in-group shame that they felt as self-identifying Britons. These voters expressed a contrary perception of the implementation of multicultural policies in British life to those studies that have informed public discourse on the issue (Nye, 2017; Joppke, 2004); for Remain voters, who are more likely to be from ethnic and cultural minorities when compared to Leave voters, multiculturalism has benefitted them and helped them to attain strong, positive and highly salient British identities. On the other hand, these voters did confirm Bobo and Fox's (2003) and Modood's (2011) concerns about social

isolation, marginalisation and discrimination of minorities within a contemporary multicultural Britain.

With regard to their European identities, Remain voters placed membership of the European Union as the most salient factor in the construction of such an identity. These voters felt that the UK's place within the former EU28 gave them a European identity that citizens of other non-EU European countries (such as Switzerland, Norway and Russia) do not possess. The eventual exit of the UK from the EU bloc would diminish the salience of the European identity within the self-construct of these voters. Conversely, Remain voters also revealed that their European identity did not occupy a position of cognitive centrality within their identity self-construct; being *European* was less central to their overall identity than their British, ethnic and other social group heritage. Remain voters exhibited the social and generational divide that separates pro-EU Britons from Eurosceptic ones (Fox and Pearce, 2018; Down and Wilson, 2013), albeit while evincing the diminished presence of a European identity in the self-constructs of Britons relative to their continental neighbours (West and Brown, 1993; Nandi and Platt, 2013). Remain are Britons with a multitude of in-group identities, of which European is one, but there are often competing and, essentially, more consequential identities that make up their self-constructs.

Finally, Remain voters perceived the loss of freedom of movement of people (as a result of Brexit implementation) and the creation of a society that is less safe for vulnerable people and groups, as the most pertinent social impacts that would arise from the UK's exit from the European Union. These voters felt that Brexit would be most devastating for Britons living in poverty, social marginalisation and those who had experienced in-group discrimination in the

society; Bobo and Fox's (2003) and Gelfand's (2011) analyses suggest that Brexit will further detriment these Britons and increase social inequalities to the overall detriment of British society.

Conclusion

The focus groups were conducted in an attempt to understand how British people, and those living in the UK, felt they would be impacted by Brexit, and social identities could have a significant impact on the national perceptions of people in the UK. These queries were concerned both with changes related to Brexit and to more general social attitudes among the people resident of the UK. The study, on the other hand, was limited by the predominantly university-based and English Midlands-based sample of participants for the focus groups. A less limited study would need to get a wider pool of participants for the research to benefit from the breadth of national attitudes.

This chapter has presented a timeline of the most significant political events that took place between the 2019 General Election campaign and the UK's exit from the post-Brexit transition period; the researcher used this information to situate the primary research within a social and political context and to aid one's understanding of the formation of attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. The chapter also explored a variety of theoretical research into how British and European identities are formed, changed and influenced by external stimuli; this scholarship ranged from social and culture norms to the historic perceptions of Europe and the European Union and the United Kingdom's position therein.

The researcher uncovered a thematic pattern of related discourse within the two groups of participants; the study consisted of five focus groups and combination of 10 Leave voters and 20 Remain voters overall. The Leave voters constructed positive British identities by celebrating and preserving British social norms and cultural institutions, but appraised their national identity

somewhat negatively based on left-progressive political changes. These voters did not self-identify as Europeans. Finally, Leave voters were most concerned about losing social relationships with Remain voters, but anticipated forming new social relationships with fellow Leavers.

Conversely, Remain voters constructed positive British identities by celebrating and embracing multicultural diversity, but appraised their national identity somewhat negatively based on the history of British imperialism and colonialism. These voters constructed their European identity by seeking the benefits of European Union membership for EU citizens (before Brexit); however, their European identity was far from the most salient social identity for these voters, especially in relation to their British identity. Finally, Remain voters were most concerned about losing freedom of movement of people as a result of Brexit, and were also deeply fearful of the social consequences for vulnerable and marginalised groups in society.

The next chapter will provide conclusions to the four research questions that were asked within this thesis, explore the significance and contribution of this thesis, identify the limitations of this research study and suggest avenues for further investigation.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Overview

In this section, the researcher provides the reader with an overview of the previous chapters, giving a reminder of the significant methodological choices and key findings from the primary research.

Chapter 1 was the introduction which presented a detailed overview of the present study, indicating, to the reader, which methods would be adopted to resolve the four research questions which were to be tackled over the course of data collection and analysis. The four research questions were: *To what extent did social identification and collective narcissism predict voting behaviour differences in the UK voters? How did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term social impact of Brexit? How did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit? How did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?*

Chapter 2 exhibited the findings from the online social surveys which were conducted to resolve the first research question: *To what extent did social identification and collective narcissism predict voting behaviour differences in the UK voters?* The researcher found that British collective narcissism did significantly increase the likelihood of voting for a Leave-supporting party in the 2019 General Election. The findings of this data collection and analysis were discussed in relation to previous studies into Social Identity Theory, collective narcissism, out-group derogation and in-group favouritism.

Chapter 3 discussed the methodology for the primary and secondary research of this research study, illustrating the methodological choices which underpinned the study, and assessing the validity of the chosen research methods. The research appraised the ethical considerations that arose out from conducting a study of this nature and concluded that a pragmatic approach to the generation of knowledge worked well in tandem with a mixed methods primary data collection.

Chapter 4 presented the findings from the textual analyses of the 2019 General Election manifestos in order to resolve the second research question: *How did the 2019 General Election manifestos of nine major political parties construct perceptions of the long-term social impact of Brexit?* The researcher discovered that nine of the major political parties in the British electoral system used their manifestos to shape attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit in three competing ways: *to advocate a beneficial perception of Brexit, to call for a second referendum with Remain as an option to deter the negative impact of Brexit, and to increase support for a separatist movement in each of the three devolved nations of the UK (Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland).* These findings were discussed with reference to communications theory, British political theory and socio-economic analysis.

Chapter 5 demonstrated the findings from the focus groups which were conducted in order to resolve the third and fourth research questions: firstly, *how did voters construct British and European identities before Brexit?* And secondly, *how did voters' British and European identities influence perceptions of the potential social impact of Brexit?* The researcher realised that Leave voters constructed their British identities by celebrating and embracing British history and tradition, but also lamented contemporary British life; these voters did not construct salient European social identities for themselves. Conversely, Remain voters constructed their British

identities by embracing and celebrating contemporary British multiculturalism and by critiquing the history of British imperialism and colonialism; Remain voters constructed European identities which, although less salient than their other competing social identities, were centred on the citizenship within the previous EU28 (later EU27). These findings were discussed in partnership with secondary research into British social and cultural history, and socio-political research on Euroscepticism and globalisation.

Findings

In this section, the researcher restates the findings that were generated in pursuit of resolving the four research questions, using the three chosen research methods: online social surveys, focus groups, textual thematic analysis on manifestos.

The researcher found a significant positive relationship between social identification (*cognitive centrality of an identity*) and collective narcissism when measured in both the British and European domains. Remain-supporting party voters reported higher levels of European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism than Leave voters, with the first cognitive trait being more salient than the latter. Leave party voters reported higher levels of British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism than Remain voters, with the first cognitive trait being more salient than the latter. In all, the likelihood of a vote for a Leave-supporting party was moderated by a preference for Leave in a hypothetical second referendum on EU membership in 2019, and by support for a hypothetical Leave vote *and* higher British Collective Narcissism in 2017. These findings provide partial evidence for identifying a relationship between the discourse of political parties and cognitive centrality of British identity in understanding voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. British nationalism appears to increase support for pro-Leave parties and their associated discourse.

Furthermore, the researcher unearthed a thematic pattern of related discourse within the three sets of parties (*pro-Leave, British unionist parties; pro-second referendum, British unionist parties; pro-second referendum, British separatist parties*). The pro-Leave, British unionists collectively sought to create the impression, in voters, that Brexit would give the UK greater levels of sovereignty and a stronger ability to create policy that is in the UK's self-interest above external interests. The pro-second referendum, British unionists, however, wanted to give voters' the perception that Brexit would both diminish the UK's reputation amongst its internal allies, and make life more dangerous for vulnerable Britons living in the UK. Furthermore, the pro-second referendum, British separatists instilled, in voters, the perception that Brexit would both undermine the sovereignty of the devolved parliaments/assemblies and would, ultimately, strengthen the mandate for separatism in each of the three devolved nations. With these findings the researcher observed a clear distinction in the way major political parties, in the British political system, use policy and impact discourse to influence voters' attitudes toward Brexit; for some, Brexit is a benefit to the United Kingdom, to others it is a burden, and, to the third group, it is a clear justification for separatist independence of their nation from the longstanding union of the UK.

The researcher found, finally, a thematic pattern of related discourse within the two groups of participants; the study consisted of five focus groups and combination of 10 Leave voters and 20 Remain voters overall. The Leave voters constructed positive British identities by celebrating and preserving British social norms and cultural institutions, but appraised their national identity somewhat negatively based on left-progressive political changes. These voters did not self-identify as Europeans. Ultimately, Leave voters were most concerned about losing social relationships with Remain voters, but anticipated forming new social relationships with

fellow Leavers. These findings gave the researcher further insight into how voters use external stimuli to process the social impact of Brexit for themselves and their loved one; for Brexit enthusiasts, Brexit is a bitter-sweet social development that will see some social relationships perish while others will soon flourish, whereas Brexit opponents consider the loss of the social benefits of EU membership and the increase in right wing discourse within the mainstream public discourse to be too heavy a price to pay for Brexit, which they also voted against in the 2016 European Union Membership referendum.

Wider Ambitions of the Study

The researcher explored how different forms of nationalism can affect British referenda and elections, such as in the 2016 EU membership referendum and the 2017 and 2019 UK General Elections. The study also considered how nationalistic social identities can impact the wider society outside of such political events. The researcher investigated how Leave and Remain voters placed value on national pride and local traditions to see how each group perceived the importance of self-governance and self-interest more broadly. The research was partly limited by an overly cautious approach adopted by the researcher. Concerns about failing to obtain a statistically valid sample led the researcher to choose a small number of independent variables for the quantitative element of the research. This increased the chances of participants completing the whole study but narrowed the breadth of options for analysing social attitudes related to the Brexit and the elections of the post-Brexit period. Going forward, the researcher will have more confidence in their ability to obtain sufficient sample sizes on studies with a large number of independent variables and a longer average time to complete.

The researcher questioned how a young generation of Britons would perceive life outside of the European Union in the foreseeable future, and if the social divisions which emerged after the referendum 2016 would continue to play a significant role in UK society. The resource limitations of the present doctoral research meant that the researcher was unable to track Britons in a longitudinal manner. A large, longitudinal study would allow the researcher to understand how social perceptions about Brexit shift over of time.

In conducting this research, the researcher set about understanding how people living in the UK felt they would be impacted by the implementation of Brexit. This was one of the primary motivations of the focus group element. Moreover, the online surveys were chosen to gauge how healthy and unhealthy social identities could have a significant influence on how voters perceive their country and its relationship to Europe and the European Union. These questions were concerned with picking apart attitudes to changes in demographics in the UK and how voters appraise the moral, traditional and economic position of their country. The study was, unfortunately, limited by the recruitment of a predominantly student sample which was based mostly in the English Midlands. A study that would be better able to achieve the wider aims of the study would require a wider pool of participants who would have a greater variety of perspectives on Britain, Europe, and the impact of the UK's exit from the European Union.

Finally, the thematic analysis of the electoral manifestos afforded the researcher a method of understanding the influence of British political parties on shaping their voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Britain's future in the shadow of Brexit. This method allowed the researcher to consider whether political influence is a significant factor on voter behaviour in the Britain. A limitation of this portion of the study was that the researcher used a small number of primary texts analysed for the thematic analysis. Resource and time constraints meant that the researcher

chose to focus on a single document from each of the parties during the specific historic event of the 2019 General Election. In future work, the researcher would construct a larger corpus of speeches, documents and social media data over a longer period of time to get a longitudinal perspective on voters' attitudes in the UK.

Contributions

In the following sections, the researcher will set out what they consider to be the most significant contributions that this thesis will make to academic scholarship; the two domains in which this contribution is measured are *in the study of Brexit* and *in the study of social psychology*.

Contribution to the Study of Brexit

The present research contributed significantly to the understanding of British nationalism throughout the Brexit era of British politics; the study demonstrated the extent to which the cognitive centrality of British identity can determine voting behaviour that asserts nationalism and rejects, to a certain extent, external out-groups and their identities. Moreover, the study contributes to how the academy understands British attitudes toward Europe, the European Union and the future of EU integration. The primary data collection, and its thematic analysis, revealed two distinct sets of ideologies among the British electorate: the first strongly rejected their own European identity, critiqued the concept of *ever closer union* and did not consider Brexit to be negative element of British history; conversely, the second group embraced a European identity that was tied to membership of the European Union and decried the prospect of losing the person benefits that were associated with being citizens of the former EU28 (not EU27). Finally, the study contributes to the understanding of temporally specific perceptions of the social impact of Brexit. Participants in this study, and the party manifestos of the 2019 General Election in the UK, discussed the how Brexit would impact Britain and British life;

however, these perceptions were manifested well before the 2020 Covid-19 Pandemic which was predicted to have a considerably more significant effect on Britons and Europeans than Brexit could reasonably be expected to.

Contribution to the Study of Social Psychology

The research contained within this thesis contributed significantly to the study of the form of social sciences research which combines psychology and elements of sociology and political science; being social psychology. This thesis is situated within the growing body of research which uses psychological research to investigate the two intertwined, transatlantic socio-political phenomena of the Brexit movement and the Trump movement, both of which reached their zenith in 2016. Furthermore, this study utilises Brexit-specific external stimuli to investigate identity construction among people living in the UK in two domains, the British domain and the European domain. This approach, coupled with a three-pronged mixed methods approach (online social surveys; focus groups; textual thematic analysis of electoral manifestos), contributes to how a variety of methods can give significant insight into the psychological processes that voters experience when engaging with politics.

Limitations of the Study

In this section, the researcher illustrates the most significant limitations that were encountered in the years spent conducting the present study.

In conducting the present study, one of the most significant limitations encountered was the lack of access to voters across the breadth of the United Kingdom. Limited resources for sampling and participants recruitment meant that all participants for the focus groups were located in either the West Midlands (Birmingham and Dudley) or the East Midlands (Nottingham) of England; this led to a non-representative sample of participants from both sides

of the Leave/Remain divide by excluding participants from the other seven regions of England and the three devolved nations. Moreover, the online social surveys recruited the majority of participants from two large urban centers in England (London and Birmingham) at the expense of other cities and rural provinces of the United Kingdom.

Additionally, the original vision for this research study involved conducting a truly longitudinal mixed methods study; for the following reasons this was not possible. The pilot study of the focus groups concluded with informal discussions with participants about their willingness to participate in a longitudinal study which could reconvene the focus groups at future points in time; this request was met with refusal from the majority of participants who, citing the nature of an intense public discourse concerning Brexit, opted not give contact details for a follow-up study and requested complete personal anonymity in exchange for their participation. These eventualities, based on the experiences of the pilot study, necessitated the selection of a cross-sectional approach to the overall study; focus groups and the online social survey were two different methods of surveying two distinct temporal cross-sections of the electorate (the electorate in Spring 2019 for the British Attitudes Survey, and the electorate in Autumn 2019 for the focus groups and the European Attitudes Survey).

Recommendations for Further Research

In this section, the researcher recommends new and complimentary approaches that could be adopted to follow this study into voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit; these recommendations could be freely taken up by any researcher in the social sciences or complimentary fields.

