



Citizenship after Orientalism

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51





1 *Palgrave Studies in Citizenship Transitions*

2 *Series editors*

3
4 **Michele Michiletti** is Lars Hierta Chair of Political Science at Stockholm University,
5 Sweden. **Ludvig Beckman** is Professor of Political Science, Stockholm University,
6 Sweden. **David Owen** is Professor of Social and Political Philosophy, University of
7 Southampton, UK.

8
9 The Editorial Board: **Keith Banting** (Queen's University, Canada), **Rainer Baubock**
10 (European University Institute, Italy), **Russell Dalton** (University of California at
11 Irving, USA), **Avigail Eisenberg** (University of Victoria, Canada), **Nancy Fraser** (The
12 New School for Social Research, USA), **David Jacobson** (University of South Florida,
13 USA) and **Ariadne Vromen** (The University of Sydney, Australia).

14 This series focuses on citizenship transitions encompassing contemporary
15 transformations of citizenship as institution, status, and practice as well as normative
16 and explanatory analysis of these transformations and their cultural, social,
17 economic, and political implications. The series bridges theoretical and empirical
18 debates on democracy, transnationalism, and citizenship that have been too
19 insulated from each other. It takes citizenship transitions as its starting point and
20 studies the status, role, and function of citizenship within contemporary democratic
21 systems and multi-layered governance structures beyond the state. It aims to add a
22 broader array of critical, conceptual, normative, and empirical perspectives on the
23 borders, territories, and political agents of citizenship. It scrutinizes the possibilities
24 and challenges of citizenship in light of present broad processes of political
25 fragmentation and pluralization and the ways emerging ideals and expectations of
26 citizenship are inspired by new social, political, and environmental movements.
27 Its cross-disciplinary approach intends to capture the transitions of citizenship
28 from an apparently simple relation between the state and its citizens into a cluster
29 of complex responsibility claims and practices that raise questions concerning
30 citizenship borders and obligations, the public-private scope of citizenship, and even
31 how political actors attempt to and in fact avoid citizenship.
32

33 Titles in the series include:

34 Ludvig Beckman and Eva Erman (*editors*)
35 TERRITORIES OF CITIZENSHIP

36
37 Costica Dumbrava
38 NATIONALITY, CITIZENSHIP AND ETHNO-CULTURAL BELONGING
39 Preferential Membership Policies in Europe

40
41 Karin Svedberg Helgesson and Ulrika Mörth (*editors*)
42 THE POLITICAL ROLE OF CORPORATE CITIZENS
43 An Interdisciplinary Approach

44
45 Simon McMahon
46 IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION
47 The Political Dynamics of Intra-EU Mobility
48
49
50
51





1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Palgrave Studies In Citizenship Transitions series
Series Standing Order ISBN 978-1-137-33137-3

You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBNs quoted above.

Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England





1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51





1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Citizenship after Orientalism

Transforming Political Theory

Edited by

Engin Isin

Professor of Citizenship, Open University, UK




palgrave
macmillan





1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51



Introduction, conclusion, selection and editorial matter © Engin Isin 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author(s) has/have asserted his/her/their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978-1-137-47949-5

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.





8

Multicultural Society Must Be Defended?

Zaki Nahaboo

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Abstract

This chapter investigates how orientalist citizenship is reinvented through attempts to define and defend multicultural society in Britain. I begin by describing how the normalizing function of ‘state racism’ charted in Michel Foucault’s *Society Must Be Defended* has been partially recast through the ‘post-racial’, ‘multiculturalist’, and ‘multiculture’ conceptions of multicultural society. In doing so, this chapter helps us to identify the parameters through which new expressions of orientalist citizenship emerge to sustain contemporary state racism. This is exemplified in the figures of citizenship that manifest through an ethnic minority wing of the United Kingdom Independence Party, calls in the British media for intercultural dialogue, and the Stop the War Coalition’s response to the War on Terror in the 2000s. Each captures how attempts at subverting identitarian life scripts, dichotomous subject positions, and essentialist identities become a means of reinventing orientalist citizenship. I conclude that the co-option of anti-essentialist challenges to orientalist citizenship facilitates a new imperative to state racism: ‘multicultural society must be defended’.

Introduction

From the mid-1960s onwards, Britain became increasingly characterized as a multicultural society.¹ Yet its referent escapes consensus. The phrase ‘multicultural society’ is used to denote a political community marked by diversity in faith, ‘race’, nationality, attire, music, cuisine, language, customs, values, and citizenship status. What politicians and media commentators across the mainstream political spectrum tacitly agree upon is the irreversibility of multicultural society.² As Stuart Hall observes, contemporary Britain ‘can [still] have purges...it can enforce assimilation but it can’t go back to being stable and steady on its own mono-cultural foundations’.³ This chapter explores the governmental effects of the naturalization and normalization of multicultural society upon orientalist citizenship.



1 The figure of the citizen is dominantly understood as having a Western genesis.
 2 Engin Isin notes that in the 'occidental tradition' it is considered a sov-
 3 ereign figure 'capable of judgment and being judged, transcending his (and
 4 much later her) tribal, kinship, and other primordial loyalties and belonging-
 5 ness'.⁴ The orientalist citizen emerges when this figure is co-constituted with,
 6 and hierarchically opposed to, 'oriental' others who are said to lack these fac-
 7 ulties.⁵ This chapter demonstrates how 'state racism', as outlined by Michel
 8 Foucault in *Society Must Be Defended*, continues through 'post-racial', multicul-
 9 turalist, and 'multiculture' conceptions of multicultural society. It investigates
 10 how certain attempts to define and defend multicultural society operate as a
 11 prism through which otherwise antithetical racist and anti-racist discourses
 12 become combined and refracted to facilitate novel expressions of orientalist
 13 citizenship. This can be illustrated through the emergence of three figures:
 14 'just-in-time' citizens, intercultural citizens, and anti-civilizational citizens.
 15

16 To legitimate its anti-immigration policies, the 2013 and 2014 campaign-
 17 ing by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) emphasized its multi-
 18 racial membership. While UKIP's hostility towards multicultural society is
 19 now unequivocally embraced, I draw attention to the brief campaigning by
 20 UKIP's ethnic minorities to reveal a moment where 'just-in-time' citizens
 21 mobilize a post-racial conception of society. This is shown to facilitate the
 22 rejection of recent immigrants beyond traditional terms of a national 'us'
 23 and a racialized 'them'.
 24

25 The orientalist possibilities of intercultural citizens are revealed through
 26 *Make Bradford British*. The Channel 4 'documentary', broadcasted in 2012,
 27 reveals how critiques of essentializing definitions of multicultural citizenship
 28 can be disassociated from a progressive anti-racist trajectory. The programme
 29 exemplifies how state racism can be reconstituted even through challenges
 30 to dichotomous notions of an 'us' and 'them'. Finally, the Stop the War
 31 Coalition's (StWC) deployment of anti-civilizational citizens is analysed. It
 32 illustrates how the deconstruction of civilizational hierarchies through mul-
 33 ticulture can unintentionally realize state racism through anti-civilizational
 34 citizens' normalization of secular protest.
 35

36 These three figures of the citizen are politically incongruent. Yet they
 37 respectively capture how attempts at subverting identitarian life scripts,
 38 dichotomous subject positions, and essentialist identities have become a
 39 means of constituting orientalist citizenship. This chapter concludes that
 40 anti-essentialist possibilities to overcome orientalist citizenship have par-
 41 tially been co-opted and foreclosed through state racism's new imperative:
 42 'multicultural society must be defended'.
 43

44 Towards an Account of State Racism in Multicultural Society

45 From the seventeenth century onwards, populations in Western Europe statis-
 46 tically emerged in tandem with governmental concerns about how to regulate
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51

1 health, movement, productivity, and the relationship between resources and
2 inhabitants.⁶ Populations became perceived as a natural phenomenon that
3 has its own regularities and constitution, thereby resituating governmental
4 focus from the 'juridical-political' to objects of management.⁷ Creating popu-
5 lations as natural phenomena to be steered, vitiated, and made productive
6 meant that the scale of governmental address shifted onto facilitating life
7 itself.⁸ Foucault argued that during the nineteenth century this expression of
8 'biopolitics' became interwoven with earlier disciplinary strategies of normal-
9 izing and regulating society.⁹ One of the lynchpins that enabled biopolitics
10 to discriminate between healthy and unhealthy populations was state racism.
11 This posited that 'society must be defended' against other 'races', now con-
12 sidered as an intrinsic element of society that must be expelled.¹⁰ Crucially,
13 every act of expulsion was made correlative to the health and hygiene of
14 a population deemed rightful and authentic.¹¹ In other words, state racism
15 introduced a socially diffused economy of life and death that can organize,
16 legitimate, and sustain the traditional function of the sovereign's right to kill.

