Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing under Asymmetric Information
Miglo, Anton (2010) Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Business and Economics Research, 8 (8). pp. 27-42. ISSN 1542-4448
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Abstract
In recent years financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firm's insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or an assumption that firms have the same mean of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding asset securitization.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||
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| Subjects: | CAH15 - social sciences > CAH15-02 - economics > CAH15-02-01 - economics CAH17 - business and management > CAH17-01 - business and management > CAH17-01-02 - business studies CAH17 - business and management > CAH17-01 - business and management > CAH17-01-04 - management studies CAH17 - business and management > CAH17-01 - business and management > CAH17-01-07 - finance |
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| Divisions: | Faculty of Business, Law and Social Sciences > Birmingham City Business School | ||||||
| Depositing User: | Anton Miglo | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 13 Aug 2018 07:53 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 22 Mar 2023 11:49 | ||||||
| URI: | https://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/6212 |
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