This doctoral study opened numerous avenues for further research into the study of voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. A more resource intensive study into the

psychological processes involved could incorporate a truly longitudinal approach that was not possible for this study. In this research, a group of participants from either side of the debate (Leave and Remain) could be interviewed, collectively or individually, over a period of years or decades to regularly observe their changing attitudes toward Brexit in the following domains: its change to their British and European identities, its change upon their opinion of the merits and demerits of the European Union and its influence on their perceptions of the social impact of Brexit. The resource intensiveness could include incentives, such as remuneration, to compensate for the lack of true anonymity (with respect to the researcher) and to reduce sample attrition.

Moreover, follow-up studies could granularise the domains for identity construction in Britain and Europe. This could include gauging identities on a local or regional level (Birmingham and Black Country; Yorkshire; Cornwall), or on an ethnocentric level (black British, British Asian; Polish British) to understand how the cognitive centrality of these in-group domains influences voting behaviour regarding Brexit. Again, this would require greater resource intensiveness to obtain statistically reliable sample sizes for surveys among less ubiquitous in-groups living in the United Kingdom; that is to say, for example, there are fewer British Asian people in the UK than there are British people (of whom British Asian people also belong).

Finally, the online social surveys could be updated to include other psychometric indicators that could build greater understanding of the psychological processes that inform voters' attitudes and perceptions toward Brexit. These could involve pre-existing scales and measures about other *trait theories* in psychology, *political ideologies* in political science and *the indices of deprivation* within social statistics. All three of these avenues for research should generate even richer data from a more robust and representative sample, in order to gain deeper insight into voters' attitudes and perceptions toward the historic event in question.

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Chapter 8: Appendices

Appendix 1: Exploratory T-tests Data

British Attitudes Survey

Independent Samples T-tests

British Social Identification

An independent samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean score for British Social Identification in the Leave and Remain voting conditions. There was a significant difference in the means for Leave voters ($M=5.45$, $SD=1.46$) and Remain voters ($M=3.75$, $SD=1.67$); $t(146)=5.22$, $p<.001$. These results suggest that social identification with Britain did have an effect on voting choice in the 2016 European Union Membership Referendum. Specifically, these results indicate that for Leave voters, British identities are more highly salient social identities than for Remain voters.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Leave	32	5.45	1.46	5.22	<.001
Remain	116	3.75	1.67		

Table 16 British Social Identification Findings




Figure 25 British Social Identification Findings

British Collective Narcissism

An independent samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean score for British Collective Narcissism in the Leave and Remain voting conditions. There was a significant difference in the means for Leave voters ($M=3.58$, $SD=1.57$) and Remain voters ($M=2.05$, $SD=1.07$);

$t(146)=6.44$, $p<.001$. These results suggest that collective narcissism regarding the British in-group did affect voting choice in the 2016 European Union Membership Referendum.

Particularly, these results indicate that Leave voters felt higher levels of national narcissism when compared to Remain voters in the same study.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Leave	32	3.58	1.57	6.44	<.001
Remain	116	2.05	1.07		

Table 17 British Collective Narcissism Findings




Figure 26 British Collective Narcissism Findings

Paired Samples T-tests

Leave Voters

A paired samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean scores for both British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism among Leave voters. There was a significant difference in the means for British Social Identification ($M=5.45$, $SD=1.46$) and British Collective Narcissism ($M=3.58$, $SD=1.57$) for Leave voters; $t(31) = -7.68$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that differences in British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism had an effect on voting choice in the 2016 EU referendum. Specifically, the results indicate that Leave voters construct the British identity around non-narcissistic social attitudes more so than narcissistic ones.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Social Identification	32	5.45	1.46	-7.68	<.001

**Collective
Narcissism**

32

3.58

1.57

Table 18 Leave British Findings




Figure 27 Leave British Findings

Remain Voters

A paired samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean scores for both British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism among Remain voters. There was a significant difference in the means for British Social Identification ($M=3.75$, $SD=1.67$) and British Collective Narcissism ($M=2.05$, $SD=1.07$) for Remain voters; $t(115) = -10.72$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that differences in British Social Identification and British Collective Narcissism had an effect on voting choice in the 2016 EU referendum. Particularly, the results indicate that Remain voters also construct a British identity around non-narcissistic social attitudes more saliently than narcissistic ones.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Social Identification	116	3.75	1.67	-10.72	<.001

Collective Narcissism

116

2.05

1.07

Table 19 Remain British Findings




Figure 28 Remain British Findings

European Attitudes Survey

Independent Samples T-tests

European Social Identification

An independent samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean score for European Social Identification in the Leave and Remain voting conditions. There was a significant difference in the means for Leave voters ($M=2.85$, $SD=1.23$) and Remain voters ($M=5.18$, $SD=1.61$); $t(155)=-9.12$, $p<.001$. These results suggest that social identification with Europe did have an effect on voting choice in the 2016 European Union Membership Referendum. Specifically, these results

indicate that for Remain voters, European identities are more highly salient social identities than for Leave voters.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Leave	51	2.85	1.23	-9.12	<.001
Remain	106	5.18	1.61		

Table 20 European Social Identification Findings




Figure 29 European Social Identification Findings

European Collective Narcissism

An independent samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean score for European Collective Narcissism in the Leave and Remain voting conditions. There was a significant difference in the means for Leave voters ($M=2.05$, $SD=.81$) and Remain voters ($M=3.59$, $SD=1.40$); $t(155) = -7.26$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that collective narcissism regarding the European in-group did affect voting choice in the 2016 European Union Membership Referendum. Particularly, these results indicate that Remain voters felt higher levels of national narcissism when compared to Leave voters in the same survey.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Leave	51	2.05	.81	-7.26	<.001
Remain	106	3.59	1.40		

Table 21 European Collective Narcissism Findings




Figure 30 European Collective Narcissism Findings

Paired Samples T-tests

Leave Voters

A paired samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean scores for both European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism among Leave voters. There was a significant difference in the means for European Social Identification ($M=2.85$, $SD=1.23$) and European Collective Narcissism ($M=2.05$, $SD=.81$) for Leave voters; $t(50)= 5.73$, $p=<.001$. These results suggest that differences in European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism had an effect on voting choice in the 2016 EU referendum. Specifically, the results indicate that Leave voters construct a European identity around non-narcissistic social attitudes more so than narcissistic ones.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Social Identification	51	2.85	1.23	5.73	<.001
Collective Narcissism	51	2.05	.81		

Table 22 Leave European Findings




Figure 31 Leave European Findings

Remain Voters

A paired samples T-test was conducted to compare the mean scores for both European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism among Remain voters. There was a significant difference in the means for European Social Identification ($M=5.18$, $SD=1.61$) and European Collective Narcissism ($M=3.59$, $SD=1.40$) for Remain voters; $t(105)=9.22$, $p<.001$. These results suggest that differences in European Social Identification and European Collective Narcissism had an effect on voting choice in the 2016 EU referendum. Particularly, the results indicate that Remain voters also construct a European identity around non-narcissistic social attitudes more saliently than narcissistic ones.

	N	Mean	SD	T	Sig.
Social Identification Collective Narcissism	106	5.18	1.61	9.22	<.001
	106	3.59	1.40		

Table 23 Remain European Findings




Figure 32 Remain European Findings

Appendix 2: British Attitudes Survey

Participant	2016 Vote	2019 2nd Ref	2017 Party	Regions	Reg Mob	Class	Age	Gender	Ethnicity
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	19	1	0
2	0	0	1	1	1	1	40	0	1
3	1	1	1	0	1	1	47	1	0
4	0	1	0	1	0	0	58	0	0
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	40	0	0
6	1	1	1	0	0	0	32	0	0
7	1	1	1	0	1	1	40	0	0
8	1	1	1	0	1	0	70	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	1	0	72	0	0
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	22	0	1
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	69	0	0
12	1	1	0	1	0	1	31	0	1
13	1	1	1	1	0	1	20	1	0
14	1	1	1	1	0	0	21	0	0

15	1	0	1	0	1	0	57	0	0
16	1	1	1	0	1	1	47	1	1
17	1	1	1	0	1	1	45	0	0
18	1	1	1	0	1	1	55	1	0
19	1	0	1	0	1	1	27	1	1
20	1	1	1	0	1	1	45	1	0
21	1	1	1	0	0	0	23	1	1
22	1	1	1	1	1	1	43	0	1
23	1	1	1	0	1	0	24	0	0
24	1	1	1	0	0	1	22	1	0
25	1	1	1	0	0	0	24	1	1
26	1	1	1	0	0	0	24	1	1
27	0	1	1	0	1	0	49	0	0
28	1	1	1	0	0	0	62	0	0
29	1	1	1	0	1	1	62	1	0
30	0	0	0	0	0	1	30	0	0
31	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	0
32	1	1	1	0	1	1	27	0	1
33	1	1	1	0	1	1	65	0	0
34	1	1	1	0	1	0	52	0	0
35	1	1	1	0	1	0	21	1	0
36	0	1	1	1	1	1	26	0	0
37	1	1	1	0	1	1	26	1	0
38	0	0	0	1	1	0	60	0	0
39	1	1	0	0	1	1	48	0	0
40	1	1	1	0	0	0	21	1	1
41	1	1	1	0	0	0	47	1	1
42	1	1	1	0	1	1	20	1	1
43	1	1	1	0	0	1	20	1	1
44	1	1	1	0	0	1	19	1	0
45	1	1	1	0	0	1	20	1	0
46	1	1	1	1	1	1	25	1	0
47	1	1	1	0	0	0	19	0	1
48	1	1	1	0	0	1	21	1	0
49	1	1	1	0	0	0	22	1	1
50	0	1	0	0	0	0	59	1	0
51	1	1	1	0	0	0	20	0	1
52	1	1	1	0	1	0	29	1	1
53	1	1	1	1	0	1	29	0	0
54	1	1	1	0	0	1	39	0	0
55	1	1	1	0	1	1	32	0	0
56	1	1	1	0	1	1	31	1	0
57	0	0	0	0	1	1	58	1	0

58	1	1	1	0	1	0	30	0	0
59	0	0	0	1	0	0	29	0	1
60	1	1	1	0	0	1	22	1	0
61	1	1	1	0	1	0	39	1	1
62	1	1	1	1	1	1	29	0	0
63	1	1	1	0	0	1	31	0	0
64	1	1	1	0	0	0	34	0	0
65	1	1	0	0	1	1	39	0	1
66	1	1	1	0	1	0	40	0	0
67	1	1	1	0	1	1	40	0	0
68	1	1	1	0	0	1	32	0	0
69	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	0	0
70	1	1	1	1	1	1	29	0	1
71	0	0	1	0	0	1	28	0	0
72	1	1	1	0	1	1	48	0	0
73	1	1	1	1	0	1	40	0	0
74	1	1	1	1	1	1	26	0	0
75	1	1	1	0	1	1	20	0	0
76	0	1	1	0	0	0	21	0	0
77	1	1	1	1	1	1	50	1	0
78	1	1	1	0	0	0	21	1	0
79	1	1	1	0	0	0	41	0	0
80	0	0	0	0	0	1	33	0	0
81	1	1	1	0	1	1	21	0	0
82	1	1	1	0	0	1	19	1	1
83	1	1	1	0	0	0	29	0	0
84	1	1	1	0	1	1	27	0	0
85	1	1	1	0	0	1	27	1	0
86	1	1	1	0	1	0	19	0	1
87	1	1	1	0	1	1	47	1	1
88	1	1	1	0	0	1	62	0	0
89	1	1	1	0	1	1	43	1	0
90	1	1	1	0	0	0	67	0	1
91	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	1	0
92	0	1	1	0	0	0	25	0	1
93	1	1	1	0	1	1	37	1	0
94	0	0	0	1	1	1	23	0	1
95	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	1	0
96	1	1	0	0	0	1	31	0	0
97	1	1	1	0	1	0	45	1	0
98	0	1	1	0	1	1	23	1	0
99	1	1	0	1	1	1	54	0	0
100	1	1	1	0	1	1	30	1	0

144	0	1	1	0	0	0	23	1	0
145	0	1	1	0	0	0	25	1	0
146	1	0	1	0	0	0	21	0	0
147	1	1	1	0	1	1	20	1	0
148	1	1	1	1	0	0	21	0	1

Participant	Q11_1	Q11_2	Q11_3	Q11_4	Q11_5	Q11_6	Q11_7
1	3	4	4	4	5	4	3
2	4	5	4	5	4	2	6
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
5	4	3	1	1	4	4	3
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
7	1	1	1	1	4	2	2
8	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
9	2	1	1	2	3	4	2
10	4	1	1	5	4	4	4
11	4	4	4	4	5	4	4
12	1	1	4	1	1	1	1
13	1	1	2	3	1	1	3
14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
15	1	1	1	4	1	1	4
16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
17	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
19	1	1	1	1	3	3	1
20	4	1	2	6	1	1	4
21	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
23	5	3	2	2	3	1	4
24	2	1	1	2	2	2	1
25	4	1	4	4	1	1	1
26	1	3	3	2	4	1	1
27	1	1	1	1	4	1	4
28	2	4	3	3	2	2	3
29	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
30	5	4	3	3	3	4	3
31	6	5	7	7	7	7	6
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
33	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
34	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
35	1	1	1	1	1	1	2

36	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
37	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
38	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
39	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
40	4	4	4	4	5	3	4
41	3	3	4	3	5	5	5
42	2	1	1	2	4	2	3
43	6	5	5	6	4	4	5
44	4	5	5	5	3	4	5
45	6	2	2	2	5	5	4
46	4	1	1	1	2	4	3
47	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
48	4	2	2	2	3	3	3
49	4	1	3	2	1	1	1
50	2	1	1	2	2	2	1
51	3	2	3	4	4	4	4
52	4	1	1	1	3	1	2
53	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
54	1	1	1	4	1	4	1
55	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
56	4	1	1	1	1	4	2
57	4	2	2	2	5	2	5
58	1	2	1	1	1	3	1
59	7	4	7	7	7	7	7
60	4	1	1	1	4	1	1
61	1	1	1	3	1	2	2
62	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
63	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
64	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
65	4	7	7	7	3	4	4
66	1	1	1	4	1	4	1
67	3	2	2	2	2	2	4
68	4	1	1	1	2	1	2
69	4	1	4	4	4	5	4
70	2	1	1	2	3	1	1
71	7	5	5	4	5	4	6
72	3	2	3	1	2	5	5
73	1	1	1	4	1	1	1
74	5	2	4	4	3	2	2
75	2	3	4	3	1	3	4
76	7	4	4	5	5	6	4
77	1	1	1	1	1	4	1
78	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
79	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

80	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
81	4	2	4	4	2	4	3
82	6	1	4	5	4	2	3
83	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
84	1	1	1	1	4	2	1
85	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
86	2	1	1	2	1	1	1
87	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
88	1	3	2	1	2	2	4
89	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
90	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
91	5	4	6	6	4	4	7
92	3	3	3	5	4	1	3
93	3	3	3	3	4	4	5
94	5	1	7	6	5	6	6
95	3	2	2	2	4	2	3
96	3	1	1	1	2	2	2
97	2	1	2	3	2	1	3
98	4	1	1	4	3	1	3
99	4	2	1	1	4	4	4
100	3	2	2	4	2	2	3
101	2	2	2	2	3	4	4
102	1	1	1	1	3	2	1
103	2	1	1	4	2	3	2
104	4	1	1	7	4	4	4
105	1	1	1	4	1	1	1
106	5	5	4	5	6	4	5
107	7	1	1	1	2	2	3
108	1	1	1	1	5	2	6
109	2	2	2	1	1	2	1
110	1	1	2	2	4	3	2
111	4	2	1	3	2	2	4
112	3	1	2	3	1	2	1
113	4	6	4	4	5	4	1
114	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
115	5	4	5	5	5	5	5
116	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
117	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
118	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
119	2	1	1	1	1	2	1
120	5	1	1	4	1	2	1
121	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
122	1	1	4	5	2	2	2
123	6	1	3	4	5	2	5

