Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing under Asymmetric Information

Miglo, Anton (2010) Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Business and Economics Research, 8 (8). pp. 27-42. ISSN 1542-4448

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Abstract

In recent years financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firm's insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or an assumption that firms have the same mean of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding asset securitization.

Item Type:	Article
Dates:	Date Event 15 January 2010 Accepted 2010 Published
Subjects:	CAH15 - social sciences > CAH15-02 - economics > CAH15-02-01 - economics CAH17 - business and management > CAH17-01 - business and management > CAH17-01-02 - business studies CAH17 - business and management > CAH17-01 - business and management > CAH17-01-04 - management studies CAH17 - business and management > CAH17-01 - business and management > CAH17-01-07 - finance
Divisions:	Business School > Accountancy, Finance and Economics Business School > Management, Business and Marketing Law and Social Sciences > Criminology and Sociology > Criminology Law and Social Sciences > Criminology and Sociology > Sociology
Depositing User:	Anton Miglo
Date Deposited:	13 Aug 2018 07:53
Last Modified:	04 Aug 2025 13:01
URI:	https://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/6212

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