17
18
19 If state racism gains its most virulent and explicit expression through
20 Nazism and certain variants of socialism, as Foucault described, this does
21 not mean that state racism always relies solely upon biological or culturalist
22 notions of race and class for its sustenance.¹² One of the central (if not always
23 present) mechanisms of contemporary state racism is orientalist citizenship.
24 This is evident through the War on Terror as principles of democracy and
25 citizenship have begun to gain value *through* overseas wars on so-called fun-
26 damentalists.¹³ Orientalist citizenship is also present when Muslims become
27 classed as 'anti-citizens' and defined against a liberal secular population.¹⁴
28 Both instances reveal how orientalist citizenship constitutes an 'us' and
29 'them' as a zero-sum political relation. In addition, these examples illustrate
30 orientalist citizenship's tacit role in shaping the 'capacities' and pathways
31 for defining what counts as legitimate expressions of political subjectivity.¹⁵

32
33
34
35 What occurs when expressions of orientalist citizenship become recast in
36 terms of a nationally framed multicultural society? In this section, the labels
37 'post-racial', 'multiculturalist', and 'multiculture' are used to highlight sepa-
38 rate points of departure for how multicultural society has been defined and
39 defended. By providing an overview of each conception, the terrain through
40 which transformed expressions of orientalist citizenship can be identified,
41 along with their function for revitalizing state racism.

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

Multicultural society is sometimes used as a symbolic marker for a post-racial society. This conception utilizes the signifier of the multicultural to claim that racial differentiation is either being overcome or cannot be discussed without reaffirming its existence. The post-racial conception of multicultural society has enabled racism to thrive under the guise of cultural incommensurability and 'too much diversity'.¹⁶ It is against this backdrop that statistically assessing whether racialized Muslims 'feel' loyalty to Britain becomes a gauge of inclusive citizenship.¹⁷ After the 2005 bombings in London, the growth in polls by think-tanks and media outlets can be interpreted as one of the sites which

1 made allegiance a central variable for constructing and discerning the health
 2 of multicultural society.¹⁸ This enables state racism to operate in a bifurcated
 3 manner. Through a post-racial conception of defining and defending multicultu-
 4 ral society, Muslims can be written into the national narrative as Britons who
 5 mostly belong. Yet the commonplace phrase ‘most Muslims are not extremists’
 6 is qualified by Muslims being made answerable (although not responsible) for
 7 extremism.¹⁹ Subsequently a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim is categorized to deflect
 8 the racializing process that ultimately structures Muslims as problem subjects.²⁰

9 The multiculturalist conception of multicultural society as an object of
 10 defence can be characterized through its two dominant possibilities. On the
 11 one hand, the valourization of (or aspiration for) a tolerant multicultural
 12 society that is free from racism becomes testimony to an inclusive national
 13 imaginary.²¹ On the other hand, defending multicultural society in these
 14 terms has also fuelled the War on Terror through creating orientalised
 15 subjects as those who constitutively exceed the parameters of tolerance.²²
 16 These two possibilities of the multiculturalist conception do not exist in a
 17 dichotomous relation. As Alana Lentin and Gavin Titley argue, the division
 18 of populations according to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of diversity shares the
 19 same concern around setting the ‘acceptable limits of adversarial politics’.²³

20 Positing multicultural society as a situation or ‘experience’ of multiculture
 21 illustrates a third conception of multicultural society.²⁴ According to this
 22 conception, multicultural society is not defined by its supposed communi-
 23 ties but by how it operates as a floating signifier of unsettled differences prior
 24 to statist attempts that ‘manage the problems of diversity and multiplicity’.²⁵
 25 Identities and racism do not cease to exist. The setting of identities, both
 26 in racist terms, and banal presence with uncertain boundaries, is taken as a
 27 ‘multiculturalism of fact’. Multicultural society becomes viewed as a terrain
 28 where cultural racisms and the ethnic transformation of notions of belong-
 29 ing can coexist without conflict.²⁶ More specifically, adapting William Con-
 30 nolly’s characterization of identity politics, attempts to ‘pluralize’ identities
 31 become symbiotic with attempts to ‘fundamentalize’ identities.²⁷ This does
 32 not always denote a political deadlock. Ash Amin, for instance, highlights
 33 how instances of multiculture which are orientated towards shared projects
 34 (not necessarily anti-racism) can indirectly untether culture from its pre-
 35 sumed racialized bodies and undo racism.²⁸

36 The post-racial and multiculturalist conceptions are points of departure
 37 for defining and defending multicultural society which necessarily involve
 38 a formula akin to ‘us + others = multicultural we ≠ them’.²⁹ In other words,
 39 the post-racial and multiculturalist conceptions can facilitate a virtuous and
 40 legitimate population as multicultural. This population is simultaneously on
 41 the cusp of being divided into a ‘them’ by those who still retain their status
 42 as a demographic ‘us’. In contrast, it would appear that the multiculture con-
 43 ception problematizes (rather than promulgates) a conjoined definition and
 44 defence of multicultural society. The anti-essentialist possibilities of ‘multi-
 45 culture’ appear intrinsically less susceptible to state racism.
 46
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51



1 The post-racial, multiculturalist, and multicultural conceptions illustrate
 2 an unsettled dynamic of creating, governing, and contesting population dif-
 3 ferentiation. It is against this backdrop that state racism in Britain is begin-
 4 ning to adopt more nuanced dividing practices through new expressions of
 5 orientalist citizenship, which depend upon blurring these three conceptions.
 6 The remainder of this chapter illustrates this through attempts by just-in-
 7 time citizens, intercultural citizens, and anti-civilizational citizens at defin-
 8 ing and defending multicultural society.
 9

10

11

12

Just-in-Time Citizens: UKIP's Minorities

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

The biological underpinnings of nineteenth-century state racism contrasted with an earlier 'race struggle'.³⁰ This made race (understood as linguistic, cultural, national, or religious bonds) a counter-hegemonic discourse to undermine the rightfulness and virtue bestowed upon the dominant. Race struggle involved formulating a 'counterhistory' that undermined the tethering of a monumentalized history to sovereignty as a means of establishing the rightfulness and legality of rulers.³¹ Put differently, just as state racism introduced historical narrative as a political device that legitimized a segmented population as the rightful inhabitants, race struggle drew attention to subjugated histories to constitute the marginalized as rights claimants.³²

In 2000, a group of esteemed scholars, politicians, journalists, and race-equality experts were assembled to produce a report on the inequalities and challenges facing multicultural Britain. The ensuing report, *The Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report*, can be viewed as one fleeting instance of race struggle. According to that report, creating a multicultural society free from racialized hierarchies necessitates rewriting national history and pluralizing ethnic representation in public life. The report stated that an obstacle to this goal was the 'unspoken racial connotations' that mired British identity.³³ The commissioners considered that this image of Britishness was suffused by traces of imperialism, which legitimated the position of the dominant ethnicities in Britain. Mounting a critique of imperialist amnesia through educational and media spheres would, in their view, require incorporating postcolonial history into the national narrative.³⁴

This project of challenging the authorized narratives of Britain's history and undifferentiated rights regime depended upon reconceptualizing Britain as a 'community of communities and a community of citizens'.³⁵ The usage of citizens in this phrase denotes more than the regulative function civil rights discourse serves in communitarian visions of multicultural society. When taken in the context of the report's postcolonial critique, the citizen is transformed from its liberal non-racial positioning into what might be termed just-in-time citizens.