124	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
125	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
126	3	3	3	1	4	3	3
127	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
128	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
129	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
130	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
131	4	3	4	5	3	4	5
132	1	1	1	4	6	2	6
133	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
134	4	1	1	5	2	4	2
135	5	4	4	7	5	5	1
136	2	2	1	1	3	1	1
137	1	1	1	1	1	4	1
138	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
139	4	4	4	4	4	5	4
140	4	1	1	1	2	2	5
141	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
142	1	1	1	1	5	4	4
143	2	2	4	4	6	2	3
144	3	2	2	3	3	3	5
145	3	1	1	1	4	4	2
146	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
147	4	4	6	3	3	5	5
148	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Q11_9	Col Narc Brit Mean	Q20_1	Q20_2	Q20_3	Q20_4	Soc ID Brit Mean		
4	3.89	4	4	4	4	4.00		
2	4.00	6	6	7	7	6.50		
1	1.00	6	5	4	1	4.00		
7	7.00	7	7	7	7	7.00		
3	2.78	6	5	5	4	5.00		
1	1.00	5	5	5	5	5.00		
4	2.22	5	7	6	4	5.50		
4	4.00	4	4	4	4	4.00		
2	2.11	7	7	7	7	7.00		
5	3.22	7	7	7	5	6.50		
4	4.11	6	6	5	6	5.75		
1	1.33	4	4	4	4	4.00		

2	1.78	3	2	1	1	1.75		
1	1.00	1	1	1	1	1.00		
1	2.00	4	1	4	1	2.50		
1	1.00	2	2	2	2	2.00		
1	1.11	1	1	1	1	1.00		
1	1.00	2	2	3	1	2.00		
4	2.11	5	5	6	5	5.25		
1	2.33	7	6	7	6	6.50		
1	1.00	5	5	4	4	4.50		
1	1.00	5	1	2	2	2.50		
3	2.89	5	5	6	5	5.25		
1	1.44	5	3	3	5	4.00		
1	2.33	4	5	4	1	3.50		
1	1.89	5	1	4	4	3.50		
1	1.67	4	4	4	4	4.00		
3	2.78	5	5	5	5	5.00		
1	1.11	5	4	4	4	4.25		
4	3.67	5	3	4	5	4.25		
7	6.44	7	7	7	6	6.75		
1	1.00	1	5	1	1	2.00		
1	1.00	4	4	4	3	3.75		
1	1.11	6	6	6	6	6.00		
1	1.11	6	2	4	1	3.25		
4	1.67	7	7	7	7	7.00		
1	1.00	2	2	2	1	1.75		
4	4.00	4	7	1	1	3.25		
4	4.00	6	6	6	6	6.00		
3	3.89	6	6	6	6	6.00		
5	4.22	5	6	5	4	5.00		
3	2.33	6	6	6	7	6.25		
5	4.89	5	4	5	3	4.25		
5	4.56	3	3	3	4	3.25		
4	3.78	7	7	7	7	7.00		
4	2.33	5	5	5	3	4.50		
5	4.11	6	6	7	7	6.50		
2	2.56	5	5	5	4	4.75		
1	1.67	1	1	4	1	1.75		
1	1.44	4	5	5	5	4.75		
5	3.78	5	5	6	5	5.25		
1	1.78	5	5	2	1	3.25		
1	1.00	1	1	1	1	1.00		
1	1.67	7	7	7	7	7.00		
1	1.00	1	2	1	1	1.25		

4	2.44	1	1	1	1	1.00		
4	3.33	6	6	6	6	6.00		
1	1.33	4	4	7	7	5.50		
7	6.67	7	7	7	7	7.00		
1	1.67	5	3	5	3	4.00		
1	1.44	2	2	3	3	2.50		
1	1.00	1	1	1	1	1.00		
1	1.22	3	2	4	2	2.75		
4	1.78	4	4	2	2	3.00		
3	4.78	3	1	2	2	2.00		
1	1.67	3	1	3	1	2.00		
3	2.56	4	4	5	4	4.25		
1	1.56	3	3	3	1	2.50		
4	3.78	7	7	6	5	6.25		
1	1.44	6	4	5	6	5.25		
4	4.89	7	7	7	7	7.00		
4	3.22	5	6	5	5	5.25		
1	1.33	5	4	5	3	4.25		
2	2.89	5	3	3	3	3.50		
3	2.89	3	3	1	1	2.00		
3	4.56	6	6	7	7	6.50		
4	2.00	3	1	1	3	2.00		
1	1.11	1	1	2	1	1.25		
1	1.00	7	7	7	7	7.00		
1	1.00	4	4	7	1	4.00		
4	3.44	6	5	5	4	5.00		
2	3.22	5	5	6	6	5.50		
1	1.00	3	1	2	1	1.75		
2	1.67	2	3	5	2	3.00		
1	1.00	4	3	5	3	3.75		
1	1.22	4	3	4	1	3.00		
1	1.11	3	4	2	3	3.00		
4	2.33	7	6	5	5	5.75		
2	1.22	6	6	6	6	6.00		
1	1.00	2	1	1	1	1.25		
6	5.22	6	6	6	6	6.00		
4	3.22	4	6	6	6	5.50		
4	3.56	2	2	2	2	2.00		
6	5.44	7	6	7	7	6.75		
3	2.67	6	5	5	5	5.25		
2	1.78	5	5	6	4	5.00		
2	2.00	2	2	1	2	1.75		
1	2.11	3	4	4	1	3.00		

4	3.00	7	7	7	7	7.00		
2	2.44	3	3	2	3	2.75		
3	2.78	4	4	3	3	3.50		
1	1.33	4	4	4	2	3.50		
2	2.00	3	3	3	3	3.00		
3	3.22	5	5	7	6	5.75		
1	1.33	2	2	2	1	1.75		
5	4.89	7	7	7	7	7.00		
1	2.11	4	4	5	3	4.00		
1	2.11	4	4	5	2	3.75		
2	1.56	1	1	6	1	2.25		
2	2.00	6	5	5	5	5.25		
3	2.56	4	4	5	4	4.25		
1	1.67	5	5	6	6	5.50		
1	3.33	3	5	5	2	3.75		
4	1.67	4	4	5	3	4.00		
5	4.89	5	5	5	6	5.25		
1	1.00	1	1	7	1	2.50		
1	1.00	5	5	6	6	5.50		
1	1.11	3	3	2	3	2.75		
1	1.22	4	4	4	1	3.25		
1	1.89	4	2	4	2	3.00		
1	1.00	5	5	5	5	5.00		
5	2.67	1	1	2	1	1.25		
4	3.78	7	6	6	6	6.25		
2	1.33	4	4	5	2	3.75		
1	1.00	2	2	2	5	2.75		
3	2.89	5	5	4	3	4.25		
7	1.67	4	1	5	1	2.75		
4	1.44	1	1	3	1	1.50		
3	1.56	4	4	3	3	3.50		
1	1.00	1	1	4	1	1.75		
4	3.89	1	2	4	4	2.75		
4	3.22	6	6	7	6	6.25		
1	1.00	5	4	5	4	4.50		
3	2.89	2	2	3	4	2.75		
6	4.56	5	7	7	7	6.50		
1	1.44	6	5	4	4	4.75		
1	1.33	4	4	4	2	3.50		
4	1.89	6	6	7	7	6.50		
4	4.11	1	1	1	1	1.00		
3	2.44	5	5	5	3	4.50		
1	1.00	2	1	2	1	1.50		

4	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1.67	5
1	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	1.44	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.22	3
1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	4	1.78	4
4	7	7	7	3	4	4	4	3	4.78	3
1	1	1	4	1	4	1	1	1	1.67	3
3	2	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2.56	4
4	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1.56	3
4	1	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	3.78	7
2	1	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	1.44	6
7	5	5	4	5	4	6	4	4	4.89	7
3	2	3	1	2	5	5	4	4	3.22	5
1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	1.33	5
5	2	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	2.89	5
2	3	4	3	1	3	4	3	3	2.89	3
7	4	4	5	5	6	4	3	3	4.56	6
1	1	1	1	1	4	1	4	4	2.00	3
1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1.11	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	7
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	4
4	2	4	4	2	4	3	4	4	3.44	6
6	1	4	5	4	2	3	2	2	3.22	5
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	3
1	1	1	1	4	2	1	2	2	1.67	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	4
2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1.22	4
1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1.11	3
1	3	2	1	2	2	4	2	4	2.33	7
1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1.22	6
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	2
5	4	6	6	4	4	7	5	6	5.22	6
3	3	3	5	4	1	3	3	4	3.22	4
3	3	3	3	4	4	5	3	4	3.56	2
5	1	7	6	5	6	6	7	6	5.44	7
3	2	2	2	4	2	3	3	3	2.67	6
3	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1.78	5
2	1	2	3	2	1	3	2	2	2.00	2
4	1	1	4	3	1	3	1	1	2.11	3
4	2	1	1	4	4	4	3	4	3.00	7
3	2	2	4	2	2	3	2	2	2.44	3
2	2	2	2	3	4	4	3	3	2.78	4
1	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	1	1.33	4

2	1	1	4	2	3	2	1	2	2.00	3
4	1	1	7	4	4	4	1	3	3.22	5
1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	1.33	2
5	5	4	5	6	4	5	5	5	4.89	7
7	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2.11	4
1	1	1	1	5	2	6	1	1	2.11	4
2	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1.56	1
1	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	2	2.00	6
4	2	1	3	2	2	4	2	3	2.56	4
3	1	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	1.67	5
4	6	4	4	5	4	1	1	1	3.33	3
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	1.67	4
5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.89	5
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	5
1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1.11	3
2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1.22	4
5	1	1	4	1	2	1	1	1	1.89	4
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	5
1	1	4	5	2	2	2	2	5	2.67	1
6	1	3	4	5	2	5	4	4	3.78	7
1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1.33	4
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	2
3	3	3	1	4	3	3	3	3	2.89	5
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	1.67	4
1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	4	1.44	1
1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	3	1.56	4
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1
4	3	4	5	3	4	5	3	4	3.89	1
1	1	1	4	6	2	6	4	4	3.22	6
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	5
4	1	1	5	2	4	2	4	3	2.89	2
5	4	4	7	5	5	1	4	6	4.56	5
2	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1.44	6
1	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1.33	4
1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	4	1.89	6
4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4.11	1
4	1	1	1	2	2	5	3	3	2.44	5
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	2
1	1	1	1	5	4	4	2	1	2.22	7
2	2	4	4	6	2	3	4	5	3.56	7
3	2	2	3	3	3	5	3	5	3.22	5
3	1	1	1	4	4	2	1	1	2.00	4

1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	3
4	4	6	3	3	5	5	4	3	4.11	4
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1.11	5

Appendix 3: European Attitudes Survey

Participant	How old are you?	Gender	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - I identify with Europe.	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - I feel committed to Europe.	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - I'm glad to be European .	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - Being European is an important part of how I see myself.	Soc ID Euro Mean	2016 Vote
1	21	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
2	21	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
3	19	0	6	6	6	4	5.50	1
4	24	1	4	4	6	4	4.50	1
5	29	0	5	6	3	2	4.00	1
6	64	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
8	62	0	5	5	6	5	5.25	1
9	40	1	7	7	7	6	6.75	1
11	64	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
12	66	0	7	6	7	7	6.75	1
13	57	1	6	6	6	5	5.75	1
14	33	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
15	60	0	6	5	5	5	5.25	1
16	24	0	7	6	7	5	6.25	1
19	34	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
20	31	1	7	7	7	5	6.50	1
21	33	1	4	4	5	3	4.00	1

22	50	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
24	40	1	6	5	6	6	5.75	1
25	22	1	2	4	3	2	2.75	1
26	26	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
27	27	1	1	1	2	2	1.50	1
28	71	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
30	38	1	5	6	7	5	5.75	1
31	29	0	4	2	3	3	3.00	1
32	26	1	5	5	6	5	5.25	1
33	20	1	2	1	1	2	1.50	1
34	22	0	6	6	6	6	6.00	1
35	63	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
36	21	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
37	37	1	3	2	5	3	3.25	1
38	28	1	6	6	7	6	6.25	1
39	30	1	5	5	5	4	4.75	1
40	32	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
41	30	1	6	6	6	6	6.00	1
42	30	1	5	5	6	5	5.25	1
43	38	1	3	2	2	2	2.25	1
44	21	1	2	1	3	7	3.25	1
45	23	1	4	7	7	4	5.50	1
46	26	0	4	4	4	4	4.00	1
47	18	0	4	4	4	4	4.00	1
48	20	1	5	4	5	4	4.50	1
50	24	1	4	4	7	3	4.50	1
51	39	1	5	5	5	4	4.75	1
52	47	1	6	5	4	5	5.00	1
53	32	1	7	7	5	6	6.25	1
54	32	1	6	6	6	6	6.00	1
55	20	0	6	5	5	6	5.50	1
56	31	0	6	7	7	7	6.75	1
57	39	1	4	5	4	4	4.25	1
58	36	0	5	6	6	6	5.75	1
59	29	0	4	4	3	4	3.75	1
61	33	1	5	6	7	5	5.75	1
62	47	0	2	2	1	1	1.50	1
63	32	1	6	5	7	7	6.25	1
64	25	0	5	4	4	3	4.00	1
66	21	1	4	3	2	4	3.25	1
67	20	1	5	4	4	4	4.25	1
68	53	1	5	7	7	5	6.00	1
69	27	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1

71	58	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
73	21	1	6	5	6	4	5.25	1
74	19	1	2	2	2	4	2.50	1
75	20	1	6	6	6	6	6.00	1
76	22	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
77	45	0	2	2	1	1	1.50	1
79	35	1	6	7	7	6	6.50	1
83	22	0	6	6	6	6	6.00	1
85	23	1	4	5	6	4	4.75	1
86	42	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
87	21	1	7	4	2	2	3.75	1
88	21	1	4	3	4	1	3.00	1
90	34	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
91	27	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
92	25	0	4	4	4	4	4.00	1
95	39	0	7	7	7	4	6.25	1
96	37	0	6	5	6	6	5.75	1
99	25	0	6	6	6	6	6.00	1
100	30	1	6	5	7	4	5.50	1
101	26	0	6	6	6	5	5.75	1
103	25	0	7	5	7	5	6.00	1
104	34	1	6	6	7	6	6.25	1
105	30	0	7	6	6	6	6.25	1
108	24	0	6	7	6	6	6.25	1
109	26	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
110	32	0	5	5	6	3	4.75	1
111	41	0	6	6	7	5	6.00	1
112	40	0	2	2	1	4	2.25	1
113	29	0	6	6	5	5	5.50	1
114	29	0	5	5	7	6	5.75	1
115	56	0	2	2	2	2	2.00	1
119	39	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
122	21	1	3	3	2	2	2.50	1
129	25	1	2	3	2	3	2.50	1
132	21	1	5	5	5	5	5.00	1
140	21	1	2	2	2	2	2.00	1
141	32	1	6	5	6	4	5.25	1
143	21	1	3	1	3	1	2.00	1
146	21	1	5	5	5	4	4.75	1
147	37	1	4	4	4	4	4.00	1
148	21	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
150	42	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1
151	32	1	4	4	4	2	3.50	1

