Temporal binding and internal clocks: No evidence for general pacemaker slowing.

Fereday, Richard and Buehner, Marc J. (2017) Temporal binding and internal clocks: No evidence for general pacemaker slowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 43 (5). pp. 971-985. ISSN 0096-1523

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The perception of time is distorted by many factors (e.g., arousal, temperature, age etc.), but is it possible that causality would affect our perception of time? We investigate timing changes in the temporal binding effect, which refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between actions and their outcomes. Four experiments investigated whether binding may be due to variations in the rate of an internal clock. Specifically, we asked whether binding reflects changes to a general timing system, or a dedicated clock unique to causal sequences. We developed a novel experimental paradigm (embedded interval estimation procedure) in which participants made temporal judgments of either causal or non causal intervals, or the duration of an event embedded within that interval. Stimuli and modality were combined factorially, with interval markers and embedded events being either visual or auditory. While we replicated the temporal binding effect, we found no evidence for commensurate changes to time perception of the embedded event, which suggests that temporal binding is effected by changes to a specific and dedicated, rather than a general clock system.

Item Type: Article
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000370
1 May 2017Published
5 December 2016Accepted
Subjects: CAH04 - psychology > CAH04-01 - psychology > CAH04-01-01 - psychology (non-specific)
Divisions: Faculty of Business, Law and Social Sciences > School of Social Sciences > Dept. Psychology
Depositing User: Silvio Aldrovandi
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2018 15:22
Last Modified: 03 Mar 2022 15:42
URI: https://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5793

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