By this term I mean citizens who have firstly constituted themselves as having caught up with the national imaginary, and only through doing so



1 position themselves as indistinguishable in status from the historically dom-
 2 inant non-racialized population. They are also subjects produced to inject
 3 the national narrative, occupational culture, and education with differences
 4 that both reflect and instill the ever-changing requirements for how a har-
 5 monious multicultural society is envisaged.

6 From the time of its publication, the media largely ignored the recom-
 7 mendations of the authors and instead wrongly perceived it as denounc-
 8 ing Britishness.³⁶ Over a decade has passed since postcolonial critique was
 9 rejected as a guide for British multicultural society to become non-racial.
 10 Just-in-time citizens failed to emerge as a postcolonial intervention for shap-
 11 ing anti-racist notions of belonging. They instead surfaced through what
 12 Paul Gilroy notes as the niche market of 'diversity and equality consultants':
 13 an outsourcing of anti-racism into the equal opportunity agendas of public
 14 bodies.³⁷ As the dominant image of the just-in-time citizen shifts from a sub-
 15 ject who introduces difference to an agent of diversity management, this fig-
 16 ure gained a new trajectory that further eroded its anti-racist potential. This
 17 can be explored through the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

18 Since its founding in 1993, UKIP has mostly remained on the margins of
 19 mainstream politics. The anti-immigrant party's major breakthrough came
 20 in 2014 when it beat both Labour and the Conservatives in the European
 21 elections.³⁸ What distinguishes it from other far-right groups is that UKIP
 22 supposedly runs on a non-racist platform of addressing nationally ungov-
 23 ernable immigration.³⁹ However, we know the party's leader, Nigel Farage,
 24 showed racialized hostility towards Romanians in general.⁴⁰ When this is
 25 viewed in conjunction with UKIP's support for wealthy commonwealth
 26 members, it reveals what was termed in the Balkan context: 'nesting ori-
 27 entalisms' (a hierarchy of orientalized subjects which need not correspond
 28 to dominant geo-historical manifestation of racialized difference).⁴¹ Further-
 29 more, Farage's comments about a supposed Muslim 'fifth column' existing in
 30 Britain, due to 'multiculturalism', illustrates the well-established tradition of
 31 using 'multiculturalism' as a proxy for orientalist notions of cultural incom-
 32 patibility and inferiority.⁴²

33 How UKIP defends multicultural society as a means of recasting state rac-
 34 ism can be found elsewhere. As the contours of racialization encompass new
 35 (white) migrants, a post-racial discourse on immigration surfaces that ena-
 36 bles racialized British citizens to become agents of anti-immigration poli-
 37 tics. Racialized ethnic minority Britons have long perceived a complicity
 38 between stringent immigration laws and racism.⁴³ Yet in recent years this
 39 has been confounded by support for hard-line anti-immigration policies
 40 amongst a sizable minority of British Asians comparable to the white British
 41 population.⁴⁴ In 2013 and 2014, this development was politically expressed
 42 by British nationals from the new commonwealth (or those labelled as *n*th
 43 generation immigrants such as former UKIP member Sanya-Jeet Thandi)
 44 through constituting themselves as advocates of UKIP's anti-immigration.⁴⁵

1 This development was termed UKIP's 'Clause IV' moment – a reference to
 2 the moment Labour formally abandoned its socialist objectives of worker
 3 ownership.⁴⁶ If we simply dismiss the inclusion of minority anti-immigrant
 4 sentiment as mere tokenism aimed at keeping old supporters while gaining
 5 new ones, rather than the identitarian sea-change the analogy implies, we
 6 miss an important development in how just-in-time citizens have come to
 7 express state racism. It marks an unprecedented shift in how racialized Brit-
 8 ish citizens are able to constitute themselves for the first time as generators
 9 of state racism, rather than primary recipients.

10 Consider the UKIP 'carnival' held in Croydon during the run-up to the
 11 2014 European and local elections. The UKIP candidate Winston McKenzie
 12 campaigned in front of a steel band, some of whom were initially un-
 13 aware that they had been hired for a UKIP event.⁴⁷ The choice of music
 14 suggested a patronizing representation of ethnic diversity that has been
 15 used from 1980s onwards as a symbol of an inclusive multicultural soci-
 16 ety. However, as anti-UKIP protesters arrived, the black candidate was con-
 17 fronted by charges of racism from those who claimed to be Romanian.⁴⁸
 18 This illustrates a complex situation of multiculturalism where the institutional
 19 racism of the prevailing migration regime, which Derek McGhee argues is
 20 supposedly partial to 'more EU (European, White, Christian) entrants', does
 21 not always correspond to the bodies that are traditionally associated with
 22 enacting or receiving state racism.⁴⁹ This is further exemplified with UKIP's
 23 response in 2013 to charges of racism by Lord Heseltine, a Conservative
 24 peer and former minister. Amjad Bashir, a UKIP MEP, stated he was more
 25 competent than the Conservative peer in using the term since, because of
 26 his Pakistani origin, he had experienced racism. Following from this, he
 27 called the charges by Heseltine counterproductive to a 'serious debate about
 28 immigration'.⁵⁰

29 Just-in-time citizens' usage of racialized difference as central for justify-
 30 ing the parameters of citizenship, through its supposed insignificance for
 31 immigration debates, exemplifies an unforeseen twist in the politics of what
 32 Hall termed 'new ethnicities'.⁵¹ The shift away from a black/white binary
 33 in identification and social ascription had previously been viewed as chal-
 34 lenging essentialist assumptions of how racialized identities and anti-racist
 35 political agendas conjoin.⁵² From the 1980s onwards, anti-racism became
 36 considered more effective if it took into account diverse practices of eth-
 37 nic self-identification and non-equivalent 'modes of oppression'.⁵³ How-
 38 ever, UKIP's minorities illustrate McGhee's observation that the host society,
 39 which is traditionally equivalent to a white population, has been partially
 40 severed through incorporating 'settled communities' as hosts.⁵⁴ Through
 41 this seemingly inclusive process, 'contingent insiders' emerge as subject to
 42 hierarchies of belonging that can in turn dispense new ways of excluding
 43 new arrivals.⁵⁵ Importantly, UKIP's just-in-time citizens demonstrate how
 44 these new agents of state racism were produced on the spur of the moment

1 when charges of racism were levelled at UKIP during 2013–14 from across
2 the political spectrum.

3 Just-in-time citizens' enactment of state racism depends on a novel expres-
4 sion of orientalist citizenship. If, as Bryan Turner notes, orientalist citizen-
5 ship traditionally operated through a 'system of absences – absent cities,
6 the missing middle class, missing autonomous urban institutions and miss-
7 ing property' which prevented citizenship's emergence, then it follows that
8 the other is considered to have a more fundamental lack.⁵⁶ This remains
9 unstated in orientalist citizenship, but this lack involves the capacity to
10 institute equality by virtue of excluding others. It is through the emergence
11 of racialized just-in-time citizens that we find its articulation transformed to
12 constitute and exclude new immigrants in a post-racial manner.