152	19	0	6	4	4	4	4.50	1
154	23	0	6	6	7	5	6.00	1
155	25	0	6	4	7	4	5.25	1

Participant	How old are you?	Gender	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - I identify with Europe.	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - I feel committed to Europe.	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - I'm glad to be European.	Please think about Europe while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree - Being European is an important part of how I see myself.	Soc ID Euro Mean	2016 Vote	2019 2nd R
1	21	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
2	21	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
3	19	0	6	6	6	4	5.50	1	1
4	24	1	4	4	6	4	4.50	1	1
5	29	0	5	6	3	2	4.00	1	1
6	64	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
8	62	0	5	5	6	5	5.25	1	1
9	40	1	7	7	7	6	6.75	1	1
11	64	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
12	66	0	7	6	7	7	6.75	1	1
13	57	1	6	6	6	5	5.75	1	1
14	33	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
15	60	0	6	5	5	5	5.25	1	1
16	24	0	7	6	7	5	6.25	1	1
19	34	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
20	31	1	7	7	7	5	6.50	1	1
21	33	1	4	4	5	3	4.00	1	1
22	50	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1

24	40	1	6	5	6	6	5.75	1	1
25	22	1	2	4	3	2	2.75	1	1
26	26	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
27	27	1	1	1	2	2	1.50	1	1
28	71	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
30	38	1	5	6	7	5	5.75	1	1
31	29	0	4	2	3	3	3.00	1	1
32	26	1	5	5	6	5	5.25	1	1
33	20	1	2	1	1	2	1.50	1	1
34	22	0	6	6	6	6	6.00	1	1
35	63	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
36	21	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
37	37	1	3	2	5	3	3.25	1	1
38	28	1	6	6	7	6	6.25	1	1
39	30	1	5	5	5	4	4.75	1	1
40	32	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
41	30	1	6	6	6	6	6.00	1	1
42	30	1	5	5	6	5	5.25	1	1
43	38	1	3	2	2	2	2.25	1	1
44	21	1	2	1	3	7	3.25	1	1
45	23	1	4	7	7	4	5.50	1	1
46	26	0	4	4	4	4	4.00	1	1
47	18	0	4	4	4	4	4.00	1	1
48	20	1	5	4	5	4	4.50	1	1
50	24	1	4	4	7	3	4.50	1	1
51	39	1	5	5	5	4	4.75	1	1
52	47	1	6	5	4	5	5.00	1	1
53	32	1	7	7	5	6	6.25	1	1
54	32	1	6	6	6	6	6.00	1	1
55	20	0	6	5	5	6	5.50	1	1
56	31	0	6	7	7	7	6.75	1	1
57	39	1	4	5	4	4	4.25	1	1
58	36	0	5	6	6	6	5.75	1	1
59	29	0	4	4	3	4	3.75	1	1
61	33	1	5	6	7	5	5.75	1	1
62	47	0	2	2	1	1	1.50	1	0
63	32	1	6	5	7	7	6.25	1	1
64	25	0	5	4	4	3	4.00	1	1
66	21	1	4	3	2	4	3.25	1	1
67	20	1	5	4	4	4	4.25	1	1
68	53	1	5	7	7	5	6.00	1	1
69	27	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
71	58	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1

73	21	1	6	5	6	4	5.25	1	1
74	19	1	2	2	2	4	2.50	1	1
75	20	1	6	6	6	6	6.00	1	1
76	22	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
77	45	0	2	2	1	1	1.50	1	0
79	35	1	6	7	7	6	6.50	1	1
83	22	0	6	6	6	6	6.00	1	1
85	23	1	4	5	6	4	4.75	1	1
86	42	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
87	21	1	7	4	2	2	3.75	1	1
88	21	1	4	3	4	1	3.00	1	1
90	34	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
91	27	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
92	25	0	4	4	4	4	4.00	1	0
95	39	0	7	7	7	4	6.25	1	1
96	37	0	6	5	6	6	5.75	1	1
99	25	0	6	6	6	6	6.00	1	1
100	30	1	6	5	7	4	5.50	1	1
101	26	0	6	6	6	5	5.75	1	1
103	25	0	7	5	7	5	6.00	1	1
104	34	1	6	6	7	6	6.25	1	1
105	30	0	7	6	6	6	6.25	1	1
108	24	0	6	7	6	6	6.25	1	1
109	26	0	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
110	32	0	5	5	6	3	4.75	1	1
111	41	0	6	6	7	5	6.00	1	1
112	40	0	2	2	1	4	2.25	1	1
113	29	0	6	6	5	5	5.50	1	1
114	29	0	5	5	7	6	5.75	1	1
115	56	0	2	2	2	2	2.00	1	1
119	39	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
122	21	1	3	3	2	2	2.50	1	0
129	25	1	2	3	2	3	2.50	1	0
132	21	1	5	5	5	5	5.00	1	1
140	21	1	2	2	2	2	2.00	1	0
141	32	1	6	5	6	4	5.25	1	1
143	21	1	3	1	3	1	2.00	1	0
146	21	1	5	5	5	4	4.75	1	1
147	37	1	4	4	4	4	4.00	1	1
148	21	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
150	42	1	7	7	7	7	7.00	1	1
151	32	1	4	4	4	2	3.50	1	1
152	19	0	6	4	4	4	4.50	1	1

154	23	0	6	6	7	5	6.00	1	1
155	25	0	6	4	7	4	5.25	1	1

2019 2nd Ref	GE2019	Region	Reg Mob	Please think about European people while respondi ng to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - I wish other people would more quickly recognise the authority of European people.	Please think about European people while respondi ng to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - European people deserve special treatmen t.	Please think about European people while respondin g to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - I will never be satisfied until European people get the recognitio n they deserve.	Please think about European people while respondi ng to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - I insist upon European people getting the respect that is due to them.	Please think about European people while respondi ng to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - It really makes me angry when others criticise European people.
1	1	1	0	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	0	0	5	4	3	4	5
1	1	0	0	4	3	4	5	5
1	1	0	0	4	3	3	4	3
1	1	0	0	2	1	1	2	5
1	0	0	1	1	7	1	1	1
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
1	1	0	1	1	1	7	7	7
1	1	0	1	6	4	4	7	4
1	1	0	0	4	4	3	5	5
1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	7
1	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	1	1	2	1	4	4	5

1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	5
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	1	4	4	5	5	6
1	1	0	0	4	2	2	5	5
1	1	0	0	4	1	2	2	5
1	1	0	0	4	3	4	7	6
1	1	0	0	4	1	4	4	4
1	1	0	0	4	4	6	6	4
1	1	0	0	5	3	5	3	6
1	1	0	1	3	4	4	5	5
1	1	1	1	3	2	4	5	4
1	1	0	0	4	2	5	6	4
1	1	0	1	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	0	0	5	5	7	7	7
1	0	0	0	7	7	7	7	7
1	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	1
1	1	0	1	4	2	1	2	1
1	1	0	1	4	4	5	5	5
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	7
1	1	0	0	1	1	4	5	5
1	1	0	1	4	2	4	5	4
1	1	0	0	1	1	2	4	5
1	1	0	0	4	1	4	4	4
1	1	0	1	4	1	4	4	5
1	1	1	0	4	4	3	3	5
1	1	0	0	6	4	6	6	6
1	1	0	0	2	1	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	1	0	7	2	2	5	3
1	1	0	1	6	5	4	4	2
1	1	1	0	4	1	2	1	1
1	1	1	0	4	4	6	6	6
1	1	0	0	5	4	5	5	6
1	1	1	0	4	2	6	6	6
1	1	0	1	2	3	3	3	3
1	1	1	0	4	3	6	4	2
1	1	0	0	3	1	3	3	2
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	2
0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	3
1	1	1	0	4	1	2	5	3
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1

1	0	1	0	4	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	4	1	7	7	7
1	1	1	1	5	3	3	3	7
1	1	0	1	4	4	7	7	7
1	1	0	1	6	1	1	5	2
1	0	0	1	2	2	1	2	2
1	1	0	0	6	2	3	5	5
1	1	0	1	7	4	4	7	7
0	0	1	0	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	0	0	4	3	3	4	2
1	1	0	1	2	2	2	4	4
1	1	0	0	5	3	3	5	4
1	1	0	1	4	2	4	4	5
1	1	0	0	5	5	5	5	5
1	1	0	0	2	2	2	2	4
1	1	0	1	4	4	4	4	7
1	1	0	0	4	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	4
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
1	1	0	1	4	4	4	6	3
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	0	4	3	4	4	5
1	1	1	0	4	4	4	4	7
1	1	0	1	4	3	4	6	5
1	1	0	1	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	5	5	5	5	6
1	1	0	0	4	3	2	2	2
1	1	0	1	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	0	1	1	4	5	5
1	1	0	1	6	4	2	2	2
1	1	0	1	4	2	2	3	2
1	1	1	0	6	6	6	6	5
1	1	1	0	4	4	5	5	5
1	1	0	0	4	4	4	4	5
0	1	0	1	1	4	3	1	3
0	0	0	1	2	2	1	2	3
1	1	1	1	6	4	6	6	6
0	1	0	1	1	1	3	3	3
1	1	0	0	3	1	1	4	7
0	0	0	0	2	3	3	4	2
1	1	0	0	5	1	3	3	3
1	1	0	0	4	3	4	4	5

1	1	0	0	7	7	7	7	7
1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	0	0	4	4	4	4	3
1	1	0	0	4	4	4	4	4
1	1	0	0	4	4	4	5	5
1	1	1	0	5	4	5	3	4

Please think about European people while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - If European people had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.	Please think about European people while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - I get upset when people do not notice the achievements of European people.	Please think about European people while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of European people.	Please think about European people while responding to the items of the scale. 1 = Totally Disagree to 7 = Totally Agree - The true worth of European people is often misunderstood.	Col Narc Euro Mean	Class	Race		
4	4	4	4	4.00	1	0		
3	2	4	4	3.78	0	0		
4	4	4	4	4.11	1	1		
4	4	4	4	3.67	0	0		
4	3	2	4	2.67	0	1		
1	1	1	1	1.67	1	0		
2	2	1	4	1.56	1	0		
1	1	1	1	1.11	1	0		

4	7	7	7	5.33	1	0		
5	6	6	5	5.22	1	0		
4	5	4	4	4.22	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.33	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.00	0	0		
4	5	3	3	3.44	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.00	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.11	1	0		
1	1	1	1	1.00	0	0		
5	5	6	4	4.89	1	0		
2	2	2	2	2.89	0	0		
2	2	2	4	2.67	0	1		
6	4	5	4	4.78	0	0		
5	5	5	5	4.11	0	1		
4	4	4	4	4.44	1	0		
5	5	5	5	4.67	0	0		
5	5	5	4	4.44	0	0		
4	3	2	3	3.33	1	1		
4	4	4	4	4.11	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.00	0	0		
7	7	7	7	6.56	0	0		
7	7	7	7	7.00	0	0		
2	2	3	2	1.78	1	0		
1	1	1	1	1.56	1	0		
5	5	5	4	4.67	0	0		
1	2	2	2	2.11	1	0		
2	2	1	3	2.67	1	0		
3	4	3	2	3.44	1	0		
2	7	7	7	4.00	0	1		
4	4	4	4	3.67	0	1		
2	5	7	6	4.22	1	0		
5	5	5	5	4.33	0	0		
4	6	6	6	5.56	0	1		
3	3	4	3	2.44	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.00	1	0		
4	4	5	5	4.11	1	1		
4	4	3	4	4.00	0	1		
1	1	1	1	1.44	0	0		
6	6	6	6	5.56	0	1		
4	4	5	6	4.89	0	1		
3	6	4	4	4.56	0	0		
4	3	3	3	3.00	1	0		
3	6	5	3	4.00	1	0		

3	3	4	4	2.89	0	0		
2	2	1	1	1.33	1	0		
2	2	2	2	2.11	0	0		
5	3	3	2	3.11	0	0		
1	1	1	1	1.00	0	0		
1	1	1	1	1.00	0	0		
1	1	1	1	1.44	1	0		
6	6	6	4	5.33	1	0		
4	4	3	3	3.89	1	0		
7	7	7	7	6.33	1	0		
3	1	2	2	2.56	0	1		
5	5	5	5	3.22	0	1		
5	5	5	5	4.56	0	1		
4	4	5	6	5.33	1	0		
2	2	2	2	2.00	1	1		
5	2	5	3	3.44	1	0		
4	4	4	4	3.33	0	0		
5	4	3	4	4.00	0	0		
5	6	6	6	4.67	1	1		
5	5	6	5	5.11	0	0		
3	2	2	2	2.33	0	0		
4	4	4	4	4.33	0	0		
4	4	4	4	2.67	1	0		
1	1	1	1	1.00	0	1		
4	1	1	1	1.67	1	0		
6	4	3	4	2.78	1	0		
6	6	6	6	5.00	1	0		
2	1	1	1	1.11	0	0		
4	4	4	4	4.00	0	0		
5	4	4	4	4.44	1	0		
4	4	4	4	4.22	0	0		
5	2	2	2	2.33	0	0		
6	5	5	6	5.33	1	1		
3	2	2	2	2.44	0	0		
2	2	2	2	2.00	1	0		
5	4	4	4	3.67	1	0		
5	4	5	5	3.89	0	0		
4	3	3	3	2.89	0	0		
7	7	7	7	6.33	1	0		
4	5	5	6	4.78	0	0		
4	4	5	5	4.33	0	0		
1	1	2	3	2.11	0	1		
1	3	2	1	1.89	0	1		

6	6	6	6	5.78	0	1		
1	2	2	2	2.00	0	1		
4	1	1	1	2.56	0	0		
1	1	1	2	2.11	0	1		
2	4	4	4	3.22	0	0		
4	4	4	4	4.00	0	0		
7	7	7	7	7.00	0	1		
4	4	4	4	4.00	1	0		
4	2	5	4	3.78	0	1		
4	4	4	4	4.00	1	1		
4	5	5	4	4.44	1	0		
3	4	2	3	3.67	0	0		

Legend for European Attitudes Survey

Descriptive Statistic	0 Code	1 Code
Region	Leave Region	Remain Region
Regional Mobility	Same Region as Birth	New Region to Birth
Class	Working Class	Middle Class
Gender	Male	Female
Race	White	Non-white
2016 Referendum	Leave	Remain
2019 Referendum Preference	Leave	Remain
2019 Party	Pro-Leave Party	Pro-Second Referendum Party

Appendix 4: Focus Group Transcripts

1 Focus Group Transcript ONE

2

3 Thursday 31st October 2019

4 (P1) Leave supporter, Over 55, White British, Female

5 (P2) Leave supporter, Over 55, White British, Male

6 (P3) Leave supporter, 45-54, White British, Male

7 (P4) Leave supporter, 25-34, White British, Male

8 (P5) Leave supporter, 35-44, White British, Male

9 (P6) Leave supporter, 45-54, White British, Female

10 (P7) Leave supporter, Over 55, White British, Male

11 (P8) Leave supporter, Over 55, White British, Female

12 How do you feel Brexit will impact your close friends and immediate family?

13 • What I've found amongst my friends, is that if you're going to chastise me because I
14 think differently to you, then you're not my friend, full stop. I respect everybody's right
15 to their vote. No matter what they use it for. If they're well-informed, and they use that
16 information to vote, that's fine by me. If they vote just on a gut feeling. That is just as
17 valid as anybody else's vote. And, what's really affected people, is that Remainers have
18 been saying terrible things about uneducated people. "People didn't know what they
19 were voting for." I think that has triggered something in the people, that they're not

20 being respected. They might be a factory worker who hasn't had a good education like
21 me. They left school at fifteen and maybe had to wait until they were older to have
22 enough money to be educated. No matter the person's social or economic status in the
23 country, their vote is just as valid as anybody else's vote. The other thing that I've found
24 to be a good thing, is that amongst young people I found a lot of them are not really
25 interested in politics. At sixteen and seventeen, I thought love and flower power was
26 going to cure the world. I was young and stupid, and I loved it. I enjoyed it. But,
27 gratefully, my parents allowed me to grow up and not put all this politics and the
28 ecosystem, and everything, on my shoulders. They're too young. I've also found that
29 they're very naïve about what Brexit is. I've even had two who are at university and I've
30 said to them, "what do you think about Brexit?" They're at London universities, and
31 they've both said to me, "what's Brexit?". Also, it's given us a little bit of opportunity to
32 educate them about our history which I found lacking in many young people. Of
33 knowing English history. My neice asked me a few weeks ago, what's a suffragette.
34 Which I find abominable. That a young girl in England, a free country, doesn't know
35 some of our history. How people fought to get that vote. They are teaching them all
36 about Europe. What the EU gives them. Some of them seem to think that the National
37 Health Service was given to us by the EU. I find this lack of knowing their British history

