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OUTLAW BIKER CLUBS

A Case Study Exploration of
Collective Violence*Mohammed Rahman***Introduction**

In the academic epoch, *outlaw* motorcycle clubs are known as the “one-percenters”, an established sub-culture that is not recognized by the American Motorcyclist Association as a law-abiding motorcycle organization (Barker and Human 2009). Indeed, this has resulted in several biker clubs being labelled as “organized crime” groups, and in other cases as “gangs”. In the global north, academically and politically, the terms are used interchangeably when describing such clubs (Barker 2007). In regards to a motorcycle club (MC), the label “organized crime” was first associated with the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC), an international club, which formed in 1948 in California, USA. By 1969, the HAMC had established itself in London, England, after being chartered by its founder, Ralph “Sonny” Barger (Barger *et al.*, 2001). Across the Atlantic, the United States Federal Government indicted Barger and several of his associates under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); a US federal law passed in 1970 with extensive focus on racketeering crimes, and one that allowed identified leaders of an organization to be tried for crimes that they ordered others to do, or assisted them in doing.

Of note, contemporary research on outlaw clubs gravitates towards the perception that such fraternities are indeed “gangs”, given their explicit symbolic nature, which is often displayed through garment “patches”. Scholars note how patches identify club membership, ranking, and territorial location (Quinn and Koch 2003). However, clubs that wear such insignias refute patches as gang emblems, which is reinforced by research that argues how biker apparels contribute towards the construction of identity and organizational branding. So too, through the cultivation of a deviant image, outlaw organizations have been able to successfully commercialize themselves, with many of the self-proclaimed one-percenters “trademarking” their brand (Kuldova 2017). The trademark’s symbolic power within consumer culture is global, which therefore illustrates the paradoxical nature of outlaw clubs. By default, they are anti-establishment, yet their utilization of licit services enables them to promote their organization on an international scale, which in turn finances growth in legal and illegal markets (Schouten and McAlexander, 1995). Crucially, Kuldova (2019) argues that growth of anti-establishment movements under the spell of neoliberalism is not accidental, but inevitable. Nonetheless, discussions of whether such clubs are street gangs or criminal organizations continue to dominate scholarly

work (see Wolf, 1991; Bjørge, 2019; Lauchs, 2019), yet Rahman and Lynes (2018) posit that it is difficult to distinguish authoritatively gangs from organized crime groups, given the blurred and indistinct nature of actors and their interactions.

Rather than contributing towards the ongoing academic debate on defining gangs and organized crime groups, this chapter explores spontaneous collective violence, which is generally overlooked in collective violence scholarship. In doing so, through case examples, it illustrates how spontaneous acts of collective violence are welcomed by outlaw clubs, as they contribute towards the clubs' maintenance of symbolic boundaries and "brotherhood", a keystone concept that will be critically explored later.

Collective violence, the legitimization of violence and brotherhood

In everyday discussions, violence is viewed as an undesirable or illegal act. Gangland conflict, for example, is typically described as violent practice, whereas soldiers who maim or kill in the battlefield are likely to be described as war heroes or patriots. While official and unofficial statements underline the conceptuality of violence, we can see how euphemisms distort our perceptions of actors of harm. Globally, collective violence is a unified approach towards employing violent practice. Commentators who have extensively explored the phenomenon align their discussion towards extreme organized or institutionalized forms of violence, which include student protests, riots, revolutions, wars and genocide (Apter, 1997; Tilly, 2003; Brewer, 2010). Indeed, as Ray (2018, p. 181) eloquently says, "the role of state or quasi-state agents in pursuing collective violence requires different analysis from that of spontaneous violence". So, before considering spontaneous violence that emerges from outlaw biker clubs, this section will first consider key arguments in relation to collective violence and the legitimization of violence.