13 Hanif Kureishi argues new migrants are constituted as 'the undead, who
14 will invade, colonize and contaminate'.⁵⁷ The contemporary immigrant
15 can be deprived of citizenship without explicit recourse to orientalized
16 and racialized difference. We should not misconstrue this development as
17 another instance of the dominant anti-immigrant crisis of multiculturalism
18 discourse.⁵⁸ Racialized otherness is no longer positioned, in this context, as
19 a mark of citizenship's alterity. The dynamic between just-in-time citizens
20 and zombie immigrants depends on the latter being stripped of all identity
21 except that of an infringement on a 'post-racial' multicultural society.

22 The trajectory of just-in-time citizens reveals how the role of orientalist cit-
23 izenship in sustaining state racism is becoming articulated in less traditional
24 terms. The example of UKIP's just-in-time citizens shows that the capacity
25 and ability to exclude others from rights emanates from an anti-essentialist
26 enactment of minority identity politics. Orientalist citizenship was dis-
27 pensed through inappropriate bodies (e.g., UKIP's minority candidates), as
28 opposed to having permission and exclusion in multicultural society spring
29 from what Ghassan Hage calls the 'white national manager'.⁵⁹

30 **Intercultural Citizens: *Make Bradford British***

31 Aside from recent immigrants being juxtaposed with a 'post-racial' multi-
32 cultural society, those cast as desirable subjects of multicultural society have
33 become defined as intercultural. This involves a 'descending individualism':
34 establishing divergences from a 'norm' through scientific and disciplinary
35 practices rather than identifying individuals through histories of exceptional
36 ancestry.⁶⁰ The normal and calculable subject of multicultural society was
37 first shaped during the pioneering Canadian experiment in multicultural-
38 ism in 1971.⁶¹ This depended upon joining the 'multicultural assumption',
39 which argued that developing 'self-esteem' in one's previously marginalized
40 identity fosters acceptance by other groups, with the contact hypothesis.⁶²
41 The latter was derived from Gordon Allport's (1954) *The Nature of Preju-
42 dice*, which supposed that the more contact one had with different cultural
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

1 groups, accounting for variables in power, the more likely inter-group toler-
 2 ance would surface.⁶³ While such practices once solely resided under the term
 3 'multiculturalism', they have also come to be understood as interculturalism.

4 Theoretical differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism
 5 are mostly imperceptible.⁶⁴ However, the 'inter' emphasizes one aspect of
 6 a predominantly multiculturalist conception of society where the health
 7 of society is determined through the quality of interactions that take place
 8 across (and within) cultural communities. It is against this backdrop that
 9 intercultural citizens emerge as subjects that normalize the terms of cultural
 10 relations. This section demonstrates how this transforms expressions of ori-
 11 entalist citizenship to facilitate state racism.

12 Through envisaging multicultural society as comprised of multiplicity
 13 rather than simply majorities and minorities, conditions for a shared dialogic
 14 space become ostensibly possible. Bhikhu Parekh argues that intercultural
 15 dialogue is essential to permit individuals to 'step outside of their culture...
 16 [and] tease out its strengths and weaknesses'.⁶⁵ This correspondingly enables
 17 them to realize the 'contingency of their culture and relate to it freely...
 18 rather than as a fate'.⁶⁶ These dispositions are condensed into the figure of
 19 the intercultural citizen.
 20
 21
 22

23 The Council of Europe's *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together*
 24 *as Equals in Dignity* published in 2008 stated that an intercultural approach,
 25 involving the 'capacity to listen' and 'respectful exchange of views between
 26 individuals and groups with different ethnic...backgrounds', is central to a
 27 harmonious society.⁶⁷ While the intercultural citizen has enough curiosity
 28 and ability to learn about others' 'habits and beliefs', this can lead to a posi-
 29 tion where one speaks for a culture, thereby petrifying its content, meaning,
 30 and borders.⁶⁸ This sensitivity towards the otherness of the other is at odds
 31 with the traditional figure of the spoken-for orientalized subject. As Ted Can-
 32 tle argues, emphasizing the intercultural means recognizing how identities
 33 are 'chosen and developmental', overlapping, and resistant to ascription.⁶⁹

34 Yet orientalism is being transformed, rather than overcome, through the
 35 intercultural citizen. It is a figure which largely corresponds to a multicul-
 36 turalist conception of society and can be illustrated through the Channel 4
 37 reality programme *Make Bradford British* aired in 2012. Like numerous media
 38 representations of multicultural society, the documentary caused a brief
 39 media frenzy and was later forgotten. It is, however, distinguishable through
 40 its promotion of intercultural citizens. The programme mostly concurred
 41 with many of the Labour Party's guidelines for community activism such as
 42 'developing resilience' through sharing futures and notions of belongings,
 43 while dispelling 'myths' and 'promoting interaction'.⁷⁰ Yet there was one
 44 crucial difference. The narrator tacitly participated in the crisis of multicul-
 45 turalism discourse by stating the programme was in response to Conserva-
 46 tive Prime Minister David Cameron's suggestion that 'state multiculturalism'
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51

1 promoted 'passive tolerance'.⁷¹ The programme aimed to 'break away' from
 2 tolerance and cohesion discourse.⁷² Instead, it explicitly assumed the mantle
 3 of enacting a decentralized, locally envisioned idea of what form desirable
 4 multicultural coexistence should assume by finding out how it 'really works'
 5 on the ground.⁷³

6 *Make Bradford British* placed eight people from different classes, ethnicities,
 7 and postcodes under the same roof. What the individuals had in common
 8 was their labelling as 'failed citizens'. This was defined as those who had
 9 failed the Life in the UK citizenship test. The choice of locations within Brad-
 10 ford, predominantly white, Asian, and affluent or deprived areas, supposed
 11 that their 'failure' as citizens was related to their lack of everyday contact
 12 with different ethnicities. The failed citizen status created an equalized start-
 13 ing line, in regards to British identity, regardless of class or ethnicity. This
 14 was possible since Britishness became a quantifiable possession through the
 15 citizenship test, which enabled individuals to be collectively judged against
 16 a norm. In addition, as participants were said to share a common 'failure'
 17 and atypical segregated lifestyle, we were to assume some of the participants'
 18 racism was idiosyncratic and exceptional to Britain. Although the common
 19 starting point was derived from results of the citizenship test, over the course
 20 of the programme, the state that judges their collective failure receded from
 21 view. In its place the capacity for non-conflicting social interaction became
 22 a measure of citizenship.

23 An initial viewing of the programme reveals simply a renewed advocacy
 24 for contact theory, which makes 'acculturation' and 'adaptation' central
 25 for peaceably negotiated cultural difference.⁷⁴ In our context, this became
 26 a new way of instilling power relations. As *Make Bradford British* reached
 27 its conclusion, the majority of participants strove for an intercultural posi-
 28 tion. Even though racist and tolerant beliefs were maintained, participants
 29 who held these views were no longer marked as failed citizens. This became
 30 evident in the conclusion to the programme when they were brought back
 31 to the question of Britishness. This time, however, they were presented as
 32 British by virtue of being asked to define their cultural citizenship in sub-
 33 jective terms. Their various narratives were presented to the audience as
 34 representative of the plurality of the British national imaginary. The only
 35 participant who remained implicitly a failed citizen was the 'South Asian'
 36 'taxi driver'. This was due to his premature departure from the show after
 37 his refusal to discuss his patriarchal beliefs. His absence at the end meant
 38 that he missed the opportunity given to his fellow participants, now inter-
 39 cultural citizens, to express their Britishness. The unplanned narrative of
 40 the programme is symbolic of how intercultural citizens opened spaces for
 41 challenging orientalist assumptions. At the same time, intercultural citi-
 42 zens emerged as disciplining subjects who discerned those who qualify as
 43 equal citizens.
 44
 45
 46
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51