38 takes their national identity away from them. (P1)

39 • There's always been divisions between friends and family on a political basis anyway in
40 the country. I'm not ashamed to say I've got friends who do vote Labour. I don't like
41 them very much. But it doesn't affect the way I interact with them, how we work
42 together, and things of that nature. But, I think the vitriol that's come about with regard
43 to Brexit has become a greater, stronger and wider divide. It's become particularly
44 nasty. A lot of people are putting out blatantly untrue things on both sides. And, I think
45 social media especially. This is the first real social media event in political terms; it's
46 been used a weapon in a lot of cases. But, on personal relationships, I don't think it will
47 have a huge impact. (P2)

48 • I think the idea behind some of the people who wanted to kill Brexit was to draw it out
49 for as long as possible. Hope that people get bored of it, which to a certain extent they
50 have, and then they could probably do what they want with it. Basically, override it, kill
51 it, whatever they want. That was part of the idea, but I don't think they factored in that
52 people have gotten a lot more polarised. Because of gradually putting it off, and off, and
53 off, people have gotten really annoyed and angry. It has created divisions. I've lost quite
54 a good friend because of it. I tried really hard not to talk about Brexit, but he always
55 wanted to talk about Brexit. He's a big Remainer, so it has caused some divisions. In

56 other ways, I take (P6)'s point, people have gotten together and formed alliances which
57 they wouldn't have done otherwise. So, that's definitely true. So, in terms of impacting
58 friends and family, it certainly has done, but that's largely because of this policy to draw
59 it out for as long as possible, hope it goes away or we can just squash it; and, it's had the
60 opposite effect at times. (P3)

61 • The further time passes from World War 2 this stuff (British history education) just gets
62 phased out. People who died for freedom and democracy. (P4)

63 • With friends and family, as well, not all of your family agree with you and not all of your
64 friends will agree with you. I really love this country because we have got free speech.

65 And, whether it's your friends or your family, everyone has their right to a view. This
66 discourse has been about how it's going to divide you. Friends and family, it's going to
67 divide. No-one has looked into how it unites friends and family. Or, brings people
68 together. For instance, me and (P3) is my partner now. We met through Brexit, and you
69 don't hear these good news stories. So, as far as friends and families, and how it will
70 affect them, I think that's up to them to say. Not you (as a participant) says would be
71 their view... People have said to me, what about worker's rights. The environment? We
72 did the equal pay act. Long before the EU. Thank you very much. But, they don't know
73 that. (P6)

74 • There will be problems in the generations. About the somewheres and anywheres.
75 Some of the younger generation will fit in with the anywhere category. There are some
76 people in our own family, probably my daughter, feels totally the opposite from me.
77 And it's a bit strained. My daughter has got a Belgian boyfriend. Our grandchild has got
78 a Belgian father. There are issues there that will put a strain on the relationship because
79 they're looking at me and saying, "you're causing us problems here". But the issue is
80 bigger than that... We're the only country in Europe, you look at the health and safety
81 standards compared to ours. (P7)

82 • I think because of how long it's been going on; it's probably drawn in a lot of youngsters
83 who were never interested in politics before. So, that's probably a good thing. I'm not
84 sure I'm for voting at sixteen, but to see that twenty-year olds are looking at it and being
85 interested, I think that's a good thing. (P8)

86 What does British identity mean to you?

87 • I was brought up, every day at school, saying the Lord's Prayer. Because we were a
88 Christian country, we still are, and we stood up and sang God Save the Queen. I love the
89 fact that we've got England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. We're together. But,
90 when you go to Scotland and Wales, they've got their own culture their own dress.
91 That's what we want to see. If you go somewhere like the Edinburgh Tattoo, I love the

92 fact that we've got the best soldiers in the world. They go all over the world; defend us,
93 teach other countries all over the world how to defend themselves and I can't describe
94 the feeling when I go to London and see all the pomp and the ceremony. My Queen;
95 give me her any day than a President. (P1)

96 • I'm proud to be British, I always have been. I don't think we get enough coverage of our
97 achievements, enough credit for our achievements. I think there are many of them and
98 they are very good. I think we have been fair; we've been a force for good in the world.
99 We don't get the thanks for it. I'd much rather be an independent British person rather
100 than swallowed up into a European mass with no identity whatsoever... The Labour
101 Party decided to create this nanny state where you become almost ashamed of having
102 pride in your country. It's wrong to be in a situation where you can't be proud of what
103 this country has achieved. We've done our share of bad things right the way through,
104 but we've also done a lot of good. For the size of the country, and the size of the
105 population we've punched well above our weight all through history. And, now we've
106 got to apologise for that? And, it's all a case of let's keep diluting your national identity
107 because then we can just assimilate you. We can just bring you all in under one banner
108 and call you all European. I'm not European. I've never been European and I'm not
109 European. I'm British. I'm happy with being British. Europe might be a nice lovely place

110 to visit, but it's not somewhere I want to be. (P2)

111 • For me, being British is having the qualities of being fair, tolerant, democratic, outward
112 looking. It means being proud of our history and being proud of our role in the future
113 world as well. And, I don't feel that is as being part of some wooly conglomerate,
114 European set of nations, empire, federated states, or whatever they want to call it. I'm
115 proud of this country, and I want it to remain a country, rather than being swallowed up
116 into a set of regions within the EU... It's like we're constantly searching for something to
117 beat ourselves up about. Look at Kipling, he said something a little bit racist a hundred
118 years ago, or whenever it was, that was a hundred years ago, you can't apply modernday
119 standards to it... Furthermore, don't call me a little Englander just because I happen
120 to believe in this country and its history and everything that's associated with that.
121 Because most of it is good, and yeah we've done a few bad things but we've done a lot
122 of good, as well. It's the idea I can't be proud of this country without suddenly being a
123 little Englander, wanting to live in the past, that really grates with me. (P3)

124 • It's quite funny. I've got a friend from Florida. He's a Jewish Republican, but he's a big
125 democrat. He believes in democracy. And, he's gay as well. He's a gay, Jewish youth who
126 believes in conservatism. He came here for further education, he basically toured the
127 country, and he was shocked. He said, "I thought you British were more like us
128 Americans. You're so European." I said, "do not offend me by calling me European, I am

129 not European. Ever.” I said, “how do you mean?” “You don’t realise that you’ve drifted
130 more to the “left us”. Your taxation is very high. You’re more reliant on the state than
131 we are, you’re less free than we are. You can’t say what we can day. You’ve got hate
132 speech; we don’t have that.” You look back and see how this has gone on even in my
133 lifetime, I’m early thirties. And it’s quite scary. For me, being British is apologizing a lot,
134 it means we have a Queen. We’ve got the best comedy in the world. We’ve got James
135 Bond. We’ve got the best language. We are the world’s universal language. I’m sure
136 eventually Europeans will claim they invented English. What do you speak? “We speak
137 European.” “No, you speak English.” You almost feel robbed. It’s like you can be a
138 patriot if you’re English. The Americans are proud to be American. Whereas we can be
139 that. Something else, and I’ve said this time and time again, my friend said the same
140 thing. He said, “in America, you see someone doing well, you pat them on the back. You
141 encourage them. They’re living the American dream.” In this country, you see someone
142 doing well, they’ve got a nice car, good-looking partner, you go and key their car. We’ve
143 turned into a bitter, twisted, envious country. If someone’s doing better than you,
144 nobody wants to work anymore, everything is the state’s fault. We’ve turned into a
145 complete blame culture. And, I do blame this on the “left” on socialism, everyone’s
146 owed a living, and that’s not what being British is about. If that’s what being European

147 is, stick it where the sun doesn't shine; I'm off to America. I want no part of that... The
148 Britishness has almost been sucked out of us. (P4)

149 • Monarchy. Military, as an ex-military person. Monarchy is probably how I identify as
150 being British. We are, as a country, a separate entity. As such, I'm British I'm not
151 European. The UK is not next door to Belgium or France or Germany. We are a complete
152 separate island. We have our own completely separate identity and that is saying I'm
153 British, I'm not European. (P5)

154 • Last night we were watching the Apprentice, they're not sixteen and seventeen-year
155 olds on the Apprentice, they aspire to be businesspeople and own their own businesses.
156 Between them, they couldn't decide when the Second World War was. They've got no
157 idea, and they were trying to work it going back. And, I thought, where's their sense of
158 history. I mean, maybe the First World War might be a bit... but that (WW2) shouldn't
159 be hazy. That just illustrates it. When we went to Brussels, the school kids were there,
160 and they were buzzing them in. That's indoctrination. That's what it was. Propaganda...

161 It's almost like we're grieving, not like Little Englanders as we're called, but for that
162 sense of fairness. We did have lots of immigration and we did have lots of integration.
163 That's fine. As British that's what we do, we are fair. But, I think our society has become
164 unfair to lots and lots of people. With an identity of Britishness, I want to go to Spain, I

165 want to go to Germany, I want to go to France, to Austria, I don't want to go into
166 something all meshed up in a melting pot. A nothingness. As Sweden is finding out to a
167 cost, at the moment. Sweden is on her knees. We need to retain that... In America, it
168 doesn't matter who you are. A Mexican immigrant. But, you're all under one flag and
169 that's it. You pay your allegiance to that. I quite like that about Britain. We used to do
170 that quite a lot. It's like, "we're here, whatever, but we don't have to abide by your rules
171 or your laws," and that's what's gone wrong. We've broken the contract with the people
172 who rule us. We must get that Britishness back, and it's not about colonialism. We're
173 almost made to feel ashamed of our history. Every country in the world, I'll guarantee
174 you that you go back in their history, they would all have done some appalling things,
175 but they will all have done, in their march to freedom, some wonderful things. This thing
176 of taking statues down at Oxford University, and things like this, just because the person
177 was involved in some trade years ago, and all this business; it's got to stop. (P6)

178 • I heard the same as (P4) in 1965, if you get on in America they back you up, and if you
179 get on in Britain, they try to bring you down. So, I don't know if that has changed so
180 much over the years, but that culture has developed. Since the end of the second World
181 War there has been culture that has brought us down. (P4) mentioned comedy, you
182 can't do it anymore without being done for hate crime. It's very bland and boring. We

183 were always entrepreneurs and inventors and we could get up and say or do anything.

184 Now, we're sort of tied... (Statues) should be there for people to look at and learn from,

185 not white-washed out of it and airbrushed. (P7)

186 What does European identity mean to you?

187 • I don't identify as a European. I love Europe. I love their culture, their history, but I love

188 my own (history and culture) the best... I don't identify with it (Europe) at all, apart from

189 going on holiday. (P1)

190 • European identity doesn't mean a thing to me because I am not European. They can do

191 whatever they like. My grandmother lost two of her brothers in the First World War in

192 France. So, I grew up, from an early age, with a really healthy disregard for the French.

193 And, pretty much the same for the Germans. That had modified over the years. Great

194 Britain is something special to me. I am not part of that European land block, I don't live

195 there. I go there occasionally, but that's as far as I want to be. I don't want to be living

196 cheek by jowl with their rules when we've got our own that work perfectly well for us.

197 (P2)

198 • The European Union came up with identity because they want to be a sovereign

199 European state... I personally have no issue if people in this country see themselves as

200 European. That's fine. I would personally say, maybe you should go to the continent of

- 201 Europe where you would be happiest. You'll probably feel more European over there.
- 202 Don't try to convert me because I don't feel European. (P3)
- 203 • It means as much to me as an Asian or Pakistani identity. I can't relate to it because I'm
- 204 not a European. I'm British, I'm English and I'm from the Black Country. That's it, in that
- 205 order. (P4)
- 206 • Who first coined a European identity? Who came up with that one? Do you like your
- 207 European identity? If you ask the French, they'll say they're French. Germans will say
- 208 they're German. Maybe it's just the Belgians that say their European. (P6)
- 209 • I don't think I've ever met a European. I've never addressed anyone or thought of
- 210 anyone as a European. He's Belgian, he's French, he's German, he's Italian. Today, if I
- 211 look at someone on the television, they speak with a French or German accent; they
- 212 don't speak with a European accent. To me, there's no such thing as a European. (P7)
- 213 Focus Group Transcript TWO
- 214
- 215 Monday 4th November 2019
- 216
- 217 (P1) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, British Asian (Pakistani), Male
- 218 (P2) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, British Mixed Race (White and Indian), Female
- 219 (P3) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, Black (Somali) British, Female
- 220 (P4) Leave supporter, Age 35-44, Black (African) British, Male

221 (P5) Remain supporter, Age 35-44, White (American) Expatriate, Male

222 How do you feel Brexit will impact your close friends and immediate family?

223 • I'm from an ethnic minority family, and I've got my brother-in-law in Pakistan. If the UK
224 was to go ahead and leave, the chances of my brother-in-law coming to the UK would
225 be very slim. Especially my friends as well, because I'm from an ethnic background, most
226 of my friends are from ethnic backgrounds and it would affect their chances of getting
227 jobs and cost-of-living... I feel like there is less interaction between people of different
228 ethnic backgrounds. (P1)

229 • With regards to family, it wouldn't have a direct impact unless we were planning to go
230 on holiday. But, I know with some friends I have, it would impact their lifestyle. Because
231 they do travel back to see their family. I know that some of my friends have had to apply
232 for certain passports to travel back and forth without any issues... I have friends from
233 Latvia, Russia and Holland. They often go back around Christmas time, to see
234 grandparents and stuff. I know it's a lot easier for them to go back, than for their
235 grandparents to come over. So, it will be harder for them to go back and see family. (P2)

236 • It's quite hard in terms of travel, because a lot of people do go back and forth to France
237 and other European countries, so I understand it will impact travel and seeing your
238 family, especially if your family are not all based just here... Personally, I'm not up to

239 date with the impact that Brexit will have, in terms of my family, my friends and myself.

240 I just know that in terms of travel, it would limit our travel to places outside of the EU. In

241 terms of personal stuff, I'm not quite sure. (P3)

242 • As someone who was born in Uganda and has always been looked at as an external

243 aspect, even though I'm British right now, my children were born here, and I do take on

244 board the value of a British passport might be deleted by not being part of the EU. But

245 that is only hypothetical in my point of view. I don't think that is actually going to

246 materialize because no-one leaves the British social welfare system to go and live in

247 another country unless you have a reason to be in another country. You see pensioners

248 taking all of their hard-earned money to Spain just to live in the sun. You see British

249 people going to visit Greece and all of these other countries. None of those economies is

250 going to block the British from going. I don't think that that is going to materialize, it's

251 not going to happen. What might affect my immediate family is the sense of identity.