Tilly (2003) considers collective violence to encompass at least two perpetrators of physical damage, which results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts. Collective violence, through a definition of this nature, omits individual acts and non-material damage. For Tilly, the concept is relational, which therefore means that violence conventionally emerges from social interactions and settings. Politically, we are often exposed to unified acts of violence because of "broken negotiations" whereby a bargaining process that was non-violent has skewed. These types of violent practice usually involve little coordination; however, their implications can be catastrophic. Often, violent rituals require high coordination, as their priorities involve inflicting maximum damage to others, so as to be able to receive priority within a recognized locale. Tilly (2003) recognizes gang rivalry to be associated with violent rituals, yet opportunism often acts as a catalyst for gangland rivalries, especially for those that are considered to be "outlaw bikers" (Kuldova and Quinn, 2018; Bjørge, 2019; Lauchs, 2019). While opportunistic violence resonates with politically oriented violence, in that they both involve little coordination, what separates them is that opportunistic violence is, in some cases, driven by behavioural disposition. All violence that is public or involves the public can be viewed as "political" as it may be a threat to public order, but it is not always political in its core motivations. Hence, violence may have depoliticized connotations, and this is a prevalent feature for collective violence that is employed by outlaw clubs.

In relation to outlaw biker clubs, violence is a defining characteristic of club identity, and a commodity that is used to start, maintain and advance legitimate and illegitimate enterprises (Barker, 2007). Commentators of one-percenter clubs draw together case examples of violence within a collective nature (Marsden and Sher, 2007), and note how enmity between such clubs is global. Accounts of violence employed by one-percenter organizations are often secondary and, given the clandestine nature of club members, there is little to go by with regards to

1 primary narratives. Of note, the biographical account of the founder of the HAMC – Ralph
2 “Sonny” Barger (Barger *et al.*, 2001) – is perhaps the most celebrated and reliable account of the
3 outlaw biker world, especially when it concerns the HAMC. Here, it is worth noting that the
4 significance of research on serious violence has stemmed from “true crime” genre and investiga-
5 tive journalism (Clarkson, 2003, 2008; Thompson, 2008, 2011). Such texts often offer thought-
6 provoking accounts of criminal careers, which most academic works fail to achieve. While texts
7 such as Barger *et al.* (2001) are often dismissed by social scholars, Durham *et al.* (1995, p. 144)
8 state that “the true crime genre is an important, yet understudied, aspect of popular representa-
9 tions of crime”. So too, it should be highlighted that true crime accounts may misrepresent the
10 crimes that they attempt to “reveal”. Rahman (2019) makes clear how this also extends from
11 general popular understandings to official narratives. Nonetheless, the fact that true crime offers
12 the understanding of offending through an alternative account provides a distinctive type of
13 insight that is advantageous for case study work. Thus, below are some narratives of violence
14 from Sonny Barger’s biography.

15 Throughout his biography, Sonny alludes to the importance of how members of the HAMC
16 are obliged to support fellow members under any circumstances, that is: “a very select brother-
17 hood of men who will fight and die for each other” (Barger *et al.*, 2001, p. 67); “a Hell’s Angel
18 should never break and run” (Barger *et al.*, 2001, p. 146). During the early years of the HAMC,
19 the Oakland HAMC chapter would go on regional and national runs as a pack, which inevitably
20 led to violent confrontations with rival gangs, which only helped gain nationwide notoriety.
21 Intra-gang violence was also an active issue for the HAMC during Sonny’s presidency, as there
22 was once a period when “Oakland and Frisco Hell’s Angels would fuck each other up” (Barger
23 *et al.*, 2001, p. 148).