1 Through this particular multiculturalist framing of multicultural society,
 2 orientalist citizenship is transformed. A split was created between those who
 3 can be normalized as competent for cultural dialogue and individuals per-
 4 ceived as trapped within cultural silos: the ‘failed’ citizens. However, inter-
 5 cultural citizens became teleological subjects by virtue of eradicating a failed
 6 citizen from within their own identity and that of others. A crude state racism,
 7 where an ‘us’ and ‘them’ are clearly marked, has its dynamic replaced. Inter-
 8 cultural citizens became disciplining subjects that undermined the existence
 9 of failed citizens through a non-dichotomous ‘us’ and ‘them’. The unique
 10 relation between intercultural and failed citizens may appear to provide an
 11 opening for challenges to orientalism. However, intercultural citizens in the
 12 context of *Make Bradford British* reintroduced orientalist citizenship through
 13 the normalization of an intercultural position defined against orientalized
 14 others who are disbarred from (or refuse to) make this transition.
 15
 16

17 **Anti-civilizational Citizens: Protest through the StWC**

18
 19
 20 Multicultural society is not only expressed through shaping the legal and
 21 cultural conceptions of citizenship. It has also been characterized as the
 22 lived experience of multiculturalism. This can be understood as the diasporic,
 23 syncretic, hybrid, and processual performances of difference that can poten-
 24 tially arise to undermine the framing of culture through ethnic absolut-
 25 isms.⁷⁵ As I previously argued, the multicultural conception of society places
 26 greater emphasis on how individuals can be located apart from statist cat-
 27 egorizations of ethnicity and singularly quantifiable identities. Logically,
 28 it is impossible for multiculturalism to reinvent orientalist citizenship. When
 29 it exceeds being presented as a neutral descriptor of multicultural society,
 30 valorizing multiculturalism intrinsically undermines the genealogies that hold
 31 cultures as corresponding to discrete boundaries, bodies, and geographical
 32 origins. A brief discussion of the debate between Samuel Huntington and
 33 Edward Said reveals how this brand of multiculturalism can undermine oriental-
 34 ism. This debate provides a starting point from which to highlight changes
 35 in orientalist citizenship that incorporate, rather than oppose, progressive
 36 articulations of multiculturalism.
 37
 38

39
 40 Samuel Huntington argued that humanity is organized into historically
 41 durable, hermetically sealed, and culturally incompatible civilizational blocs
 42 whose existence becomes threatened when transgression to their fault lines
 43 occurs.⁷⁶ Unlike Huntington, who, according to David Cannadine, ‘urged
 44 accommodation rather than confrontation’ between civilizations, Edward
 45 Said rejected engaging with the issue of accommodation.⁷⁷ This was due
 46 to an initial dispute around civilizational categorization. Said’s response to
 47 Huntington can be summed up as follows: we live in ‘a disorderly reality that
 48 won’t be pigeonholed or strapped down’.⁷⁸ This view derives from the argu-
 49 ment that the contemporary sectioning of humanity into ‘distinct breeds
 50
 51



1 or essences' should be exposed as both a false representation and an effect
 2 of power relations.⁷⁹ Instead, he posited culture as necessarily overlapping
 3 and appropriating in ways that resist its confinement to identitarian short-
 4 hand.⁸⁰ To discern inequity in power relations that transpires through multi-
 5 culture, Said argued for humanism: 'the agency of human individuality and
 6 subjective intuition, rather than [reliance] on received ideas and approved
 7 authority'.⁸¹

9 Said's refusal to challenge orientalist discourse on its own terms, for exam-
 10 ple by reversing orientalism or promoting tolerance, is a vital means for
 11 contesting expressions of orientalism that pervade British media and politi-
 12 cal discourse. However, orientalism has not remained static in its post-9/11
 13 'Islamophobic' and civilizational articulation. The orientalist War on Ter-
 14 ror is partially sustained without relying upon (ideologically obscured) con-
 15 structs of an 'us' and 'them'. In effect, it sidestepped the symbolic role the
 16 Huntington and Said debate has for illustrating our political conjuncture.
 17 To illustrate this we can turn to the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) protests.
 18 This reveals how an explicit refusal of orientalist terms, through casting one-
 19 self as a citizen against notions of civilizational difference, can in fact testify
 20 to a transformation in orientalist citizenship.
 21

22 The StWC protest in 2003 helped organize the largest protest in UK history
 23 against the then impending Iraq war.⁸² The StWC prided itself on the diver-
 24 sity of beliefs, nationalities, ethnicities, and ages involved in mobilization.⁸³
 25 This diversity extended from the motivation of activism to the differing
 26 agendas of the Socialist Workers Party, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and
 27 Muslim Association of Britain who were formative of StWC. The diver-
 28 sity of the act – Islamists marching alongside Quakers – embodied the shared
 29 demand for human dignity denied through the nascent War on Terror.
 30

31 The multicultural constitution of the StWC enabled a struggle beyond civ-
 32 ilizational dichotomies. Emphasis on a common humanity was vital for con-
 33 testing the terms of a War on Terror meted out on spectral subjects devoid
 34 of humanity, an undead presence that can be repeatedly killed because they
 35 are inexhaustible and unindividuated.⁸⁴ StWC resisted this form of oriental-
 36 ism by deconstructing the situation of humanity in the West. For example,
 37 in response to the disproportionate media coverage of the deaths of British
 38 soldiers overseas in relation to civilian fatalities, StWC sought to render the
 39 latter visible by reading out civilian names in public.⁸⁵ Bringing anonymous
 40 others into the sphere of nameable humanity, like the fallen British soldiers,
 41 defied the fused national and cultural boundaries of contemporary orien-
 42 talist citizenship. The unintended function of this critique should also be
 43 scrutinized.
 44

45 Aspects of the worldviews exemplified by Huntington (claiming mastery
 46 over an other which can be categorized and governed) and Said (the inability
 47 to categorize and govern through orientalism without perpetuating violence)
 48 have come to be selectively blended in a War on Terror that governs through
 49
 50
 51



1 risk. The effects of orientalism persist through what could be described as
2 'precautionary risk management'.⁸⁶ This 'displays an insatiable quest for
3 knowledge: profiling populations, surveillance, intelligence, knowledge
4 about catastrophe management, prevention, etc.'.⁸⁷ The pre-emptive forms
5 of securitization appear to have legitimated the War on Terror, in particular
6 the 2003 justification for the invasion of Iraq.⁸⁸

7
8 Less observed is how certain ways of refusing orientalist discourse can in
9 themselves become part of the diffused securitizing strategies of governing
10 in times of risk. Despite the unplanned multicultural diversity and pluralism
11 lauded in the StWC 2003 mobilization, attempts to politicize ethno-religious
12 difference were heavily constrained. This absence was not conspicuous. Some
13 members of the Muslim Association of Britain and the Islamist organization
14 Al-Muhajiroun wanted to emphasize the war as a Muslim plight by excluding
15 non-whites from the mainstream protest.⁸⁹ These individuals were margin-
16 alized.⁹⁰ Yet in so far as barring non-secular protesters prevented a specious
17 claim of a war on Muslims, and prevented an inverted clash of civilizations
18 discourse, this sustained practices of state racism. Through protesters being
19 positioned beyond identitarian terms via their shared grievance, the protest
20 assumed a function of vigilance, regulation, and disciplining of public space
21 in case a potential legitimacy for religious protest emerged. According to
22 Salma Yaqoob, the secular nature of the official protest also meant that 'mod-
23 erate' protesters who offered anti-war rationales on religious grounds could
24 not articulate their grievances as such.⁹¹

25
26
27
28 The StWC protests exemplified how defining the protest as an organic
29 expression of multicultural, underpinned by a common objective, poten-
30 tially offers a path beyond the territorial and population-managerial under-
31 pinnings of state racism. At the same time as sustaining anti-civilizational
32 citizens and multicultural, the protests became a site that marked the diffu-
33 sion of risk-based anti-terrorism. As certain anti-civilizational citizens came
34 to regulate the terms of protest, an unintended expression of orientalist citi-
35 zenship hardened dividing practices in less perceptible ways than the tradi-
36 tional 'clash of civilizations' discourse.