252 They will probably cease to identify themselves and Europeans, but as British, and I

253 don't think there's anything wrong with that. You must remember, as well, being an

254 African, they have a pan-African identity, a British identity... while a European identity

255 would be an added advantage, from a practical point of view, I don't think that they are

256 going to lose that. Britain will always be part of Europe. The things to do with security

257 can always be taken care of, in terms of NATO, so I don't see a significant impact on
258 their lives in that respect. I don't think their lives are going to change. The NHS is going
259 to remain here, it's not going to go anywhere. But the thing is, until we actually leave all
260 of these are hypotheticals... Not every country in Europe has the equivalent of the NHS,
261 so the protection of the NHS has nothing to do with whether we are in Europe. The
262 discussions that are happening right now, could still happen whether or not we're in the
263 European Union. (P4)

264 • As someone who wasn't born here. I see having to pay the money, spending on the NHS
265 surcharge, and the ridiculous fees they charge for visas. It's an investment coming here.
266 It negatively impacts me and my family directly, because the value of a UK passport
267 certainly goes down when you don't have free movement. Those pillars in the European
268 Union are there for a reason. I think it hurts. At the same token, I was a consultant
269 before, it negatively impacts the ability to build business when you have to worry about,
270 oh what are the trade tariffs going to be, what tax will you have to pay? The uncertainty
271 that comes with that, not being able to move in the EU as freely as a citizen of Belgium,
272 Berlin or even Switzerland. Swiss citizens may have more free movement in the EU than
273 the UK did. That doesn't make sense to me... I think that (P4) is giving way too much
274 credit to where the UK is, and it's bargaining power afterwards, I think with the US

275 coming in, especially with pharmaceuticals and insurance companies, they are going to
276 damage the NHS. It will raise costs, and it might actually do away with the NHS in the
277 long-term. Especially if there's an economic interest in doing so, especially if you listen
278 to Donald Trump. It puts you in a weaker economic bargaining package, when right now
279 you negotiate as a bloc, as a European Union. Trump has said, verbatim, that the NHS is
280 going to be part of the trade deals, and they had an expose on channel four that showed
281 members of the government have secretly been negotiating with pharmaceutical
282 businesses in America to do just that. Channel 4 have caught them red-handed doing
283 just that. (P5)

284 What does British identity mean to you?

285 • British identity, that's a tough one, really... What is British?... If feel like British is being
286 part of this country and having a British passport. Is that being British, I don't know... I
287 feel like, being British, you need to know that laws of the country, especially when
288 you're applying for a passport, I'm sure they make you take an oath to the Queen. I feel
289 like it forces people to take those oaths... I don't have a strong British identity. I was
290 born and brought up here, but family-wise, my Mum and Dad were born in Pakistan. So,
291 in that sense, I'm not British in terms of my family being born in Britain. But, I'm British
292 in the sense that I was born and raised here, and English is my first language... I think my

293 children in future would be more British than me. (P1)

294 • It's to do with having the documentation that you are British. That you are from here.

295 That you were either born here or have the passport. Or that you don't have a claim to

296 another country. So, if you've got a British passport, you're British. If you don't, you're

297 obviously not British... I'm also from a mixed background. I have strong identities to my

298 parent's culture. My dad and my grandparents are from India. I tend to identify more

299 with my Asian side. (P2)

300 • People who aren't educated on the backgrounds of other people, think that white

301 people are more British. If you look throughout history, the British culture has gone to

302 other countries, and because of that, people from other countries have come to Britain,

303 so the cultures have intertwined. So, people and their backgrounds from India and China

304 will bring it over here, and their going to have strong identities to Britain, because it's

305 also been brought over there.so, I feel that it's kind of a mixed thing. It depends entirely

306 on the person and how they feel... A more mixed area is more representative (of the

307 UK). Because, it's been mixed for such a long time. I don't think being British means you

308 have to be white British, because you've got people of colour who were born here.

309 They're still British. It's not because they've got coloured skin that they can't be

310 identified as British. Your skin tone shouldn't define if you're British or not... British

311 identity is being British, being a British citizen, having a British passport. It doesn't
312 entirely mean being aware of the Queen, but this is where I was brought up, so it's part
313 of my identity. If you were going to remove that from the equation, and look at me
314 entirely as a person, then I do have some strong traits toward being a British citizen...
315 (British identity) varies for me because obviously I'm not white British, so I do have
316 other parts of my identity, in terms of my ethnicity. I define myself as British. If you said,
317 American or Canadian, they don't apply to me. But, in terms of British things, yeah. And,
318 I do sometimes fall under British stereotypes, like Great British Bake Off. But I do
319 identify with my ethnicity as well, so it does balance out... I feel like the word itself,
320 British, even though for me it's more of passport than an identity, its subjective. People
321 do have stereotypes, if you're not visibly British, I don't know. But I feel that everything
322 just cross-links, there's no one perfect, or specific British person. I feel like everything is
323 just entwined. Cultures cross-link. Birmingham alone is very mixed. So, everything is just
324 mixed. British is an umbrella term. There are so many things that link to being British,
325 not just your background. We're all from different backgrounds, but we're all British.
326 (P3)

327 • It's very funny you should ask, because my sense of identity has gone through a
328 metamorphosis of some sort. I have been in the UK for sixteen years, I became British

329 after my first five years, because that is only when you can do it. So, I've been a British
330 citizen for over ten years. My sense of being British, my pride in being British and
331 Ugandan has changed based on what's happening around me. Lately, I identify more as
332 a Ugandan or pan-African. However, during the Brexit debate, I cannot remember being
333 more British. Being so proud of this little island that I now call home. And, being very
334 proud of my British passport, and being very disappointed by the vast majority of British
335 people, some who claim to be more British than me, and who were born here, who are
336 not as proud, who doubt that this small little island can actually survive outside the
337 shackles of the European Union. My sense of identity is a mixed one, my heart is in
338 Uganda, my brain is here... As an African living in Britain, hand on heart, regardless of
339 how much I feel British, I can never be fully British. I might have the passport, but the
340 society and the system have other ways of keeping me in check. But, that's a separate
341 issue altogether to do with racism and structures. The other thing that people are
342 discounting is that the world has moved on since the days of NATO and the European
343 Economic Community which is what the EU was all about. What started as a trading
344 block has metamorphosed into a federal state-almost, because that is there ultimate
345 destination. Getting lost into this European thing that even the average British guy has
346 had there identity swallowed by the bigger European one. (P4)

347 • Honestly, it's a really complicated thing because not being born here, and having a child
348 born here, getting married here. Honestly, even though I'm not a citizen, there's an
349 emotional tie to developing my career and everything like that. The thing that
350 distinguishes British identity for me is this sense of giving a crap about other people. In
351 America there's this very overly self-centered viewpoint that if I make a lot of money
352 that's because of me, and I don't need to look at the system. I think the British sense is
353 there is a sense of identity, there is a sense of Europeanness to it. Even though there's
354 the unique sense of Europeanness to it. Like, we're European but we're not
355 continentals. There is a sense of reflection as well, having lived in other European
356 countries, it's not quite to the extent of the Germans. But Britain still has a tie to the
357 negative aspects of World War One and World War Two. This new generation is a little
358 more tied to recognizing the poor choices that were made during the formation of the
359 British Empire and how they treated colonies, as well. There is some uniqueness in a
360 positive way when it comes to that sense of what is British. Other than that, I'm not a
361 British citizen so it's hard to say... To say that (Remain supporters) are not proud is a bit
362 disingenuous. Also, to say the shackles of the EU sounds very Nigel Farage rather than
363 reflecting on reality. Being here for a couple of elections before, and being here, the
364 make-up of Parliament speaks to being British. There are so many parties that are

365 represented, so many views that are represented. Which is interesting because within
366 the UK, you have a lot of home nations that certainly have questions about whether
367 there's more devolution, more independence, whether it's conservatism or liberalism.
368 Even within those contexts of liberalism, there's a lot wider perspective of viewpoints
369 when it comes to that. I think it's a positive reflection of Britishness. I think that saying
370 whether they're more or less proud to be British, the ability to agree and disagree and
371 still be British is one of the positives. It's very British to be able to disagree. Even when
372 you're the opposition, you're the Crown's Royal Opposition. There's a togetherness
373 even when you disagree. (P5)

374 What does European identity mean to you?

375 • European identity means being part of a bigger, wider union, where countries are
376 accepting of other countries cultural differences, and coming together. I feel like the EU
377 is a better place than the UK. European identity is better than British identity. There's
378 more to it, more acceptance... I'm 20. I feel like everyone was more together before the
379 Brexit vote. Everyone was more accepting of each other's cultural norms and
380 differences. But since the EU debate has come up, Leave or Remain, it's become clear
381 that people are not in sync with people's cultural norms and differences... By leaving,
382 the UK is going to push neighboring countries, which are part of the EU, away from

383 them. It's not just going to impact them socially, but especially business-wise, importing
384 and exporting. That's only going to increase living-costs for people living in the UK. It's
385 going to make it harder for them. (P1)

386 • I would interpret European as you're from the continent. That's a bit broad, I know,
387 because there are so many countries. But, you don't have to have a specific skin colour
388 or specific language, you're just from the continent itself. You could be in a different
389 country but you're still European if you're from anywhere in Europe... You tend to
390 identify yourself more with your ethnic background. When you're introducing yourself
391 to someone, and having a conversation, you don't say, oh guess what, I'm European.
392 You say, I'm mixed race. This is who I am. And, your first thought tends to go to, I'm a
393 British person, not I'm a European person. I feel like there's always been that, even
394 though we're part of the EU, there's always that division that Britain is not European
395 because it is separate from the continent. I feel like, because of that division, people
396 say, I'm not European even though, technically, we are... With certain countries and
397 cultures, you can identify them, straight off with things that they have. Like, different
398 foods, different languages, cultures, just things like that you could identify. I feel like
399 those kinds of things are stronger in European cultures than they are in British cultures. I
400 feel like a lot of British culture pops up. Not just in Europe, it could be anywhere in the

401 world. There's not a specific thing, except, maybe the Queen, there's nothing in
402 particular that makes you say, that is a British thing. So, I feel like it's just different.
403 (P2)

404 • If you're from those areas, you're European because of that... I don't call myself
405 European. Maybe because I identify myself more with my ethnicity than my nationality.
406 Obviously, I'm Somali so identify as being Somali over being just European. But, when
407 I'm filling in applications, I put down British, I think, oh yes, European... With European
408 stuff, I feel like it's more distinct. Like in France or Spain. In terms of France, I've heard
409 stories that they are like, I'm from France, I'm European. It's a strong identity compared
410 to the UK where they say, I'm British. British people don't start off conversations by
411 saying I am this, I am that. There are some people who do believe that. But, it just
412 depends on the person. Because I identify myself with my ethnicity, it's different. But,
413 for a European person it's more distinct. (P3)

414 • I have a choice to make, being an African living in the EU and being British. For me, I
415 value my British identity much more than my European identity. Being European, for
416 me, is a means to an end. It's not a big deal. With my British passport, and my skills and
417 academic credentials, I could be anywhere in the world, and I could identify as African
418 and British. I have not had any opportunities where I have proudly thought of myself as a

419 European. But, am I just being biased? I don't know... I could argue, that the same
420 experience (P5) had in France, where you got directions in English, could be replicated
421 across any part of this world, not least in Africa. Where the British and other countries
422 have had protectorates. For me, there's nothing uniquely European about that... This
423 country, from the magna carta, all the way through to the current state, regardless of
424 whether we're in Europe, we're known for championing freedom of speech and
425 expression. I am not any less British if Britain is not part of the EU. I will still be same
426 British person whether I am part of the EU, when you look at Europe, you get a lot of
427 this. Europe is like us in Africa where the demarcation was done to mix lots of people.
428 The Germans are German, the French are French, they are blocs of people within an
429 entity called Europe or the European Union or whatever you want to call it. They
430 identify collectively and also proudly individually, and that is my argument with Brexit in
431 terms of identity. The British will not be any less British whether or not they are part of
432 Europe. (P4)

433 • The sense of Europeanness, when we look at it comparatively to a sense of British
434 identity, we see it only as the EU getting something out of the UK. I'll give you an
435 example. My daughter started doing ballet with a British ballet teacher in Berlin. There's
436 a lot of English speakers in Germany to the point where there's actually some of the old

437 generation that are angry that they go to the old cafes in Central Berlin. They'll complain
438 that most of the servers don't speak German, they speak English. The tech hub in
439 Europe is Berlin... There's a togetherness. And I think it's fair to say that the UK has
440 positively influenced this. A lot of British expatriates have gone abroad to Paris and
441 things like that. As a TCN (third country national), having the ability to speak my native
442 tongue to other people, as a native English speaker, it felt like that ability to assimilate
443 at a more comfortable pace. You see that even in Paris. You go to Paris and get lost
444 here. Living in Germany for many years, my inclination is to speak German, and then
445 English... I was struggling with French even though its my second language. I was able to
446 ask someone in English how to get somewhere on the metro in Paris. That positive
447 influence, there is a sense of togetherness. You name the nationality, especially in
448 Western Europe, you're going to see an influence there. The thing with togetherness,
449 seeing it as a means to an end, kind of negates the positive impact the British have had
450 on Europe... What's interesting is to reflect on how Europeans reflect on recent history. I
451 was having a conversation with a couple of colleagues who are from the Republic of
452 Georgia, in the former Soviet bloc. We were talking about how, for the most parts,
453 Americans, especially during World War 2, didn't have to deal with any of the impacts of
454 having their country bombed, having their country feel that day-to-day impact. I've seen

455 pictures of my old neighbourhood in Berlin, it was just rubble. There's a recognition of a
456 self-struggle, self-loss. Even though it's negatively reflected, whereas we look at World
457 War 2 and say the Nazis did this, and it's awful. But, the bombing of Dresden, when you
458 have that more European reflection you realise how terrible certain things are. That
459 sense of humanity. For example, why it's so hard to get firearms in Europe compared to
460 America where it comes with your passport almost. There's this sense of reflection,
461 sense of togetherness. Whether you agree with European experience, with the
462 European Union or the Council of Europe, regardless of these formal ties, there's this
463 sense of togetherness through this struggle, this poor decision-making for such a long
464 time. That's what really distinguishes it... I always distinguish western Europe from
465 Eastern Europe, because you have people like Viktor Orban in eastern Europe. We need
466 to keep a space for free speech regardless of whether we agree or disagree. The level of
467 discourse you see from Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and the UK compared to
468 America, you see the difference. Even though we mock Boris Johnson, the detail of the
469 debate during the elections they have here is so much better. There's that common
470 sense of reflecting on a horrible history and what they suffered through. (P5)

471 Focus Group Transcript THREE

472

473 Thursday 7th November 2019

474 (P1) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, White British, Female

475 (P2) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, British Asian, Female

476 (P3) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, British Asian, Female

477 (P4) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, White British, Female

478 (P5) Remain supporter, Age 25-34, White British, Female

479

480 How do you feel Brexit will impact your close friends and immediate family?

481 • I agree with the medication side. I have a lot of medical issues. So, the cuts for the NHS
482 have impacted me enough. I'm struggling to get my medication and get my antidepressants and
483 get the treatment that I need for my joints. If we were to leave the EU
484 properly, the amount of that funding would plummet. And, if it were privatized, I'd be
485 screwed.... (P3) is vegetarian too. Obviously, in the UK we have a lot of animals and
486 livestock. But, for a lot of fruit and veg, we have to get it imported. So, if we get cut off
487 from everyone, people who are vegan and vegetarian will really suffer from that... We
488 take it (NHS) for granted as a country. I read up about the cost of an ambulance or just a
489 regular check-up in America. If we had to pay that over here, we'd be in a worse
490 situation... Rising prescription costs are already affecting me. I'm having to borrow
491 money from my mum for anti-depressants... I know documentation is difficult at the
492 moment because my partner's uncle was trying to get his fiancée over from Cyprus, they

493 made one spelling mistake and they had to re-do the entire thing, it pushed the process
494 back months. (P1)

495 • I didn't know much about it. I didn't do any research around the whole area. But, in
496 terms of NHS medication, they didn't think it through. They thought we would be
497 leaving or remaining. They didn't think through what the consequences would be. I
498 don't know much about the NHS side. But, in terms of going abroad, in that you're
499 getting all of these documents. My parents don't really know much about the language
500 and how it works. So, if they were to book a holiday and go abroad to see their family,
501 because they've got all their family in Europe, they're not here, they might be stuck,
502 because they don't know what documents they're going to need. (P2)

503 • The NHS is very important. (P3)

504 • A lot of it is to do with the healthcare side of it. The financial side of it. Rising costs of
505 fruit and veg. It's going to make it harder. I think, if you can't get access to the good
506 food, and if the healthcare prices go up, it's kind of a vicious circle where you can't
507 afford to look after yourself, and you can't afford to make yourself better either... It isn't
508 put out there a lot what we get with the NHS. It isn't publicised about how these things
509 actually cost. So, I think people are unaware of what we could actually lose... What
510 happens with the EU healthcare card, are you going to have to get medical insurance to

511 go on holiday. So, if something happens, can I get care? Or, is it just a case of you're
512 going to get billed and you just have to pay it then and there? (P4)

513 • For me, it's a lot about the medications. There are people who use a lot of
514 contraceptives that are made in the European Union. It's very hard to get them over.
515 Food. And I know a lot of people who are on low incomes. I know it's going to affect my
516 generation. I'm 28. So, we're trying to get houses, trying to start families, with such low
517 income and how things are going with more expensive food and water and medications.
518 It's going to make life so much harder for people. And, I don't think people realised that
519 at first... Debt is really big in this country with people going into arrears. If we add
520 healthcare costs on top of that. (P5)

521 What does British identity mean to you?

522 • I think it's changed a lot over the years as we've become more diverse. It used to be a
523 lot about the Royal Family and patriotism. But, to me, if you live here, you work here,
524 you contribute to the society, you are British. No matter your nationality or anything,
525 you are British. If you're contributing to the British economy by working or paying taxes,
526 you are British. And, you should be able to say that you are British without people
527 attacking you for that... I focus more on the Yorkshire aspect of my personality than the
528 British part. Especially when moving to Birmingham, I was like, "I will remain Yorkshire"

529 ... Britain has come to mean so many different things... I don't really think about being
530 British until I'm filling in a form. (P1)

531 • To be identified as just British, there's more to it than that. It comes across as a label
532 you're given just for being here. There's a lot more that contributes to your identity.
533 (P2).