24 While the reasons of these violent encounters were often trivial, all members were required
25 to partake in brawls in order to maintain themselves as “righteous” bikers (Katz, 1988). Here it
26 is important to note that the propensity to violence is what separates “patched” bikers from
27 mainstream bikers. Hence, the former is labelled as what has already been described as the one-
28 percenters, those that “engage in unconventional behaviour, often criminal behaviour” (Barker
29 and Human, 2009, p. 174). Quinn and Koch (2003, p. 286) consider how status frustration and
30 endless quest for power drives the agenda for “establishing and maintaining an image as danger-
31 ous, unpredictable, and outrageous”. Barker and Human (2009, p. 174) further clarify that the
32 one-percenters are of all one race, sex, or sexual orientation. Indeed, the tension between
33 intense allegiance and hierarchal control on the one hand, and the autonomous violent mascu-
34 linity is perplexing to the “outsider” (Becker, 1997). As Quinn and Koch (2003, p. 289) observe,
35 “loyalty to a national hierarchy reinforces deeply felt tribal solidarity and power”. Indeed, based
36 on the above, violence is a “legitimated” function that is used for clarifying issues, solving prob-
37 lems, and promoting intergroup communication.

38 Before critically exploring the legitimization of violence in the outlaw biker world, it is worth-
39 while first defining legitimacy, which Ball-Rokeach (2017, p. 101) considers to be “a collective
40 judgement that attributes the qualities of ‘goodness’ or ‘morality’ or ‘righteousness’ to behaviour”.
41 It can be argued that individuals who are engaged in legitimated forms of violence are often
42 embraced by others through praise and acceptance. In return, they may view themselves as
43 righteous individuals who carried out an act for the sake of “Good” (Katz, 1988). Legitimacy is
44 a complex social phenomenon, and given its political construct, it is only in some cases that the
45 use of violence is “legitimate” in the eyes of all concerned. However, it is the outlaw character-
46 istic of brotherhood, and the paradoxical nature of biker clubs that help outlaw members identify
47 when violence can be employed in a legitimate manner (Barker, 2007). For instance, members
48 tend to separate themselves from the opposite gender when it comes to business imperatives but

they are prepared to exploit women for their intrinsic desires (Bjørge, 2019). Members tend to also separate themselves from mainstream society, yet are unable to do so economically, be it due to legitimate or illegitimate means. It is these paradoxes that serve as clear boundaries, which leads to the rationalization and justification of violence.

In relation to the justification of violence, the term justification alludes to the explanation or reasoning of behaviour. Ball-Rokeach (2017, p. 102) argues that “justifications for violent actions are not inherently properties of events, but develop as part of events in process”. Thus, when legitimacy of a violent act is cleared from scrutiny, evaluation in the form of justification is integrated into the event. Indeed, when this is not achieved, justification becomes problematic. In the context of outlaw clubs, the justification of violence, and violence itself is underpinned by “brotherhood” (Wolf, 1991) – a keystone characteristic in the biker subculture.

The notion of brotherhood is commonplace in academic literature (Reynolds, 1967; Thompson, 2011), yet there is no consensus as to what it means. Some scholars have viewed the concept functionally, in the sense that brotherhood means being dependent on each other on a day to day basis (Quinn, 1987; Marsden and Sher, 2007). Others view it as a default value that can be used when a fellow biker needs help, especially in compromising situations (Barker, 2007; Barker and Human, 2009). While the term remains ambiguous, it generally considers the relationship between brothers, which seemingly excludes women. Indeed, this reinforces, Barger’s stance on how outlaw clubs such as the HAMC are elite men’s club, and the participation of women is contingent upon club rules as opposed to state laws. The meticulous ethnographic work of Wolf (1991) provides persuasive accounts of how, through brotherhood, an outlaw club fulfils a member’s personal search for identity and community. The author epitomizes brotherhood as the bedrock of the outlaw community, and considers it to be a lengthy process that reveals the true nature of a biker. In relation to brotherhood, Wolf (1991, pp. 98–99) notes:

The prospective member discovers that his involvement in the club is expected to go beyond institutional participation (love of the club) and beyond motorcycling (love of biking) to include the formation of friendship ties – ‘love for your brothers’. In a parallel manner, the participation of members as a collective transcends formal organizational tasks to include the generation and maintenance of group solidarity.