39 Conclusion

40
41
42 Claiming 'society must be defended' is a task undertaken by those who have
43 positioned themselves as part of a legitimate population who can dictate
44 terms for excluding others. This move no longer involves a 'race struggle'
45 where historical discontinuity is introduced into the prevailing notions
46 of the rightful and authentic inhabitants. Instead, state racism emerges to
47 preserve society as irrevocably tethered to the institutions of the state (and
48 thereby constitute society as already 'ours').⁹² This chapter has explored the
49 ways state racism is expressed through attempts to define and defend mul-
50 ticultural society. I uncovered various ways orientalist citizenship has been
51



1 transformed to enable state racism persistence through post-racial, multiculturalist, and multicultural conceptions of society.

2
3 The first exploration of orientalist citizenship focused on how it reinforced
4 a conception of multicultural society as post-racial and anti-immigrant. By
5 drawing attention to UKIP's just-in-time citizens, I argued that an anti-
6 essentialist severing of a fused racialized identity and support for immigration
7 partially occurred as racialized citizens assumed an orientalist position
8 of excluding others. Second, I showed how *Make Bradford British* illustrated
9 one way intercultural citizens have defined and defended a multiculturalist
10 conception of society. Of significance was how normalized intercultural
11 citizens were demarcated from failed citizens in non-dichotomous terms to
12 facilitate a more inclusive notion of cultural citizenship. Yet it was precisely
13 this attempt at creating intercultural citizens and failed citizens as occupying
14 dynamic subject positions, rather than mutually exclusive identities, that
15 the intercultural citizen became a disciplining position from which orientalist
16 citizenship could gain a new expression. In a similar vein to UKIP's
17 just-in-time citizens, the normalization of intercultural citizens revealed
18 how transformations in orientalist citizenship enable state racism to persist
19 in situations where biological and culturally defined hierarchies become
20 untenable. Just-in-time and intercultural citizens illustrate positions from
21 which racialized citizens can constitute the legitimate occupants of society
22 and terms of exclusion.

23
24
25
26 Lastly, I investigated how anti-civilizational citizens emerged through (and
27 depended upon) multicultural. A more thoroughgoing critique of state racism
28 becomes possible through this figure. This is the case since multicultural can
29 potentially erode a genealogy of identity as bearing pure inheritances and
30 valorized statuses, which state racism has historically defined against those
31 who can be killed with impunity. This anti-essentialist challenge to identity
32 was illustrated through StWC protests. However, I demonstrated how this
33 specific instance of deconstructing positions of 'us' and 'them' in the War on
34 Terror also served as an orientalist disciplinary mechanism for normalizing
35 protest as secular and circulating risk-based anti-terrorism.

36
37
38 According to Slavoj Žižek, when individuals become confined to politically
39 acting under the label of cultural difference, heterogeneous struggles
40 for equality become condensed and repressed into a 'post-political' discourse
41 of managing cultural diversity.⁹³ The conceptions of multicultural society
42 discussed, and the expressions of citizenship which loosely correspond to
43 each conception, should not be interpreted as yet another general indictment
44 of the 'culturalization of politics'.⁹⁴ This chapter instead analysed
45 orientalist instances of just-in-time, intercultural, and anti-civilizational
46 citizens to illustrate a distinctive issue: how state racism materializes through
47 the co-option of anti-essentialist critique. State racism was shown to depend
48 on these expressions of orientalist citizenship to fulfill its new imperative:
49 multicultural society must be defended.
50
51

Notes

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

- 1 Bhikhu Parekh, "Integrating Minorities," in *Race Relations: A Developing Agenda*, ed. Tessa Blackstone, Bhikhu Parekh and Peter Sanders (London: Routledge, 1998), 14.
- 2 David Cameron, *PM's speech at Munich Security Conference* [online]. Number10.gov. <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293> (accessed 5 June 2011); Nick Clegg, *An Open, Confident Society*, The Liberal Democrats, 2011. http://www.libdemocrats.org/latest_news_detail.aspx?title=Nick_Clegg_speech:_An_Open,_Confident_Society&pPK=25e28e0b-a8e7-4104-ba5e-e860d752c31a. (accessed 4 March 2011); Ken Livingstone, *Text of statement by Mayor Ken Livingstone*, Financial Times, 2005 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dcdfe116-ef08-11d9-8b10-00000e2511c8.html-axzz3FDu9JDA>. (accessed 3 October 2014).
- 3 Les Back, Shamsir Sinha, and Charlynnne Bryan, "New Hierarchies of Belonging," *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15, 2 (2012): 679–80.
- 4 E. F. Isin "Citizenship after Orientalism: Ottoman Citizenship," in *Challenges to Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, eds. F. Keyman and A. Icduygu (London: Routledge, 2005), 31.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *Power: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2001), 216–17.
- 7 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France 1977–1978* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 70.
- 8 Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* (London: Penguin, 2003), 242–3.
- 9 Ibid., 256.
- 10 Ibid., 61.
- 11 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 257.
- 12 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 259–63.
- 13 Luce Irigaray and Michael Marder, "Is 'Democracy' Nothing More Than a Slogan Now?" *The New Statesman* 2014 (accessed 28 November 2014).
- 14 Giovanni Sartori, cited in Iker Barbero, "Orientalising Citizenship: The Legitimation of Immigration Regimes in the European Union," *Citizenship Studies* 16, 5-6 (2012): 759.
- 15 Engin Isin, "Citizenship after Orientalism: An Unfinished Project," *Citizenship Studies* 16, 5-6 (2012): 568.
- 16 Alana Lentin, "Post-Race, Post Politics: The Paradoxical Rise of Culture after Multiculturalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5-9 (2012).
- 17 Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood, "Who Doesn't Feel British? Divisions over Muslims," *Parliamentary Affairs* 63, 2 (2010): 304.
- 18 Maria Sobolewska, "Religious Extremism in Britain and British Muslims: Threatened Citizenship and the Role of Religion," in *The New Extremism in the 21st Century*, ed. R. Eatwell and M. J. Goodwin (New York: Routledge, 2010), 29.
- 19 Bhikhu Parekh, "Muslim Alienation and the Obligations of Citizenship," *The Times*, 7 July 2006.
- 20 Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004).
- 21 Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB). *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report* (London: Profile Books).
- 22 Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Diversity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 183–4.