534 • I don't think I've ever really considered being British as an identity. I just feel, yeah, it's
535 where I live, it doesn't really impact anything else. People are really so much more than
536 where they live... We're more likely to identify with where we live in a smaller
537 community rather than being part of a British community... Living in Britain, it's such a
538 wide community. With people being able to move between countries. It's so wide and
539 so flexible; it just is what it is. (P4)

540 • The whole concept of being British is very outdated. In the society that we live in these
541 days, people move all over the world, and people migrate from here to Australia, and
542 from other countries to here. I think the whole concept of, "Britain First" and "This is
543 Britain" is just completely outdated. I do like the fact that we have a monarchy. It does
544 make us very interesting, but other than that really, you live here, you work here, you go
545 to school here, you buy your shopping here, it doesn't really matter. IF you feel you're
546 British, then you're British. That's the way that I see it... There are so many different

547 types of people from all over the country. Me being from the Black Country, is very
548 different from someone who lives in Cambridge or Kent. Our mannerisms, the way we
549 talk, the way we act, the way we dress. We're completely different. I've been to America
550 loads of times; they don't know I'm British; they have to guess where I'm from. What
551 they stereotype as a British person is what everyone stereotypes as a British person.
552 Cup of tea, crumpets, the Union Jack flag, Buckingham palace, the Queen. There are so
553 many different people who live in the country now over decades and centuries that
554 there isn't just one stereotype of what a British person is anymore. (P5)

555 What does European identity mean to you?

556 • Because of the amount of imports we get from different European countries, the food,
557 clothing styles and culture in general, I would much rather identify with the European
558 identity than what the British identity has come to mean. The British identity has come
559 to mean, you're stand-offish. You're rigid. Saying, "we will be by ourselves." Whereas
560 the European identity is much more of a community, much more accepting... People
561 complain that all it is, is us bailing countries out. But, if we were in their situation, we
562 would want to be bailed out. We need to bail someone else out, for them to bail us
563 out... Would we be able to dig ourselves out from that massive hole? It's already hard to
564 buy a house, with food costs going up, if there is a massive economic crash, the amount

565 of people who are going to plummet into poverty... I'm much quicker to give myself a
 566 Yorkshire identity than any other. That's where I'm from, more close to home for me
 567 than saying I'm from Europe. That could mean anywhere in Europe. Just like Britain is a
 568 very large country, it could mean so many places in Britain. I would much rather have
 569 that closer to home label of, "I am from Yorkshire." (P1)

570 • European identity is being part of a community. You've got support from all of these
 571 different countries, so it's more of being a community. Everyone coming together.

572 Whereas, what Britain has done with the whole Leave thing is say, "Britain wants to
 573 stand on its own two feet. We don't need help." They're the ones who are rejecting the
 574 help that the EU would offer you... Even with the government, it's already such a mess
 575 and we haven't properly left. From David Cameron leaving to Theresa May leaving.

576 There is no proper government, so what will happen when we actually do leave and we
 577 need help. Is everyone just going to say, "well, I give up and I'm going to resign." What's
 578 going to happen when we do leave... If somebody said, "what are you?" I wouldn't say,
 579 "I'm European." The first thing I would say, knowing that is what they expect, is, that I'm
 580 British. But, I wouldn't recognise myself as European. Not until you realise that if you're
 581 in the EU, you are technically European. (P2)

582 • Until somebody mentions it, or until you're filling in a form, you don't really think about

583 it that much. (P3)

584 • I think it's much more the idea of different countries standing together. We've got
585 friends in other places. If anything happens, we've got support from other countries that
586 we know will help us through. If we're on our own, there is that potential for other
587 countries to be like, "hmm, sorry. That's your problem." It's almost like a safety net. At
588 the minute, we're lucky, in the most part, that we are alright with running the country.
589 We don't have some of the issues that other countries have. But, if we leave the EU,
590 how will that impact the economy? Will we end up effectively going back in time,
591 experiencing the struggles? ... The only time I think, "I'm European," is when I am ticking
592 boxes on a form. I don't really consider myself European. When I'm abroad, I don't go to
593 France and think, "I'm in France, that's in Europe." It isn't something I really think of at
594 all. (P4)

595 • There were a lot of other countries back in the 60's and 70's and 80's that were thriving
596 communities, that had massive economies; now they're considered some of the lower
597 standards of countries. Could this whole situation flip it around? "Yeah, Britain used to
598 be this great country back in the early 2000's. Now it's not." You're not going to know
599 until you know. There is a risk of without having that support from other countries who
600 felt, "well, you decided to leave." ... Even though I was in the EU, I never felt like I was a

601 European. I never counted myself as a European. When I was in the states, they would
602 be like, “ooh, you’re from Europe.” “No, I’m from England.” I feel like it’s a completely
603 separate country. We’re part of a network of countries that are together. To me, Ireland
604 is a separate country. Although you have your individual identities, it is nice to have a
605 larger scale identity, and a belonging to a society. (P5)

606 Focus Group Transcript FOUR

607

608 Friday 8th November 2019

609 (P1) Remain supporter, Age 35-44, White British, Female

610 (P2) Leave supporter, Age 18-24, British (Indian) Asian, Female

611 (P3) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, British Asian, Female

612 (P4) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, British (Indian) Asian, Female

613

614 How do you feel Brexit will impact your close friends and immediate family?

615 1. I don’t know what’s on the table with it, I really don’t. They seem to put one thing on

616 the table then have an argument about it between themselves and say they are all liars.

617 I genuinely don’t know what each party is coming forward with. I think the choices

618 coming forward at the moment are that bleak. You’ve got one back choice after another

619 to make. Whichever way it’s going to go, it’s going to end badly. For women at the

620 moment, I think the biggest crisis, and I don't know where Brexit will take it, is domestic
621 abuse. Domestic abuse is at it's worst, and they took the domestic violence bill out of
622 the situation to focus on Brexit. I feel that women are in a volatile state at the moment. I
623 don't think politicians are looking at that at all. The focus is entirely on, are we staying,
624 or are we leaving. They're being negligent to a lot of other things, and I think that
625 impacts on the likes of my mother, my sister, my daughter. But, really I've got no
626 understanding of what Brexit entails.

627 2. The Brexit party are confused about what is on the table. In terms of affecting those
628 around me, if we did leave, one impact was education. Students who want to go to
629 other countries will have to pay quite a bit to get educated somewhere else. No-one is
630 ever going to get educated through that kind of system. They won't have the
631 opportunity to travel and do what they want to do. They have to follow these rules and
632 have their aims and goals in life restricted.

633 3. I feel like it's left families in fear because they don't know what's happening. It's just
634 confused and it's not a nice feeling. Everyone just wants to know if we're staying or
635 going. If we do leave, what new policies they're going to bring up. It's just a hard
636 decision.

637 4. I don't have much knowledge about Brexit either. I would say it will impact businesses

638 too. In terms of cars, Volkswagens aren't going to be traded. My uncles work for
639 Volkswagen. They have raised it but they're not worried, they're not entirely sure about
640 which way it's going to turn.

641 What does British identity mean to you?

642 1. A British passport. NHS. My friend lives in Portugal and she's had a child and had to pay
643 for everything. If you compare it to us, we've got the NHS, the school's system. We've
644 got quite a lot of positives in this country. Being British is a good thing. When I come out
645 of uni, and I see people on the street, homeless, women and children in refuges who
646 can't get somewhere to live, I think we are a disgrace. It doesn't make me proud to be
647 British, it makes me want to leave. I'd like to get a degree, get a doctorate and raise my
648 children somewhere else. But, equally, you may not have the NHS and the benefits that
649 you've got in this country somewhere else. As with anything, it gives, and it takes... All of
650 my family are from here. My kid's dad is mixed race, and he doesn't know his father. So,
651 they're mixed, but I don't know what the mix is. I'll never know, will I? My sister was
652 filling in a form for my son, she said, "what is he? Is he white British?" I said, "no, he's
653 mixed." And, I thought, they will never truly know their heritage. I think it's what you
654 identify with. If you were to say, "what do you identify as?" We might have said,
655 "women, children, mothers." It's part of that whole, stand with your country, poor lads

656 have got to go off and fight. What are they fighting for? It all comes back to one thing,
657 money. That's all they are putting on the table, and taking off the table. It all comes back
658 to money, but it is put under that guise of, "you're British, fight for your country".
659 Really, we don't know what state our country is going to in after all of this. Whichever
660 way we go, I feel like we are lambs to slaughter. I read John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*
661 years ago, I really think we're getting to a point where we are just going to be told what
662 to do. We're going to be having to pay for everything, and we'll have to thank people for
663 the privilege... We're talking about free healthcare, I'm doing surveillance in criminology
664 module. They're on about the free cost of Google and how everything we put into
665 Google generates information for them of how they can advertise to us. How they can
666 make money commercially. We're giving nothing for free and we're getting nothing for
667 free. We just don't know what it is? We're not educated in it. Tell us.

668 2. It makes sense that we have a lot for us. As we pay tax, it gets taken off our wages. It's
669 ideal that we do get those police, NHS to benefit us and be free. We work hard to
670 provide for ourselves, but then a portion of it does go to tax, and that will benefit
671 everyone. There is poverty which is a great issue that needs to be solved. Even when I'm
672 in bigger cities like London, there will be at least one person on the street. "What do I do
673 to help you? Where do I start?" It's a bit confusing... Well, I'm Indian, so I don't know. I

674 don't really visit India enough to be a part of it. I probably say I have a little bit of a
675 strong British identity, not that strong.

676 3. I feel like everybody wants to have a British passport because of the positives,
677 everybody wants something free. If we do leave the EU, how can we be promised that
678 we won't be paying for healthcare? What if they go, "sorry, we're out of money, we
679 can't do this, you're going to have to start paying for stuff." If they're going to take that
680 away from us, what is the point of having a British identity? What's the point? ... If
681 you're born here, raised here, you obviously do want to come back. You're happy with
682 it. If it's changing that's not something that people want to be happy and strong about.

683 4. You take pride in being British because we have all the healthcare benefits alongside all
684 the other benefits. Also, the fact that we've got the monarchy, as well. You do take
685 pride in that. There are still issues like poverty that need to be raised, because the
686 people can do something about it. They need to come together. That is difficult, looking
687 at everyone's attitudes... I wouldn't say I have a strong British identity. Because I come
688 from India. Obviously, it (British identity) wouldn't be a strong one. It would be shared.
689 It's of the same importance.

690 What does European identity mean to you?

691 1. It's divisive. To be European, to be British. To be American or whatever you are. It's

692 categorizing people and putting them into a certain box. When they go, “there’s
693 refugees here, we’re going to build a wall so these people can’t come into our country.”
694 It just splits everybody off, and then they go, “everybody is racist, I don’t know how it’s
695 happening.” And yet, they’re generating it on a daily basis from the gods. We’re all
696 jumping in line and picking a side against each other without even realising you’re all
697 doing it... I don’t think I’ve got one (a European identity). My dad has got one. There is
698 Italian in our family. My dad has got Italian, my mum had got Irish. Does that give me a
699 European identity? I don’t know. I’ve been to Europe. When you said it first, I just
700 thought: “hot”. That’s what it means to me.

701 2. I’ve been to Spain and it’s so beautiful. If I was a European, I would not even
702 contemplate coming to Britain; it’s so cold here. You can go to Spain now, it’s nice and
703 sunny, there are beaches and villas. We don’t have that opportunity here. If I was
704 European, I’m not, it’s just so full of history. I went to Madrid in Spain, and that is so full
705 of this rich history. I went past this statue and they had this walking tour and they told
706 us what it was. I just walked past it the other day. You never know that around every
707 corner, there is so much to tell. I just feel like the history of it is really beautiful.

708 3. It will be more expensive, from £15 to £1500 (to Spain) a flight if we leave. Europe will
709 be like, we don’t need you anymore. It’s more of a competition. Who has got more

710 money? It's just bringing the past all the way back and making everything worse... I
 711 don't know if I have a European identity, either. I'm in the middle... They're going to be
 712 like, "oh, you don't live in the European Union. This is the flight for people who do live in
 713 the European Union, this is the flight for people who don't." Obviously, no-one will
 714 know that until it happens, and everyone is going to be broke. Britain is going to be like,
 715 "more money, more money, please." And, everyone is going to be on the streets.

716 4. I have been to Europe. It doesn't mean much to me to be honest. It's part of /England,
 717 so it is something. If we do leave it, it will still break my heart, even though I'm not
 718 attached to that, it still does make a difference.

719 Focus Group Transcript FIVE

720

721 Friday 21st November 2019

722 (P1) Remain supporter, Age 35-44, British Asian (Indian), Female

723 (P2) Undecided supporter/Remain voter, Age 18-24, Black British, Female

724 (P3) Remain supporter, Age 25-34, Indian Expatriate, Female

725 (P4) Remain supporter, Age 25-34, Mixed (Black and Asian) British, Male

726 (P5) Remain supporter, Age Over-55, White British, Female

727 (P6) Remain supporter, Age 18-24, Mixed (Black and White) British, Female

728 (P7) Remain supporter, Age 25-34, Black (West African) French Expatriate, Female

729 (P8) Remain supporter, Age 25-34, Catalan Expatriate, Female

730 How do you feel Brexit will impact your close friends and immediate family?

731 • For me, there has been a rise in hate crime and racist incidents since the EU

732 referendum. It seems to have opened a can of worms, and it's given permission to say

733 things and to behave in a way that perhaps wasn't so accepted before the referendum.