The term “prospect” is often used to denote bikers who have joined a club and are on a probationary period. During this period, the individual will be tested by “patched” (established, full-time) members to determine his devotion towards the club and its followers. During the prospect stage of a biker, Barker (2007, p. 69) notes that “the man’s attitude is conditioned so that he displays a sense of responsibility and respect towards the patchholders of the club, without which he will not develop a sense of brotherhood”. Interestingly, this resonates with the above passage from Wolf (1991), in that a group social network – the “brotherhood” – becomes a means for underlying realities of group association. Indeed, because of the subculture nature of such clubs; the social network element for the prospect biker – a byproduct of brotherhood – serves as a buffer to isolate oneself from outside social ties, so as to be able to build allegiances within club quarters. This reinforces the clandestine nature of such organizations. In sum, brotherhood is characterized by a combination of a high degree of connectedness, the construction and strengthening of interpersonal commitment, and the scope of interpersonal contact.

Based on this, it is evident that the premise which triggers brotherhood is support. Support is contingent upon collectivity and welfare – of collective fate – without which an outlaw club cannot function. Scholarly works on biker clubs have commented on how such fraternities

1 institutionalize the “all for one, one for all” support ethos, by incorporating it into their club
2 rules, which in turn is often displayed through deviant or criminal behaviour against rival clubs
3 or members of mainstream society (Barger *et al.*, 2001; Thompson, 2011; Bjørge, 2019; Lauchs,
4 2019). The mutual-support ethos, namely in relation to public awareness, acts as a defensive
5 group border marker and functions effectively to impede any conflict between the club and host
6 society. As Wolf (1991, p. 98) notes: “The knowledge that a violator faces retribution from the
7 whole club serves to restrain assaults by outsiders”. Such sentiments are echoed by Sonny Barger,
8 who states in his biography: “when a Hell’s Angel fights a citizen or a rival club member, every-
9 body rat-packs to his side” (Barger *et al.* 2001, 148).

10 As mentioned, prospect members can face testing times to measure their fidelity towards club
11 members and the club itself. In some cases, these involve violent encounters. Below is a nar-
12 rative account from Gypsy, a North American motorcycle club road captain and his recollection
13 of how his club reacted when a prospect failed to live up to his commitment:
14

15 We were an outlaw club, but that doesn’t mean that we went looking for trouble. But
16 when it came, we didn’t back down from it ... We were walking down an alley and
17 there were these five Italians ... They came at us, one of them grabbed a two-by-four.
18 Stu took away the two-by-four and we beat them. They could have been dead for all
19 we knew. We didn’t have time to find out cause the sirens began, and we hit the road.
20 And we had this striker [prospect] with us. While we were there fighting like fucking
21 cats and dogs this fucker stood back and watched. When we got back to the club-
22 house, Stu said: ‘You Fuck! Get out of the building. Either get out, or I’ll drag you
23 out! If you’re in a fight with us it’s all for one and one for all. If we’re getting the shit
24 kicked out of us, you get in there and get the shit kicked out of you. You’re no
25 fucking blood special!’ Stu took that poor fucker outside and he beat the supreme shit
26 out of him. Stu left him lying outside the clubhouse. When we came the next morning,
27 he was gone.

(Wolf, 1991, pp. 99–100)

28
29
30 The excerpt above charts the significance of brotherhood; an uncompromising commit-
31 ment from club members, which in turn is rewarded through unwavering comradeship and
32 support. For the biker, the acquisition of brotherhood means the surrender of past friendships.
33 In this subculture, by default and design, there is an expectation for all newcomers to embrace
34 the outlaw way of life, or what is deemed to be “all for one, one for all”. So too, collective
35 nature requires members to be on constant standby, so as to be able to help a fellow comrade
36 pragmatically or combatively. Based on the passage above, while outlaw MCs may not actively
37 look for trouble, retreating from conflict is never an option. As Ellis (2014, p. 23) explains,
38 “the need for men to achieve, and appear to be in possession of, a particular masculinity has
39 relevance for understanding violent criminality, which can represent a means to exert domi-
40 nance and power over others”. Outlaw MCs are like most subcultures, in the sense that their
41 belief system or interests are at variance with the larger culture. The legitimization of violence is
42 a politically laden construct (Apter, 1997), yet in relation to outlaw MCs, the legitimization of
43 violence, especially in regards to spontaneous acts of violence, is an ingrained disposition that
44 is reinforced through brotherhood, a quality that advocates unity and support in compromising
45 or conflictual situations.