- 1 23 Alana Lentin and Gavin Titley, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal*
 2 *Age* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 187.
- 3 24 Sarah Neal et al., "Living Multiculture: Understanding the New Spatial and Social
 4 Relations of Ethnicity and Multiculture in England," *Environment and Planning C:*
 5 *Government and Policy* 31, 2 (2013): 309.
- 6 25 Stuart Hall, "Conclusion: The Multi-Cultural Question," in *Un/Settled Multicultur-*
 7 *alisms*, ed. Barnor Hesse (London: Zed Books, 2000), 209.
- 8 26 Stuart Hall, *The Multicultural Question* (Milton Keynes: Pavis Centre for Social and
 9 Cultural Research, The Open University, 2000), 14.
- 10 27 William Connolly, "Pluralism, Multiculturalism and the Nation-State: Rethinking
 11 the Connections," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1, 1 (1996): 60.
- 12 28 Ash Amin, "Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity," *Environ-*
 13 *ment and Planning A* 34, 6 (2002): 269–70.
- 14 29 Elke Winter, *Us, Them, and Others* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 111.
- 15 30 Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended*, 66–7.
- 16 31 Ibid.
- 17 32 Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire* (London: Duke University Press, 1995),
 18 62.
- 19 33 CMEB, *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report*, 38.
- 20 34 Ibid.
- 21 35 Ibid.
- 22 36 Ibid., 56.
- 23 37 Paul Gilroy, "'My Britain Is Fuck All' Zombie Multiculturalism and the Race Poli-
 24 tics of Citizenship," *Identities* 19, 4 (2012): 386.
- 25 38 Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, "Ukip Wins European Elections with Ease to
 26 Set Off Political Earthquake," *The Guardian* 2014 [http://www.theguardian.com/
 27 politics/2014/may/26/ukip-european-elections-political-earthquake](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/26/ukip-european-elections-political-earthquake) (accessed 2
 28 January 2015).
- 29 39 Nigel Farage, Interview with Nigel Farage, Leader of the U.K. Independence Party
 30 2014 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-with-nigel-farage-leader-
 31 -of-the-uk-independence-party/2014/05/14/3b2f8c72-f855-47be-b3f8-
 32 -8e7f638ad3a6_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-with-nigel-farage-leader-of-the-uk-independence-party/2014/05/14/3b2f8c72-f855-47be-b3f8-8e7f638ad3a6_story.html) (accessed 30 May 2014).
- 33 40 BBC, Nigel Farage Defends Romanian Comments Amid Racism Claims. *BBC* 2014
 34 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27474099> (accessed 29 May 2014).
- 35 41 Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,"
 36 *Slavic Review* 54, 4 (1995): 918.
- 37 42 Farage cited in M. Holehouse, "Nigel Farage Blames Paris Attack on 'Rather Gross
 38 Policy of Multi-Culturalism,'" *The Telegraph* 2015 [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
 39 news/politics/nick-clegg/11332461/Nigel-Farage-blames-Paris-attack-on-rather-
 40 -gross-policy-of-multi-culturalism.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nick-clegg/11332461/Nigel-Farage-blames-Paris-attack-on-rather-gross-policy-of-multi-culturalism.html) (accessed 9 January 2015).
- 41 43 Shamit Sagar, "Immigration and the Politics of Public Opinion," *The Political*
 42 *Quarterly* 74 (2003): 178–94.
- 43 44 Nick Lowles and Aron Painter, "Fear and Hope: The New Politics of Identity,"
 44 *Searchlight Educational Trust* 2012 [http://www.fearandhope.org.uk/project-report/
 45 themes](http://www.fearandhope.org.uk/project-report/themes) (accessed 13 July 2013).
- 46 45 Sarfraz Manzoor, "The New Faces of Ukip," *The Times* 2013 [http://www.thetimes
 47 .co.uk/tto/magazine/article3938636.ece](http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/magazine/article3938636.ece) (accessed 3 January 2014).
- 48 46 A. Singh, "Why Are Ethnic Minorities Supporting Ukip?" *Independent* 2014
 49 [http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-are-ethnic-minorities-supporting
 50 -ukip-9347369.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-are-ethnic-minorities-supporting-ukip-9347369.html) (accessed 19 May 2014).
- 51

- 1 47 Georgia Graham and Christopher Hope, "Nigel Farage Feels Too 'Unsafe' to Attend
2 His Own 'Ukip Carnival,'" *The Telegraph* 2014 [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
3 politics/ukip/10844087/Nigel-Farage-feels-too-unsafe-to-attend-his-own-Ukip-
4 carnival.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10844087/Nigel-Farage-feels-too-unsafe-to-attend-his-own-Ukip-carnival.html) (accessed 3 January 2015).
- 5 48 Gareth Davies, "Nigel Farage Fails to Show as Ukip 'Carnival' Ends with Winston
6 Mckenzie Calling Croydon an 'Absolute Dump,'" *Croydon Advertiser* 2014 [http://
7 www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/Nigel-Farage-fails-Ukip-carnival-ends-Winston/
8 story-21115536-detail/story.html](http://www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/Nigel-Farage-fails-Ukip-carnival-ends-Winston/story-21115536-detail/story.html) (accessed 12 June 2014).
- 9 49 Derek McGhee, "The Paths to Citizenship: A Critical Examination of Immigration
10 Policy in Britain since 2001," *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, 1 (2009): 53–54.
- 11 50 BBC, "Ukip Is Not a Racist Party, Lord Heseltine Told," *BBC* 2013 [http://www.bbc
12 .co.uk/news/uk-politics-24385139](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24385139) (accessed 16 June 2014).
- 13 51 S. Hall, "New Ethnicities," in *'Race', Culture and Difference*, eds. J. Donald and A.
14 Rattansi (London: Sage, 1992).
- 15 52 Ibid.
- 16 53 T. Modood, "Difference, 'Multi' and Equality," in *The Plural States of Recognition*,
17 ed. Michel Seymour (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 155.
- 18 54 Derek McGhee, "Getting 'Host' Communities on Board: Finding the Balance
19 between 'Managed Migration' and 'Managed Settlement' in Community Cohe-
20 sion Strategies," *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 32, 1 (2006): 122–3.
- 21 55 Les Back, Shamser Sinha, and Charlyne Bryan, "New Hierarchies of Belonging,"
22 *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15, 2 (2012): 140.
- 23 56 Bryan S. Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism & Globalism* (London: Routledge,
24 1994).
- 25 57 Hanif Kureishi, "The Migrant Has No Face, Status or Story," *The Guardian* 2014
26 [http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/30/hanif-kureishi-migrant
27 -immigration-1](http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/30/hanif-kureishi-migrant-immigration-1) (accessed 30 May 2014).
- 28 58 Alana Lentin and Gavin Titley, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism*, 2.
- 29 59 Ghassan Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in Multicultural Society*
30 (London: Routledge, 2000), 132–3.
- 31 60 Foucault cited in John O'Neill, "The Disciplinary Society: From Weber to Fou-
32 cault," *The British Journal of Sociology* 37, 1 (1986): 53.
- 33 61 Pierre Trudeau, Announcement of Implementation of Policy of Multiculturalism
34 within Bilingual Framework, *Heritage Community Foundation* 1971 [http://www
35 .abheritage.ca/albertans/speeches/trudeau.html](http://www.abheritage.ca/albertans/speeches/trudeau.html) (accessed 25 June 2011).
- 36 62 John W. Berry, Rudolf Kalin, and Donald M. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and Ethnic*
37 *Attitudes in Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977).
- 38 63 Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology* 49
39 (February 1998): 66–9.
- 40 64 Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multi-
41 culturalism?," *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33, 2 (2012): 175–96.
- 42 65 Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*
43 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 167.
- 44 66 Ibid.
- 45 67 Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue "Living Together as
46 Equals in Dignity," *Council of Europe* 2008 [bit.ly/MRx6jshttp://www.coe.int/t/dg4/
47 intercultural/source/white_paper_final_revised_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white_paper_final_revised_en.pdf), 17 (accessed 6 November
48 2013).
- 49 68 Will Kymlicka, "Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens," *Theory and*
50 *Research in Education* 1, 2 (2003): 158–60.
- 51