734 So, my worry is that it will increase, and my friends and my family, who are potential

735 victims of hate crime, are not safe. Me, myself. I count myself in that, as well... My

736 partner grew up in Mansfield, we were at a Christmas social, of course it all happens at

737 Christmas. There were some very racist views being expressed, post-referendum, it was

738 very Islamophobic and I had to say something. It all got very dramatic and very tense,

739 and, as a result, we just don't speak to that whole part of the family. That's it, job done,

740 the choice is made. (P1)

741 • I think generally, my peer group that I associate with are kind of like-minded. Which is a

742 good thing. My immediate family, I don't like their steering of political views. They've

743 developed quite insular views that aren't helpful. My mum didn't vote in the first

744 referendum because her partner wanted to Leave and she wanted to Remain, so they

745 thought, cancel it both out. I said to her, "well you could still vote couldn't you." The

746 level of importance differs to people, doesn't it... It's funny that, before that, with British

747 sensibility, everything kind of runs under the surface, doesn't it? This (Hate crime) is
748 probably the first instance of it. I remember the next day, there's that thing within your
749 bubble and sphere, everything feeling safe and then not feeling safe afterwards. The
750 hostility afterwards was horrible, it was horrible to feel alien in your own space. (P4)

751 • I've been in a really difficult situation with my in-laws, who I've always rubbed along
752 okay with before, but I've been in a situation at a hundredth birthday party where I was
753 just sitting on a table with people who were expressing blatant racism and I was really
754 shocked by it. I confronted them on it, but I still wonder now if I should have reported
755 them on it and other things that were said, but I didn't. It really, really shocked me. The
756 other thing that has hurt me quite a lot is knowing two young, really bright, talented
757 French women who were happy living here, who have now moved away. I'm aware with
758 my daughters, it was my youngest daughter's first vote during the referendum. My
759 daughters are disillusioned about it. The fact that they've lost friends who've moved
760 away from the place, when they were quite settled here... I've made the decision not to
761 go and mix with that group of people (hate speech expressers) again, which I have done
762 for 30 years. I've been socialising with them. (P5)

763 • It definitely validated a lot hostility and certain behaviour. The increase in people's
764 nastiness to one another. So, it's become a lot more visible. I can see that by, living in

765 the UK for 6, 7 years now, I'm seeing a big difference between the before and the after.

766 Definitely living in Nottingham, I don't feel it so much in going to London. In terms of

767 your question about family and people around me; they're not here, so it's not so

768 relevant. I'm in a bit of a bubble, because all of my friends are totally Remainers, as well.

769 That is also a tricky thing because then the result of the Brexit vote was quite surprising

770 in a way, because I'm just in a bubble of people who think the same as me. So, I'm

771 totally isolated from other fascist discourses unless it's some in the media. I'd be super

772 shocked. It's just not part of the reality I'm living even on social media, or at work, or

773 anything like that. So, the everyday is isolated from seeing that change. (P7)

774 • I think it's going to make it more difficult for the Europeans who are already living here,

775 who have the leave to remain, to get to see our families and see our friends back home.

776 It's okay for them to come and go, but it's not okay for them to come back in if a hard

777 Brexit really happens. So, I'm concerned that I'm not going to see them often, it's not

778 that I see them that often anyway, so I'm going to see them less often. That's very

779 selfish, but that's how it would affect mine. Friends, I agree too, we're all going to live in

780 a little bubble. We're all akin to each other's political views, but I have these arguments

781 and questions around that. It will impact some friendships. (P8)

782 What does British identity mean to you?

783 • I guess, as well, British means also Scottish and Welsh, as well. Not just England. So, the
784 idea of that being unifying and having this commonality, is what it should be.

785 (P2)

786 • The way I was thinking about Britain, and I only came here a year ago, discussing it
787 (Brexit) with my friends in Singapore and India; it seems to be some fantasy idea of a
788 second colonial wave, like the great colonial empire coming back. That's the kind of idea
789 that seemed to be sold to a lot of people in Britain, at least from what I could see just
790 through media and social media discourse... I had a very long talk with a Welsh woman
791 last night at the pub. She said, "she would never call herself British, because they were
792 the first to be colonised." Nowhere close to English, British. Nowhere near that territory.
793 Always Welsh. She gets really mad when someone mischaracterises her. (P3)

794 • It would be nice to know what that idea of reclamation looks like. The cupboard is
795 empty now, isn't it? Thankfully... If you're from a mixed nationality family, there's
796 always that thing about aspiring to be British in a sense. My dad was born here but he
797 would never... Growing up, you know what I mean? I would be, you remove yourself
798 from it. I don't, as a person. But, there's that idea there. (P4)

799 • As a white, British-born person I would like to say that I think class divide is a really big
800 symptom, feature and it has been for years and years. And, it's reared its ugly head with

801 Brexit. That's why we are in the pickle we're in. The under-privileged, the disadvantaged
802 were not being listened to. They have tried to find a way out. So, I grew up proud of the
803 fact we are a multi-cultural nation and that we can be quite tolerant, and we can be
804 quite respectful of different faiths and beliefs. But, I think the class divide has just sort of
805 overruled all of that. That's the tragedy, and that's the main reason we got the
806 referendum result we did... (Leavers) have a nostalgic, romanticized view of Britain.

807 (P5)

808 • There is a massive class divide which is obviously aided massively. A lot of rich people, a
809 lot of wealthy, upper-class people have voted for it as well. I think it all goes back to
810 their idea of what Britain has become is not what they thought it was. Also, I think it's a
811 divide between age. A lot of the younger generation have grown up with the internet,
812 they are a lot more educated on things like colonialism and stuff that isn't taught
813 massively in school. We just had a totally different educational upbringing in terms of
814 the internet and sharing. More people from different diverse backgrounds have been
815 here for us to mix with. The older generation didn't have that as much. To me, before
816 Brexit, I would say I was proud to be British although we weren't a perfect country, you
817 look at other countries in the world, we're doing very, very well. There's a lot of things
818 we've built up that have been massively successful. If someone asked me, "would you

819 count yourself as British.” I’m mixed race. My dad is white British, my mum is black
 820 Jamaican. Sometimes, my sisters would be like, “no, I’m not British.” I’d be the one like,
 821 “yeah I am British.” I class myself as British. I’m proud of that. After Breixt, it’s made me
 822 want to turn against that more. I don’t want to be associated with this thing that’s
 823 become poisonous. It’s patriotic, but it’s like a poisonous version of that. They’ve
 824 twisted and gone back to this colonialist idea. Maybe I won’t say, “I’m British,”
 825 depending on how this all works out. (P6)

826 • I came here totally, “oh my gosh, it’s going to be so good, I’m so into indie stuff.” I grew
 827 up looking at the UK, well England mainly, looking up to it, in a way. I had no clue; I
 828 hadn’t studied any of the history of the country. That was just not part of my education,
 829 at all. So, I was introduced to it through arts and culture mainly. For me, it was like super
 830 dreamy, in a way. (We weren’t taught about British colonialism in France), we were
 831 barely taught about French colonialism. I was also in a super horrible Catholic school,
 832 they were totally not talking about these subjects at all. So, I came here super-positive.
 833 (P7)

834 • I came here because I thought the UK was a very progressive country, very accepting
 835 and multicultural. I knew it wasn’t perfect, all rainbows and unicorns and all that, but
 836 compared to where I was coming from, I could feel more comfortable here than in my

837 own country (Spain). So, my perception was not only the tea and scones joke, but that it
838 was a more open and accepting society because the UK has got a very old history of
839 colonialism, obviously. So, they had to integrate all of these cultures within their society.
840 They had to. I thought that was beneficial. But, I'm starting to change my mind... I feel
841 close to the Scottish because I am from Catalonia in Spain. So, we always look up to
842 Scotland to see what they're doing and their struggles. Then, we try and fail to replicate
843 them. The (Catalan) referendum on independence was mental. The Scottish were able
844 to do it and nothing happened. Catalonia tried to do it and they were put in prison, after
845 being beaten up. (I'm pro-Catalan independence) now more than ever. (P8)

846 What does European identity mean to you?

847 • I have enough of a life journey going around wrestling with being British, Indian, all the
848 rest of it to think about being European. So, I'm in a state of confusion about it all right
849 now. (P1)

850 • European identity is the ability to move free. From my perspective, I lived in Germany
851 twice in my life, so when I was about 5 years old, my mum was able to work there. The
852 ability for my mother, as a black woman in engineering, was incredible at that time. I
853 gave her opportunities to have a life as a single parent raising her kids. You don't have
854 to be stuck where you are, there are opportunities. Being part of Europe means the

855 opportunity to work in other countries if the UK is not doing it for you, or if the
856 opportunities there are limiting. My friend, just now, has started to look at jobs
857 elsewhere. The biggest part is the freedom of movement, isn't it? I care about the ability
858 to move without there being strict border control between France, Germany, Belgium,
859 etc. That's something that would go away. For me, being European is partially about
860 that freedom to move... The rhetoric is British and Europe. If you look at media and
861 sport, for example, we only rarely come together to feel like we're part of Europe and
862 add ourselves within that discourse. When I hear people speak about Europe, it's always
863 Britain and Europe. We're never considered European first before we talk about British.
864 However, some other countries might consider being European first... Europeans look to
865 us. We are European, but other European cultures look to us. Especially hip-hop. When I
866 was in Germany, Deutsche hip-pop. It feels like, woah this is crazy. The music and
867 culture we have here is definitely influencing (the rest of Europe)... They always say
868 English breakfast or Continental breakfast, it's one or the other. (P2)

869 • I lived in Berlin too. Being able to go to other countries with having a long-term German
870 visa and being here (UK) feeling so absolutely claustrophobic and stuck. For a 45-minute
871 trip to Amsterdam, I need to apply two weeks in advance, show documentation, proof
872 of finance, about 20 different documents. I need to get down to London which is the

873 only place I can get a Schengen visa, just to take a 45-minute flight. That's something I
 874 foresee a lot of British people having to do, all depending on what kind of British you
 875 are. I feel like that's going to be another level of discrimination on people of colour,
 876 people coming from more oppressed parts of British society, to actually have the
 877 freedom to move around. (P3)

878 • The country and the continent have a lot to answer for. America and Europe are actually
 879 kind of evil. They've caused all the projects, effectively. We're not in a good place. We
 880 live in privileged positions. We have nice lives and all the rest of it, but it's based off the
 881 back of such badness. There's no way around that. You've got to pick your battles, we all
 882 have... We're (Britain) quite central to popular culture though, aren't we? ... Imagine
 883 without it (food from other countries) it would just be meat and two veg, wouldn't it.
 884 forevermore. (P4)

885 • I feel European and I feel that Britain is in a really dangerous route to being isolated...
 886 We've benefited as well from European influences in this country. For instance, the tram
 887 system in Nottingham. That's made the city feel continental, I think, and it's massively
 888 improved the city. Especially speaking as a pedestrian. And, food. Well, for me that's not
 889 just Europe. (P5)

890 • I've grown up in a family where I've been told that, "you aspire to be European, but

891 you're not quite there because you're out of the way. You go there and everyone speaks
 892 English, you don't speak any of their languages. You're not educated enough." People in
 893 Britain who aren't from upper class families, they don't go on holiday to Europe. We're
 894 European but I've never been there, I don't know what it is. I don't speak the language,
 895 so, am I European? (P6)

896 • I was more reflecting on freedom of movement. Thinking about refugees and asylum
 897 seekers for example. Their freedom of movement is just no way. Look at the migration
 898 crisis and what's going on at the moment within Europe and how we've been looking up
 899 at that situation and dealing with it is actually shameful. The freedom of movement, I'm
 900 very divided about it. I feel very free myself. Being born in France, I feel absolutely
 901 privileged about that, but when you look at the bigger situation, it's not the case at all.

902 (P7)

903 • The continental breakfast is not what we have in Spain. (P8)

904 (*Supplementary from off-topic preamble*) (F1P4 Leave – Euro ID) "I don't like being ruled by a
 905 parasite, which is what the European Union has become. It's grown well beyond what it was
 906 intended to do. It's undemocratic, it's wasteful. Apart from location, I don't feel we've got that
 907 much in common with the other 27 countries that make up the European Union. I think we
 908 should trade with them like we do with the rest of the world. But, being ruled by them?
 909 Absolutely not. No."

910 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F1P5 Leave - Impact) “From a business point of view,
 911 yes, I voted to leave. Yes, I own a business. I’m an ex-university lecturer, an ex-teacher. I’ve got
 912 Masters’ degrees in this that and the other. I deal with the EU, I sell to the EU, I buy from the EU
 913 and nothing has changed. Nothing actually has changed. The orders haven't dropped. I’m still
 914 shipping out, I'm having deliveries back in. Nothing has changed whatsoever. That’s dealing
 915 with the automotive sector.” ... “BMW, “if you wish to trade with us, you need to vote Remain.”
 916 I don’t like being blackmailed, but this is the way that some businesses work. I think it’s good
 917 that we have all these trade deals. We have £5 billion trade deal with Saudi Arabia, okay it’s
 918 arms its military. But, if we don’t do this, another country is going to. The trade deal that we
 919 have with China was how many billions of pounds? But, nobody recognises this.”

920 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F1P5 Leave - Impact) “I think it’s overstated.
 921 Oxbridge and Russel Group will still see people come. If you have EU citizens being charged
 922 TCN rates for tuition, they’re not going to do it. You’re eventually going to see BCU being more
 923 expensive than going to the Sorbonne or going to Humboldt or Freie Universität (Berlin). That
 924 BCU just doesn’t rate next to. If EU citizens have to pay more to go to a British institution, I
 925 don’t see outside of the Russell Group and Oxbridge, I don’t think they’re going to sustain that. I
 926 think there’s going to be a drop in students, and that’s going to be negative.” Economic
 927 Detriment (Legal Scholar: Lower Ranked Universities Suffer i.e. colleague’s impacted).

928 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F3P4 Remain - Euro) “I come from quite a small
 929 country town, Hereford; the majority of Hereford is older people who hold quite old-fashioned
 930 beliefs. We also have quite a large Polish community, Easter European community. That might
 931 be part of the reason I don’t really think of myself as European. Because, in Hereford they

932 (Eastern Europeans) all keep to themselves and we're all kind of not part of that community. I
 933 think it's almost that subliminal, "we're different from the Europeans."

934 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F4P1 Remain - Impact) "Are there going to be riots?
 935 That's where people are standing back now, saying, "if it's taking this long, it's going to be
 936 massive, something bad is going to happen." They are making everyone panic about it instead of
 937 moving it along quicker."

938 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F5P2 Remain - Impact) "I wouldn't be surprised if
 939 there were riots because there is a lot of hostility and tension I'm seeking. Maybe just in the UK
 940 (not in the other countries of the EU). But, then again, you never know how these effects will
 941 occur. If you've got family and friends in other parts of the EU, they don't know how they're
 942 going to react to that"... "What about Ireland, they're going to have quite a difficult relationship
 943 with the UK. They already have a difficult relationship. Then Northern Ireland and mainland
 944 Ireland" ... I read something about the NHS being made up of a lot of people from the EU.
 945 Nurses and workers. In terms of the services we use every day, you're greeted with people who
 946 are European citizens.

947 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F5P3 Remain - Brit) "We've seen the effects of
 948 partition in general across history. It's never been good. Why would anyone think this is going to
 949 be good? British exceptionalism alongside American exceptionalism is such a dumb ass thing"

950 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F5P4 Remain - Brit) "I think it's quite funny in
 951 England because I consider myself to be European, I'm very happy about that, but we've got a
 952 lot of Americanisms, haven't we? ... if we build a more ingrained relationship with America, we
 953 probably will provoke a reluctance from the rest of the continent."

954 *(Supplementary from off-topic preamble)* (F5P4 Remain - Euro) “Since the 60’s. With mainland
955 Europe, you can condense it all. There is a similar culture that runs right along the continent.
956 Here is very separate from that, I think.”

957

958 End of Transcript