46 This chapter has thus far alluded to how collective violence within outlaw MC settings is an
47 extension of brotherhood. This will now be elaborated on in relation to two airport brawls that
48 involved outlaw fraternities.

Two airport brawls

The public display of violence of outlaw members is unique in contrast to other organizations that are deemed to be criminally inclined. In addition, the public violence carried out by such MCs are “glocal”, in that their crimes are not conducted in fixed terrain, rather they are manifested because of local and global networks of opportunities (Hobbs, 2013; Rahman, 2019). The HAMC is the biggest outlaw MC in the world and, at the time of writing, the MC is spread across five continents, 58 countries, 85 areas, with a total of 466 charters (Hells Angels, 2019). The MC is notorious for its violent feuds with rival MCs, especially in North America and other regions of the global north. Often, however, the violent feuds take place in public domains, which Rahman (2019) considers to be *spectator violence*; that is, physical violence which is exhibited in a public capacity. Indeed, there is another paradox to consider here; while the intrinsic interactions of MCs are clandestine, their violent interactions are often openly displayed in public settings.

In England, spectator violence or public displays of violence in a collective sense is hardly associated with outlaw biker clubs. While outlaw clubs are spread across England, their nefarious actions rarely make news headlines. So, when members of the HAMC and Outlaw Motorcycle Club (OMC) brawled on 20 January 2008, at Birmingham International Airport, Birmingham, England, the incident became national headline news. The brawl started when a few members from both clubs noticed each other on the same flight back from Alicante, Spain. According to court information, both clubs rang for reinforcements prior to landing at Birmingham airport. Those that came as reinforcements brought with them various weapons, including a meat cleaver. Almost 30 members from both sides clashed, with some wielding knuckledusters and hammers (*The Telegraph* 2009).

In the airport, passengers had to take cover from the violence that proceeded in the arrivals terminal. In total, four OMC members – Mark Mosely, Neale Harrison, Mark Price and Jeremy Ball were found guilty of rioting. Three HAMC members – Paul Artlett, Sean Timmins and Leonard Hawthorne were found guilty of rioting. Once the trial ended, the West Midlands Police said that the “horrendous” violence during the riot was unprecedented in the history of the airport. According to the BBC (2009), Bill Holland, who was Assistant Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police at the time, said the following:

It is a matter of official record that over many years, outlaw motorcycle clubs have been actively engaged in organised crime.

While the above reiterates the global narrative that outlaw clubs are indeed organized crime groups, the Birmingham airport brawl depicts the unique spontaneous nature of their collective violence. Criminologically, the case is an iconic “signal crime”, a concept coined by Innes and Fielding (2002) that argues how certain criminal or disorderly acts have a disproportionate impact upon the fear of crime. Indeed, airport disorders, especially those that involve rival fraternities, are uncommon.

