Administrative deference and its link with the non-delegation doctrine in the law of the United States

Di Gioia, Ilaria (2020) Administrative deference and its link with the non-delegation doctrine in the law of the United States. Juris Poiesis, 23 (32). pp. 632-640. ISSN 2448-0517

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Abstract

The question of whether courts should defer interpretation of ambiguous provisions to agencies is often regarded as a technical question relevant to some aspect of administrative law procedure. In reality, far from being only a technicality, it is a question that encompasses legal issues related to the doctrine of separation of powers and the broader constitutionality of congressional delegation of powers to administrative agencies.
This extended abstract explores the theoretical link between the non-delegation doctrine and the practice of administrative deference. More broadly, it examines the argument that the delegation of power to interpret laws and regulations is an implicit consequence of the delegation of power to execute congressional statutes and issue regulations.

Item Type:	Article
Dates:	Date Event 17 June 2020 Accepted 31 August 2020 Published
Uncontrolled Keywords:	non, delegation doctrine, administrative deference,Chevron
Subjects:	CAH15 - social sciences > CAH15-03 - politics > CAH15-03-01 - politics CAH16 - law > CAH16-01 - law > CAH16-01-01 - law
Divisions:	Faculty of Business, Law and Social Sciences > College of Law, Social and Criminal Justice
Depositing User:	Ilaria Di Gioia
Date Deposited:	14 Sep 2020 08:54
Last Modified:	03 Mar 2022 15:54
URI:	https://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/9887

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