- 1 69 Ted Cante, "Interculturalism: For the Era of Globalisation, Cohesion and Diver-
2 sity," *Political Insight* (December 2012): 40.
- 3 70 Jo Broadwood and Nicola Sugden, *Building Cohesive Communities: What Frontline*
4 *Staff and Community Activists Need to Know* (London: Department for Communi-
5 ties and Local Government, 2009), 6–12.
- 6 71 Laurie Trott, Lessons to Learn, Channel 4 2012 [http://www.channel4.com/](http://www.channel4.com/programmes/make-bradford-british/articles/lessons-to-learn)
7 [programmes/make-bradford-british/articles/lessons-to-learn](http://www.channel4.com/programmes/make-bradford-british/articles/lessons-to-learn) (accessed 2 March
8 2012).
- 9 72 Ibid.
- 10 73 Channel 4, *Make Bradford British* (2012).
- 11 74 John W. Berry, "Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation," *Applied Psychology:*
12 *An International Review* 46, 1 (1997): 6–7.
- 13 75 Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso,
14 1992); J. N. Pieterse, *Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for an Octopus* (Plym-
15 outh: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
- 16 76 Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*
17 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
- 18 77 David Cannadine, *The Undivided Past: History Beyond Our Differences* (London:
19 Allen Lane, 2013), 253.
- 20 78 Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation* 2001 [http://www](http://www.unipa.it/~michele.cometa/Said_The%20Clash%20of%20Ignorance.pdf)
21 [.unipa.it/~michele.cometa/Said_The Clash of Ignorance.pdf](http://www.unipa.it/~michele.cometa/Said_The Clash of Ignorance.pdf) (accessed 7 August
22 2013).
- 23 79 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003[1978]), 348–9.
- 24 80 Said, *Orientalism*, xxii.
- 25 81 Ibid.
- 26 82 BBC, "'Million' March against Iraq War," *BBC* 2003 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2765041.stm)
27 [uk/2765041.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2765041.stm). (accessed 10 December 2011).
- 28 83 Lindsey German, War and Resistance: Moving on Up 2002 [http://www](http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8187)
29 [.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8187](http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8187) (accessed 5 August 2013).
- 30 84 Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso,
31 2004), 33–4.
- 32 85 StWC, Tyneside Stop the War Coalition Reads the Names of the Dead at Newcastle
33 Monument. *North East Stop the War* 2009 [http://www.northeaststopwar.org.uk/](http://www.northeaststopwar.org.uk/archive/manch08/100death.htm)
34 [archive/manch08/100death.htm](http://www.northeaststopwar.org.uk/archive/manch08/100death.htm) (accessed 2 August 2013).
- 35 86 Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Tak-
36 ing Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future," *European Journal of International Rela-*
37 *tions* 13, (2007): 104.
- 38 87 Ibid., 91.
- 39 88 Ibid., 109.
- 40 89 Richard Phillips, "Standing Together: The Muslim Association of Britain and the
41 Anti-War Movement," *Race & Class* 50, 2 (2008): 101–13.
- 42 90 Andrew Murray and Lindsey German, *Stop the War: The Story of Britain's Biggest*
43 *Mass Movement* (London: Bookmark Publications, 2005), 61.
- 44 91 Yahya Birt, "Islamophobia in the Construction of British Muslim Identity Poli-
45 tics," in *Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities*, ed. Peter Hopkins and Richard
46 Gale (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
- 47 92 Foucault, *Society Must be Defended*.
- 48 93 Slavoj Žižek, "Tolerance as an Ideological Category," *Critical Inquiry* 34 (2008):
49 660.
- 50 94 Ibid.
- 51



- 1 Davies, Gareth. "Nigel Farage Fails to Show as Ukip 'Carnival' Ends with Winston
2 Mckenzie Calling Croydon an 'Absolute Dump'," *Croydon Advertiser* (2014) [http://](http://www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/Nigel-Farage-fails-Ukip-carnival-ends-Winston-story-21115536-detail/story.html)
3 [www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/Nigel-Farage-fails-Ukip-carnival-ends-Winston-](http://www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/Nigel-Farage-fails-Ukip-carnival-ends-Winston-story-21115536-detail/story.html)
4 [story-21115536-detail/story.html](http://www.croydonadvertiser.co.uk/Nigel-Farage-fails-Ukip-carnival-ends-Winston-story-21115536-detail/story.html) (accessed 12 June 2014).
- 5 Farage, Nigel. "Interview with Nigel Farage, Leader of the U.K. Independence Party
6 2014" [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-with-nigel-farage-leader](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-with-nigel-farage-leader-of-the-uk-independence-party/2014/05/14/3b2f8c72-f855-47be-b3f8-8e7f638ad3a6_story.html)
7 [-of-the-uk-independence-party/2014/05/14/3b2f8c72-f855-47be-b3f8](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-with-nigel-farage-leader-of-the-uk-independence-party/2014/05/14/3b2f8c72-f855-47be-b3f8-8e7f638ad3a6_story.html)
8 [-8e7f638ad3a6_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-with-nigel-farage-leader-of-the-uk-independence-party/2014/05/14/3b2f8c72-f855-47be-b3f8-8e7f638ad3a6_story.html) (accessed 30 May 2014).
- 9 Foucault, Michel. "Governmentality," in *Power: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-*
10 *1984*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2001).
- 11 Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France 1977-*
12 *1978* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
- 13 Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended* (London: Penguin, 2003).
- 14 German, Lindsey. "War and Resistance: Moving on Up 2002" [http://www.socialistreview](http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8187)
15 [.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8187](http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=8187) (accessed 5 August 2013).
- 16 Gilroy, Paul. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso,
17 1992).
- 18 Gilroy, Paul. "'My Britain Is Fuck All' Zombie Multiculturalism and the Race Politics of
19 Citizenship," *Identities* 19, 4 (2012): 380–97.
- 20 Graham, Georgia, and Christopher Hope. "Nigel Farage Feels Too 'Unsafe' to Attend
21 His Own 'Ukip Carnival'," *The Telegraph* (2014) [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10844087/Nigel-Farage-feels-too-unsafe-to-attend-his-own-Ukip-carnival.html)
22 [politics/ukip/10844087/Nigel-Farage-feels-too-unsafe-to-attend-his-own-Ukip-car-](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10844087/Nigel-Farage-feels-too-unsafe-to-attend-his-own-Ukip-carnival.html)
23 [nival.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10844087/Nigel-Farage-feels-too-unsafe-to-attend-his-own-Ukip-carnival.html) (accessed 03 January 2015).
- 24 Hage, Ghassan. *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in Multicultural Society* (Lon-
25 don: Routledge, 2000).
- 26 Hall, Stuart. "Conclusion: The Multi-Cultural Question," in *Un/Settled Multicultural-*
27 *isms*, ed. Barnor Hesse (London: Zed Books, 2000).
- 28 Hall, Stuart, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," *Identity: Community, culture, difference* 2
29 (1990): 222–37.
- 30 Hall, Stuart. "The Meaning of New Times," in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural*
31 *Studies*, eds. D. Morley and K. Chen (London: Routledge, 1996[1989]).
- 32 Hall, Stuart. *The Multicultural Question* (Milton Keynes: Pavis Centre for Social and
33 Cultural Research, The Open University, 2000).
- 34 Hall, Stuart. "New Ethnicities," in *'Race', Culture and Difference*, eds. James Donald and
35 Ali Rattansi (London: Sage, 1992).
- 36 Hall, Stuart, and Les Back, "At Home and Not at Home: Stuart Hall in Conversation
37 with Les Back," *Cultural Studies* 23, 4 (2009): 657–88.
- 38 Hesse, Barnor. "Diasporicity: Black Britain's Post-Colonial Formations," in *Un/Settled*
39 *Multiculturalisms*, ed. Barnor Hesse (London: Zed Books, 2000).
- 40 Holehouse, Matthew. "Nigel Farage Blames Paris Attack on 'Rather Gross Policy
41 of Multi-Culturalism'," *The Telegraph* (2015) [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nick-clegg/11332461/Nigel-Farage-blames-Paris-attack-on-rather-gross-policy-of-multi-culturalism.html)
42 [politics/nick-clegg/11332461/Nigel-Farage-blames-Paris-attack-on-rather-gross-](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nick-clegg/11332461/Nigel-Farage-blames-Paris-attack-on-rather-gross-policy-of-multi-culturalism.html)
43 [policy-of-multi-culturalism.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nick-clegg/11332461/Nigel-Farage-blames-Paris-attack-on-rather-gross-policy-of-multi-culturalism.html) (accessed 9 January 2015).
- 44 Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*
45 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
- 46 Irigaray, Luce, and Michael Marder. "Is 'Democracy' Nothing More Than a Slogan
47 Now?," *The New Statesman* (2014) (accessed 28 November 2014).
- 48 Isin, Engin F. "Citizenship after Orientalism: Ottoman Citizenship," in *Challenges to*
49 *Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, eds. F.
50 Keyman and A. Icdyugu (London: Routledge, 2005).
- 51