Of note, another example of spectator violence, in an airport, within a collective capacity, is the murder of Hells Angels bikie Anthony Zervas. Zervas was clubbed with a 17kg metal bollard and stabbed with a pair of scissors at a domestic airport terminal in Sydney, Australia on 22 March 2009. According to news reports, Zervas got off a flight with his brother, a senior Hells Angels member, and the president of the Hells Angels Guildford chapter, Derek Wainohu (Sutton, 2018). He was killed by the president of the Comancheros biker club, Mahmoud “Mick” Hawi. Before the fatal incident, several members of the Hells Angels and the Comancheros brawled in

1 the airport terminal after a chance encounter between Hawi and Wainohu. Similar to the
 2 Birmingham airport case, the Comancheros requested back up. During the trial, the jury heard
 3 evidence from airport staff, passengers and CCTV footage was also shown. In total, six Coman-
 4 chero members stood trial for murder, while a Hells Angels member was tried for riot and affray.
 5 After a four-month trial, the jury took 21 days to deliver its verdict. While part of the defence
 6 case was that the victim approached Hawi with an offensive weapon, the Comanchero leader was
 7 found guilty of murder and affray in 2011 (Wells, 2011). He was sentenced to 28 years in prison,
 8 with a non-parole period of 21 years. While the sole Hells Angel, David Padovan, was found not
 9 guilty, four of the five Comancheros were convicted for several violent acts. Christian Menzies,
 10 Zoran Kisacanin and Usama Potrus were acquitted of manslaughter and murder, but were found
 11 guilty of rioting. Menzies and Kisacanin were also found guilty of affray (Welch, 2009).

12 Like most one-percenter club presidents, Hawi was a notorious figure who was feared in the
 13 biker underworld. Born in Beirut, Lebanon, Hawi emigrated with his family to Australia. Before
 14 murdering Zervas, Hawi lived a flamboyant lifestyle and was known to recruit young men from
 15 Middle Eastern backgrounds into the biker fold. After serving three years for Zervas' murder,
 16 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal set aside the conviction and Hawi was released
 17 on bail. Soon after, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was given a six-year sentence, but was
 18 immediately released because of the time he had already served. However, in February 2018,
 19 Hawi was assassinated in his car outside a gym in Rockdale, Sydney. At the time of writing,
 20 several individuals have been charged with murder and are awaiting trial (AAP, 2019).

21 In relation to the two cases above, there are some commonalities to consider. Both depict
 22 spontaneous acts of collective violence, as the encounters were not premeditated, albeit both
 23 cases offer descriptions of reinforcement. The reinforcement aspect should be of interest. It
 24 elucidates the notion of brotherhood, and portrays the fraternal nature of outlaw clubs – one
 25 that is contingent on comradeship – irrespective of how difficult or compromising the task
 26 ahead may be. In addition, both brawls occurred in a public place, two international airports.
 27 Violent disorder in a collective capacity is usually a redundant phenomenon; however, within
 28 the space of 14 months, two chapters of the HAMC were involved in extreme violence that
 29 served to be spectator violence. Some scholars have argued that a spectator approach towards
 30 violence is a means of “doing gender” and “doing masculinity”, especially in the presence of
 31 both peers (Muncie, 2009; Deuchar, 2013). While in both cases the HAMC members were
 32 outnumbered, it can be argued that their participation in spectator violence, irrespective of
 33 purpose, was an “honour contest”, which therefore required MC members to exert dominance
 34 in order to acclaim honour. So too, the notion of honour is often achieved through the con-
 35 sumption of violence, which in turn provides a means of maintaining symbolic boundaries. It is
 36 for this reason that this chapter now moves on to consider symbolic boundaries, and their
 37 significance for the growth and progression of outlaw MCs.

39 **The consumption of collective violence: maintaining symbolic boundaries**

40 This chapter started by considering how collective violence, like most violence, involves
 41 symbolic-expressive action. In the political sense, the upshot of collective violence encompasses
 42 the expectation of instrumental gain, which Ray (2018, p. 182) argues includes a “complex play
 43 of control, policing, and mobility through space”. In this work on the sociology of collective
 44 violent action, Hartman (2015) notes that symbolic boundaries constitute the “missing link”,
 45 thus filling the micro-macro “gap” in violence. By “symbolic boundaries”, Hartman considers
 46 the relational elements of cognitive, affective and cultural resources that actors mobilize, so as to
 47 be able to act within a violent capacity individually and on behalf of a group.
 48

As Tilly (1998) describes, symbolic boundaries are selective representational re-descriptions embedded and constrained by socially organized speech, which are often produced and reproduced as oral or written “stories” in terms of “standard stories”. By standard stories, he means “stories in which connected, self-propelled actors, individual or collective, cause events, outcomes, and each other’s actions” (Tilly, 1998, pp. 42–43). Indeed, for Hartman (2015), the measurements of violence are of significance, and symbolic boundaries serve as a marker to frame an individual’s identification with another person and their intentional or mental state.

According to Ray (2018, p. 183), “maintaining and mobilizing status differences and boundaries involves narratives especially of past dramatic events including defeats, through which actors become drawn into mobilization processes”. Narratives are crucial for the creation of symbolic boundaries, and in turn they set patterns of relationships and conceptual distinctions. For example, violence in the motorcycle world is not exclusively an outlaw phenomenon; however, the narratives that are constructed by media or popular culture suggest otherwise. For outlaws, narratives of the past are based on interactions which inform, educate and shape the temperament of a MC member. While the two cases discussed in this chapter may come across as merely spontaneous acts of collective violence, it is worth noting that outlaw violence is often instrumental, in that “violence [is] used to achieve a recognised objective” (D’Cruze *et al.* 2006, p. 125). This means that the execution of violence is used for gain.

Moreover, D’Cruze *et al.* (2006, p. 130), alludes to how particular murders connected with organized crime can be viewed as “expressive than rational – gestures of power, which assert (masculine) identity and authority through their very recklessness or the excess of violence”. This is evident in the Sydney airport brawl, whereby Hawi’s penchant for violence offset any “reasoning”, a characteristic that is integral for all leaders, even those that represent criminal fraternities. In addition, this exemplifies the symbolic nature of outlaw members; individuals who take “special liberties”, whose motivation centre on self, and therefore it allows them to deprive, rob, and destroy with impunity without ever acknowledging the harms placed upon others (Hall, 2012). As Winlow (2014) notes, rather than acknowledging such harms, the individuals who believe that they are entitled to special liberty remain attached to an image of themselves as the most useful circulators of commodities and the most transcendent free individuals, the creators of a prosperous future and the pioneers of the free expression of the full spectrum of drives and desires.

Irrespective of motive or opportunity, the consumption of violence is an indicator that separates outlaw MC’s from other motorcycle clubs. Indeed, for criminal organizations, violence serves as a basis for achieving masculine honour. In their research on collective identity in the MC underworld, Rahman and Lynes (2018) discuss how masculine honour is conventionally focused on cultural factors to assist explaining that men from certain societies may express overt masculine qualities. Johnson and Demetriou (2016) argue that masculine honour has usually been thought to depend on a man’s virility and willingness to defend with violence. Indeed, honour that is achieved through collective violent interactions represents the understanding of solidarity, and subsequently cultivates the creation, maintenance and advancement of symbolic boundaries.

Here, it is important to note the twofold aspect of collective violence and symbolic boundaries in the outlaw realm. In the micro (individual) sense, MC members, especially prospect members, are expected to develop, hone and display their physical prowess via intra-gang violence, which in many ways serves as invaluable conditioning for violent encounters with external groups. As Sonny recalls, ‘Oakland and Frisco Hell’s Angels would fuck each other up at every occasion’ (Barger *et al.* 2001, p. 148). Most MCs are territorial, which means that each club has various *chapters* that spread regionally across a country. Thus, given the territorial nature, Barker (2007) describes how concerns of honour and financial issues converge to ignite inter-club warfare. This

1 reinforces the importance of all members being on standby, as the preservation of a chapter is para-
2 mount, regardless of it being due to intra-club rivalry. In addition, the protection of a chapter via
3 violence symbolizes those that are deemed to be what Hall (2012) calls “criminal undertakers”,
4 individuals who aim to journey from the ranks of the exploited to the exploiters.

5 From a non-violent perspective, in relation to symbolic boundaries, members are expected
6 to represent themselves in ways that leave no doubt of who they are and what they epitomize.
7 This chapter has already highlighted that there is an expectation for members to unequivocally
8 devout themselves to their club, its members and their needs. In doing so, this displays club
9 commitment, mutual support ethic and a protective mechanism that transcends into an impreg-
10 nable social network. For instance, Wolf (1991) considers the significance of a clubhouse, which
11 is a building space that members occupy and share for formal business. This makes the clubhouse
12 a sacred place, and, from a logistical perspective, members who operate from an established
13 clubhouse are “required to provide a place of refuge and hospitality for touring patch holders or
14 visiting clubs” (Wolf, 1991, p. 165). Thus, it is through the notion of brotherhood whereby ties
15 become multi-layered and serve an array of interests.

16 Political or spontaneous collective violence is spread by communication and behaviour.
17 From a collective (macro) perspective, this chapter has revealed how violence is a crucial com-
18 modity that is used to maintain or advance the violent reputation of outlaw clubs. Additionally,
19 from a masculine standpoint, the consumption of violence is imperative. For these kinds of
20 organizations, retaliation is perceived as an alternative form of criminal justice, which is obliga-
21 tory to undertake to defend their status of honour and masculinity. In other words, to not act
22 antagonistically may produce a form of social stigmatization, because “responding with tough-
23 ness and strength becomes imbedded in the definition of being a man” (Gilbert and Andrews,
24 1998, p. 266). It can be argued that those involved in the airport brawls merely saw their rivals
25 as “objects” that would enable them to defend and advance their “masculine honour”. For as
26 Johnson and Demetriou (2016, p. 4) state, “what really matters for male honour is performance,
27 especially on the battlefield”.

28 The symbolic boundaries of outlaw clubs are explicit, in so far that permanent members of a
29 club are required to represent themselves collectively in public settings via “patched” garments,
30 which serve as keynote insignias, and which are always maintained, honoured and respected. In
31 simple terms, the patches are treated in the manner that military personnel would treat their service
32 stripes. This chapter has highlighted the symbolic capital that outlaw clubs such as the HAMC
33 acquire based on their image, and while outlaw clubs are vilified in media and popular culture
34 based on their physical appearance, Kuldova (2019) notes how recently large numbers of people
35 have gravitated towards outlaw groups. For instance, following the 2019 Christchurch terrorist
36 attack, which was carried out by far-right extremist Brenton Tarrant, who killed 50 Muslims whilst
37 they prayed at a mosque, the president of the Waikato Mongrel Mob, Sonny Fatu vowed to guard
38 mosques with members of his chapter. According to news coverage by Kerr (2019), he was quoted
39 to have said: “we will support and assist our Muslim brothers and sisters for however long they
40 need us”. This reiterates the paradoxical and anti-establishment nature of outlaw clubs, but high-
41 lights the relevance of brotherhood, which Maas (2013) found in her empirical study is a quality
42 that is shared by some bikers between anyone, irrespective of their walk in life.

43 Conclusion

44 This chapter highlights the politically driven notion of collective violence, and how it can be
45 employed when considering spontaneous acts of violent practice. Through case study examples, it
46 is evident that the common thread that runs through collective violence and symbolic boundaries
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is brotherhood; which also serves as a guiding principle for the functionalities of club member, and what is expected from them individually and collectively. Violence is a legitimated function in the outlaw realm, which therefore makes it a viable commodity that is used to create, maintain and advance operations or activities deemed to be deviant or criminal. In summary, outlaw clubs are mainly in warfare with the “mirror image”, as both fraternities occupy men who, in the capitalist era, undertake “special liberties” (Hall, 2012), by configuring their ethical codes to employ harm so as to be able to elevate themselves within an asocial hierarchy.

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